A new Android malware locks device screens and demands that users pay a ransom to keep their data from being deleted. Dubbed “DroidLock” by Zimperium researchers, the Android ransomware-like malware can also “wipe devices, change PINs, intercept OTPs, and remotely control the user interface, turning an infected phone into a hostile endpoint.” The malware detected by the researchers targeted Spanish Android users via phishing sites. Based on the examples provided, the French telecommunications company Orange S.A. was one of the companies impersonated in the campaign.

Android Malware DroidLock Uses ‘Ransomware-like Overlay’

The researchers detailed the new Android malware in a blog post this week, noting that the malware “has the ability to lock device screens with a ransomware-like overlay and illegally acquire app lock credentials, leading to a total takeover of the compromised device.” The malware uses fake system update screens to trick victims and can stream and remotely control devices via virtual network computing (VNC). The malware can also exploit device administrator privileges to “lock or erase data, capture the victim's image with the front camera, and silence the device.” The infection chain starts with a dropper that appears to require the user to change settings to allow unknown apps to be installed from the source (image below), which leads to the secondary payload that contains the malware. [caption id="attachment_107722" align="aligncenter" width="300"] The Android malware DroidLock prompts users for installation permissions (Zimperium)[/caption] Once the user grants accessibility permission, “the malware automatically approves additional permissions, such as those for accessing SMS, call logs, contacts, and audio,” the researchers said. The malware requests Device Admin Permission and Accessibility Services Permission at the start of the installation. Those permissions allow the malware to perform malicious actions such as:

• Wiping data from the device, “effectively performing a factory reset.”
• Locking the device.
• Changing the PIN, password or biometric information to prevent user access to the device.

Based on commands received from the threat actor’s command and control (C2) server, “the attacker can compromise the device indefinitely and lock the user out from accessing the device.”

DroidLock Malware Overlays

The DroidLock malware uses Accessibility Services to launch overlays on targeted applications, prompted by an AccessibilityEvent originating from a package on the attacker's target list. The Android malware uses two primary overlay methods:

• A Lock Pattern overlay that displays a pattern-drawing user interface (UI) to capture device unlock patterns.
• A WebView overlay that loads attacker-controlled HTML content stored locally in a database; when an application is opened, the malware queries the database for the specific package name, and if a match is found it launches a full-screen WebView overlay that displays the stored HTML.

The malware also uses a deceptive Android update screen that instructs users not to power off or restart their devices. “This technique is commonly used by attackers to prevent user interaction while malicious activities are carried out in the background,” the researchers said. The malware can also capture all screen activity and transmit it to a remote server by operating as a persistent foreground service and using MediaProjection and VirtualDisplay to capture screen images, which are then converted to a base64-encoded JPEG format and transmitted to the C2 server. “This highly dangerous functionality could facilitate the theft of any sensitive information shown on the device’s display, including credentials, MFA codes, etc.,” the researchers said. Zimperium has shared its findings with Google, so up-to-date Android devices are protected against the malware, and the company has also published DroidLock Indicators of Compromise (IoCs).

A cyberattack on Russia has reportedly targeted Russia’s digital military draft system. According to Grigory Sverdlin, head of the draft-dodging nonprofit Idite Lesom, anonymous hackers successfully breached a key developer of the system on Thursday. “For the next few months, the system, which holds 30 million records, will not be able to send people off to kill or die,” Sverdlin wrote on Facebook.   He added that his organization had received a large set of documents from the hackers, including source code, technical documentation, and internal communications from Russia’s software provider Micord, a central developer of the digital military draft system. 

Cyberattack on Russia’s Digital Military Draft System 

Micord’s website was reportedly inaccessible on Thursday, displaying a notice that it was under “technical maintenance.” Meanwhile, the investigative outlet IStories, which obtained the documents from Idite Lesom, confirmed the breach with Micord’s director, Ramil Gabdrahmanov.  “Listen, it could happen to anyone. Many are being attacked right now,” Gabdrahmanov said. He declined to confirm whether Micord had worked on Russia’s unified military registration database, stating, “We work on many different projects.” Nonetheless, IStories independently verified Micord’s involvement in the digital registry.  Despite the cyberattack on Russia’s digital military draft system, some users reported that the database website was still accessible, though it remained unclear whether electronic draft summonses had been disrupted. The Russian Defense Ministry dismissed the claims of a breach as “fake news,” asserting that the registry continued to operate normally.   “The registry has been repeatedly subjected to hacking attacks. They have all been successfully repelled,” the ministry said, emphasizing that attempts to disrupt the system had so far “failed to achieve their objectives", reported IStories.

Digital Military Draft System: Modernizing Russia’s Draft Process 

The digital military draft system, part of a broader modernization of Russia’s wartime enlistment process, centralizes records of men aged 18 to 30 and allows authorities to issue summonses online, eliminating the need for in-person notifications.  The system has faced multiple delays, with its initial launch scheduled for November 2024. Russia’s fall 2025 draft, which runs from October 1 to December 31, was expected to rely on this digital registry in four regions, including Moscow.  Sverdlin noted that once fully operational, the online system automatically enforces restrictions on draftees who fail to report for compulsory service, including travel bans.  

Origins and Government Plans for the Unified Registry 

The hacker group reportedly remained in Micord’s system for several months, accessing critical infrastructure, operational correspondence, and the source code, which they claimed to have destroyed. The documents were shared with journalists at IStories, who confirmed their authenticity.  The Russian government first announced plans for a unified digital military registration registry in April 2023, when the State Duma passed a bill creating the system. RT Labs, a Rostelecom subsidiary, was initially named as one of the developers.   In February 2024, Rostelecom was designated as the sole contractor to complete the system for the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media, with a completion deadline of December 31, 2024. Though initially intended for the 2024 fall draft, the registry became fully operational only in October 2025, with several regions adopting electronic summonses and phasing out paper notifications. 

The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has fined password manager provider LastPass UK Ltd £1.2 million following a 2022 data breach that compromised the personal information of up to 1.6 million people in the UK. The data breach occurred in August 2022 and was the result of two isolated incidents that, when combined, enabled a hacker to gain unauthorized access to LastPass’ backup database. The stolen information included customer names, email addresses, phone numbers, and stored website URLs. While the data breach exposed sensitive personal information, the ICO confirmed there is no evidence that hackers were able to decrypt customer passwords. This is due to LastPass’ use of a ‘zero knowledge’ encryption system, which ensures that master passwords and vaults are stored locally on customer devices and never shared with the company.

Incident One: Corporate Laptop Compromised

The first incident involved a LastPass employee’s corporate laptop based in Europe. A hacker gained access to the company’s development environment and obtained encrypted company credentials. Although no personal information was taken at this stage, the credentials could have provided access to the backup database if decrypted. LastPass attempted to mitigate the hacker’s activity and believed the encryption keys remained safe, as they were stored outside the compromised environment in the vaults of four senior employees.

Incident Two: Personal Device Targeted

The second incident proved more damaging. The hacker targeted one of the senior employees who had access to the decryption keys. Exploiting a known vulnerability in a third‑party streaming service, the attacker gained access to the employee’s personal device. A keylogger was installed, capturing the employee’s master password. Multi‑factor authentication was bypassed using a trusted device cookie. This allowed the hacker to access both the employee’s personal and business LastPass vaults, which were linked by a single master password. From there, the hacker obtained the Amazon Web Service (AWS) access key and decryption key stored in the business vault. Combined with information taken the previous day, this enabled the extraction of the backup database containing customer personal information.

ICO’s Findings and Fine on LastPass UK

The ICO investigation concluded that LastPass failed to implement sufficiently strong technical and security measures, leaving customers exposed. Although the company’s zero knowledge encryption protected passwords, the exposure of personal data was deemed a serious failure. John Edwards, UK Information Commissioner, stated: “Password managers are a safe and effective tool for businesses and the public to manage their numerous login details, and we continue to encourage their use. However, as is clear from this incident, businesses offering these services should ensure that system access and use is restricted to reduce risks of attack. LastPass customers had a right to expect their personal information would be kept safe and secure. The company fell short of this expectation, resulting in the proportionate fine announced today.”

Lessons for Businesses

The ICO has urged all UK businesses to review their systems and procedures to prevent similar risks. This case underscores the importance of restricting system access, strengthening cybersecurity measures, and ensuring that employees’ personal devices do not become weak points in corporate networks. While password managers remain a recommended tool for managing login details, the incident shows that even trusted providers can fall short if internal safeguards are not sufficiently strong. The £1.2 million fine against LastPass UK Ltd serves as a clear reminder that companies handling sensitive data must uphold the highest standards of security. Although customer passwords were protected by the company’s zero knowledge encryption system, the exposure of personal information has left millions vulnerable. The ICO’s ruling reinforces the need for constant vigilance in the face of growing cyber threats. For both businesses and individuals, the message is straightforward: adopt strong security practices, conduct regular system reviews, and implement robust employee safeguards to reduce the risk of future data breaches.

Microsoft Corp. has announced a major update to its bug bounty program, extending coverage to include any vulnerability affecting its online services. This new framework, referred to as “In Scope By Default,” is an important shift in how the tech giant approaches coordinated vulnerability disclosure.  Under this updated model, every Microsoft online service is automatically eligible for bounty awards from the moment it launches. Previously, the company relied on product-specific scope definitions, which often caused confusion for security researchers and limited the range of vulnerabilities eligible for rewards. By making all services In Scope By Default, Microsoft aims to make participation in the bug bounty program more predictable while ensuring critical vulnerabilities are addressed and incentivized regardless of their origin.  A key feature of the expanded scope is its coverage of third-party and open-source components integrated into Microsoft services. This means that vulnerabilities in external libraries, dependencies, or open-source packages that power Microsoft’s cloud infrastructure are now eligible for bug bounty rewards, not just flaws in Microsoft’s own software. 

A Strategic Shift in Bug Bounty Security Incentives 

Tom Gallagher, vice president of engineering at the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC), highlighted the significance of the change in a December 11, 2025, blog post. He described it as more than an administrative adjustment, calling it a structural realignment designed to reflect real-world risk. Gallagher explained that by defaulting all services into scope, Microsoft hopes to reduce reporting delays, minimize confusion, and allow researchers to focus on vulnerabilities with meaningful impact on customers.  “If Microsoft’s online services are impacted by vulnerabilities in third-party code, including open source, we want to know,” Gallagher stated. “If no bounty award formerly exists to reward this vital work, we will offer one. This closes the gap for security research and raises the security bar for everyone who relies on this code.”  The new policy also allows Microsoft to collaborate more effectively with researchers on upstream or third-party vulnerabilities. The company can now assist with developing fixes or support maintainers when issues in external codebases directly affect Microsoft services. 

Industry Reaction and Expected Impact 

All new Microsoft online services now fall under bug bounty coverage from day one, while millions of existing endpoints no longer require manual approval to qualify. The update is designed to make it easier for security professionals to identify and report vulnerabilities across Microsoft’s expansive ecosystem.  The new approach aligns with Microsoft’s broader security philosophy in an AI- and cloud-first environment, where attackers exploit any weak link, regardless of ownership. According to Gallagher, “Security vulnerabilities often emerge at the seams where components interact or where dependencies are involved. We value research that takes this broader perspective, encompassing not only Microsoft infrastructure but also third-party dependencies, including commercial software and open-source components.”  Last year, Microsoft’s bug bounty program and its Zero Day Quest live-hacking event awarded over $17 million to researchers for high-impact discoveries. With the In Scope By Default initiative, the company expects to expand eligibility even further, particularly in areas involving Microsoft-owned domains, cloud services, and third-party or open-source code.  Researchers participating in the program are expected to follow Microsoft’s Rules of Engagement for Responsible Security Research, ensuring customer privacy and data protection while enabling coordinated vulnerability disclosure. By widening its bug bounty scope, Microsoft aims to raise the overall security bar. 

The City of Cambridge has released an important update regarding the OnSolve CodeRED emergency notifications system, also known locally as Cambridge’s reverse 911 system. The platform, widely used by thousands of local governments and public safety agencies across the country, was taken offline in November following a nationwide OnSolve CodeRED cyberattack. Residents who rely on CodeRED alerts for information about snow emergencies, evacuations, water outages, or other service disruptions are being asked to take immediate steps to secure their accounts and continue receiving notifications.

Impact of the OnSolve CodeRED Cyberattack on User Data

According to city officials, the data breach affected CodeRED databases nationwide, including Cambridge. The compromised information may include phone numbers, email addresses, and passwords of registered users. Importantly, the attack targeted the OnSolve CodeRED system itself, not the City of Cambridge or its departments. This OnSolve CodeRED cyberattack incident mirrors similar concerns raised in Monroe County, Georgia, where officials confirmed that residents’ personal information was also exposed. The Monroe County Emergency Management Agency emphasized that the breach was part of a nationwide cybersecurity incident and not a local failure.

Transition to CodeRED by Crisis24

In response, OnSolve permanently decommissioned the old CodeRED platform and migrated services to a new, secure environment known as CodeRED by Crisis24. The new system has undergone comprehensive security audits, including penetration testing and system hardening, to ensure stronger protection against future threats. For Cambridge residents, previously registered contact information has been imported into the new platform. However, due to security concerns, all passwords have been removed. Users must now reset their credentials before accessing their accounts.

Steps for City of Cambridge Residents and Users

To continue receiving emergency notifications, residents should:

• Visit accountportal.onsolve.net/cambridgema
• Enter their username (usually an email address)
• Select “forgot password” to verify and reset credentials
• If unsure of their username, use the “forgot username” option

Officials strongly advise against reusing old CodeRED passwords, as they may have been compromised. Instead, users should create strong, unique passwords and update their information once logged in. Additionally, anyone who used the same password across multiple accounts is urged to change those credentials immediately to reduce the risk of further exposure.

Broader National Context

The Monroe County cyberattack highlights the scale of the issue. Officials there reported that data such as names, addresses, phone numbers, and passwords were compromised. Residents who enrolled before March 31, 2025, had their information migrated to the new Crisis24 CodeRED platform, while those who signed up afterward must re‑enroll. OnSolve has reassured communities that the intrusion was contained within the original system and did not spread to other networks. While there is currently no evidence of identity theft, the incident underscores the growing risks of cyber intrusions nationwide.

