Normal view

There are new articles available, click to refresh the page.
Before yesterdayMain stream

Ola Bini Faces Ecuadorian Prosecutors Seeking to Overturn Acquittal of Cybercrime Charge

1 April 2024 at 12:21

Ola Bini, the software developer acquitted last year of cybercrime charges in a unanimous verdict in Ecuador, was back in court last week in Quito as prosecutors, using the same evidence that helped clear him, asked an appeals court to overturn the decision with bogus allegations of unauthorized access of a telecommunications system.

Armed with a grainy image of a telnet session—which the lower court already ruled was not proof of criminal activity—and testimony of an expert witness to the lower court—who never had access to the devices and systems involved in the alleged intrusion—prosecutors presented the theory that, by connecting to a router, Bini made partial unauthorized access in an attempt to break into a  system  provided by Ecuador’s national telecommunications company (CNT) to a presidency's
contingency center.

If this all sounds familiar, that’s because it is. In an unfounded criminal case plagued by irregularities, delays, and due process violations, Ecuadorian prosecutors have for the last five years sought to prove Bini violated the law by allegedly accessing an information system without authorization.

Bini, who resides in Ecuador, was arrested at the Quito airport in 2019 without being told why. He first learned about the charges from a TV news report depicting him as a criminal trying to destabilize the country. He spent 70 days in jail and cannot leave Ecuador or use his bank accounts.

Bini prevailed in a trial last year before a three-judge panel. The core evidence the Prosecutor’s Office and CNT’s lawyer presented to support the accusation of unauthorized access to a computer, telematic, or telecommunications system was a printed image of a telnet session allegedly taken from Bini’s mobile phone.

The image shows the user requesting a telnet connection to an open server using their computer’s command line. The open server warns that unauthorized access is prohibited and asks for a username. No username is entered. The connection then times out and closes. Rather than demonstrating that Bini intruded into the Ecuadorean telephone network system, it shows the trail of someone who paid a visit to a publicly accessible server—and then politely obeyed the server's warnings about usage and access.

Bini’s acquittal was a major victory for him and the work of security researchers. By assessing the evidence presented, the court concluded that both the Prosecutor’s Office and CNT failed to demonstrate a crime had occurred. There was no evidence that unauthorized access had ever happened, nor anything to sustain the malicious intent that article 234 of Ecuador’s Penal Code requires to characterize the offense of unauthorized access.

The court emphasized the necessity of proper evidence to prove that an alleged computer crime occurred and found that the image of a telnet session presented in Bini’s case is not fit for this purpose. The court explained that graphical representations, which can be altered, do not constitute evidence of cybercrime since an image cannot verify whether the commands illustrated in it were actually executed. Building on technical experts' testimonies, the court said that what does not emerge, or what can't be verified from digital forensics, is not proper digital evidence.

Prosecutors appealed the verdict and are back in court using the same image that didn’t prove any crime was committed. At the March 26 hearing, prosecutors said their expert witness’s analysis of the telnet image shows there was connectivity to the router. The witness compared it to entering the yard of someone’s property to see if the gate to the property is open or closed. Entering the yard is analogous to connecting to the router, the witness said.

Actually, no.
Our interpretation of the image, which was leaked to the media before Bini’s trial, is that it’s the internet equivalent of seeing an open gate, walking up to it, seeing a “NO TRESPASSING” sign, and walking away. If this image could prove anything it is that no unauthorized access happened.

Yet, no expert analysis was conducted in the systems allegedly affected. The  expert witness’s testimony was based on his analysis of a CNT report—he didn’t have access to the CNT router to verify its configuration. He didn’t digitally validate whether what was shown in the report actually happened and he was never asked to verify the existence of an IP address owned or managed by CNT.

That’s not the only problem with the appeal proceedings. Deciding the appeal is a panel of three judges, two of whom ruled to keep Bini in detention after his arrest in 2019 because there were allegedly sufficient elements to establish a suspicion against him. The detention was later considered illegal and arbitrary because of a lack of such elements. Bini filed a lawsuit against the Ecuadorian state, including the two judges, for violating his rights. Bini’s defense team has sought to remove these two judges from the appeals case, but his requests were denied.

The appeals court panel is expected to issue a final ruling in the coming days.  

