On October 5, 2026, Atlassian published a security advisory for CVE-2026-21589, a critical arbitrary file access vulnerability affecting eight products: Bitbucket Data Center, Confluence Data Center, Jira Service Management Data Center, Jira Software Data Center, Bamboo Data Center, Crowd Data Center, Crucible, and Fisheye. Atlassian assigned the vulnerability a CVSSv4 score of 9.3. An unauthenticated remote attacker who knows a target file's exact name and path can access it within the application's web root; the vulnerability does not provide directory listing or enumeration.
Atlassian's advisory treats all versions before the applicable fixed releases as affected, including unsupported versions. Affected Atlassian Cloud products have already been patched, and no action is required from Cloud customers.
Detailed technical analysis and file-read proof-of-concept scripts are public, so Rapid7 recommends patching on an emergency basis, outside of normal patch cycles, and reviewing access logs for attempted exploitation.
Technical overview
NVD lists files or directories accessible to external parties (CWE-552) as the weakness associated with CVE-2026-21589.
On October 6, watchTowr Labs published a technical analysis based on comparisons of vulnerable and patched Jira, Confluence, and Bitbucket packages. Their analysis identified a path traversal vulnerability in Atlassian's web-resource handling: double-colon (::) sequences can become path separators during request processing, allowing traversal components to reach the resource-loading code, resulting in the contents of arbitrary file being read back to an attacker.
Their testing could not traverse outside the Tomcat context, but could read files throughout the application web root. In an Atlassian Crowd deployment that had Jira configured, reading WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties exposed application credentials. With network access to Crowd, they used those credentials to create a user and add it to jira-administrators; Crowd's IP allowlisting can block this direct route.
Mitigation guidance
Organizations should upgrade each affected installation to a listed fixed version or the latest available version. Atlassian's October 5 advisory lists the following fixed versions:
Product
Fixed versions
Bitbucket Data Center
9.4.26, 10.2.8, 10.5.1
Confluence Data Center
9.2.26, 10.2.19
Jira Service Management Data Center
5.12.40, 10.3.26, 11.3.12
Jira Software Data Center
9.12.40, 10.3.26, 11.3.12
Bamboo Data Center
10.2.24, 12.1.12
Crowd Data Center
6.3.7, 7.0.3, 7.1.7, 7.2.4
Crucible
4.9.15
Fisheye
4.9.15
Organizations unable to patch immediately should remove affected instances from the internet or otherwise restrict them from external network access. Atlassian provides a Web Application Firewall or proxy rule for all affected products, a Tomcat RewriteValve mitigation for Confluence, Jira Service Management, Jira Software, Bamboo, and Crowd, and a separate urlrewrite.xml rule for Bitbucket. These mitigations are limited and are not replacements for patching.
Rapid7 strongly recommends looking for signs of compromise even after the patch has been applied. Atlassian recommends URL-decoding each access-log request line up to twice, then searching for .. immediately adjacent to /, \, or ::. Alternatively, search raw logs with the vendor-supplied regex:
Public testing artifacts for Jira, Confluence, and Bitbucket include a Python file-read PoC and a Nuclei template. If investigation identifies access to protected configuration files, organizations should rotate exposed credentials and other secrets after containing the affected systems.
For the latest mitigation and investigation guidance, please refer to the vendor security advisory.
Rapid7 customers
Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose
Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-21589 with unauthenticated vulnerability checks on Jira Software Data Center available in the October 8 content release.
Updates
October 7, 2026: Initial publication.
October 8, 2026: Updated Rapid7 Customers section to reflect availability of vulnerability checks.
After a previous solution angered mathematicians, the company characterized the new release as being more responsive to concerns about A.I. disrupting research.
For 10 of the findings, OpenAI provided summaries of how the A.I. model came up with its solution. The average result took about three hours of computing, the company said.
Many think artificial intelligence companies should be held liable for their runaway technology. But legal scholars say applying existing law could be messy.
Greg Brockman, OpenAI’s president and co-founder, said internally that the super PAC, Leading the Future, had become a “distraction” for the A.I. company.
On September 30, 2026, Cisco published a security advisory for CVE-2026-76504, a critical API authentication bypass vulnerability affecting Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. The vulnerability has a CVSSv3.1 score of 9.8 and results from improper handling of URL encoding (CWE-177). An unauthenticated, remote attacker can send a crafted HTTP request that bypasses an authentication rule for a specific API endpoint, gaining access to the API with the privileges of the admin user.