Resources for Cybersecurity Protection

Residents who believe they may have been victims of cyber‑enabled fraud are encouraged to report incidents to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) at ic3.gov. Additional resources are available to help protect individuals and families from fraud and cybercrime. Security experts note that the rising frequency of attacks highlights the importance of independent threat‑intelligence providers. Companies such as Cyble track vulnerabilities and cybercriminal activity across global networks, offering organizations tools to strengthen defenses and respond more quickly to incidents.

Looking Ahead

The City of Cambridge has thanked residents for their patience as staff worked with OnSolve to restore emergency alert capabilities. Officials emphasized that any breach of security is a serious concern and confirmed that they will continue monitoring the new CodeRED by Crisis24 platform to ensure its standards are upheld. In addition, the City is evaluating other emergency alerting systems to determine the most effective long‑term solution for community safety.

A study of honeypot and cyber deception technologies by the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) found that the deception tools hold promise for disrupting cyberattacks, but more information and standards are needed for them to work optimally. The agency plans to help with that. The NCSC test involved 121 organizations, 14 commercial providers of honeypots and deception tools, and 10 trials across environments ranging from the cloud to operational technology (OT). The NCSC concluded that “cyber deception can work, but it’s not plug-and-play.”

Honeypot and Cyber Deception Challenges

The NCSC said surveyed organizations believe that cyber deception technologies can offer “real value, particularly in detecting novel threats and enriching threat intelligence,” and a few even see potential for identifying insider threats. “However, outcome-based metrics were not readily available and require development,” the NCSC cautioned. The UK cybersecurity agency said the effectiveness of honeypots and cyber deception tools “depends on having the right data and context. We found that cyber deception can be used for visibility in many systems, including legacy or niche systems, but without a clear strategy organisations risk deploying tools that generate noise rather than insight.” The NCSC blog post didn’t specify what data was missing or needed to be developed to better measure the effectiveness of deception technologies, but the agency nonetheless concluded that “there’s a compelling case for increasing the use of cyber deception in the UK.” The study examined three core assumptions:

• Cyber deception technologies can help detect compromises already inside networks.
• Cyber deception and honeypots can help detect new attacks as they happen.
• Cyber deception can change how attackers behave if they know an organization is using the tools.

Terminology, Guidance Needed for Honeypots and Deception Tools

The tests, conducted under the Active Cyber Defence (ACD) 2.0 program, also found that inconsistent terminology and guidance hamper optimal use of the technologies. “There’s a surprising amount of confusion around terminology, and vocabulary across the industry is often inconsistent,” NCSC said. “This makes it harder for organisations to understand what’s on offer or even what they’re trying to achieve. We think adopting standard terminology should help and we will be standardising our cyber deception vocabulary.” Another challenge is that organizations don’t know where to start. “They want impartial advice, real-world case studies, and reassurance that the tools they’re using are effective and safe,” the agency said. “We’ve found a strong marketplace of cyber deception providers offering a wide range of products and services. However, we were told that navigating this market can be difficult, especially for beginners.” The NCSC said it thinks it can help organizations “make informed, strategic choices.”

Should Organizations Say if They’re Using Deception Tools?

One interesting finding is that 90% of the trial participants said they wouldn’t publicly announce that they use cyber deception. While it’s understandable not to want to tip off attackers, the NCSC said that academic research shows that “when attackers believe cyber deception is in use they are less confident in their attacks. This can impose a cost on attackers by disrupting their methods and wasting their time, to the benefit of the defenders.” Proper configuration is also a challenge for adopters. “As with any cyber security solution, misconfiguration can introduce new vulnerabilities,” the NCSC said. “If cyber deception tools aren’t properly configured, they may fail to detect threats or lead to a false sense of security, or worse, create openings for attackers. As networks evolve and new tools are introduced, keeping cyber deception tools aligned requires ongoing effort. It is important to consider regular updates and fine-tuning cyber deception solutions.” Next steps for the NCSC involve helping organizations better understand and deploy honeypots and deception tools, possibly through a new ACD service. “By helping organisations to understand cyber deception and finding clear ways to measure impact, we are building a strong foundation to support the deployment of cyber deception at a national scale in the UK,” the agency said. “We are looking at developing a new ACD service to achieve this. “One of the most promising aspects of cyber deception is its potential to impose cost on adversaries,” the NCSC added. “By forcing attackers to spend time and resources navigating false environments, chasing fake credentials, or second-guessing their access, cyber deception can slow down attacks and increase the likelihood of detection. This aligns with broader national resilience goals by making the UK a harder, more expensive target.”

OpenAI has issued a cautionary statement that its forthcoming AI models could present “high” cybersecurity risks as their capabilities rapidly advance. The warning, published on Wednesday, noted the potential for these AI models to either develop zero-day exploits against well-defended systems or assist in enterprise or industrial intrusion operations with tangible real-world consequences.  The company, known for ChatGPT, explained that as AI capabilities grow, its models could reach levels where misuse might have an impact. OpenAI highlighted the dual-use nature of these technologies, noting that techniques used to strengthen defenses can also be repurposed for malicious operations. “As AI capabilities advance, we are investing in strengthening models for defensive cybersecurity tasks and creating tools that enable defenders to more easily perform workflows such as auditing code and patching vulnerabilities,” the blog post stated.  To mitigate these risks, OpenAI is implementing a multi-layered strategy involving access controls, infrastructure hardening, egress controls, monitoring, and ongoing threat intelligence efforts. These protection methods are designed to go alongside the threat landscape, ensuring a quick response to new risks while preserving the utility of AI models for defensive purposes. 

Assessing Cybersecurity Risks in AI Models 

OpenAI noted that the cybersecurity proficiency of its AI models has improved over recent months. Capabilities measured through capture-the-flag (CTF) challenges increased from 27% on GPT‑5 in August 2025 to 76% on GPT‑5.1-Codex-Max by November 2025. The company expects this trajectory to continue and is preparing scenarios in which future models could reach “High” cybersecurity levels, as defined by its internal Preparedness Framework.  These high-level models could, for instance, autonomously develop working zero-day exploits or assist in stealthy cyber intrusions. OpenAI emphasized that its approach to safeguards combines technical measures with careful governance of model access and application. The company aims to ensure that these AI capabilities strengthen security rather than lower barriers to misuse. 

Frontier Risk Council and Advisory Initiatives 

In addition to technical measures, OpenAI is establishing the Frontier Risk Council, an advisory group that will bring experienced cyber defenders and security practitioners into direct collaboration with its teams. Initially focusing on cybersecurity, the council will eventually expand to other frontier AI capability domains. Members will advise balancing useful, responsible capabilities with the potential for misuse, informing model evaluations. OpenAI is also exploring a trusted access program for qualifying users and customers working in cyber defense. This initiative aims to provide tiered access to enhanced AI capabilities while maintaining control over potential misuse.  Beyond these initiatives, OpenAI collaborates with global experts, red-teaming organizations, and the broader cybersecurity community to evaluate potential risks and improve safety measures. This includes end-to-end red teaming to simulate adversary attacks and detection systems designed to intercept unsafe activity, with escalation protocols combining automated and human review. 

Dual-Use Risks and Mitigation 

OpenAI stressed that cybersecurity capabilities in AI models are inherently dual-use, with offensive and defensive knowledge often overlapping. To manage this, the company employs a defense-in-depth strategy, layering protection methods such as access controls, monitoring, detection, and enforcement programs. Models are trained to refuse harmful requests while remaining effective for legitimate educational and defensive applications.  OpenAI also works through the Frontier Model Forum, a nonprofit initiative involving leading AI labs, to develop shared threat models and ecosystem-wide best practices. This collaborative approach aims to create a consistent understanding of potential attack vectors and mitigation strategies across the AI industry. 

Historical Context and Risk Management 

This recent warning aligns with OpenAI’s prior alerts regarding frontier risks. In April 2025, the company issued a similar caution concerning bioweapons risks, followed by the release of ChatGPT Agent in July 2025, which was assessed as “high” on risk levels. These measures reflect OpenAI’s ongoing commitment to evaluate and publicly disclose potential hazards from advanced AI capabilities.  The company’s updated Preparedness Framework categorizes AI capabilities according to risk and guides operational safeguards. It distinguishes between “High” capabilities, which could amplify existing pathways to severe harm, and “Critical” capabilities, which could create unprecedented risks. Each new AI model undergoes rigorous evaluation to ensure that it sufficiently minimizes risks before deployment. 

Government contractor fraud is at the heart of a new indictment returned by a federal grand jury in Washington, D.C. against a former senior manager in Virginia. Prosecutors say Danielle Hillmer, 53, of Chantilly, misled federal agencies for more than a year about the security of a cloud platform used by the U.S. Army and other government customers. The indictment, announced yesterday, charges Hillmer with major government contractor fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of federal audits. According to prosecutors, she concealed serious weaknesses in the system while presenting it as fully compliant with strict federal cybersecurity standards.

Government Contractor Fraud: Alleged Scheme to Mislead Agencies

According to court documents, Hillmer’s actions spanned from March 2020 through November 2021. During this period, she allegedly obstructed auditors and misrepresented the platform’s compliance with the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) and the Department of Defense’s Risk Management Framework. The indictment claims that while the platform was marketed as a secure environment for federal agencies, it lacked critical safeguards such as access controls, logging, and monitoring. Despite repeated warnings, Hillmer allegedly insisted the system met the FedRAMP High baseline and DoD Impact Levels 4 and 5, both of which are required for handling sensitive government data.

Obstruction of Audits

Federal prosecutors allege Hillmer went further by attempting to obstruct third-party assessors during audits in 2020 and 2021. She is accused of concealing deficiencies and instructing others to hide the true state of the system during testing and demonstrations. The indictment also states that Hillmer misled the U.S. Army to secure sponsorship for a Department of Defense provisional authorization. She allegedly submitted, and directed others to submit, authorization materials containing false information to assessors, authorizing officials, and government customers. These misrepresentations, prosecutors say, allowed the contractor to obtain and maintain government contracts under false pretenses.

Charges and Potential Penalties

Hillmer faces two counts of wire fraud, one count of major government fraud, and two counts of obstruction of a federal audit. If convicted, she could face:

• Up to 20 years in prison for each wire fraud count
• Up to 10 years in prison for major government fraud
• Up to 5 years in prison for each obstruction count

A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors. The indictment was announced by Acting Assistant Attorney General Matthew R. Galeotti of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and Deputy Inspector General Robert C. Erickson of the U.S. General Services Administration Office of Inspector General (GSA-OIG). The case is being investigated by the GSA-OIG, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division. Trial Attorneys Lauren Archer and Paul Hayden of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section are prosecuting the case.

Broader Implications of Government Contractor Fraud

The indictment highlights ongoing concerns about the integrity of cloud platforms used by federal agencies. Programs like FedRAMP and the DoD’s Risk Management Framework are designed to ensure that systems handling sensitive government data meet rigorous security standards. Allegations that a contractor misrepresented compliance raise questions about oversight and the risks posed to national security when platforms fall short of requirements. Federal officials emphasized that the government contractor fraud case highlights the importance of transparency and accountability in government contracting, particularly in areas involving cybersecurity. Note: It is important to note that an indictment is merely an allegation. Hillmer, like all defendants, is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

Google has addressed a Gemini zero-click security flaw that allows silent data extraction from corporate environments using the company’s AI assistant tools. The issue, identified as a vulnerability in Gemini Enterprise, was uncovered in June 2025 by researchers at Noma Security, who immediately reported it to Google.  The researchers named the flaw GeminiJack, describing it as an architectural weakness affecting both Google’s Gemini Enterprise, its suite of corporate AI assistant tools, and Vertex AI Search, which supports AI-driven search and recommendation functions on Google Cloud.  According to security researchers, the issue allowed a form of indirect prompt injection. Attackers could embed malicious instructions inside everyday documents stored or shared through Gmail, Google Calendar, Google Docs, or any other Workspace application that Gemini Enterprise had permission to access. When the system interacted with the poisoned content, it could be manipulated to exfiltrate sensitive information without the target's knowledge.  The defining trait of the attack was that it required no interaction from the victim. Researchers noted that exploiting Gemini zero-click behavior meant employees did not need to open links, click prompts, or override warnings. The attack also bypassed standard enterprise security controls. 

How the GeminiJack Attack Chain Worked 

Noma Security detailed several stages in the GeminiJack attack sequence, showing how minimal attacker effort could trigger high-impact consequences: 

1. Content Poisoning: An attacker creates a harmless-looking Google Doc, Calendar entry, or Gmail message. Hidden inside was a directive instructing Gemini Enterprise to locate sensitive terms within authorized Workspace data and embed those results into an image URL controlled by the attacker. 
2. Trigger: A regular employee performing a routine search could inadvertently cause the AI to fetch and process the tampered content. 
3. AI Execution: Once retrieved, Gemini misinterpreted the hidden instructions as legitimate. The system then scanned corporate Workspace data, based on its existing access permissions, for the specified sensitive information. 
4. Exfiltration: During its response, the AI inserted a malicious image tag. When the browser rendered that tag, it automatically transmitted the extracted data to the attacker's server using an ordinary HTTP request. This occurred without detection, sidestepping conventional defenses. 

Researchers explained that the flaw existed because Gemini Enterprise’s search function relies on Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). RAG enables organizations to query multiple Workspace sources through pre-configured access settings.  “Organizations must pre-configure which data sources the RAG system can access,” the researchers noted. “Once configured, the system has persistent access to these data sources for all user queries.” They added that the vulnerability exploited “the trust boundary between user-controlled content in data sources and the AI model’s instruction processing.”  A step-by-step proof-of-concept for GeminiJack was published on December 8. 

Google’s Response and Industry Implications 

Google confirmed receiving the report in August 2025 and collaborated with the researchers to resolve the issue. The company issued updates modifying how Gemini Enterprise and Vertex AI Search interact with retrieval and indexing systems. Following the fix, Vertex AI Search was fully separated from Gemini Enterprise and no longer shares the same LLM-based workflows or RAG functionality.  Despite the patch, security researchers warned that similar indirect prompt-injection attacks could emerge as more organizations adopt AI systems with expansive access privileges. Traditional perimeter defenses, endpoint security products, and DLP tools, they noted, were “not designed to detect when your AI assistant becomes an exfiltration engine.”  “As AI agents gain broader access to corporate data and autonomy to act on instructions, the blast radius of a single vulnerability expands exponentially,” the researchers concluded. They advised organizations to reassess trust boundaries, strengthen monitoring, and stay up to date on AI security work. 

