The San Francisco Police Department is the latest California law enforcement agency to get caught sharing automated license plate reader (ALPR) data with out-of-state and federal agencies. EFF and the ACLU of Northern California are calling them out for this direct violation of California law, which has put every driver in the city at risk and is especially dangerous for immigrants, abortion seekers, and other targets of the federal government.

This week, we sent the San Francisco Police Department a demand letter and request for records under the city’s Sunshine Ordinance following the SF Standard’s recent report that SFPD provided non-California agencies direct access to the city’s ALPR database. Reporters uncovered that at least 19 searches run by these agencies were marked as related to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The city’s ALPR database was also searched by law enforcement agencies from Georgia and Texas, both states with severe restrictions on reproductive healthcare.

ALPRs are cameras that capture the movements of vehicles and upload the location of the vehicles to a searchable, shareable database. It is a mass surveillance technology that collects data indiscriminately on every vehicle on the road. As of September 2025, SFPD operates 415 ALPR cameras purchased from the company Flock Safety.

Since 2016, sharing ALPR data with out-of-state or federal agencies—for any reason—violates California law (SB 34). If this data is shared for the purpose of assisting with immigration enforcement, agencies violate an additional California law (SB 54).

In total, the SF Standard found that SFPD had allowed out-of-state cops to run 1.6 million searches of their data. “This sharing violated state law, as well as exposed sensitive driver location information to misuse by the federal government and by states that lack California’s robust privacy protections,” the letter explained.

EFF and ACLU are urging SFPD to launch a thorough audit of its ALPR database, institute new protocols for compliance, and assess penalties and sanctions for any employee found to be sharing ALPR information out of state.

“Your office reportedly claims that agencies outside of California are no longer able to access the SFPD ALPR database,” the letter says. “However, your office has not explained how outside agencies obtained access in the first place or how you plan to prevent future violations of SB 34 and 54.”

As we’ve demonstrated over and over again, many California agencies continue to ignore these laws, exposing sensitive location information to misuse and putting entire communities at risk. As federal agencies continue to carry out violent ICE raids, and many states enforce harsh, draconian restrictions on abortion, ALPR technology is already being used to target and surveil immigrants and abortion seekers. California agencies, including SFPD, have an obligation to protect the rights of Californians, even when those rights are not recognized by other states or the federal government.

See the full letter here: https://www.eff.org/files/2025/09/17/aclu_and_eff_letter_to_sfpd_9.16.2025-1.pdf

This is the first installment in a blog series documenting EFF's findings from the Stop Censoring Abortion campaign. You can read additional posts here. 

We’ve been hearing that social media platforms are censoring abortion-related content, even when no law requires them to do so. Now, we’ve got the receipts. 

For months, EFF has been investigating stories from users whose abortion-related content has been taken down or otherwise suppressed by major social media platforms. In collaboration with our allies—including Plan C, Women on Web, Reproaction, and Women First Digital—we launched the #StopCensoringAbortion campaign to collect and amplify these stories.  

Submissions came from a variety of users, including personal accounts, influencers, healthcare clinics, research organizations, and advocacy groups from across the country and abroad—a spectrum that underscores the wide reach of this censorship. Since the start of the year, we’ve seen nearly 100 examples of abortion-related content taken down by social media platforms. 

We analyzed these takedowns, deletions, and bans, comparing the content to what platform policies allow—particularly those of Meta—and found that almost none of the submissions we received violated any of the platforms’ stated policies. Most of the censored posts simply provided factual, educational information. This Threads post is a perfect example: 

Screenshot submitted by Lauren Kahre to EFF

In this post, health policy strategist Lauren Kahre discussed abortion pills’ availability via mail. She provided factual information about two FDA approved medications (mifepristone and misoprostol), including facts like shelf life and how to store pills safely.  

Lauren’s post doesn’t violate any of Meta’s policies and shouldn’t have been removed. But don’t just take our word for it: Meta has publicly insisted that posts like these should not be censored. In a February 2024 letter to Amnesty International, Meta Human Rights Policy Director Miranda Sissons wrote: “Organic content (i.e., non paid content) educating users about medication abortion is allowed and does not violate our Community Standards. Additionally, providing guidance on legal access to pharmaceuticals is allowed.” 

Still, shortly after Lauren shared this post, Meta took it down. Perhaps even more perplexing was their explanation for doing so. According to Meta, the post was removed because “[they] don’t allow people to buy, sell, or exchange drugs that require a prescription from a doctor or a pharmacist.” 

Screenshot submitted by Lauren Kahre to EFF

In the submissions we received, this was the most common reason Meta gave for removing abortion-related content. The company frequently claimed that posts violated policies on Restricted Goods and Services, which prohibit any “attempts to buy, sell, trade, donate, gift or ask for pharmaceutical drugs.”  