According to Cisco, CVE-2026-76504 is being actively exploited in the wild; Cisco PSIRT became aware of the activity in September 2026. Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager systems with ports exposed to the internet are at risk of compromise. The vulnerability affects the product regardless of system configuration, and Cisco has not provided a workaround, however vendor supplied updates are available. Rapid7 strongly recommends that organizations upgrade affected systems to a fixed release on an emergency basis, outside of normal patch cycles, and investigate internet-facing systems for signs of exploitation.
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager was also affected by two critical, unauthenticated peering authentication flaws earlier in 2026: CVE-2026-20127 and Rapid7-discovered CVE-2026-20182. Both were distinct issues in the vdaemon service and similar parts of its networking stack. CVE-2026-76504 targets a separate API authentication path, but the recurrence of authentication bypasses in internet-facing Catalyst SD-WAN control components reinforces the need for emergency remediation.
Cisco has released software updates that remediate CVE-2026-76504. Organizations running affected instances of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager should upgrade to an appropriate fixed release listed below without waiting for a regular patch cycle:
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Software release
First fixed release
Earlier than 20.9
Migrate to a fixed release
20.9
20.9.10.1
20.12
20.12.8.2
20.15
20.15.6.1
20.18
20.18.4.1
26.1
26.1.2.1
26.2
26.2.1
Cisco has addressed the vulnerability in the cloud-based Cisco SD-WAN Cloud (Cisco Managed) release 20.15.605, and indicates that no customer action is required for that service.
There are no workarounds. As a temporary mitigation, Cisco recommends that on-premises customers prevent access to the system from unsecured networks. If internet access is required, restrict access to known, trusted hosts and protect Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN control components behind a filtering device. Cisco indicates that this mitigation is already deployed in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Cloud Hosted environments. Organizations should apply updates even when the mitigation is in place.
Because active exploitation has occurred, Rapid7 strongly recommends that organizations audit affected systems for compromise. For help assessing a potentially compromised system, Cisco customers may open a Severity 3 TAC case with CVE-2026-76504 in the title and provide an admin-tech file generated with the request admin-tech command.
For the latest mitigation guidance and release compatibility information, please refer to the vendor's security advisory.
Rapid7 customers
Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose
Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-76504 with vulnerability checks expected to be available in the October 1 content release.
Indicators of compromise
Cisco recommends reviewing the following logs for requests related to j_security_check from unknown or unauthorized IP addresses:
/var/log/nms/containers/service-proxy/serviceproxy-access.log: Requests with an encoded character in the j_security_check path, such as POST /%6a_security_check HTTP/1.1.
/var/log/nms/vmanage-server.log: Requests to j_security_check associated with usernames beginning with viptela-reserved-.
The %6a value, which URI-encodes the character j, is only an example. According to Cisco, an attacker can exploit the vulnerability by encoding any single character in the request. The vendor cautions that these log entries can also occur during standard operations and should be evaluated against normal network posture to avoid false positives.
Updates
September 30, 2026: Initial publication.
October 1, 2026: Updated to reflect CVE-2026-76504 being added to the CISA KEV list.
The Federal Trade Commission building in Washington. The agency is examining whether top A.I. companies have harmed consumers, a person with knowledge of the inquiry said.
President Trump’s meetings with tech leaders produced some voluntary safeguards and a commitment to rebrand artificial intelligence as “super intelligence,” the term that Mr. Trump prefers.
Employees and security researchers said that they had cautioned the company on safely testing its A.I. models and strengthening its corporate infrastructure, but that OpenAI did not listen.
The ChatGPT maker unveiled agents that act as assistants, just weeks after Meta released Muse, as it faces scrutiny over incidents involving its technology.
An OpenAI booth at a technology conference in San Francisco this month. The company said its new GPT-6.1 Astra model exhibited high levels of deception and a willingness to go beyond the scope of its given task.
The gap between technology and policymaking has gotten wider than ever with artificial intelligence, leaving a global policy vacuum as A.I. models rapidly advance.
The company did not learn until recently that its technology had meddled with websites for the Education and Commerce Departments and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
A new report by a Bay Area start-up called Parse adds details to an incident that has shocked the A.I. world and led to calls for closer government regulation.
As Xi Jinping visits President Trump in Washington, the leaders are expected to discuss claims that China is surreptitiously copying American A.I. technologies, a process known as distillation.
As Xi Jinping visits President Trump in Washington, the leaders are expected to discuss claims that China is surreptitiously copying American A.I. technologies, a process known as distillation.