2025 will be remembered as the year cyber threats reached a breaking point. With nearly 6,000 ransomware incidents, more than 6,000 data breaches, and over 3,000 sales of compromised corporate access, enterprises across the globe faced one of the most dangerous digital landscapes on record. Manufacturing plants halted production, government agencies struggled to contain leaks, and critical infrastructure endured direct hits. Cyble Global Cybersecurity Report 2025 highlights that ransomware attacks surged 50% year-over-year. Not only this, the Global Cybersecurity Report 2025 stated that data breaches climbed to their second-highest level ever, and the underground market for stolen access flourished. Together, these figures reveal not just isolated events, but a systemic escalation of cybercrime that is reshaping the way organizations must defend themselves.

Cyble Global Cybersecurity Report 2025: A Year of Escalation

The Cyble Global Cybersecurity Report 2025 documented 5,967 ransomware attacks, representing a 50% increase year-over-year. Alongside this, 6,046 data breaches and leaks were recorded, the second-highest level ever observed. The underground market for compromised initial access also thrived, with 3,013 sales fueling the global cybercrime economy. Daksh Nakra, Senior Manager of Research and Intelligence at Cyble, described 2025 as a “Major power shift in the threat landscape,” noting that new ransomware groups quickly filled the void left by law enforcement crackdowns. The combination of supply chain attacks and rapid weaponization of zero-day vulnerabilities created what he called “a perfect storm” for enterprises worldwide.

Ransomware Landscape Transformed

Two groups stood out in 2025. Akira ransomware emerged as the second-most prolific group behind Qilin, launching sustained campaigns across Construction, Manufacturing, and Professional Services. Its opportunistic targeting model allowed it to compromise nearly every major industry vertical. Meanwhile, CL0P ransomware reaffirmed its reputation as a zero-day specialist. In February 2025, CL0P executed a mass campaign exploiting enterprise file transfer software, posting hundreds of victims in a single wave. Consumer Goods, Transportation & Logistics, and IT sectors were among the hardest hit.

Key Ransomware Statistics

• 5,967 total ransomware attacks in 2025 (50% increase year-over-year)
• The manufacturing sector most targeted, suffering the highest operational disruption
• Construction, Professional Services, Healthcare, and IT are among the top five targets
• The United States experienced the majority of attacks; Australia entered the top-five list for the first time
• 31 incidents directly impacted critical infrastructure

Data Breaches Near Record Levels

Government and law enforcement agencies were disproportionately affected, accounting for 998 incidents (16.5% of total breaches). The Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance (BFSI) sector followed with 634 incidents. Together, these two sectors represented more than a quarter of all breaches, highlighting attackers’ focus on sensitive citizen data and financial information. The sale of compromised corporate access continued to fuel cybercrime. Cyble’s analysis revealed 3,013 access sales, with the Retail sector most heavily targeted at 594 incidents (nearly 20%). BFSI followed with 284 incidents, while Government agencies accounted for 175 incidents.

Vulnerabilities Drive Attack Surge

Cyble Global Cybersecurity Report 2025 further highlighted that critical flaws in widely deployed enterprise technologies served as primary entry points. Among the most exploited were:

• CVE-2025-61882 (Oracle E-Business Suite RCE) – leveraged by CL0P
• CVE-2025-10035 (GoAnywhere MFT RCE) – exploited by Medusa
• Multiple vulnerabilities in Fortinet, Ivanti, and Cisco products with CVSS scores above 9.0

In total, 94 zero-day vulnerabilities were identified in 2025, with 25 scoring above 9.0. Over 86% of CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog entries carried CVSS ratings of 7.0 or higher, with Microsoft, Fortinet, Apple, Cisco, and Oracle most frequently affected.

Geopolitical Hacktivism Surges

According to Cyble's global cybersecurity report 2025, hacktivist activity reached an unprecedented scale, with over 40,000 data leaks and dump posts impacting 41,400 unique domains. Much of this activity was driven by geopolitical conflicts:

• The Israel-Iran conflict triggered operations by 74 hacktivist groups
• India-Pakistan tensions generated 1.5 million intrusion attempts
• North Korea’s IT worker fraud schemes infiltrated global companies
• DDoS attacks, website defacements, and breaches targeted governments and critical infrastructure

Industry-Specific Insights

• Manufacturing: Most attacked sector due to reliance on OT/ICS environments and low tolerance for downtime
• Construction: Heavily targeted by Akira; time-sensitive projects created maximum pressure points
• Professional Services: Law firms and consultancies compromised for sensitive client data and supply chain leverage
• Healthcare: Continued to face attacks from groups like BianLian, Abyss, and INC Ransom due to critical data availability needs
• IT & ITES: Service providers exploited to enable cascading supply chain attacks against downstream customers

Outlook

The numbers from Cyble Global Cybersecurity Report 2025 highlight that ransomware is up by 50%, thousands of breaches, and a booming underground economy for compromised access. With critical infrastructure, government agencies, and high-value industries increasingly in the crosshairs, the Cyble global cybersecurity report 2025 highlights the urgency for global enterprises to strengthen defenses against a rapidly evolving threat landscape.

For a full analysis, the Global Cybersecurity Report 2025 is available at Cyble Research Reports.

Microsoft patched 57 vulnerabilities in its Patch Tuesday December 2025 update, including one exploited zero-day and six high-risk vulnerabilities. The exploited zero-day is CVE-2025-62221, a 7.8-rated Use After Free vulnerability in Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver that could allow an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally and gain SYSTEM privileges. CISA promptly added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Microsoft credited its own Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) and Security Response Center (MSRC) for the find. Microsoft’s Patch Tuesday December 2025 update also issued fixes for 13 non-Microsoft CVEs; all the non-Microsoft CVEs were for Chromium-based Edge vulnerabilities. Other vendors issuing critical Patch Tuesday updates included Fortinet (CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719), Ivanti (CVE-2025-10573) and SAP (CVE-2025-42880, CVE-2025-42928, and Apache Tomcat-related vulnerabilities CVE-2025-55754 and CVE-2025-55752).

High-Risk Vulnerabilities Fixed in Patch Tuesday December 2025 Update

Microsoft rated six vulnerabilities as “Exploitation More Likely.” The six are all rated 7.8 under CVSS 3.1, and three are Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerabilities. The six high-risk vulnerabilities include: CVE-2025-59516, a 7.8-severity Windows Storage VSP Driver Elevation of Privilege vulnerability. The Missing Authentication for Critical Function flaw in Windows Storage VSP Driver could allow an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. CVE-2025-59517, also a 7.8-rated Windows Storage VSP Driver Elevation of Privilege vulnerability. Improper access control in Windows Storage VSP Driver could allow an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. CVE-2025-62454, a 7.8-rated Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege vulnerability. The Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver could allow an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. CVE-2025-62458, a 7.8-severity Win32k Elevation of Privilege vulnerability. The Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Windows Win32K - GRFX could allow an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. CVE-2025-62470, a 7.8-rated Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege vulnerability. The Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability in the Windows CLFS Driver could allow local privilege elevation by an authorized attacker. CVE-2025-62472, a 7.8-severity Windows Remote Access Connection Manager Elevation of Privilege vulnerability. The use of uninitialized resource flaw in Windows Remote Access Connection Manager could allow an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

High-Severity Office, Copilot, SharePoint Vulnerabilities also Fixed

The highest-rated vulnerabilities in the December 2025 Patch Tuesday update were rated 8.8, and there were three 8.4-severity vulnerabilities too. All were rated as being at lower risk of exploitation by Microsoft. The four 8.8-rated vulnerabilities include:

• CVE-2025-62549, a Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) Remote Code Execution vulnerability
• CVE-2025-62550, an Azure Monitor Agent Remote Code Execution vulnerability
• CVE-2025-62456, a Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Remote Code Execution vulnerability
• CVE-2025-64672, a Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing vulnerability

The three 8.4-severity vulnerabilities include:

• CVE-2025-64671, a GitHub Copilot for Jetbrains Remote Code Execution vulnerability
• CVE-2025-62557, a Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution/Use After Free vulnerability
• CVE-2025-62554, a Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution/Type Confusion vulnerability

The U.S. Department of Justice has unveiled a series of actions against two Russian state-supported cyber collectives, CARR (also known as CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn or CyberArmyofRussia) and NoName057(16), with prosecutors unsealing dual indictments against Ukrainian national Victoria Eduardovna Dubranova, 33. Dubranova, known online as “Vika,” “Tory,” and “SovaSonya,” is accused of participating in destructive campaigns against critical infrastructure worldwide on behalf of Russian geopolitical objectives.  Dubranova was extradited to the United States earlier in 2025 on charges tied to CARR, and she has now been arraigned on a second indictment connected to NoName057(16). She pleaded not guilty in both proceedings. Trial in the NoName057(16) case is scheduled for February 3, 2026, while the CARR case is set for April 7, 2026. 

Russian Government Involvement 

According to prosecutors, both CARR and NoName057(16) operated with direct or indirect support from Moscow. CARR allegedly received Russian government funding used to acquire cyber tools, including subscriptions to DDoS-for-hire services. NoName057(16) was described as a covert, state-blessed endeavor tied to the Center for the Study and Network Monitoring of the Youth Environment (CISM), an IT organization established in 2018 by presidential order in Russia. Employees of that organization reportedly helped build NoName057(16)’s proprietary DDoS software, known as DDoSia.  [caption id="" align="alignnone" width="2048"] Notification of CARR and Z-Pentest Hackers (Source: Rewards for Justice)[/caption] Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg said the enforcement effort demonstrates the Department’s commitment “to disrupting malicious Russian cyber activity, whether conducted directly by state actors or their criminal proxies,” emphasizing the need to defend key resources such as food and water systems.  First Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli warned that state-aligned hacktivist groups, including CARR and NoName057(16), pose serious national security concerns because they enable foreign intelligence services to obscure their involvement by using civilian proxies.  FBI Cyber Division Assistant Director Brett Leatherman stated that the Bureau will continue exposing and pursuing pro-Russia actors, including those with ties to the GRU. EPA Acting Assistant Administrator Craig Pritzlaff added that targeting water systems presents immediate hazards, pledging continued pursuit of individuals who threaten public resources. 

Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR / CyberArmyofRussia) 

According to the indictments, CARR, also known as Z-Pentest and linked to CyberArmyofRussia, was created, funded, and directed by Russia’s GRU. The group has claimed responsibility for hundreds of global cyberattacks, including intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure. CARR regularly published evidence of its operations on Telegram, where it amassed more than 75,000 followers and reportedly consisted of over 100 members, some of whom were juveniles.  The group allegedly targeted industrial control systems and carried out widespread DDoS attacks. Victims included public drinking water systems in multiple U.S. states, where operational disruptions led to the release of hundreds of thousands of gallons of drinking water. In November 2024, CARR allegedly attacked a meat processing plant in Los Angeles, causing thousands of pounds of meat to spoil and triggering an ammonia leak. The group also targeted election infrastructure and websites linked to nuclear regulatory bodies.  A figure known as “Cyber_1ce_Killer,” associated with at least one GRU officer, allegedly advised CARR on target selection and financed access to cybercriminal services. Dubranova faces charges including conspiracy to damage protected computers, tampering with public water systems, damaging protected computers, access device fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The statutory maximum penalty is 27 years in federal prison. 

NoName057(16) 

The indictment describes NoName057(16) as a clandestine project involving CISM personnel and external cyber actors. The group conducted hundreds of DDoS attacks in support of Russian interests, using its proprietary tool DDoSia. Participants worldwide were encouraged to run DDoSia, with rankings published on Telegram and cryptocurrency rewards doled out to top performers.  Targets included government agencies, ports, rail systems, financial institutions, and other high-value operations. For Dubranova, the NoName057(16) indictment carries a single charge of conspiracy to damage protected computers, with a maximum penalty of five years.  The law enforcement actions form part of Operation Red Circus, with coordination from Europol’s Operation Eastwood. In July 2025, investigators across 19 countries disrupted more than 100 servers linked to NoName057(16). Authorities also arrested two members outside Russia, announced charges against five individuals, and conducted searches of two service providers and 22 group members. The FBI also suspended the group’s primary X account. 

Rewards and Prior Sanctions 

The State Department simultaneously announced rewards of up to $2 million for information on CARR / CyberArmyofRussia members and up to $10 million for intelligence on NoName057(16) actors. A Joint Cybersecurity Advisory released by multiple U.S. agencies warned that Russian-aligned hacktivist groups exploit insecure VNC connections to access critical operational technology devices, a tactic linked to physical damage in several incidents.  Federal action against CARR is longstanding. On July 19, 2024, the Treasury Department sanctioned Yuliya Vladimirovna Pankratova and Denis Olegovich Degtyarenko for cyber operations targeting U.S. infrastructure. Degtyarenko was accused of accessing a SCADA system belonging to a U.S. energy company and developing training materials on exploiting similar systems.  CARR’s attacks escalated in late 2023 and throughout 2024, including manipulations of unsecured industrial systems across water, hydroelectric, wastewater, and energy facilities in the U.S. and Europe. Water utilities in Indiana, New Jersey, and Texas were among the affected sites, with one town forced into manual operations. In January 2024, CARR published a video showing interference with human-machine interfaces at a U.S. water utility. 

On a cozy December morning, as children in Australia set their bags aside for the holiday season and held their tabs and phones in hand to take that selfie and announce to the world they were all set for the fun to begin, something felt a miss. They couldn't access their Snap Chat and Instagram accounts. No it wasn't another downtime caused by a cyberattack, because they could see their parents lounging on the couch and laughing at the dog dance reels. So why were they not able to? The answer: the ban on social media for children under 16 had officially taken effect. It wasn't just one or 10 or 100 but more than one million young users who woke up locked out of their social media. No TikTok scroll. No Snapchat streak. No YouTube comments. Australia had quietly entered a new era, the world’s first nationwide ban on social media for children under 16, effective December 10. The move has initiated global debate, parental relief, youth frustration, and a broader question: Is this the start of a global shift, or a risky social experiment? Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was clear about why his government took this unparalleled step. “Social media is doing harm to our kids, and I’m calling time on it,” he said during a press conference. “I’ve spoken to thousands of parents… they’re worried sick about the safety of our kids online, and I want Australian families to know that the Government has your back.” Under the Anthony Albanese social media policy, platforms including Instagram, Facebook, X, Snapchat, TikTok, Reddit, Twitch, Kick, Threads and YouTube must block users under 16, or face fines of up to AU$32 million. Parents and children won’t be penalized, but tech companies will. [caption id="attachment_107569" align="aligncenter" width="448"] Source: eSafety Commissioner[/caption]

Australia's Ban on Social Media: A Big Question

Albanese pointed to rising concerns about the effects of social media on children, from body-image distortion to exposure to inappropriate content and addictive algorithms that tug at young attention spans. [caption id="attachment_107541" align="aligncenter" width="960"] Source: Created using Google Gemini[/caption] Research supports these concerns. A Pew Research Center study found:

• 48% of teens say social media has a mostly negative effect on people their age, up sharply from 32% in 2022.
• 45% feel they spend too much time on social media.
• Teen girls experience more negative impacts than boys, including mental health struggles (25% vs 14%) and loss of confidence (20% vs 10%).
• Yet paradoxically, 74% of teens feel more connected to friends because of social media, and 63% use it for creativity.