Protect Good Faith Security Research Globally in Proposed UN Cybercrime Treaty

7 February 2024 at 10:57

Statement submitted to the UN Ad Hoc Committee Secretariat by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, accredited under operative paragraph No. 9 of UN General Assembly Resolution 75/282, on behalf of 124 signatories.

We, the undersigned, representing a broad spectrum of the global security research community, write to express our serious concerns about the UN Cybercrime Treaty drafts released during the sixth session and the most recent one. These drafts pose substantial risks to global cybersecurity and significantly impact the rights and activities of good faith cybersecurity researchers.

Our community, which includes good faith security researchers in academia and cybersecurity companies, as well as those working independently, plays a critical role in safeguarding information technology systems. We identify vulnerabilities that, if left unchecked, can spread malware, cause data breaches, and give criminals access to sensitive information of millions of people. We rely on the freedom to openly discuss, analyze, and test these systems, free of legal threats.

The nature of our work is to research, discover, and report vulnerabilities in networks, operating systems, devices, firmware, and software. However, several provisions in the draft treaty risk hindering our work by categorizing much of it as criminal activity. If adopted in its current form, the proposed treaty would increase the risk that good faith security researchers could face prosecution, even when our goal is to enhance technological safety and educate the public on cybersecurity matters. It is critical that legal frameworks support our efforts to find and disclose technological weaknesses to make everyone more secure, rather than penalize us, and chill the very research and disclosure needed to keep us safe. This support is essential to improving the security and safety of technology for everyone across the world.

Equally important is our ability to differentiate our legitimate security research activities from malicious
exploitation of security flaws. Current laws focusing on “unauthorized access” can be misapplied to good faith security researchers, leading to unnecessary legal challenges. In addressing this, we must consider two potential obstacles to our vital work. Broad, undefined rules for prior authorization risk deterring good faith security researchers, as they may not understand when or under what circumstances they need permission. This lack of clarity could ultimately weaken everyone's online safety and security. Moreover, our work often involves uncovering unknown vulnerabilities. These are security weaknesses that no one, including the system's owners, knows about until we discover them. We cannot be certain what vulnerabilities we might find. Therefore, requiring us to obtain prior authorization for each potential discovery is impractical and overlooks the essence of our work.

The unique strength of the security research community lies in its global focus, which prioritizes safeguarding infrastructure and protecting users worldwide, often putting aside geopolitical interests. Our work, particularly the open publication of research, minimizes and prevents harm that could impact people
globally, transcending particular jurisdictions. The proposed treaty’s failure to exempt good faith security research from the expansive scope of its cybercrime prohibitions and to make the safeguards and limitations in Article 6-10 mandatory leaves the door wide open for states to suppress or control the flow of security related information. This would undermine the universal benefit of openly shared cybersecurity knowledge, and ultimately the safety and security of the digital environment.

We urge states to recognize the vital role the security research community plays in defending our digital ecosystem against cybercriminals, and call on delegations to ensure that the treaty supports, rather than hinders, our efforts to enhance global cybersecurity and prevent cybercrime. Specifically:

Article 6 (Illegal Access): This article risks criminalizing essential activities in security research, particularly where researchers access systems without prior authorization, to identify vulnerabilities. A clearer distinction is needed between malicious unauthorized access “without right” and “good faith” security research activities; safeguards for legitimate activities should be mandatory. A malicious intent requirementincluding an intent to cause damage, defraud, or harmis needed to avoid criminal liability for accidental or unintended access to a computer system, as well as for good faith security testing.

Article 6 should not use the ambiguous term “without right” as a basis for establishing criminal liability for
unauthorized access. Apart from potentially criminalizing security research, similar provisions have also been misconstrued to attach criminal liability to minor violations committed deliberately or accidentally by authorized users. For example, violation of private terms of service (TOS)a minor infraction ordinarily considered a civil issuecould be elevated into a criminal offense category via this treaty on a global scale.