American artificial intelligence companies have accused their Chinese counterparts of using a technique called distillation to enhance their own systems.
OpenAI’s offices in San Francisco. At least four times this year, the company’s artificial intelligence hacked or tried to break into government and university websites without being instructed to do so.
Sam Altman of OpenAI and Dario Amodei of Anthropic told the Security Council that international cooperation was needed to ensure that A.I. remains under human control.
Sam Altman, the head of OpenAI, told the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday that A.I.’s development had made its “upside more tangible, but also the stakes and risks more immediate.”
On September 22, 2026, F5 published a security advisory for CVE-2026-94127, a critical heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability affecting F5 BIG-IP Access Policy Manager (APM). The vulnerability has a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to an affected virtual server may be able to achieve remote code execution (RCE) by sending specifically crafted traffic.
BIG-IP APM provides identity-aware access control for applications and other corporate resources and can integrate with authentication technologies including OAuth, OpenID Connect, and SAML. CVE-2026-94127 is not exposed in a default configuration: exploitation requires a BIG-IP virtual server with both an APM access policy and an OAuth profile configured. Because affected BIG-IP systems may process traffic at an organization's network edge, organizations using this configuration should prioritize remediation.
The vulnerability affects the data plane and does not expose the BIG-IP control plane. BIG-IP systems operating in Appliance mode are also affected.
F5 lists the following affected release trains and corresponding fixed hotfixes:
BIG-IP 21.1.0: versions prior to Hotfix-BIGIP-21.1.0.2.0.30.22-ENG
BIG-IP 17.5.0: versions prior to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.5.1.9.0.160.12-ENG
BIG-IP 17.1.0: versions prior to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.1.3.5.0.41.14-ENG
As of September 22, 2026, CVE-2026-94127 has been added to the CISA KEV while a publicly available proof of concept was not confirmed.
Mitigation guidance
Organizations running affected F5 BIG-IP deployments should apply the appropriate F5 hotfix as soon as operationally feasible, particularly where a vulnerable APM and OAuth configuration is reachable from untrusted networks.
F5 lists the following remediation versions:
BIG-IP 21.1.0: update to Hotfix-BIGIP-21.1.0.2.0.30.22-ENG or later.
BIG-IP 17.5.0: update to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.5.1.9.0.160.12-ENG or later.
BIG-IP 17.1.0: update to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.1.3.5.0.41.14-ENG or later.
Administrators should first determine whether a BIG-IP APM access policy and an OAuth profile are configured together on a virtual server, since this configuration is required for exposure.
For organizations that cannot immediately apply the applicable update, F5 provides an iRule workaround through F5 Support. Customers should open a support case with F5 to obtain the vendor-provided workaround and follow F5's implementation guidance.
Rapid7 customers
Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose
Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-94127 using vulnerability checks expected to be available in today’s (September 23) content release.
OpenAI, Google and others recently disclosed breaches by their artificial intelligence models that amplified concerns about the advancing capabilities of the technology.
A corporate spat between two tech giants last week was just the latest volley in a conflict over whether dangerous mistakes are being made in A.I. training.
Mustafa Suleyman, Microsoft’s A.I. chief, argued in an essay published Wednesday that the tech start-up Anthropic was pushing its systems too hard to mimic human behaviors.
A bipartisan group in Congress and Gov. Gavin Newsom of California have floated ideas for building a mechanism that would instantly power down an A.I. system. Only no one really knows how.
Creating a kill switch, a metaphorical big red button that could be pressed in an emergency, is harder than many policymakers assume. “There often isn’t one plug you can pull,” said one A.I. researcher.
A third-party test company inadvertently gave internet access to Google’s Gemini and other artificial intelligence models during cybersecurity testing.
The Gemini incidents occurred while the model was undergoing testing at Irregular, an Israeli start-up that works with tech companies to assess their A.I. models before they are publicly released.
The company is expected to reach $100 billion in annualized revenue this year, even as chief executive Dario Amodei calls for slowing down development of some advanced A.I. models.
“The Social Reckoning” and other movies reflect growing discontent with Silicon Valley founders. But such films may be at the mercy of the companies themselves.
Some people worry that connecting A.I. agents to the internet or vital infrastructure will wreak havoc in unexpected ways, while others worry that researchers will soon develop A.I. systems that have agency.
“Alignment” is the science of teaching A.I. to do what is in line with human preferences, ethics and judgment. But, at times, the systems have gone rogue.