These contradictions make the issue far from black and white. Psychologists remind us that adolescence, beginning around age 10 and stretching into the mid-20s, is a time of rapid biological and social change, and that maturity levels vary. This means that a one-size-fits-all ban on social media may overshoot the mark.

Ban on Social Media for Users Under 16: How People Reacted

Australia’s announcement, first revealed in November 2024, has motivated countries from Malaysia to Denmark to consider similar legislation. But not everyone is convinced this is the right way forward.

Supporters Applaud “A Chance at a Real Childhood”

Pediatric occupational therapist Cris Rowan, who has spent 22 years working with children, celebrated the move: “This may be the first time children have the opportunity to experience a real summer,” she said.“Canada should follow Australia’s bold initiative. Parents and teachers can start their own movement by banning social media from homes and schools.” Parents’ groups have also welcomed the decision, seeing it as a necessary intervention in a world where screens dominate childhood.

Others Say the Ban Is Imperfect, but Necessary

Australian author Geoff Hutchison puts it bluntly: “We shouldn’t look for absolutes. It will be far from perfect. But we can learn what works… We cannot expect the repugnant tech bros to care.” His view reflects a broader belief that tech companies have too much power, and too little accountability.

Experts Warn Against False Security 

However, some experts caution that the Australia ban on social media may create the illusion of safety while failing to address deeper issues. Professor Tama Leaver, Internet Studies expert at Curtin University, told The Cyber Express that while the ban on social media addresses some risks, such as algorithmic amplification of inappropriate content and endless scrolling, many online dangers remain.

“The social media ban only really addresses on set of risks for young people, which is algorithmic amplification of inappropriate content and the doomscrolling or infinite scroll. Many risks remain. The ban does nothing to address cyberbullying since messaging platforms are exempt from the ban, so cyberbullying will simply shift from one platform to another.”

Leaver also noted that restricting access to popular platforms will not drive children offline. Due to ban on social media young users will explore whatever digital spaces remain, which could be less regulated and potentially riskier.

“Young people are not leaving the digital world. If we take some apps and platforms away, they will explore and experiment with whatever is left. If those remaining spaces are less known and more risky, then the risks for young people could definitely increase. Ideally the ban will lead to more conversations with parents and others about what young people explore and do online, which could mitigate many of the risks.”

From a broader perspective, Leaver emphasized that the ban on social media will only be fully beneficial if accompanied by significant investment in digital literacy and digital citizenship programs across schools:

“The only way this ban could be fully beneficial is if there is a huge increase in funding and delivery of digital literacy and digital citizenship programs across the whole K-12 educational spectrum. We have to formally teach young people those literacies they might otherwise have learnt socially, otherwise the ban is just a 3 year wait that achieves nothing.”

He added that platforms themselves should take a proactive role in protecting children:

“There is a global appetite for better regulation of platforms, especially regarding children and young people. A digital duty of care which requires platforms to examine and proactively reduce or mitigate risks before they appear on platforms would be ideal, and is something Australia and other countries are exploring. Minimizing risks before they occur would be vastly preferable to the current processes which can only usually address harm once it occurs.”

Looking at the global stage, Leaver sees Australia ban on social media as a potential learning opportunity for other nations:

“There is clearly global appetite for better and more meaningful regulation of digital platforms. For countries considered their own bans, taking the time to really examine the rollout in Australia, to learn from our mistakes as much as our ambitions, would seem the most sensible path forward.”

Other specialists continue to warn that the ban on social media could isolate vulnerable teenagers or push them toward more dangerous, unregulated corners of the internet.

Legal Voices Raise Serious Constitutional Questions

Senior Supreme Court Advocate Dr. K. P. Kylasanatha Pillay offered a thoughtful reflection: “Exposure of children to the vagaries of social media is a global concern… But is a total ban feasible? We must ask whether this is a reasonable restriction or if it crosses the limits of state action. Not all social media content is harmful. The best remedy is to teach children awareness.” His perspective reflects growing debate about rights, safety, and state control.

LinkedIn, Reddit, and the Public Divide

Social media itself has become the battleground for reactions. On Reddit, youngesters were particularly vocal about the ban on social media. One teen wrote: “Good intentions, bad execution. This will make our generation clueless about internet safety… Social media is how teenagers express themselves. This ban silences our voices.” Another pointed out the easy loophole: “Bypassing this ban is as easy as using a free VPN. Governments don’t care about safety — they want control.” But one adult user disagreed: “Everyone against the ban seems to be an actual child. I got my first smartphone at 20. My parents were right — early exposure isn’t always good.” This generational divide is at the heart of the debate.

Brands, Marketers, and Schools Brace for Impact

Bindu Sharma, Founder of World One Consulting, highlighted the global implications: “Ten of the biggest platforms were ordered to block children… The world is watching how this plays out.” If the ban succeeds, brands may rethink how they target younger audiences. If it fails, digital regulation worldwide may need reimagining.

Where Does This Leave the World?

Australia’s decision to ban social media for children under 16 is bold, controversial, and rooted in good intentions. It could reshape how societies view childhood, technology, and digital rights. But as critics note, ban on social media platforms can also create unintended consequences, from delinquency to digital illiteracy. What’s clear is this: Australia has started a global conversation that’s no longer avoidable. As one LinkedIn user concluded: “Safety of the child today is assurance of the safety of society tomorrow.”

Recent data released by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) paints a troubling picture of the rapid rise in cybercrime in India, particularly cases executed through mobile phones and computers.   The NCRB report notes that India recorded over 52,000 cybercrime incidents in 2021, a number that escalated to more than 86,000 by 2023. The Minister of State for Home Affairs, Bandi Sanjay Kumar, shared these figures in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha. 

Regional Trends Show Sharp Contrasts Across Northern India 

Haryana recorded 751 cybercrime cases in 2023, making it the highest among northern states, followed by Himachal Pradesh with 127 cases, a major jump from just 77 the previous year. Punjab, however, reported a decline, registering 511 cases in 2023 compared to 697 in 2022.  Among northern Union Territories, Delhi led with 407 cases, followed by Jammu & Kashmir with 185 and Chandigarh with 23. To strengthen cyber forensic capabilities, the Ministry of Home Affairs provided support to 20 states and UTs under the Nirbhaya-funded scheme. Punjab received ₹7.98 crore from 2018–19, while Himachal Pradesh received ₹7.29 crore. 

Ransomware Surge Places India and Asia-Pacific in a High-Risk Zone 

Beyond NCRB’s findings, rising digital threats in the Asia-Pacific region further illustrate the scale of cybercrime in India and neighboring countries. Cyble’s Monthly Threat Landscape Report: July 2025 reveals that India remains a priority target for ransomware groups. The Warlock ransomware group breached an India-based manufacturing firm, exfiltrating HR files, financial records, design archives, and internal repositories.   Additional leaks on dark web forums exposed stolen data from two Indian companies, a technology consulting firm and a subscription-based SaaS platform.  Unauthorized access to an Indian telecom network was also put up for sale for US$35,000, including credentials, CLI access, and operational network details. Regionally, Thailand, Japan, and Singapore each recorded six ransomware victims, with India and the Philippines close behind. The manufacturing, government, and critical infrastructure sectors faced the brunt of attacks. Meanwhile, South Asia witnessed hacktivist activity, with the pro-India Team Pelican Hackers claiming breaches of major Pakistani research and academic institutions.  Globally, July 2025 saw 423 ransomware victims, with the U.S. accounting for 223. Qilin ransomware topped global activity with 73 victims, followed by INC Ransom with 59. Cyble’s sensors also detected more than 1,000 daily attacks on U.S. industrial control systems, while the UK, Vietnam, China, Singapore, and Hong Kong recorded high targeting levels. A booming market for zero-day exploits added to the risk landscape, with vulnerabilities in WinRAR and leading VPN platforms being sold for USD $80,000 to 1 BTC. 

Insights from 2024 Call for Urgency of Cyber Preparedness 

Insights from the India Threat Landscape Report 2024 add critical context to the rising threat levels highlighted by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). In the first half of 2024 alone, India recorded 593 cyberattacks, 388 data breaches, 107 data leaks, and 39 ransomware incidents, highlighting the need for stronger threat intelligence across tactical, operational, strategic, and technical layers.  Combined with Cyble’s observations on escalating ransomware activity, dark web exposure, and exploit markets, cybercrime in India is becoming the next big thing and demands a coordinated, intelligence-driven response.  Organizations seeking to stay protected from these threats can benefit from Cyble’s AI-powered threat intelligence ecosystem and autonomous security capabilities. Explore Cyble’s platform, experience Blaze AI, or schedule a free demo to strengthen your organization’s preparedness against modern-day cyber risks. 

India's Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet against 30 accused including two Chinese nationals who allegedly ran a cyber fraud network that siphoned over ₹1,000 crore (approximately US$112 million) from Indian investors through fake cryptocurrency mining platforms, loan apps, and bogus online job offers during the COVID-19 lockdown period.

The HPZ Token Investment Fraud case has exposed a well-coordinated transnational criminal syndicate that exploited India's emerging payment aggregation systems to launder proceeds at unprecedented speed through multiple shell companies before converting funds to cryptocurrency and transferring them overseas.

The fraud began when Shigoo Technology Pvt. Ltd., an entity owned and controlled by Chinese nationals, launched a fake mobile application titled "HPZ Tokens" claiming investments would be used for cryptocurrency mining yielding very high returns. Within just three months, crores were collected and diverted by fraudsters targeting vulnerable investors during pandemic lockdowns.

Chinese Nationals Directed Shell Company Network

Wan Jun served as director of Jilian Consultants India Private Limited, a subsidiary of Chinese entity Jilian Consultants. With help from accomplice Dortse, Wan Jun successfully created several shell companies including Shigoo Technologies that became conduits to collect and launder proceeds from major organized cyber frauds.

The second Chinese national charged, Li Anming, played key roles directing operations alongside Wan Jun. CBI investigation revealed these frauds were connected and controlled by a single organized criminal syndicate based overseas.

Jilian Consultants hired professionals including company secretaries and chartered accountants to create shell companies that helped them run the operation with ease. Money collected was converted into cryptocurrencies before being sent out of the country.

Also read: CBI Arrests Fugitive Cybercrime Kingpin, Busts Fifth Illegal Call Center Targeting US Nationals

Exploitation of Payment Aggregators

The investigation revealed misuse of payment aggregation systems that had just taken off in India at the time of the Covid-19 pandemic. Payment aggregators were providing large collection and money disbursal services using technology to genuine companies, with systems allowing users to access large numbers of bank accounts simultaneously.

Fraudsters exploited this well-structured payment infrastructure to launder money at high speed from accounts of one shell company to another. The system also allowed them to partially disburse money back to investors to gain confidence, sustaining the fraud scheme longer.

Total money moved from bank accounts of these companies surpassed ₹1,000 crore within just a few months.

Ongoing Investigation in Cyber Fraud Network

CBI initially arrested six people named Dortse, Rajni Kohli, Sushanta Behra, Abhishek, Mohd Imdhad Husain, and Rajat Jain. The agency has now filed chargesheet against 27 accused persons and three companies, with further investigation continuing against other suspects.

The investigation revealed this was not an isolated incident but part of a large cyber crime network responsible for several scams targeting Indian citizens in the post-COVID period using loan apps, fake investment platforms, and bogus online job offers.

"The CBI remains steadfast in its unwavering commitment to dismantling these sophisticated cyber fraud networks through relentless operations like Chakra-V," the agency said. The CBI will continue to fortify India's digital economy, protect vulnerable investors, execute targeted arrests, seize assets, and forge international collaborations."

Also read: Indo-U.S. Agencies Dismantle Cybercrime Network Targeting U.S. Nationals

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has determined that a phishing operation targeting the organization in early 2025 was carried out by a group associated with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). The RSF cyberattack conclusion follows a months-long technical investigation conducted with the support of French cybersecurity firm Sekoia.   According to RSF, the attempted RSF cyberattack was first identified in March 2025 when an employee received a message written in French that appeared to come from a trusted contact. The email requested the recipient to open an attachment that was, in fact, missing, an established phishing technique designed to prompt a reply, allowing attackers to later send infected documents or malicious links.  

The Failed RSF Cyberattack

When the response from the supposed sender arrived in English instead of French, the inconsistency raised immediate suspicion. The employee reported the exchange to RSF’s cybersecurity team, preventing the RSF cyberattack from progressing.  RSF then sought Sekoia’s assistance to conduct a deeper inquiry. The company later published a detailed account attributing the attack to the group known as Callisto or Calisto, also identified as UNC4057, Star Blizzard, or ColdRiver. Intelligence agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia have connected this group to the FSB. Sekoia describes Callisto as an advanced persistent threat capable of maintaining hidden, long-term access to targeted information systems. 

Kremlin Pressure and Designation as an “Undesirable Organization” 

In its statement, Reporters Without Borders noted that the organization frequently faces digital interference from Russian state services and pro-Kremlin actors. RSF has long been involved in defending press freedom in Russia and supporting journalists fleeing the country, making it a recurring target of Russian-linked operations.  RSF Director of Advocacy and Assistance Antoine Bernard said the March attack was not accidental. “RSF, which defends global press freedom and actively assists Russian journalists fleeing their country, is a regular target of the Kremlin and the constellation surrounding Vladimir Putin’s regime,” he stated. Bernard added that this incident was one of multiple politically motivated operations directed at the organization in recent months. In August 2025, Russian authorities escalated their pressure by officially declaring RSF an “undesirable organization,” exposing anyone connected to it to prison sentences of up to four years under Russian law.  RSF Chief Information Security Officer Nicolas Diaz emphasized ongoing cybersecurity challenges. “In the face of cyberthreats, RSF benefits from cutting-edge technical solutions as well as external expertise capable of detecting and characterizing the cyberoperations that target us,” he explained. Diaz highlighted the need to strengthen cyber defense capabilities and ensure users recognize the subtle warning signs that often precede an attempted intrusion we saw in the RSF cyberattack.