Additionally, the treaty currently gives states the option to define unauthorized access in national law as the bypassing of security measures. This should not be optional, but rather a mandatory safeguard, to avoid criminalizing routine behavior such as c
hanging one’s IP address, inspecting website code, and accessing unpublished URLs. Furthermore, it is crucial to specify that the bypassed security measures must be actually "effective." This distinction is important because it ensures that criminalization is precise and scoped to activities that cause harm. For instance, bypassing basic measures like geoblockingwhich can be done innocently simply by changing locationshould not be treated the same as overcoming robust security barriers with the intention to cause harm.

By adopting this safeguard and ensuring that security measures are indeed effective, the proposed treaty would shield researchers from arbitrary criminal sanctions for good faith security research.

These changes would clarify unauthorized access, more clearly differentiating malicious hacking from legitimate cybersecurity practices like security research and vulnerability testing. Adopting these amendments would enhance protection for cybersecurity efforts and more effectively address concerns about harmful or fraudulent unauthorized intrusions.

Article 7 (Illegal Interception): Analysis of network traffic is also a common practice in cybersecurity; this article currently risks criminalizing such analysis and should similarly be narrowed to require criminal intent (mens rea) to harm or defraud.

Article 8 (Interference with Data) and Article 9 (Interference with Computer Systems): These articles may inadvertently criminalize acts of security research, which often involve testing the robustness of systems by simulating attacks through interferences. As with prior articles, criminal intent to cause harm or defraud is not mandated, and a requirement that the activity cause serious harm is absent from Article 9 and optional in Article 8. These safeguards should be mandatory.

Article 10 (Misuse of Devices): The broad scope of this article could criminalize the legitimate use of tools employed in cybersecurity research, thereby affecting the development and use of these tools. Under the current draft, Article 10(2) specifically addresses the misuse of cybersecurity tools. It criminalizes obtaining, producing, or distributing these tools only if they are intended for committing cybercrimes as defined in Articles 6 to 9 (which cover illegal access, interception, data interference, and system interference). However, this also raises a concern. If Articles 6 to 9 do not explicitly protect activities like security testing, Article 10(2) may inadvertently criminalize security researchers. These researchers often use similar tools for legitimate purposes, like testing and enhancing systems security. Without narrow scope and clear safeguards in Articles 6-9, these well-intentioned activities could fall under legal scrutiny, despite not being aligned with the criminal malicious intent (mens rea) targeted by Article 10(2).

Article 22 (Jurisdiction): In combination with other provisions about measures that may be inappropriately used to punish or deter good-faith security researchers, the overly broad jurisdictional scope outlined in Article 22 also raises significant concerns. Under the article's provisions, security researchers discovering or disclosing vulnerabilities to keep the digital ecosystem secure could be subject to criminal prosecution simultaneously across multiple jurisdictions. This would have a chilling effect on essential security research globally and hinder researchers' ability to contribute to global cybersecurity. To mitigate this, we suggest revising Article 22(5) to prioritize “determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution” rather than “coordinating actions.” This shift could prevent the redundant prosecution of security researchers. Additionally, deleting Article 17 and limiting the scope of procedural and international cooperation measures to crimes defined in Articles 6 to 16 would further clarify and protect against overreach.

Article 28(4): This article is gravely concerning from a cybersecurity perspective. It empowers authorities to compel “any individual” with knowledge of computer systems to provide any “necessary information” for conducting searches and seizures of computer systems. This provision can be abused to force security experts, software engineers and/or tech employees to expose sensitive or proprietary information. It could also encourage authorities to bypass normal channels within companies and coerce individual employees, under the threat of criminal prosecution, to provide assistance in subverting technical access controls such as credentials, encryption, and just-in-time approvals without their employers’ knowledge. This dangerous paragraph must be removed in favor of the general duty for custodians of information to comply with lawful orders to the extent of their ability.

Security researchers
whether within organizations or independentdiscover, report and assist in fixing tens of thousands of critical Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) reported over the lifetime of the National Vulnerability Database. Our work is a crucial part of the security landscape, yet often faces serious legal risk from overbroad cybercrime legislation.

While the proposed UN CybercrimeTreaty's core cybercrime provisions closely mirror the Council of
Europe’s Budapest Convention, the impact of cybercrime regimes and security research has evolved considerably in the two decades since that treaty was adopted in 2001. In that time, good faith cybersecurity researchers have faced significant repercussions for responsibly identifying security flaws. Concurrently, a number of countries have enacted legislative or other measures to protect the critical line of defense this type of research provides. The UN Treaty should learn from these past experiences by explicitly exempting good faith cybersecurity research from the scope of the treaty. It should also make existing safeguards and limitations mandatory. This change is essential to protect the crucial work of good faith security researchers and ensure the treaty remains effective against current and future cybersecurity challenges.

