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Nation-State Hackers, Cybercriminals Weaponize Patched WinRAR Flaw Despite Six-Month-Old Fix

29 January 2026 at 05:38

WinRAR, CVE-2025-8088, Nation-State Actors

Russian and Chinese espionage groups continue to exploit an N-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-8088) in WinRAR alongside financially motivated actors, all leveraging a path traversal vulnerability that drops malware into Windows Startup folders.

Google Threat Intelligence Group discovered widespread exploitation of a critical WinRAR vulnerability six months after the vendor patched it, with government-backed hackers from Russia and China deploying the flaw alongside financially motivated cybercriminals. The attacks demonstrate how effective exploits remain valuable long after patches become available, especially when organizations delay updates.

CVE-2025-8088, a high-severity path traversal vulnerability in WinRAR, allows attackers to write files to arbitrary system locations by crafting malicious RAR archives. RARLAB released WinRAR version 7.13 on July 30, 2025, to address the flaw. However, exploitation began at least 12 days earlier, on July 18, according to ESET research.

Read: New Zero-Day in WinRAR Abused by RomCom

The vulnerability exploits Alternate Data Streams, a Windows feature that allows multiple data streams to be associated with a single file. Attackers conceal malicious files within ADS entries of decoy documents inside archives. While victims view what appears to be a legitimate PDF or document, hidden payload streams execute in the background.

The exploit uses specially crafted paths combining ADS features with directory traversal characters. A file might carry a composite name like "innocuous.pdf:malicious.lnk" paired with a path traversing to critical directories. When victims open the archive, the ADS content extracts to destinations specified by the traversal path, frequently targeting the Windows Startup folder for automatic execution at next login.

Multiple Russian threat groups consistently exploit the vulnerability in campaigns targeting Ukrainian military and government entities using highly tailored geopolitical lures. UNC4895, also known as RomCom, conducts dual financial and espionage operations through spearphishing emails with subject lines indicating targeting of specific Ukrainian military units. The attacks deliver NESTPACKER malware, externally known as Snipbot.

APT44, tracked under the designation FROZENBARENTS, drops decoy files with Ukrainian filenames alongside malicious LNK files attempting further downloads. TEMP.Armageddon, designated CARPATHIAN, uses RAR archives to place HTA files into Startup folders, with the HTA acting as a downloader for second-stage payloads. This activity continued through January 2026.

Turla, adopted CVE-2025-8088 to deliver the STOCKSTAY malware suite using lures themed around Ukrainian military activities and drone operations. A China-nexus actor exploits the vulnerability to deliver POISONIVY malware via BAT files dropped into Startup folders, which then download droppers.

The exploitation mirrors widespread abuse of CVE-2023-38831, a previous WinRAR bug that government-backed actors heavily exploited despite available patches. The pattern demonstrates that exploits for known vulnerabilities remain highly effective when organizations fail to patch promptly.

Financially motivated threat groups quickly adopted the vulnerability. One group targeting Indonesian entities uses lure documents to drop CMD files into Startup folders. These scripts download password-protected RAR archives from Dropbox containing backdoors that communicate with Telegram bot command-and-control servers.

Another group focuses on hospitality and travel sectors, particularly in Latin America, using phishing emails themed around hotel bookings to deliver commodity remote access trojans including XWorm and AsyncRAT. A separate group targeting Brazilian users via banking websites delivered malicious Chrome extensions that inject JavaScript into pages of two Brazilian banking sites to display phishing content and steal credentials.

An actor known as "zeroplayer" advertised a WinRAR exploit in July 2025, shortly before widespread exploitation began. zeroplayer's portfolio extends beyond WinRAR. In November 2025, the actor claimed a sandbox escape remote code execution zero-day exploit for Microsoft Office, advertising it for $300,000. In late September 2025, zeroplayer advertised a remote code execution zero-day for an unnamed popular corporate VPN provider.

Starting mid-October 2025, zeroplayer advertised a Windows local privilege escalation zero-day exploit for $100,000. In early September 2025, the actor advertised a zero-day for an unspecified drive allowing attackers to disable antivirus and endpoint detection and response software for $80,000.

zeroplayer's continued activity demonstrates the commoditization of the attack lifecycle. By providing ready-to-use capabilities, actors like zeroplayer reduce technical complexity and resource demands, allowing groups with diverse motivationsβ€”from ransomware deployment to state-sponsored intelligence gatheringβ€”to leverage sophisticated capabilities.

The rapid exploitation adoption occurred despite Google Safe Browsing and Gmail actively identifying and blocking files containing the exploit.Β When reliable proof of concept for critical flaws enters cybercriminal and espionage marketplaces, adoption becomes instantaneous. This blurs lines between sophisticated government-backed operations and financially motivated campaigns.

The vulnerability's commoditization reinforces that effective defense requires immediate application patching coupled with fundamental shifts toward detecting consistent, predictable post-exploitation tactics.

Google published comprehensive indicators of compromise in a VirusTotal collection for registered users to assist security teams in hunting and identifying related activity.

Google Dismantles Massive Proxy Network That Hid Espionage, Cybercrime for Nation-State Actors

29 January 2026 at 03:45

Proxy Network, Google, Google Threat Intelligence, Nation-State Actors,

Google dismantled what is believed to be one of the world's largest residential proxy networks, taking legal action to seize domains controlling IPIDEA's infrastructure and removing millions of consumer devices unknowingly enrolled as proxy exit nodes.