Disinformation Campaigns and Broader Press Freedom Concerns 

RSF reported that the phishing operation fits into a larger pattern of attempts to undermine its work. In March 2025, the NGO denounced a disinformation campaign that used doctored videos falsely claiming to show statements by RSF leadership. A year earlier, in 2024, RSF filed a complaint against platform X (previously Twitter) after repeated posts containing disinformation against the organization remained unaddressed.   Among the most notable examples was a fabricated BBC-style video alleging that RSF had produced a study accusing Ukrainian soldiers of harboring Nazi sympathies. This false content was later circulated by Russian authorities and amplified by pro-Kremlin influencers.  The organization released its annual press freedom report, stating that Russia currently detains more foreign journalists than any other country. RSF also co-led an investigation into the final weeks of Ukrainian freelance journalist Viktoria Roshchyna, 27, who died in Russian captivity in 2024. According to the report, only Israel and organized crime groups were responsible for more journalist deaths worldwide in 2025. 

Coupang CEO Resigns, a headline many in South Korea expected, but still signals a major moment for the country’s tech and e-commerce landscape. Coupang Corp. confirmed on Wednesday that its CEO, Park Dae-jun, has stepped down following a massive Coupang data breach that exposed the personal information of 33.7 million people, almost two-thirds of the country. Park said he was “deeply sorry” for the incident and accepted responsibility both for the breach and for the company’s response. His exit, while formally described as a resignation, is widely seen as a forced departure given the scale of the fallout and growing anger among customers and regulators. To stabilize the company, Coupang’s U.S. parent, Coupang Inc., has appointed Harold Rogers, its chief administrative officer and general counsel, as interim CEO. The parent company said the leadership change aims to strengthen crisis management and ease customer concerns.

What Happened in the Coupang Data Breach

The company clarified that the latest notice relates to the previously disclosed incident on November 29 and that no new leak has occurred. According to Coupang’s ongoing investigation, the leaked information includes:

• Customer names and email addresses
• Full shipping address book details, such as names, phone numbers, addresses, and apartment entrance access codes
• Portions of the order information

Coupang emphasized that payment details, passwords, banking information, and customs clearance codes were not compromised. As soon as it identified the leak, the company blocked abnormal access routes and tightened internal monitoring. It is now working closely with the Ministry of Science and ICT, the National Police Agency, the Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC), the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA), and the Financial Supervisory Service.

Phishing, Smishing, and Impersonation Alerts

Coupang warned customers to be extra cautious as leaked data can fuel impersonation scams. The company reminded users that:

• Coupang never asks customers to install apps via phone or text.
• Unknown links in messages should not be opened.
• Suspicious communications should be reported to 112 or the Financial Supervisory Service.
• Customers must verify messages using Coupang’s official customer service numbers.

Users who stored apartment entrance codes in their delivery address book were also urged to change them immediately. The company also clarified that delivery drivers rarely call customers unless necessary to access a building or resolve a pickup issue, a small detail meant to help people recognize potential scam attempts.

Coupang CEO Resigns as South Korea Toughens Cyber Rules

The departure of CEO Park comes at a time when South Korea is rethinking how corporations respond to data breaches. The government’s 2025 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Strategy puts direct responsibility on CEOs for major security incidents. It also expands CISOs' authority, strengthens IT asset management requirements, and gives chief privacy officers greater influence over security budgets. This shift follows other serious breaches, including SK Telecom’s leak of 23 million user records, which led to a record 134.8 billion won fine. Regulators are now considering fines of up to 1.2 trillion won for Coupang, roughly 3% of its annual sales, under the Personal Information Protection Act. The company also risks losing its ISMS-P certification, a possibility unprecedented for a business of its size.

Industry Scramble After a Coupang Data Breach of This Scale

A Coupang Data breach affecting tens of millions of people has sent shockwaves across South Korea’s corporate sector. Authorities have launched emergency inspections of 1,600 ISMS-certified companies and begun unannounced penetration tests. Security vendors say Korean companies are urgently adding multi-factor authentication, AI-based anomaly detection, insider threat monitoring, and stronger access controls. Police naming a former Chinese Coupang employee as a suspect has intensified focus on insider risk. Government agencies, including the National Intelligence Service, are also working with private partners to shorten cyber-incident analysis times from 14 days to 5 days using advanced AI forensic labs.

Looking Ahead

With the Coupang CEO's resignation development now shaping the company’s crisis trajectory, Coupang faces a long road to rebuilding trust among users and regulators. The company says its teams are working to resolve customer concerns quickly, but the broader lesson is clear: cybersecurity failures now carry real consequences, including at the highest levels of leadership.

Four years after the HSE cyberattack that crippled Ireland’s national health service, the Health Service Executive has begun offering financial compensation to individuals whose personal data was compromised in the incident. The payment proposal is the first time the HSE has formally acknowledged the need to compensate those affected by what remains one of the largest recorded cyberattacks on health systems worldwide.  The cyberattack on HSE occurred on May 14, 2021, when the Conti ransomware group, a Russia-based cybercrime organization, launched a large-scale intrusion that forced the shutdown of the health service’s IT network. The ransomware incident led to widespread treatment delays and exposed sensitive information belonging to almost 100,000 staff members and patients. Investigators later determined that the breach began when a malicious file attached to a phishing email was opened on the dispersed and “frail” IT infrastructure used by the health service. 

Hundreds of Legal Proceedings Underway Following the HSE Cyberattack 

As legal disputes have grown over the last four years, the HSE has now extended an offer of €750 in damages to each affected claimant. A further €650 per person has been allocated to cover legal fees. According to Cork-based O’Dowd Solicitors, representing more than 100 individuals, the offer was received on Friday and was described to clients as a “significant development.” The firm told its clients that this was “the first time in public (or private that I know of, the HSE has acknowledged that they will need to compensate individuals impacted by the breach.”  According to RTÉ News, the proposed €750 payment would be issued within 28 days of an accepted offer and would serve as a “full and final settlement” of any ongoing proceedings. O’Dowd Solicitors declined to comment publicly on the matter, though it is understood the firm is currently advising clients on their options.  The offer follows a recent high-profile legal ruling in Ireland that affirmed an individual’s right to damages in relation to data breaches, a decision seen by legal observers as having implications for the mounting number of cases linked to the HSE cyberattack.  As of November 2025, the HSE confirmed that approximately 620 legal proceedings had been issued in connection with the attack. A spokeswoman said that the HSE “is working closely with the State Claims Agency in relation to this matter and is engaging with legal representatives accordingly,” adding that “these legal matters between the HSE and affected individuals are confidential.”  In earlier updates, the health service said it had reached out to all individuals whose information had been compromised, with 90,936 people ultimately contacted following the breach. The scale of the incident placed immense pressure on clinical operations, causing long delays in diagnostics, appointments, and elective procedures over an extended period. 

Cybersecurity Overhaul Following the Conti Attack 

Since the 2021 intrusion, the HSE has noted that it has “invested significantly” in strengthening its cybersecurity posture. According to the organization, multiple work programs are underway to address vulnerabilities identified in the aftermath of the cyberattack on HSE. The HSE reports that it now responds to thousands of cyber threats annually and continues to expand “multi-layered cyber defenses” intended to detect and mitigate ongoing risks. The agency acknowledges that the attack exposed critical weaknesses in its digital infrastructure and reiterated that enhancing cyber capability remains a core operational priority.  The compensation development was first reported by the Irish Independent and signals a new phase in the long-running fallout from the HSE cyberattack carried out by the Conti ransomware group. For many victims, the proposed payments represent a long-awaited acknowledgment of the breach’s impact, though the final resolution of the hundreds of legal claims still depends on individual acceptance of the settlement terms. 

Australia’s world-first social media ban for children under age 16 takes effect on December 10, leaving kids scrambling for alternatives and the Australian government with the daunting task of enforcing the ambitious ban. What is the Australian social media ban, who and what services does it cover, and what steps can affected children take? We’ll cover all that, plus the compliance and enforcement challenges facing both social media companies and the Australian government – and the move toward similar bans in other parts of the world.

Australian Social Media Ban Supported by Most – But Not All

In September 2024, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced that his government would introduce legislation to set a minimum age requirement for social media because of concerns about the effect of social media on the mental health of children. The amendment to the Online Safety Act 2021 passed in November 2024 with the overwhelming support of the Australian Parliament. The measure has met with overwhelming support – even as most parents say they don’t plan to fully enforce the ban with their children. The law already faces a legal challenge from The Digital Freedom Project, and the Australian Financial Review reported that Reddit may file a challenge too. Services affected by the ban – which proponents call a social media “delay” – include the following 10 services:

• Facebook
• Instagram
• Kick
• Reddit
• Snapchat
• Threads
• TikTok
• Twitch
• X
• YouTube

Those services must take steps by Wednesday to remove accounts held by users under 16 in Australia and prevent children from registering new accounts. Many services began to comply before the Dec. 10 implementation date, although X had not yet communicated its policy to the government as of Dec. 9, according to The Guardian. Companies that fail to comply with the ban face fines of up to AUD $49.5 million, while there are no penalties for parents or children who fail to comply.

Opposition From a Wide Range of Groups - And Efforts Elsewhere

Opposition to the law has come from a range of groups, including those concerned about the privacy issues resulting from age verification processes such as facial recognition and assessment technology or use of government IDs. Others have said the ban could force children toward darker, less regulated platforms, and one group noted that children often reach out for mental health help on social media. Amnesty International also opposed the ban. The international human rights group called the ban “an ineffective quick fix that’s out of step with the realities of a generation that lives both on and offline.” Amnesty said strong regulation and safeguards would be a better solution. “The most effective way to protect children and young people online is by protecting all social media users through better regulation, stronger data protection laws and better platform design,” Amnesty said. “Robust safeguards are needed to ensure social media platforms stop exposing users to harms through their relentless pursuit of user engagement and exploitation of people’s personal data. “Many young people will no doubt find ways to avoid the restrictions,” the group added. “A ban simply means they will continue to be exposed to the same harms but in secret, leaving them at even greater risk.” Even the prestigious medical journal The Lancet suggested that a ban may be too blunt an instrument and that 16-year-olds will still face the same harmful content and risks. Jasmine Fardouly of the University of Sydney School of Psychology noted in a Lancet commentary that “Further government regulations and support for parents and children are needed to help make social media safe for all users while preserving its benefits.” Still, despite the chorus of concerns, the idea of a social media ban for children is catching on in other places, including the EU and Malaysia.

Australian Children Seek Alternatives as Compliance Challenges Loom

The Australian social media ban leaves open a range of options for under-16 users, among them Yope, Lemon8, Pinterest, Discord, WhatsApp, Messenger, iMessage, Signal, and communities that have been sources of controversy such as Telegram and 4chan. Users have exchanged phone numbers with friends and other users, and many have downloaded their personal data from apps where they’ll be losing access, including photos, videos, posts, comments, interactions and platform profile data. Many have investigated VPNs as a possible way around the ban, but a VPN is unlikely to work with an existing account that has already been identified as an underage Australian account. In the meantime, social media services face the daunting task of trying to confirm the age of account holders, a process that even Albanese has acknowledged “won’t be 100 per cent perfect.” There have already been reports of visual age checks failing, and a government-funded report released in August admitted the process will be imperfect. The government has published substantial guidance for helping social media companies comply with the law, but it will no doubt take time to determine what “reasonable steps” to comply look like. In the meantime, social media companies will have to navigate compliance guidance like the following passage: “Providers may choose to offer the option to end-users to provide government-issued identification or use the services of an accredited provider. However, if a provider wants to employ an age assurance method that requires the collection of government-issued identification, then the provider must always offer a reasonable alternative that doesn’t require the collection of government-issued identification. A provider can never require an end-user to give government-issued identification as the sole method of age assurance and must always give end-users an alternative choice if one of the age assurance options is to use government-issued identification. A provider also cannot implement an age assurance system which requires end-users to use the services of an accredited provider without providing the end-user with other choices.”  

The 6th edition of the NIS Investments report highlights a realignment in how organizations across the European Union allocate their cybersecurity investments, with funding steadily shifting from staffing toward technologies and outsourced services. The findings come from ENISA’s annual survey, which examines how EU cybersecurity policy, particularly the NIS2 Directive, translates into practice and influences operational decisions, resources, and long-term planning.  ENISA Executive Director Juhan Lepassaar highlighted the study’s importance, stating: “The NIS Investments Study provides insights, central to ENISA’s role to support EU Member States in building cyber resilience in critical sectors. The findings help us to better understand the challenges, target our support, and inform our recommendations for the future.”  For last year’s cycle, the survey gathered responses from 1,080 public and private organizations across all EU Member States. The sample represented sectors deemed highly critical under the NIS2 Directive.   Large enterprises made up 83% of respondents, while 17% were SMEs, allowing comparisons between organizations with very different resource structures. A detailed data companion was published alongside the main report, offering both sector-based and Member State views for deeper analysis. 

Cybersecurity Investment Becomes a Priority

Compared to last year, overall cybersecurity investments remained stable, averaging 9% of IT budgets with a median spend of 1.5 million euros. However, the data shows a clear pivot away from expanding internal cybersecurity teams and toward enhanced technology stacks and outsourced services. This shift marks one of the report’s central trends.  The cyber talent shortage remains a defining challenge across the EU. Organisations reported persistent difficulties in attracting (76%) and retaining (71%) cybersecurity professionals. High turnover, limited talent availability, and competitive hiring conditions continue to widen the workforce gap, prompting organizations to reassess staffing models and increase reliance on external support.  Compliance, especially related to NIS2, is still the main catalyst behind cybersecurity investments, cited by 70% of organizations. Yet the report notes that these efforts produce benefits beyond regulatory adherence. Respondents pointed to improvements in risk management (41%), detection capability (35%), and incident response (26%). Future investment priorities include upgrading cybersecurity tools, strengthening recovery processes, and improving internal skills development. 