Since these negotiations began, we had hoped that governments would adopt a treaty that strengthens global computer security and enhances our ability to combat cybercrime. Unfortunately, the draft text, as written, would have the opposite effect. The current text would weaken cybersecurity and make it easier for malicious actors to create or exploit weaknesses in the digital ecosystem by subjecting us to criminal prosecution for good faith work that keeps us all safer. Such an outcome would undermine the very purpose of the treaty: to protect individuals and our institutions from cybercrime.

To be submitted by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, accredited under operative paragraph No. 9 of UN General Assembly Resolution 75/282 on behalf of 124 signatories.

Individual Signatories
Jobert Abma, Co-Founder, HackerOne (United States)
Martin Albrecht, Chair of Cryptography, King's College London (Global) Nicholas Allegra (United States)
Ross Anderson, Universities of Edinburgh and Cambridge (United Kingdom)
Diego F. Aranha, Associate Professor, Aarhus University (Denmark)
Kevin Beaumont, Security researcher (Global) Steven Becker (Global)
Janik Besendorf, Security Researcher (Global) Wietse Boonstra (Global)
Juan Brodersen, Cybersecurity Reporter, Clarin (Argentina)
Sven Bugiel, Faculty, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security (Germany)
Jon Callas, Founder and Distinguished Engineer, Zatik Security (Global)
Lorenzo Cavallaro, Professor of Computer Science, University College London (Global)
Joel Cardella, Cybersecurity Researcher (Global)
Inti De Ceukelaire (Belgium)
Enrique Chaparro, Information Security Researcher (Global)
David Choffnes, Associate Professor and Executive Director of the Cybersecurity and Privacy Institute at Northeastern University (United States/Global)
Gabriella Coleman, Full Professor Harvard University (United States/Europe)
Cas Cremers, Professor and Faculty, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security (Global)
Daniel Cuthbert (Europe, Middle East, Africa)
Ron Deibert, Professor and Director, the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto's Munk School (Canada)
Domingo, Security Incident Handler, Access Now (Global)
Stephane Duguin, CEO, CyberPeace Institute (Global)
Zakir Durumeric, Assistant Professor of Computer Science, Stanford University; Chief Scientist, Censys (United States)
James Eaton-Lee, CISO, NetHope (Global)
Serge Egelman, University of California, Berkeley; Co-Founder and Chief Scientist, AppCensus (United States/Global)
Jen Ellis, Founder, NextJenSecurity (United Kingdom/Global)
Chris Evans, Chief Hacking Officer @ HackerOne; Founder @ Google Project Zero (United States)
Dra. Johanna Caterina Faliero, Phd; Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Buenos Aires; Professor, University of National Defence (Argentina/Global))
Dr. Ali Farooq, University of Strathclyde, United Kingdom (Global)
Victor Gevers, co-founder of the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (Netherlands)
Abir Ghattas (Global)
Ian Goldberg, Professor and Canada Research Chair in Privacy Enhancing Technologies, University of Waterloo (Canada)
Matthew D. Green, Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins University (United States)
Harry Grobbelaar, Chief Customer Officer, Intigriti (Global)
Juan Andrés Guerrero-Saade, Associate Vice President of Research, SentinelOne (United States/Global)
Mudit Gupta, Chief Information Security Officer, Polygon (Global)
Hamed Haddadi, Professor of Human-Centred Systems at Imperial College London; Chief Scientist at Brave Software (Global)
J. Alex Halderman, Professor of Computer Science & Engineering and Director of the Center for Computer Security & Society, University of Michigan (United States)
Joseph Lorenzo Hall, PhD, Distinguished Technologist, The Internet Society
Dr. Ryan Henry, Assistant Professor and Director of Masters of Information Security and Privacy Program, University of Calgary (Canada)
Thorsten Holz, Professor and Faculty, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany (Global)
Joran Honig, Security Researcher (Global)
Wouter Honselaar, MSc student security; hosting engineer & volunteer, Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD)(Netherlands)
Prof. Dr. Jaap-Henk Hoepman (Europe)
Christian “fukami” Horchert (Germany / Global)
Andrew 'bunnie' Huang, Researcher (Global)
Dr. Rodrigo Iglesias, Information Security, Lawyer (Argentina)
Hudson Jameson, Co-Founder - Security Alliance (SEAL)(Global)
Stijn Jans, CEO of Intigriti (Global)
Gerard Janssen, Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD)(Netherlands)
JoyCfTw, Hacktivist (United States/Argentina/Global)
Doña Keating, President and CEO, Professional Options LLC (Global)