When an A.I. system starts acting of its own accord, engages in unsafe behavior or ignores the wishes of humans, the behavior is known as misalignment.
“Recursive self-improvement” is the idea that artificial intelligence could learn to build and train itself, creating exponential new progress — and risk.
Jeff Clune a computer scientist and researcher at the University of British Columbia in Canada and founder of Recursive Superintelligence, one of two $4-billion start-ups chasing recursive self-intelligence.
On September 14, 2026, Cisco published a security advisory for CVE-2026-76461, a critical SQL injection vulnerability affecting Cisco AsyncOS Software for Cisco Secure Email Gateway. The vulnerability has a reported CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 and could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on an affected appliance.
Cisco Secure Email Gateway, formerly known as IronPort Email Security Appliance, is an enterprise email security product that inspects inbound and outbound email for threats including phishing, malware, spam, and business email compromise. Because affected gateways process externally delivered email as part of their normal operation, exploitation does not require access to an administrative interface or authentication. An attacker can reportedly trigger the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted email through a vulnerable gateway.
CVE-2026-76461 was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on the same day as the vendor disclosed the vulnerability, indicating that CVE-2026-76461 was exploited as a zero-day prior to disclosure. Cisco noted that their PSIRT became aware of active exploitation in September 2026. At the time of publication, there is no public proof-of-concept exploit code available, and no attribution for the current threat actor activity.
Mitigation guidance
Organizations running Cisco Secure Email Gateway should prioritize upgrading to a vendor-supplied fixed version on an emergency basis, outside of normal patching cycles.
Affected Version
Fixed Version
15.5 and earlier
15.5.5-014
16.0
16.0.4-302
16.5
16.5.0-780
Given the reported active exploitation and the ability to achieve unauthenticated root-level command execution through malicious email processing, organizations should prioritize patching rather than relying solely on network controls or monitoring. Cisco also strongly recommends that customers migrate to the latest product version, 16.5.0-780.
For the latest remediation guidance, see the vendor advisory.
Indicators of compromise
The following indicators of compromise for CVE-2026-76461 were reported within the Cisco security advisory.
To confirm any attempted exploitation of this vulnerability, review the mail_logs and look for suspicious SQL statements. If the device is part of a cluster, review the logs of each cluster device. The following is a non-exhaustive example of how a malicious SQL statement could be detected in the logs:
cisco-esa> grep -i "COPY.*TO PROGRAM" [IronPort Text Mail Logs Log name - Default: mail_logs]
The presence of any entry in the output may indicate malicious activity.
Rapid7 customers
Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose
Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-76461 with a vulnerability check expected to be available in the September 16 content release.
At an event in Washington, partisanship took a back seat as elected officials, religious leaders, parents and artists called for reining in artificial intelligence.
Alex Bores, who lost a congressional primary contest that revolved around A.I. regulation, is trying to position himself at the center of the conversation for the next presidential election.
Mr. Trump called Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s chief executive, while Mr. Huang was onstage in Los Angeles and criticized calls to slow down and regulate A.I.
Today’s chatbots aren’t likely to help lone actors invent a deadly pathogen, experts say. But newer models, trained in biology, may need stronger safeguards.
The debate over the safety of artificial intelligence grew personal as key tech leaders said calls for government regulation were self-serving and misplaced.
OpenAI offices in San Francisco. Sam Altman, the company’s chief executive, agreed with the Anthropic chief’s call to slow down artificial intelligence advancements.
Dario Amodei, the chief executive of Anthropic, at a summit this year. His letter also called for cooperation from A.I. companies from other democratic countries.
In an essay, the head of Anthropic laid out the rapidly advancing capabilities of artificial intelligence and said there needed to be greater safety controls across the industry.
Dario Amodei, Anthropic’s chief executive, in February. “Over the last few months, I have become convinced that fully addressing the risks requires even more prudence,” he wrote in an essay.
A demonstration of Anthropic’s Claude Cowork A.I. agent in May. The company’s employees have been talking about the risks of artificial intelligence after a colleague, citing dangers, resigned this week.
A controversy around OpenAI’s latest math proof raises a fear that might become increasingly common: that A.I. tools could take valuable insights from one user and hand them to another.
Their warnings echo concerns that other artificial intelligence experts have voiced in recent months, as calls increase for a slowdown in the pace of development.