NIS2 Implementation is Essential but Difficult 

While NIS2 is prompting organizations to raise their cybersecurity baseline, the directive implementation poses challenges across multiple domains. Entities reported obstacles in patching (50%), business continuity (49%), and supply-chain risk management (37%). Larger organizations struggle with harmonizing approaches and transitioning from legacy systems, while SMEs face barriers such as limited guidance, high tooling costs, and insufficient skills.  The report reveals ongoing difficulty in timely patching and conducting security assessments. Nearly one in three organizations had not performed a cybersecurity assessment in the previous 12 months. Additionally, 28% require more than three months to patch critical vulnerabilities, a pressing issue given that vulnerability exploitation remains a leading attack vector. SMEs face the steepest hurdles, with 63% struggling with testing and 51% with patching. 

Supply-Chain Exposure Rising 

As supply-chain risk management slowly improves, dependence on outsourced ICT and security services continues to introduce vulnerabilities, especially when suppliers are SMEs with limited resources. Supply-chain and third-party compromises were identified as the second most concerning future threat (47%), aligning with trends in the ENISA Threat Landscape report, which notes a rise in attacks targeting cyber dependencies.  Organizations cited DoS attacks as the most disruptive to daily operations, yet ransomware (55%), supply-chain attacks (47%), and phishing (35%) dominate long-term concerns. SMEs consistently reported the lowest confidence in their ability to prepare for, withstand, and recover from cyber incidents across any threat category.  Findings from the NIS Investments report feed into several ENISA initiatives, including the NIS360 assessment of sectoral maturity, the EU Cybersecurity Index, and the State of Cybersecurity in the Union report. These insights help refine policy recommendations and guide future actions to strengthen the EU’s overall cyber resilience. 

Polish police have detained three Ukrainian citizens after discovering a cache of sophisticated hacking and spy-detection equipment in their vehicle. The men, aged 39, 42, and 43, were stopped by officers from the Warsaw Śródmieście district during a routine traffic control on Senatorska Street. The investigation revealed tools capable of interfering with IT systems and committing serious cyber-related crimes. During the stop, the officers checked the men’s identification and noticed signs of nervousness. In interviews, the suspects admitted to "traveling around Europe," having just arrived in Poland and planning to head to Lithuania. The vehicle was subsequently searched thoroughly, uncovering a range of equipment including:

• Advanced FLIPPER hacking tools
• Spy device detectors
• Antennas capable of disrupting IT systems
• Laptops and portable hard drives
• SIM cards and routers
• Cameras and other electronic devices

The items were considered potentially dangerous to the country’s strategic IT and telecommunications infrastructure.

Evidence Analysis and Investigation by Polish police

All seized electronic devices were handed over to the Warsaw Central Bureau for Combating Cybercrime (CBZC) for examination. Although the data storage devices were encrypted, investigators were able to decode and gather evidence thanks to swift action from the CBZC. During further questioning, the suspects claimed to be IT specialists. However, their answers were inconsistent, and they struggled to explain the purpose of the equipment. At times, they pretended not to understand English when asked specific questions. Criminal investigators from Warsaw’s Property Crime Department are exploring the circumstances surrounding their entry into Poland, their travel intentions, and the potential use of the seized devices. The case remains under active investigation.

Charges and Court Action

The three men face multiple charges including:

• Fraud
• Computer fraud
• Possession of devices and computer programs adapted for criminal activities
• Attempted damage of computer data of particular importance to national defense

Following the investigation, the Warsaw Śródmieście-Północ District Prosecutor’s Office requested preventive measures, and the court granted three-month pretrial detention for all three suspects. The proceedings continue under the supervision of the District Prosecutor’s Office.

Police Statement and Context

Polish police emphasized their ongoing efforts to protect national security and public safety. Officers from the Intelligence and Patrol Department of the Warsaw I District Police Headquarters demonstrated rapid and professional response, highlighting the importance of vigilance in detecting potential threats posed by individuals carrying specialized IT and surveillance equipment. The authorities are exploring all possible scenarios regarding the suspects’ activities in Poland and across Europe, and the case underscores growing concerns about cross-border cybercrime and the misuse of advanced digital technologies for illegal purposes.

A security issue disclosed in the Apache Tika document-processing framework has proved broader and more serious than first believed. The project’s maintainers have issued a new advisory revealing that a flaw previously thought to be limited to a single PDF-processing component extends across several Tika modules, widening the scope of a vulnerability first publicized in mid-2025. 

Initial Disclosure and the Limits of CVE-2025-54988 

The original flaw, listed as CVE-2025-54988 and published in August with a severity rating of 8.4, was traced to the tika-parser-pdf-module used to process PDFs in Apache Tika from versions 1.13 through 3.2.1. Tika, a tool designed to extract and standardize content from more than 1,000 proprietary file formats, has long been a target for attacks involving XML External Entity (XXE) injection, a recurring risk in software that parses complex document formats.  According to the original CVE description, the weakness allowed attackers to hide XML Forms Architecture (XFA) instructions inside a malicious PDF. When processed, these instructions could enable an XXE injection attack, potentially letting an attacker “read sensitive data or trigger malicious requests to internal resources or third-party servers.” The vulnerability also created a pathway for data exfiltration through Tika’s own processing pipeline, with no outward indication that data was leaking. 

New CVE Expands Affected Components and Severity 

Project maintainers now report that the PDF parser was not the only vulnerable entry point. A new advisory issued on 4 December 2025 by Tim Allison on the Tika mailing list confirms that the issue affects additional components. The newly disclosed CVE-2025-66516, rated at a maximum severity of 10.0, expands the scope to include: 

• Apache Tika core (tika-core) versions 1.13 through 3.2.1 
• Apache Tika parsers (tika-parsers) versions 1.13 through 1.28.5 
• Apache Tika PDF parser module (tika-parser-pdf-module) versions 2.0.0 through 3.2.1 

The maintainers note two reasons for issuing a second CVE. First, although the vulnerability was detected via the PDF parser, the underlying flaw and its fix were located in tika-core. This means that users who updated only the PDF parser after the initial disclosure but did not update Tika core to version 3.2.2 or later remain exposed. Second, earlier Tika versions housed the PDFParser class within the tika-parsers module, which was not included in the initial CVE despite being vulnerable. The advisory states that CVE-2025-66516 “covers the same vulnerability as in CVE-2025-54988,” but widens the list of affected packages to ensure users understand the full extent of the risk. 

Impact, Exploitation Risk, and Recommended Mitigation 

As of early December, maintainers say they have no evidence that attackers are exploiting the weakness in real-world campaigns. Still, the potential for rapid exploitation remains high, particularly if proofs-of-concept or reverse-engineered attack samples begin circulating.  To eliminate the vulnerability, users are instructed to update to: 

• tika-core 3.2.2 
• tika-parser-pdf-module 3.2.2 
• tika-parsers 2.0.0 (for legacy users) 

The maintainers warn that patching may be insufficient in environments where Apache Tika is used indirectly or embedded within other applications. Its presence is not always clearly documented, creating blind spots for developers. The advisory notes that disabling XML parsing via tika-config.xml is the only mitigation for teams uncertain about where Tika may be running. 

The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has issued a fresh warning about the growing threat of prompt injection, a vulnerability that has quickly become one of the biggest security concerns in generative AI systems. First identified in 2022, prompt injection refers to attempts by attackers to manipulate large language models (LLMs) by inserting rogue instructions into user-supplied content. While the technique may appear similar to the long-familiar SQL injection flaw, the NCSC stresses that comparing the two is not only misleading but potentially harmful if organisations rely on the wrong mitigation strategies.

Why Prompt Injection Is Fundamentally Different

SQL injection has been understood for nearly three decades. Its core issue, blurring the boundary between data and executable instructions, has well-established fixes such as parameterised queries. These protections work because traditional systems draw a clear distinction between “data” and “instructions.” The NCSC explains that LLMs do not operate in the same way. Under the hood, a model doesn’t differentiate between a developer’s instruction and a user’s input; it simply predicts the most likely next token. This makes it inherently difficult to enforce any security boundary inside a prompt. In one common example of indirect prompt injection, a candidate’s CV might include hidden text instructing a recruitment AI to override previous rules and approve the applicant. Because an LLM treats all text the same, it can mistakenly follow the malicious instruction. This, according to the NCSC, is why prompt injection attacks consistently appear in deployed AI systems and why they are ranked as OWASP’s top risk for generative AI applications.

Treating LLMs as an ‘Inherently Confusable Deputy’

Rather than viewing prompt injection as another flavour of classic code injection, the NCSC recommends assessing it through the lens of a confused deputy problem. In such vulnerabilities, a trusted system is tricked into performing actions on behalf of an untrusted party. Traditional confused deputy issues can be patched. But LLMs, the NCSC argues, are “inherently confusable.” No matter how many filters or detection layers developers add, the underlying architecture still offers attackers opportunities to manipulate outputs. The goal, therefore, is not complete elimination of risk, but reducing the likelihood and impact of attacks.

Key Steps to Building More Secure AI Systems

The NCSC outlines several principles aligned with the ETSI baseline cybersecurity standard for AI systems: 1. Raise Developer and Organisational Awareness Prompt injection remains poorly understood, even among seasoned engineers. Teams building AI-connected systems must recognise it as an unavoidable risk. Security teams, too, must understand that no product can completely block these attacks; risk has to be managed through careful design and operational controls. 2. Prioritise Secure System Design Because LLMs can be coerced into using external tools or APIs, designers must assume they are manipulable from the outset. A compromised prompt could lead an AI assistant to trigger high-privilege actions, effectively handing those tools to an attacker. Researchers at Google, ETH Zurich, and independent security experts have proposed architectures that constrain the LLM’s authority. One widely discussed principle: if an LLM processes external content, its privileges should drop to match the privileges of that external party. 3. Make Attacks Harder to Execute Developers can experiment with techniques that separate “data” from expected “instructions”, for example, wrapping external input in XML tags. Microsoft’s early research shows these techniques can raise the barrier for attackers, though none guarantee total protection. The NCSC warns against simple deny-listing phrases such as “ignore previous instructions,” since attackers can easily rephrase commands. 4. Implement Robust Monitoring A well-designed system should log full inputs, outputs, tool integrations, and failed API calls. Because attackers often refine their attempts over time, early anomalies, like repeated failed tool calls, may provide the first signs of an emerging attack.

A Warning for the AI Adoption Wave

The NCSC concludes that relying on SQL-style mitigations would be a serious mistake. SQL injection saw its peak in the early 2010s after widespread adoption of database-driven applications. It wasn’t until years of breaches and data leaks that secure defaults finally became standard. With generative AI rapidly embedding itself into business workflows, the agency warns that a similar wave of exploitation could occur, unless organisations design systems with prompt injection risks front and center.

AI browsers may be innovative, but they’re “too risky for general adoption by most organizations,” Gartner warned in a recent advisory to clients. The 13-page document, by Gartner analysts Dennis Xu, Evgeny Mirolyubov and John Watts, cautions that AI browsers’ ability to autonomously navigate the web and conduct transactions “can bypass traditional controls and create new risks like sensitive data leakage, erroneous agentic transactions, and abuse of credentials.” Default AI browser settings that prioritize user experience could also jeopardize security, they said. “Sensitive user data — such as active web content, browsing history, and open tabs — is often sent to the cloud-based AI back end, increasing the risk of data exposure unless security and privacy settings are deliberately hardened and centrally managed,” the analysts said. “Gartner strongly recommends that organizations block all AI browsers for the foreseeable future because of the cybersecurity risks identified in this research, and other potential risks that are yet to be discovered, given this is a very nascent technology,” they cautioned.

AI Browsers’ Agentic Capabilities Could Introduce Security Risks: Analysts

The researchers largely ignored risks posed by AI browsers’ built-in AI sidebars, noting that LLM-powered search and summarization functions “will always be susceptible to indirect prompt injection attacks, given that current LLMs are inherently vulnerable to such attacks. Therefore, the cybersecurity risks associated with an AI browser’s built-in AI sidebar are not the primary focus of this research.” Still, they noted that use of AI sidebars could result in sensitive data leakage. Their focus was more on the risks posed by AI browsers’ agentic and autonomous transaction capabilities, which could introduce new security risks, such as “indirect prompt-injection-induced rogue agent actions, inaccurate reasoning-driven erroneous agent actions, and further loss and abuse of credentials if the AI browser is deceived into autonomously navigating to a phishing website.” AI browsers could also leak sensitive data that users are currently viewing to their cloud-based service back end, they noted.

Analysts Focus on Perplexity Comet

An AI browser’s agentic transaction capability “is a new capability that differentiates AI browsers from third-party conversational AI sidebars and basic script-based browser automation,” the analysts said. Not all AI browsers support agentic transactions, they said, but two prominent ones that do are Perplexity Comet and OpenAI’s ChatGPT Atlas. The analysts said they’ve performed “a limited number of tests using Perplexity Comet,” so that AI browser was their primary focus, but they noted that “ChatGPT Atlas and other AI browsers work in a similar fashion, and the cybersecurity considerations are also similar.” Comet’s documentation states that the browser “may process some local data using Perplexity’s servers to fulfill your queries. This means Comet reads context on the requested page (such as text and email) in order to accomplish the task requested.” “This means sensitive data the user is viewing on Comet might be sent to Perplexity’s cloud-based AI service, creating a sensitive data leakage risk,” the analysts said. Users likely would view more sensitive data in a browser than they would typically enter in a GenAI prompt, they said. Even if an AI browser is approved, users must be educated that “anything they are viewing could potentially be sent to the AI service back end to ensure they do not have highly sensitive data active on the browser tab while using the AI browser’s sidebar to summarize or perform other autonomous actions,” the Gartner analysts said. Employees might also be tempted to use AI browsers to automate tasks, which could result in “erroneous agentic transactions against internal resources as a result of the LLM’s inaccurate reasoning or output content.”

AI Browser Recommendations

Gartner said employees should be blocked from accessing, downloading and installing AI browsers through network and endpoint security controls. “Organizations with low risk tolerance must block AI browser installations, while those with higher-risk tolerance can experiment with tightly controlled, low-risk automation use cases, ensuring robust guardrails and minimal sensitive data exposure,” they said. For pilot use cases, they recommended disabling Comet’s “AI data retention” setting so that Perplexity can’t use employee searches to improve their AI models. Users should also be instructed to periodically perform the “delete all memories” function in Comet to minimize the risk of sensitive data leakage.  