Olaf Kolkman, Principal, Internet Society (Global)Federico Kirschbaum, Co-Founder & CEO of Faraday Security, Co-Founder of Ekoparty Security Conference (Argentina/Global)
Xavier Knol, Cybersecurity Analyst and Researcher (Global) , Principal, Internet Society (Global)
Micah Lee, Director of Information Security, The Intercept (United States)
Jan Los (Europe/Global)
Matthias Marx, Hacker (Global)
Keane Matthews, CISSP (United States)
René Mayrhofer, Full Professor and Head of Institute of Networks and Security, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria (Austria/Global)
Ron Mélotte (Netherlands)
Hans Meuris (Global)
Marten Mickos, CEO, HackerOne (United States)
Adam Molnar, Assistant Professor, Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo (Canada/Global)
Jeff Moss, Founder of the information security conferences DEF CON and Black Hat (United States)
Katie Moussouris, Founder and CEO of Luta Security; coauthor of ISO standards on vulnerability disclosure and handling processes (Global)
Alec Muffett, Security Researcher (United Kingdom)
Kurt Opsahl,
Associate General Counsel for Cybersecurity and Civil Liberties Policy, Filecoin Foundation; President, Security Researcher Legal Defense Fund (Global)
Ivan "HacKan" Barrera Oro (Argentina)
Chris Palmer, Security Engineer (Global)
Yanna Papadodimitraki, University of Cambridge (United Kingdom/European Union/Global)
Sunoo Park, New York University (United States)
Mathias Payer, Associate Professor, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)(Global)
Giancarlo Pellegrino, Faculty, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany (Global)
Fabio Pierazzi, King’s College London (Global)
Bart Preneel, full professor, University of Leuven, Belgium (Global)
Michiel Prins, Founder @ HackerOne (United States)
Joel Reardon, Professor of Computer Science, University of Calgary, Canada; Co-Founder of AppCensus (Global)
Alex Rice, Co-Founder & CTO, HackerOne (United States)
René Rehme, rehme.infosec (Germany)
Tyler Robinson, Offensive Security Researcher (United States)
Michael Roland, Security Researcher and Lecturer, Institute of Networks and Security, Johannes Kepler University Linz; Member, SIGFLAG - Verein zur (Austria/Europe/Global)
Christian Rossow, Professor and Faculty, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany (Global)
Pilar Sáenz, Coordinator Digital Security and Privacy Lab, Fundación Karisma (Colombia)
Runa Sandvik, Founder, Granitt (United States/Global)
Koen Schagen (Netherlands)
Sebastian Schinzel, Professor at University of Applied Sciences Münster and Fraunhofer SIT (Germany)
Bruce Schneier, Fellow and Lecturer, Harvard Kennedy School (United States)
HFJ Schokkenbroek (hp197), IFCAT board member (Netherlands)
Javier Smaldone, Security Researcher (Argentina)
Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Assistant Professor, IMDEA Networks Institute (Global)
Juan Tapiador, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain (Global)
Dr Daniel R. Thomas, University of Strathclyde, StrathCyber, Computer & Information Sciences (United Kingdom)
Cris Thomas (Space Rogue), IBM X-Force (United States/Global)
Carmela Troncoso, Assistant Professor, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) (Global)
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, Research Professor at IMDEA Networks/Co-founder AppCensus Inc (Global)
Jeroen van der Broek, IT Security Engineer (Netherlands)
Jeroen van der Ham-de Vos, Associate Professor, University of Twente, The Netherlands (Global)
Charl van der Walt (Head of Security Research, Orange Cyberdefense (a division of Orange Networks)(South Arfica/France/Global)
Chris van 't Hof, Managing Director DIVD, Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (Global) Dimitri Verhoeven (Global)
Tarah Wheeler, CEO Red Queen Dynamics & Senior Fellow Global Cyber Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (United States)
Dominic White, Ethical Hacking Director, Orange Cyberdefense (a division of Orange Networks)(South Africa/Europe)
Eddy Willems, Security Evangelist (Global)
Christo Wilson, Associate Professor, Northeastern University (United States) Robin Wilton, IT Consultant (Global)
Tom Wolters (Netherlands)
Mehdi Zerouali, Co-founder & Director, Sigma Prime (Australia/Global)