While conducting research into a recent N-able N-central authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2026-18577), Rapid7 Labs discovered two new vulnerabilities affecting the latest version of N-central. When chained together, these two vulnerabilities allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication and create a new attacker-controlled System administrator account on an affected server.
Both CVE-2026-86206 and CVE-2026-86207 have been patched by the vendor via N-central 2026.3 Hotfix 3.
Product description
N-able N-central is an enterprise-grade Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) platform designed for Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and IT departments to monitor, manage, and secure complex, large-scale networks from a centralized dashboard.
Credit
These vulnerabilities were discovered by Stephen Fewer, Senior Principal Security Researcher at Rapid7, and are being disclosed in accordance with Rapid7's vulnerability disclosure policy.
Technical analysis
CVE-2026-86206
N-central exposes its management interface (TCP 8443 by default) through Envoy, an edge proxy. Envoy passes accepted requests to Jetty, the Java web server that hosts N-central's application. The application gives requests from the loopback address (i.e. 127.0.0.1) more access than requests from a remote system. This design depends on Envoy, Jetty, and the N-central access filter all agreeing on which application path the client requested and whether the client is really local. The following request can make them disagree about both of these things:
POST /dms;/services/ServerUI HTTP/1.1
Forwarded: for="127.0.0.\1"
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
SOAPAction: ""
The semicolon in the URI and backslash in the Forwarded value introduce a discrepancy when processing the request that leads to an access control bypass. Looking at Figure 1 below, we can see an overview of how these two values are processed during an incoming malicious request.
Figure 1: Processing a malicious request.
The semicolon gets the request past Envoy
The Envoy proxy rules come from the n-central-proxy-4.5.6-5 package. In /etc/opt/envoy/lds_intermediate.yaml, shown below (and edited for brevity), the management listener returns HTTP 403 for paths beginning with /dms/services or /internal/dms. A final catch-all rule sends other paths to the DMS application.
# /etc/opt/envoy/lds_intermediate.yaml:953
- match:
prefix: /internal/dms
# response-header boilerplate omitted
direct_response:
status: 403
body:
inline_string: Forbidden. No API access on the UI port.
# ...
- match:
prefix: /dms/services
# response-header boilerplate omitted
direct_response:
status: 403
body:
inline_string: Forbidden. No API access on the UI port.
# ...
# /etc/opt/envoy/lds_intermediate.yaml:1301
# A final catch-all rule...
- match:
prefix: /
route:
cluster: dms
timeout:
seconds: 300
Envoy compares those prefixes with the path it received. The path /dms;/services/ServerUI does not begin with /dms/services, because the next character after /dms is a semicolon. It therefore reaches the catch-all route, passing the request from Envoy to Jetty.
Jetty interprets the path differently. The shipped jetty-http-9.4.56.v20240826.jar contains org.eclipse.jetty.http.HttpURI, and org.eclipse.jetty.util.URIUtil. Together, these classes treat text beginning with a semicolon as a path parameter and remove it when producing the decoded path used for servlet dispatch. As a result, Jetty turns /dms;/services/ServerUI into /dms/services/ServerUI. That decoded path then matches the Axis SOAP servlet mapping in /opt/nable/webapps/ROOT/WEB-INF/web.xml.
Similarly, the same technique can be used to target the SOAP service via /internal;/dms/services2/ServerUI2. Jetty decodes it to /internal/dms/services2/ServerUI2, which matches the CXF SOAP servlet mapping. A single semicolon is sufficient to create the routing disagreement.
Reaching these servlet mappings puts the request at the protected SOAP interfaces that an exploit can leverage to establish an application session and later manage privileged objects, but the semicolon trick alone does not authorize the request. Without the crafted Forwarded header, Jetty retains the client's real remote address and N-central's ServletPathFilter denies access. Conversely, the header trick alone cannot help a request to the ordinary /dms/services/ServerUI or /internal/dms/services2/ServerUI2 path: Envoy returns HTTP 403 without forwarding that request to Jetty.
As such, an exploit needs both discrepancies; the semicolon to pass Envoy's path check and the header to pass N-central's local-request check.
The header makes the remote client look local
The Forwarded header tells an application about the original client behind a proxy. In a malicious request, the for value is quoted and contains a quoted-pair (\1):
Forwarded: for="127.0.0.\1"
Under the HTTP quoted-string grammar, the backslash escapes the following character. Jetty's ForwardedRequestCustomizer, from jetty-server-9.4.56.v20240826.jar, applies that rule. It removes the backslash, reads the value as 127.0.0.1, and exposes that value to N-central as the request's remote address.