The takedown involved platform providers, law enforcement and security firms working to eliminate a service that enabled espionage, cybercrime and information operations at scale.

Residential proxy networks sell access to IP addresses owned by internet service providers and assigned to residential customers. By routing traffic through consumer devices worldwide, attackers mask malicious activity behind legitimate-looking IP addresses, creating significant detection challenges for network defenders.

IPIDEA became notorious for facilitating multiple botnets, with its software development kits playing key roles in device enrollment while proxy software enabled attacker control. This includes the BadBox2.0 botnet Google targeted with legal action last year, plus the more recent Aisuru and Kimwolf botnets.

Also read: Cloudflare Outage or Cyberattack? The Real Reason Behind the Massive Disruption

The scale of abuse proves staggering. During just one week in January this year, Google observed over 550 individual threat groups it tracks using IP addresses associated with IPIDEA exit nodes to obfuscate their activities. These groups originated from China, North Korea, Iran and Russia, conducting activities including access to victim software-as-a-service environments, on-premises infrastructure compromise and password spray attacks.

"While proxy providers may claim ignorance or close these security gaps when notified, enforcement and verification is challenging given intentionally murky ownership structures, reseller agreements, and diversity of applications," Google's analysis stated.

Google's investigation revealed that many ostensibly independent residential proxy brands actually connect to the same actors controlling IPIDEA. The company identified 13 proxy and VPN brands as part of the IPIDEA network, including 360 Proxy, ABC Proxy, Cherry Proxy, Door VPN, IP 2 World, Luna Proxy, PIA S5 Proxy and others.

The same actors control multiple software development kit domains marketed to app developers as monetization tools. These SDKs support Android, Windows, iOS and WebOS platforms, with developers paid per download for embedding the code. Once incorporated into applications, the SDKs transform devices into proxy network exit nodes while providing whatever primary functionality the app advertised.

Google analyzed over 600 Android applications across multiple download sources containing code connecting to IPIDEA command-and-control domains. These apps appeared largely benignβ€”utilities, games and contentβ€”but utilized monetization SDKs enabling proxy behavior without clear disclosure to users.

The technical infrastructure operates through a two-tier system. Upon startup, infected devices connect to Tier One domains and send diagnostic information. They receive back a list of Tier Two servers to contact for proxy tasks. The device then polls these Tier Two servers periodically, receiving instructions to proxy traffic to specific domains and establishing dedicated connections to route that traffic.

[caption id="attachment_109008" align="aligncenter" width="600"]Proxy Network, Google, Google Threat Intelligence, Nation-State Actors, Two-Tier C2 Infrastructure. (Source: Google Threat Intelligence)[/caption]

Google identified approximately 7,400 Tier Two servers as of the takedown. The number changes daily, consistent with demand-based scaling. These servers are hosted globally, including in the United States.

Analysis of Windows binaries revealed 3,075 unique file hashes where dynamic analysis recorded DNS requests to at least one Tier One domain. Some posed as legitimate software like OneDriveSync and Windows Update, though IPIDEA actors didn't directly distribute these trojanized applications.

Residential proxies pose direct risks to consumers whose devices become exit nodes. Users knowingly or unknowingly provide their IP addresses and devices as launchpads for hacking and unauthorized activities, potentially causing providers to flag or block them. Proxy applications also introduce security vulnerabilities to home networks.

When a device becomes an exit node, network traffic the user doesn't control passes through it. This means attackers can access other devices on the same private network, effectively exposing security vulnerabilities to the internet. Google's analysis confirmed IPIDEA proxy software not only routed traffic through exit nodes but also sent traffic to devices to compromise them.

Google's disruption involved three coordinated actions. First, the company took legal action to seize domains controlling devices and proxying traffic through them. Second, Google shared technical intelligence on discovered IPIDEA software development kits with platform providers, law enforcement and research firms to drive ecosystem-wide enforcement.

Third, Google ensured Play Protect, Android's built-in security system, automatically warns users and removes applications incorporating IPIDEA SDKs while blocking future installation attempts. This protects users on certified Android devices with Google Play services.

Google believes the actions significantly degraded IPIDEA's proxy network and business operations, reducing available devices by millions. Because proxy operators share device pools through reseller agreements, the disruption likely impacts affiliated entities downstream.

Also read: What Is a Proxy Server? A Complete Guide to Types, Uses, and Benefits

The residential proxy market has become what Google describes as a "gray market" thriving on deceptionβ€”hijacking consumer bandwidth to provide cover for global espionage and cybercrime. Consumers should exercise extreme caution with applications offering payment for "unused bandwidth" or "internet sharing," as these represent primary growth vectors for illicit proxy networks.

Google urges users to purchase connected devices only from reputable manufacturers and verify certification. The company's Android TV website provides up-to-date partner lists, while users can check Play Protect certification status through device settings.

The company calls for proxy accountability and policy reform. While some providers may behave ethically and enroll devices only with clear consumer consent, any claims of "ethical sourcing" must be backed by transparent, auditable proof. App developers bear responsibility for vetting monetization SDKs they integrate.

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