Organizational Signatories
Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD)(Netherlands)
Fundacin Via Libre (Argentina)
Good Faith Cybersecurity Researchers Coalition (European Union)
Access Now (Global)
Chaos Computer Club (CCC)(Europe)
HackerOne (Global)
Hacking Policy Council (United States)
HINAC (Hacking is not a Crime)(United States/Argentina/Global)
Intigriti (Global)
Jolo Secure (Latin America)
K+LAB, Digital security and privacy Lab, Fundación Karisma (Colombia)
Luta Security (Global)
OpenZeppelin (United States)
Professional Options LLC (Global)
Stichting International Festivals for Creative Application of Technology Foundation

Draft UN Cybercrime Treaty Could Make Security Research a Crime, Leading 124 Experts to Call on UN Delegates to Fix Flawed Provisions that Weaken Everyone’s Security

7 February 2024 at 10:56

Security researchers’ work discovering and reporting vulnerabilities in software, firmware,  networks, and devices protects people, businesses and governments around the world from malware, theft of  critical data, and other cyberattacks. The internet and the digital ecosystem are safer because of their work.

The UN Cybercrime Treaty, which is in the final stages of drafting in New York this week, risks criminalizing this vitally important work. This is appalling and wrong, and must be fixed.

One hundred and twenty four prominent security researchers and cybersecurity organizations from around the world voiced their concern today about the draft and called on UN delegates to modify flawed language in the text that would hinder researchers’ efforts to enhance global security and prevent the actual criminal activity the treaty is meant to rein in.

Time is running out—the final negotiations over the treaty end Feb. 9. The talks are the culmination of two years of negotiations; EFF and its international partners have
raised concerns over the treaty’s flaws since the beginning. If approved as is, the treaty will substantially impact criminal laws around the world and grant new expansive police powers for both domestic and international criminal investigations.

Experts who work globally to find and fix vulnerabilities before real criminals can exploit them said in a statement today that vague language and overbroad provisions in the draft increase the risk that researchers could face prosecution. The draft fails to protect the good faith work of security researchers who may bypass security measures and gain access to computer systems in identifying vulnerabilities, the letter says.

The draft threatens security researchers because it doesn’t specify that access to computer systems with no malicious intent to cause harm, steal, or infect with malware should not be subject to prosecution. If left unchanged, the treaty would be a major blow to cybersecurity around the world.

Specifically, security researchers seek changes to Article 6,
which risks criminalizing essential activities, including accessing systems without prior authorization to identify vulnerabilities. The current text also includes the ambiguous term “without right” as a basis for establishing criminal liability for unauthorized access. Clarification of this vague language as well as a  requirement that unauthorized access be done with malicious intent is needed to protect security research.

The signers also called out Article 28(4), which empowers States to force “any individual” with knowledge of computer systems to turn over any information necessary to conduct searches and seizures of computer systems.
This dangerous paragraph must be removed and replaced with language specifying that custodians must only comply with lawful orders to the extent of their ability.

There are many other problems with the draft treaty—it lacks human rights safeguards, gives States’ powers to reach across borders to surveil and collect personal information of people in other States, and forces tech companies to collude with law enforcement in alleged cybercrime investigations.

EFF and its international partners have been and are pressing hard for human rights safeguards and other fixes to ensure that the fight against cybercrime does not require sacrificing fundamental rights. We stand with security researchers in demanding amendments to ensure the treaty is not used as a tool to threaten, intimidate, or prosecute them, software engineers, security teams, and developers.