N-central then parses the original header a second time. Its parser is in com.nable.util.LocalHostUtils, from /opt/nable/webapps/ROOT/WEB-INF/lib/dmsservice-11.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar. This parser removes the surrounding quotes but does not remove the backslash. It therefore checks 127.0.0.\1.
That string is not a valid IP address. LocalHostUtils.xffCheck() rejects an invalid value found in X-Forwarded-For, but its Forwarded branch rejects only values that it successfully recognizes as loopback. The below (abridged) decompilation shows the relevant branch:
When given the header value 127.0.0.\1, the isLoopbackAddress() call (at [1]) returns false (at [2]) because the value is invalid. The loop therefore continues and xffCheck() returns true (at [3]). In other words, an invalid Forwarded header value causes xffCheck to fail open. The final decision occurs in com.nable.server.ServletPathFilter, shown below.
The first check asks whether a forwarding header is trying to claim a loopback address (at [4]). N-central's parser sees the invalid value 127.0.0.\1, does not recognize it as loopback, and allows it. The second check asks whether Jetty's remote address is local (at [5]). Jetty has already converted the same header value to 127.0.0.1, so this check succeeds. The filter returns true (at [6]) before consulting the normal remote-path allowlist.
CVE-2026-86207
By leveraging CVE-2026-86206 to reach the protected URI /dms/services/ServerUI, a SessionID returned by the Session.Hello SOAP operation (See the prior work by Horizon3 on leveraging the legacy SOAP API) can be generated. However, this SessionID is only a pre-login session. It proves that the request reached the local-only SOAP API via the access control bypass, but it does not yet identify an authenticated user. A separate authentication bypass vulnerability, in how legacy two-factor authentication operates, allows a pre-login session to become an authenticated session.
The method com.nable.server.ui.UserTwoFactorLogin, from dmsservice-11.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar (shown below), binds a requested user ID (e.g. the builtin N-able Administrator account’s well known ID 1) to the session (at [1]) before it attempts legacy two-factor authentication (at [2]) . A normal authentication rejection removes that binding (at [4]), but if an exception occurs, this binding is left in place (at [3]).
N-central supports two distinct second-factor systems: legacy, profile-based authentication using an external AuthAnvil or RSA SecurID server, and native time-based one-time password (TOTP) “Two-Step Verification” using an authenticator application. Despite overlapping 2FA/MFA terminology in N-able’s documentation, com.nable.server.ui.UserTwoFactorLogin implements the former profile-based mechanism; it does not enforce the user’s native TOTP setting.
In a default installation, legacy two-factor processing raises an exception for several builtin identities used by N-central, as each of these identities lack a single legacy AuthAnvil or RSA 2FA profile association required by UserTwoFactorLogin. Specifically the following built-in identities can be leveraged via their known ID numbers.
User ID 1 (N-able Administrator)
User ID 50 (Product Administrator)
User ID 51 (N-able Support)
By creating a new pre-login session for any one of the above IDs, a SOAP call to User.TwoFactorLogin with a dummy password will achieve the authentication bypass, converting the pre-login session to a privileged SOAP session for that user. By using additional calls to the ServerUI2 SOAP endpoint, a new attacker-controlled System user account can be created.
Remediation
The vendor-supplied release of N-central 2026.3 Hotfix 3 (version 2026.3.1.13) remediates both CVE-2026-86206 and CVE-2026-86207. All versions of N-central prior to 2026.3.1.13 are vulnerable. Customers running affected on-premise N-central environments are urged to apply the latest update on an urgent basis, outside of normal patching cycles.
Customers using hosted N-central environments do not need to take action as the vendor has applied the needed updates.
Exposure Command, InsightVM and Nexpose customers will be able to assess their exposure to both CVE-2026-86206 and CVE-2026-86207, with authenticated vulnerability checks expected to be available in the September 8 content release.
Disclosure timeline
August 27, 2026: Rapid7 makes initial outreach to N-able who respond the same day.
August 28, 2026: Rapid7 provides a detailed technical analysis and exploit script to N-able, along with a proposed timeline for a coordinated disclosure.
September 5, 2026: N-able release N-central 2026.3 HF3 which fixes two of the vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-86206, CVE-2026-86207) reported by Rapid7.
September 7, 2026: Rapid7 contacts N-able requesting clarity on several issues. N-able responds the same day with requested information.
September 8, 2026: This disclosure for CVE-2026-86206 and CVE-2026-86207.