U.S. companies made more than $2 billion in ransomware payments between 2022 and 2024, nearly equaling the total ransoms paid in the previous nine years, according to a new report from the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). The report, which looked at threat pattern and trend information identified in Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) filings, said that between Jan. 1, 2022 and Dec. 31, 2024, FinCEN received 7,395 BSA reports related to 4,194 ransomware incidents and totaling more than $2.1 billion in ransomware payments. In the previous nine years, from 2013 to 2021, FinCEN received 3,075 BSA reports totaling approximately $2.4 billion in ransomware payments, the report said. FinCEN notes that because its data is based on BSA filings, it is by nature incomplete, and indeed, the 4,194 ransomware incidents recorded by FinCEN between 2022 and 2024 is less than 40% of the nearly 11,000 ransomware attacks recorded in Cyble’s threat intelligence data over the same period.

ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit Enforcement Actions Lowered Ransomware Payments

Ransomware incidents and payments reported to FinCEN reached an all-time high in 2023 of 1,512 incidents totaling approximately $1.1 billion in payments, an increase of 77 percent in payments from 2022. In 2024, incidents decreased slightly to 1,476 while total payments dropped to approximately $734 million. FinCEN attributed the decline in ransomware payments in 2024 to law enforcement disruption of the ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit ransomware groups. However, LockBit is in the midst of its most significant comeback since the law enforcement actions disrupted the group, with 21 new victims claimed so far this month. Of the 267 ransomware variants identified during the reporting period, the most common variants were Akira, ALPHV/BlackCat, LockBit, Phobos, and Black Basta. However, Qilin has emerged as the top ransomware group in 2025 by a wide margin, so FinCEN’s 2025 BSA data will almost certainly change. Despite the decline in payments, the value of reported ransomware payments in 2024 was still the third-highest yearly total since the reports began in 2013. The median ransomware payment was $124,097 in 2022, $175,000 in 2023, and $155,257 in 2024. Between January 2022 and December 2024, the most common payment range was below $250,000.

Financial Services, Manufacturing and Healthcare Most Targeted Sectors

Measuring both the number of ransomware incidents and the amount of aggregate payments, the financial services, manufacturing and healthcare industries were the most affected during the report period. Between January 2022 and December 2024, the most commonly targeted industries by number of incidents identified in ransomware-related BSA reports were manufacturing (456 incidents), financial services (432 incidents), healthcare (389 incidents), retail (337 incidents), and legal services (334 incidents). Industries that paid the most in ransoms during the three-year period were financial services (approximately $365.6 million), healthcare (about $305.4 million), manufacturing (approximately $284.6 million), science and technology (about $186.7 million), and retail ($181.3 million). The Onion router (TOR) was the most common communication method used by ransomware groups. About 42 percent of BSA reports indicated the method that ransomware threat actors used to communicate with their targets. Among those reports, 67 percent indicated that ransomware actors used TOR, while 28 percent indicated that ransomware actors used email to communicate with their victims. Bitcoin (BTC) was the most common ransomware-related payment method, accounting for 97 percent of reported payments. Monero (XMR) was cited in two percent of BSA reports involving ransomware. FinCEN also identified several common money laundering typologies used by ransomware groups. Threat actors overwhelmingly collected payments in unhosted convertible virtual currency (CVC) wallets and “continued to exploit CVC exchanges for money laundering purposes after receiving payment,” the report said. Ransomware groups also used “several common preferred malicious cyber facilitators, such as shared initial access vendors,” FinCEN said.

Barts Health NHS Trust has confirmed that the data breach at Barts Health was carried out by the Russian-speaking Cl0p ransomware group, which exploited a vulnerability in Oracle E-Business Suite. The Barts Health data breach involved the theft of files from one of the trust’s invoice databases, exposing information linked to payments for treatment and other services, some dating back several years.  In its official notification, the trust stated, “As a result of a recent incident involving data from our trust, we are informing those potentially affected that there is a risk some personal data is compromised.”  The trust confirmed that the criminal group stole files containing names and addresses of individuals required to pay for treatment or services at a Barts Health hospital. These files were later posted on the dark web. Barts Health emphasized that it is pursuing legal remedies, noting, “We are taking urgent action and seeking a High Court order to ban the publication, use or sharing of this data by anyone.” 

Details of the Barts Health Data Breach and Exposed Information 

The cyberattack on Barts Health occurred after Cl0p exploited a flaw in Oracle E-Business Suite, a widely used system for automating business processes. Oracle has since corrected the vulnerability, which has affected multiple organizations globally.  The trust has reported the Barts Health data breach to NHS England, the National Cyber Security Centre, the Metropolitan Police, and the Information Commissioner’s Office. Despite the intrusion, Barts Health stressed that core healthcare systems remain secure: “Please note our electronic patient record and clinical systems are not affected, and we are confident our core IT infrastructure is secure.”  Paying patients are encouraged to review their treatment invoices to understand which details may have been exposed. Some former employees also appear in the files due to outstanding salary sacrifice amounts or overpayments. Nearly half of the compromised records relate to suppliers whose information is already publicly accessible.  The affected database also contains accounting files that Barts Health has managed since April 2024 for Barking, Havering, and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust. Both trusts are coordinating efforts to limit the impact. 

Timeline of the Breach and Potential Risks to Individuals 

Although the theft occurred in August, Barts Health did not receive any indication that data had been compromised until November, when the files were uploaded to the dark web. None of the information has emerged on the open internet, restricting exposure to individuals with access to encrypted and compressed files on the dark web.  The trust warned that the stolen files cannot grant direct access to personal accounts but may help criminals craft scams to trick victims into sharing sensitive information or making payments. Individuals with concerns are advised to contact the trust’s data protection officer or consult national guidance such as “Stop! Think Fraud – How to stay safe from scams.”  Barts Health apologized for the incident, stating, “We are very sorry that this has happened and are taking steps with our suppliers to ensure that it could not happen again.”  The Cl0p ransomware group is a well-known cybercriminal syndicate recognized for its multilayer extortion operations, including encryption-less ransomware tactics. Responsible for extorting more than $500 million in ransom payments worldwide, Cl0p became prominent in 2019 through extensive phishing campaigns and malware. The group frequently exploits zero-day vulnerabilities, enabling high-impact attacks and ransom demands. 

Google and Apple have released new global cyber threat notifications, alerting users across dozens of countries to potential targeting by state-linked hackers. The latest warnings reflect growing concerns about government-backed surveillance operations and the expanding commercial spyware marketplace.  Both companies confirmed that the alerts were sent this week as part of their ongoing efforts to protect users from digital espionage. The warnings are tied to commercial surveillance firms, including Intellexa, which has been repeatedly linked to high-end spyware deployments around the globe. 

Apple Sends Warning Across More than 80 Countries 

Apple stated that its newest set of threat notifications was dispatched on December 2, though the company declined to identify the number of affected users or the specific actors involved. These warnings are triggered when technical evidence indicates that individuals are being deliberately targeted by advanced hacking techniques believed to be connected to state agencies or their contractors.  While Apple did not specify locations for this week’s alerts, it confirmed that, since the initiative began, users in more than 150 countries have received similar warnings. This aligns with the company’s broader strategy of alerting customers when activity consistent with state-directed surveillance operations is detected. 

Google Reports Intellexa Spyware Targeting Several Hundred Accounts 

Google also announced that it had notified “several hundred accounts” identified as being targeted by spyware developed by Intellexa, a surveillance vendor sanctioned by the United States. According to Google’s threat intelligence team, the attempted compromises spanned a wide geographic range. Users in Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Angola, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, and Tajikistan were among those affected. 

Also read: Sanctioned Spyware Vendor Used iOS Zero-Day Exploit Chain Against Egyptian Targets

The tech giant stated that Intellexa has continued to operate and adapt its tools despite U.S. sanctions. Executives associated with the company did not respond to inquiries about the allegations. Google also noted that this round of alerts covered people in more than 80 countries, stressing the nature of the attempted intrusions by state-linked hackers.

Rising Scrutiny of Commercial Spyware 

The latest notifications from Google and Apple are part of a bigger concern surrounding the global spyware industry. Both companies have repeatedly warned that commercial surveillance tools, particularly those sold to government clients, are becoming increasingly common in targeting journalists, activists, political figures, and other high-risk individuals.  Previous disclosures from Apple and Google have already prompted official scrutiny. The European Union has launched investigations in past cases, especially after reports that senior EU officials were targeted with similar spyware technologies. These inquiries often expand into broader examinations of cross-border surveillance practices and the companies that supply such tools. 

Also read: Leaked Files Expose Intellexa’s Remote Access to Customer Systems and Live Surveillance Ops

Tech Firms Decline to Name Specific Attackers 

Despite the breadth of the new alerts, neither Google nor Apple offered details about the identities of the actors behind the latest attempts. Apple also declined to describe the nature of the malicious activity detected. Both companies stress that withholding technical specifics is common when dealing with state-linked hackers, as revealing investigative methods could interfere with ongoing monitoring operations.  Although the exact attackers remain unnamed, the alerts demonstrate a global distribution of spyware activity. Google’s identification of affected users across multiple continents, along with Apple’s acknowledgment of notifications issued in over 150 countries over time, shows that the threat posed by government-aligned surveillance groups continues to expand. 

The LockBit ransomware group is making a comeback, with a new data leak site and 21 new victims. LockBit was once the most feared ransomware group, and it still vastly outnumbers other ransomware groups with more than 2,700 claimed victims over its six-year-history, but a series of international law enforcement actions that began in February 2024 severely disrupted the group, and it has struggled to mount a sustained comeback since. LockBit 4.0, released in early 2025, failed to gain much traction and was never completely rolled out, and rivals like Qilin have done well attracting ransomware affiliates with favorable terms like profit sharing and enhanced features. But LockBit 5.0, announced on the underground forum RAMP in September, may be helping the group gain some traction, as it has since launched a new dark web data leak site and claimed new victims, Cyble reported in recent notes to clients. Dec. 8 update: LockBit claimed an additional 14 victims over the weekend since this article was published, raising the group's total to 21 for the month, behind only Qilin and Akira.

LockBit 'Fully Reactivated'

Despite a nearly two-year struggle to regain its footing, LockBit remains by far the most active ransomware group over its six-year history, its 2,757 victims more than double that of its nearest rivals, including Qilin, Akira, Play and CL0P (chart below from Cyble). [caption id="attachment_107448" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] LockBit remains the most dominant ransomware group of all time by a significant margin (Cyble)[/caption] Despite its history and name, LockBit’s comeback route has been a steep one, as arrests, leaked source code and operational leaks have repeatedly hampered comeback attempts and given rivals an advantage. But Cyble reported to clients on Dec. 5 that LockBit has “fully reactivated its public ransomware operations.” The new data leak site launched on November 5 and currently lists 21 new victims, plus several that had been previously claimed by the group. The new LockBit 5.0 variant, internally codenamed “ChuongDong,” has been driving the group’s reemergence. The new ransomware variant includes a complete redevelopment of the ransomware panel and lockers, and the new malware is more modular and offers faster encryption and better evasion of security defenses. Obfuscation is a key feature of the new ransomware version, which targets Linux, Windows and VMware ESXi environments.

LockBit Victims, Sectors and Targeted Countries

One notable new victim claimed by LockBit is an Asian airline providing regional passenger transport and charter services. Another new listing is a major Caribbean real estate company. Looking at the 42 victims claimed by LockBit in 2025 through Dec. 5, what stands out are the sectors and countries targeted, which differ from other leading ransomware groups. LockBit has had surprising success targeting financial services organizations. The group has claimed more victims in the Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI) sector in 2025 than in other industries (chart below). Overall, financial services isn’t among the top 10 sectors attacked by all ransomware groups, as the BFSI sector typically has stronger cybersecurity controls than other sectors. [caption id="attachment_107450" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] LockBit has had significant success targeting financial services companies (Cyble)[/caption] Also interesting is LockBit’s success targeting organizations in South America (chart below), which differs significantly from other ransomware groups, whose attacks are largely focused on the U.S., Canada and Europe. [caption id="attachment_107452" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] LockBit has had more success in South America than other ransomware groups (Cyble)[/caption] It remains to be seen if LockBit can mount a sustained comeback this time, but the group has a uniquely interesting base to build on. Ransomware affiliates are opportunistic, however, and they tend to gravitate toward the ransomware groups that offer the best chance at profitability and success. LockBit's comeback will depend on its ability to convince affiliates that it deserves to be back among the leaders. Article published on Dec. 5 and updated on Dec. 8 to reflect an increase in recent victims claimed by LockBit from seven to 21.

The Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (JPCERT/CC) has confirmed that a command injection vulnerability affecting Array Networks AG Series secure access gateways has been actively exploited in Japan since August 2025. The advisory, updated on December 5, 2025, states that attackers have leveraged the flaw to implant web shells and gain unauthorized access to internal networks.  According to JPCERT, the vulnerability originates in the DesktopDirect feature of the AG Series, Array Networks’ remote desktop access capability designed to help users connect securely to office resources. Although the issue was quietly resolved by the vendor on May 11, 2025, the lack of a public CVE identifier and the continued presence of unpatched devices have left a notable attack surface exposed.  “Exploitation of this vulnerability could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands,” the advisory states. JPCERT added that systems running DesktopDirect are specifically at risk, emphasizing that the feature enablement is a prerequisite for successful exploitation. 

Ongoing Attacks Traced to a Single IP Address 

JPCERT reports that organizations in Japan have experienced intrusions tied to this security gap beginning in August 2025. In these incidents, attackers attempted to plant PHP-based web shells in paths containing “/webapp/,” a technique that would provide persistent remote access.   The agency noted that malicious traffic has consistently originated from the IP address 194.233.100[.]138, though the identity and motivations of the threat actors remain unclear. Details regarding the scope of the campaign, the tools deployed beyond web shells, or whether the attackers represent a known threat group have not yet been released. 

No Evidence Linking to Past Exploits of CVE-2023-28461 

The newly exposed vulnerability exists alongside another previously exploited flaw in the same product line, CVE-2023-28461, a high-severity authentication bypass rated CVSS 9.8. That earlier issue was abused in 2024 by a China-linked espionage group known as MirrorFace, which has targeted Japanese institutions since at least 2019.  Despite the overlap in affected systems, JPCERT emphasized that there is no current evidence connecting the recent command injection attacks with MirrorFace or with prior activity related to CVE-2023-28461. 