 For the statement:
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/02/protect-good-faith-security-research-globally-proposed-un-cybercrime-treaty

For more on the treaty:
https://ahc.derechosdigitales.org/en/

In Final Talks on Proposed UN Cybercrime Treaty, EFF Calls on Delegates to Incorporate Protections Against Spying and Restrict Overcriminalization or Reject Convention

29 January 2024 at 12:42

Update: Delegates at the concluding negotiating session failed to reach consensus on human rights protections, government surveillance, and other key issues. The session was suspended Feb. 8 without a final draft text. Delegates will resume talks at a later day with a view to concluding their work and providing a draft convention to the UN General Assembly at its 78th session later this year.

UN Member States are meeting in New York this week to conclude negotiations over the final text of the UN Cybercrime Treaty, which—despite warnings from hundreds of civil society organizations across the globe, security researchers, media rights defenders, and the world’s largest tech companies—will, in its present form, endanger human rights and make the cyber ecosystem less secure for everyone.

EFF and its international partners are going into this last session with a
unified message: without meaningful changes to limit surveillance powers for electronic evidence gathering across borders and add robust minimum human rights safeguard that apply across borders, the convention should be rejected by state delegations and not advance to the UN General Assembly in February for adoption.

EFF and its partners have for months warned that enforcement of such a treaty would have dire consequences for human rights. On a practical level, it will impede free expression and endanger activists, journalists, dissenters, and everyday people.

Under the draft treaty's current provisions on accessing personal data for criminal investigations across borders, each country is allowed to define what constitutes a "serious crime." Such definitions can be excessively broad and violate international human rights standards. States where it’s a crime to  criticize political leaders (
Thailand), upload videos of yourself dancing (Iran), or wave a rainbow flag in support of LGBTQ+ rights (Egypt), can, under this UN-sanctioned treaty, require one country to conduct surveillance to aid another, in accordance with the data disclosure standards of the requesting country. This includes surveilling individuals under investigation for these offenses, with the expectation that technology companies will assist. Such assistance involves turning over personal information, location data, and private communications secretly, without any guardrails, in jurisdictions lacking robust legal protections.

The final 10-day negotiating session in New York will conclude a
series of talks that started in 2022 to create a treaty to prevent and combat core computer-enabled crimes, like distribution of malware, data interception and theft, and money laundering. From the beginning, Member States failed to reach consensus on the treaty’s scope, the inclusion of human rights safeguards, and even the definition of “cybercrime.” The scope of the entire treaty was too broad from the very beginning; Member States eventually drops some of these offenses, limiting the scope of the criminalization section, but not evidence gathering provisions that hands States dangerous surveillance powers. What was supposed to be an international accord to combat core cybercrime morphed into a global surveillance agreement covering any and all crimes conceived by Member States. 

The latest draft,
released last November, blatantly disregards our calls to narrow the scope, strengthen human rights safeguards, and tighten loopholes enabling countries to assist each other in spying on people. It also retains a controversial provision allowing states to compel engineers or tech employees to undermine security measures, posing a threat to encryption. Absent from the draft are protections for good-faith cybersecurity researchers and others acting in the public interest.

This is unacceptable. In a Jan. 23 joint
statement to delegates participating in this final session, EFF and 110 organizations outlined non-negotiable redlines for the draft that will emerge from this session, which ends Feb. 8. These include:

  • Narrowing the scope of the entire Convention to cyber-dependent crimes specifically defined within its text.
  • Including provisions to ensure that security researchers, whistleblowers, journalists, and human rights defenders are not prosecuted for their legitimate activities and that other public interest activities are protected. 
  • Guaranteeing explicit data protection and human rights standards like legitimate purpose, nondiscrimination, prior judicial authorization, necessity and proportionality apply to the entire Convention.
  • Mainstreaming gender across the Convention as a whole and throughout each article in efforts to prevent and combat cybercrime.

It’s been a long fight pushing for a treaty that combats cybercrime without undermining basic human rights. Without these improvements, the risks of this treaty far outweigh its potential benefits. States must stand firm and reject the treaty if our redlines can’t be met. We cannot and will not support or recommend a draft that will make everyone less, instead of more, secure.

❌
❌