Yet in Lauren’s case and others, the posts very clearly did no such thing. And as Meta itself has explained: “Providing guidance on how to legally access pharmaceuticals is permitted as it is not considered an offer to buy, sell or trade these drugs.” 

In fact, Meta’s policies on Restricted Goods & Services further state: “We allow discussions about the sale of these goods in stores or by online retailers, advocating for changes to regulations of goods and services covered in this policy, and advocating for or concerning the use of pharmaceutical drugs in the context of medical treatment, including discussion of physical or mental side effects.” Also, “Debating or advocating for the legality or discussing scientific or medical merits of prescription drugs is allowed. This includes news and public service announcements.” 

Over and over again, the policies say one thing, but the actual enforcement says another. 

We spoke with multiple Meta representatives to share these findings. We asked hard questions about their policies and the gap between how they’re being applied. Unfortunately, we were mostly left with the same concerns, but we’re continuing to push them to do better.  

In the coming weeks, we will share a series of blogs further examining trends we found, including stories of unequal enforcement, where individuals and organizations needed to rely on internal connections at Meta to get wrongfully censored posts restored; examples of account suspensions without sufficient warnings; an exploration of Meta’s ad policies; practical tips for users to avoid being censored; and concrete steps platforms should take to reform their abortion content moderation practices. For a preview, we’ve already shared some of our findings with Barbara Ortutay at The Associated Press, whose report on some of these takedowns was published today.  

We hope this series highlighting examples of abortion content censorship will help the public and the platforms understand the breadth of this problem, who is affected, and with what consequences. These stories collectively underscore the urgent need for platforms to review and consistently enforce their policies in a fair and transparent manner.  

With reproductive rights under attack both in the U.S. and abroad, sharing accurate information about abortion online has never been more critical. Together, we can hold platforms like Meta accountable, demand transparency in moderation practices, and ultimately stop the censorship of this essential, sometimes life-saving information. 

This is the first post in our blog series documenting the findings from our Stop Censoring Abortion campaign. Read more in the series: https://www.eff.org/pages/stop-censoring-abortion    

EFF legal intern Noam Shemtov was the principal author of this post.

When police have a warrant to search a phone, should they be able to see everything on the phone—from family photos to communications with your doctor to everywhere you’ve been since you first started using the phone—in other words, data that is in no way connected to the crime they’re investigating? The Michigan Supreme Court just ruled no. 

In People v. Carson, the court held that to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, warrants authorizing searches of cell phones and other digital devices must contain express limitations on the data police can review, restricting searches to data that they can establish is clearly connected to the crime.

The realities of modern cell phones call for a strict application of rules governing the scope of warrants.

EFF, along with ACLU National and the ACLU of Michigan, filed an amicus brief in Carson, expressly calling on the court to limit the scope of cell phone search warrants. We explained that the realities of modern cell phones call for a strict application of rules governing the scope of warrants. Without clear limits, warrants would  become de facto licenses to look at everything on the device, a great universe of information that amounts to “the sum of an individual’s private life.” 

The Carson case shows just how broad many cell phone search warrants can be. Defendant Michael Carson was suspected of stealing money from a neighbor’s safe. The warrant to search his phone allowed the police to access:

Any and all data including, text messages, text/picture messages, pictures and videos, address book, any data on the SIM card if applicable, and all records or documents which were created, modified, or stored in electronic or magnetic form and, any data, image, or information.

There were no temporal or subject matter limitations. Consequently, investigators obtained over 1,000 pages of information from Mr. Carson’s phone, the vast majority of which did not have anything to do with the crime under investigation.

The Michigan Supreme Court held that this extremely broad search warrant was “constitutionally intolerable” and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 

The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This is intended to limit authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search and to prevent police from conducting “wide-ranging exploratory searches.” 

Cell phones hold vast and varied information, including our most intimate data.

Across two opinions, a four-Justice majority joined a growing national consensus of courts recognizing that, given the immense and ever-growing storage capacity of cell phones, warrants must spell out up-front limitations on the information the government may review, including the dates and data categories that constrain investigators’ authority to search. And magistrates reviewing warrants must ensure the information provided by police in the warrant affidavit properly supports a tailored search.

This ruling is good news for digital privacy. Cell phones hold vast and varied information, including our most intimate data—“privacies of life” like our personal messages, location histories, and medical and financial information. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized as much, saying that application of Fourth Amendment principles to searches of cell phones must respond to cell phones’ unique characteristics, including the weighty privacy interests in our digital data. 

We applaud the Michigan Supreme Court’s recognition that unfettered cell phone searches pose serious risks to privacy. We hope that courts around the country will follow its lead in concluding that the particularity rule applies with special force to such searches and requires clear limitations on the data the government may access.