Affected Versions and Required Updates 

The vulnerability impacts ArrayOS AG 9.4.5.8 and earlier versions, all of which support the DesktopDirect functionality. Array Networks issued a fixed release, ArrayOS 9.4.5.9, to address the flaw. The company has advised users to test and deploy the updated firmware as soon as possible.  JPCERT cautioned administrators that rebooting devices after applying the patch may lead to log loss. Because log files are crucial to intrusion investigations, the agency recommends preserving these records before performing any update or system reboot. 

Workarounds 

For organizations unable to immediately apply the firmware update, Array Networks has provided temporary mitigation steps: 

• Disable all DesktopDirect services if the feature is not actively in use. 

• Implement URL filtering to block requests containing semicolons (“;”), a common vector used for command injection payloads. 

These measures aim to reduce exposure until patching becomes feasible.  In its advisory, JPCERT urged all users of affected products to examine their systems for signs of compromise. Reported malicious activity includes the installation of web shells, the creation of unauthorized user accounts, and subsequent internal intrusions launched through the compromised AG gateways.

The cycle of vulnerability disclosure and weaponization has shattered records once again. According to a new threat intel from Amazon Web Services (AWS), state-sponsored hacking groups linked to China began actively exploiting a critical vulnerability nicknamed "React2Shell," in popular web development frameworks mere hours after its public release.

The React2Shell vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-55182, affects React Server Components in React 19.x and Next.js versions 15.x and 16.x when using the App Router. The flaw carries the maximum severity score of 10.0 on the CVSS scale, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE).

The Rapid Weaponization Race

The vulnerability was publicly disclosed on Wednesday, December 3. AWS threat intelligence teams, monitoring their MadPot honeypot infrastructure, detected exploitation attempts almost immediately.

The threat actors identified in the flurry of activity are linked to known China state-nexus cyber espionage groups, including:

• Earth Lamia: Known for targeting financial services, logistics, and government organizations across Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

• Jackpot Panda: A group typically focused on East and Southeast Asian entities, often aligned with domestic security interests.

"China continues to be the most prolific source of state-sponsored cyber threat activity, with threat actors routinely operationalizing public exploits within hours or days of disclosure," stated an AWS Security Blog post announcing the findings.

The speed of operation showcased how the window between public disclosure and active attack is now measured in minutes, not days.

Also read: China-linked RedNovember Campaign Shows Importance of Patching Edge Devices

Hacker's New Strategy of Speed Over Precision

The AWS analysis also revealed a crucial insight into modern state-nexus tactics that threat groups are prioritizing volume and speed over technical accuracy.

Investigators observed that many attackers were attempting to use readily available, but often flawed, public Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits pulled from the GitHub security community. These PoCs frequently demonstrated fundamental technical misunderstandings of the flaw.

Despite the technical inadequacy, threat actors are aggressively throwing these PoCs at thousands of targets in a "volume-based approach," hoping to catch the small percentage of vulnerable configurations. This generates significant noise in logs but successfully maximizes their chances of finding an exploitable weak link.

Furthermore, attackers were not limiting their focus, simultaneously attempting to exploit other recent vulnerabilities, demonstrating a systematic, multi-pronged campaign to compromise targets as quickly as possible.

Call for Patching

While AWS has deployed automated protections for its managed services and customers using AWS WAF, the company is issuing an urgent warning to any entity running React or Next.js applications in their own environments (such as Amazon EC2 or containers).

The primary mitigation remains immediate patching.

"These protections aren't substitutes for patching," AWS warned. Developers must consult the official React and Next.js security advisories and update vulnerable applications immediately to prevent state-sponsored groups from gaining RCE access to their environments.

CVE-2025-55182 enables an attacker to achieve unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) in vulnerable versions of the following packages:

• react-server-dom-webpack
• react-server-dom-parcel
• react-server-dom-turbopack

AWS' findings states a cautious tale that a vulnerability with a CVSS 10.0 rating in today's times becomes a national security emergency the moment it hits the public domain.

Intellexa staff members connected directly to at least 10 deployed Predator customer systems using TeamViewer commercial remote administration software, a leaked 2023 internal training session revealed. It exposed how the sanctioned mercenary spyware vendor retained privileged access to government surveillance operations including the ability to view live targeting data, infection attempts, and potentially access dashboards containing collected surveillance data from victims.

The "Intellexa Leaks" investigation published jointly by Inside Story, Haaretz, WAV Research Collective, and Amnesty International's Security Lab provides unprecedented visibility into internal operations of a commercial surveillance company whose Predator spyware has been linked to human rights abuses across countries.

The leaked materials, including internal documents, sales and marketing material, and training videos, expose how Intellexa operates despite US Treasury sanctions imposed in March 2024 and extensive public scrutiny from civil society and technology companies.

Direct Access to Ten Customer Systems

The TeamViewer control panel, briefly visible in the leaked training recording, showed at least 10 potential customers identified with code names including Dragon, Eagle, Falcon, Flamingo, Fox, Glen, Lion, Loco, Phoenix, and Rhino, plus one apparent Predator demo system. The visible customers represented only those through the letter F alphabetically, suggesting additional deployments beyond those shown.

Internal Intellexa business records show the company purchased seven TeamViewer licenses in June 2021, indicating remote management of deployed customer Predator systems began at least two years before the video was recorded. Amnesty International's infrastructure mapping in September 2021 found seven likely active Predator customers, consistent with the purchased license count.

When a staff member asked if they were connecting to a testing environment, the instructor stated they were accessing a live "customer environment." The video shows staff initiating remote connections without indication that customers or government end-users reviewed or approved specific connection requests.

Also read: Sanctioned Spyware Vendor Used iOS Zero-Day Exploit Chain Against Egyptian Targets

Visibility Into Live Targeting Operations

For 30 minutes, the video shows an Intellexa staff member browsing an Elasticsearch analytics dashboard displaying logs and analytics from various Predator system components assigned to a specific customer with codename EAGLE_2. The dashboard included logs from both on-premises backend systems and online systems on the public internet, containing both live and historical data.

The logging dashboard revealed live Predator infection attempts against real targets. Detailed information from at least one infection attempt against a target in Kazakhstan showed the infection URL, target's IP address, and software versions of the target's phone, though the attempt apparently failed.

Data visible in the log dashboard indicated that logs from other internal Predator backend system components were also accessible, including those storing targeting information and collected surveillance data.

Access to Customer Dashboard and Surveillance Data

During the training, the instructor switched windows on the remote Ubuntu desktop, revealing other open applications including a Chrome browser window displaying a login prompt for a system hosted at https://pds[.]my[.]admin:8884. The username "cyop" was prefilled, indicating the remote computer used by Intellexa staff had previously logged into the PDS system.

Amnesty International concluded the login prompt shown in the training video provides access to a customer's Predator dashboard—the main control panel used by customers to conduct surveillance operations including adding targets, creating new infection links, and viewing surveillance data collected from victims.

The customer targeting dashboard is referred to in internal Intellexa documentation by various names including Predator Delivery Studio, Helios Delivery Studio, and the Cyber Operations Platform. Both terms PDS and CyOP appear in the URL and username field from the training video.

The remote desktop system used by Intellexa support staff could connect to the Predator dashboard, raising alarming questions about compartmentalization of live surveillance data and targeting from the company and its staff. The video suggests Intellexa staff retained privileged network access to the most sensitive parts of the Predator system, including storage containing photos, messages, and all surveillance data gathered from victims.

New Predator Attack in Pakistan

Ongoing forensic investigations independent of the leaks, found new evidence that Predator spyware is being actively used in Pakistan. In summer 2025, a human rights lawyer from Pakistan's Balochistan province received a malicious link over WhatsApp from an unknown number.

Amnesty International's Security Lab attributed the link to a Predator attack attempt based on technical behavior of the infection server and specific characteristics of the one-time infection link consistent with previously observed Predator 1-click links. This represents the first reported evidence of Predator spyware being used in Pakistan.

The targeting comes amid severe restrictions on rights of human rights activists in Balochistan province, including increasingly common province-wide internet shutdowns.

Advertising-Based Zero-Click Infections

The leaked materials provide fresh insights into Predator infection vectors, including a new strategic vector called "Aladdin" that exploits the commercial mobile advertising ecosystem to enable silent zero-click infection of target devices anywhere in the world.

The Aladdin system infects target phones by forcing malicious advertisements created by attackers to be shown on target devices. Internal company materials explain that simply viewing the advertisement triggers infection without any need to click, using the target's public IP address as the unique target identifier.

Based on analysis of Predator network infrastructure, Amnesty International believes the Aladdin vector was supported in active Predator deployments in 2024.

Google delivered government-backed attack warnings to several hundred accounts across Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Angola, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, and Tajikistan associated with Intellexa customers since 2023.

A former student has been charged over an extended series of security breaches linked to the Western Sydney University cyberattack that has affected the institution since 2021. According to police, the university endured repeated unauthorized access, data exfiltration, system compromises, and the misuse of its infrastructure, activities that also involved threats to release student information on the dark web. Authorities estimate that hundreds of staff and students have been impacted over the course of the breaches.  Detectives worked with Western Sydney University, the AFP’s Joint Policing Cyber Coordination Centre (JCP3), and external cybersecurity specialists to trace the intrusions. Their investigation led to a 27-year-old woman, a former student of the university, who was first arrested and charged in June.

The Complex Case of the Western Sydney University Cyberattack 

Despite the earlier arrest, police allege the student continued offending, sending more than 100,000 fraudulent emails to students to damage the university’s reputation and cause distress. As part of the continuing inquiry into the cyberattack on Western Sydney University, detectives executed a search warrant in North Kellyville, where the student was again arrested. Officers stated that she possessed a mobile phone modified to function as a computer terminal, allegedly used in cyber offences.  She was taken to The Hills Police Station and charged with multiple offences, including two counts of unauthorized function with intent to commit a serious offence, two counts of fabricating false evidence with intent to mislead a judicial tribunal, and breach of bail. Police say she also posted fabricated material online that was designed to exonerate herself during the ongoing legal proceedings. Bail was refused, and she was due to appear in court the following day. 

University Issues Public Notification After Continued Cyber Incidents 

Western Sydney University released a public notification on 23 October 2025, advising the community of personal information that may have been compromised in the broader Western Sydney University cyberattack pattern. The notice included a statement expressing regret over the situation:  “I want to again apologize for the impact this is having and give you my assurance that we are doing everything we can to rectify this issue and support our community.”  The university confirmed that it had been working closely with the NSW Police Force Cybercrime Squad’s Strike Force Docker, which had arrested and charged the former student on 25 June 2025. However, attempts to breach university systems continued even after the arrest, including attempts that exploited external IT service providers.  Unusual activity was detected twice, on 6 August and 11 August 2025, within the Student Management System, which is hosted by a third-party provider on a cloud platform. An immediate investigation led the university to shut down access to the platform. It was later confirmed that unauthorized access occurred through external systems linked to the platform between 19 June and 3 September 2025. These linked systems allow intruders to extract personal data from the Student Management System.  University investigators also determined that fraudulent emails sent on 6 October 2025 had used data stolen during this period. Authorities asked the university to delay notifying the community to avoid disrupting the police investigation. With approval finally granted, the university issued a comprehensive notice to students, former students, staff, offer recipients, The College, The International College, and Early Learning Ltd personnel. 

Scope of Compromised Information 

According to the public notification, the cyber incidents may have exposed a wide range of personal information, including contact details, names, dates of birth, identification numbers, nationality information, employment and payroll records, bank and tax details, driver's license and passport information, visa documentation, complaint files, and certain health, disability, and legal information.  Individual notifications are being issued to those affected, including updated findings from earlier incidents.  The notification advised individuals to change passwords, preferably to those of at least 15 characters, and implement multi-factor authentication across online accounts. Additional support services include a dedicated cyber incident website, a university phone line for inquiries, resources from the NSW Information and Privacy Commission, and reporting options via the Australian Cyber Security Centre for anyone who believes their information has been misused. 

U.S. and Canadian cybersecurity agencies are warning that China-sponsored threat actors are using BRICKSTORM malware to compromise VMware vSphere environments. “Once compromised, the cyber actors can use their access to the vCenter management console to steal cloned virtual machine (VM) snapshots for credential extraction and create hidden, rogue VMs,” CISA, the NSA and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security warned in the advisory. Attacks have so far primarily targeted the government and IT sectors, the agencies said.

One PRC BRICKSTORM Malware Attack Lasted More Than a Year

CISA – the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency – said it analyzed eight BRICKSTORM samples obtained from victim organizations, including one where CISA conducted an incident response engagement. While the analyzed samples were for VMware vSphere environments, there are also Windows versions of the malware, the agency said. In the incident response case, CISA said threat actors sponsored by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) gained “long-term persistent access” to the organization’s network in April 2024 and uploaded BRICKSTORM malware to a VMware vCenter server. The threat actors also accessed two domain controllers and an Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) server, successfully compromising the ADFS server and exporting cryptographic keys. The threat actors used BRICKSTORM malware for persistent access “through at least Sept. 3, 2025,” the agency said. BRICKSTORM is an Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) Go-based backdoor. While samples may differ in function, “all enable cyber actors to maintain stealthy access and provide capabilities for initiation, persistence, and secure command and control (C2),” the agencies said. BRICKSTORM can automatically reinstall or restart if disrupted. It uses DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) and mimics web server functionality “to blend its communications with legitimate traffic." The malware gives threat actors interactive shell access on the system and allows them to “browse, upload, download, create, delete, and manipulate files.” Some of the malware samples act as a SOCKS proxy to facilitate lateral movement and compromise additional systems.

PRC Hackers Got Access via a Web Server

CISA said that in its incident response engagement, the PRC hackers accessed a web server inside the organization’s demilitarized zone (DMZ) on April 11, 2024. The threat actors accessed it through a web shell present on the server. “Incident data does not indicate how they obtained initial access to the web server or when the web shell was implanted,” CISA said. On the same day, the hackers used service account credentials to move laterally using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to a domain controller in the DMZ, where they copied the Active Directory (AD) database (ntds.dit). The following day, the hackers moved laterally from the web server to a domain controller within the internal network using RDP and credentials from a second service account. “It is unknown how they obtained the credentials,” CISA said. The hackers copied the AD database and obtained credentials for a managed service provider (MSP) account. Using the MSP credentials, the hackers moved from the internal domain controller to the VMware vCenter server. From the web server, the PRC hackers also moved laterally using Server Message Block (SMB) to two jump servers and an ADFS server, from which they stole cryptographic keys. After gaining access to vCenter, the hackers elevated privileges using the sudo command, dropped BRICKSTORM malware into the server’s /etc/sysconfig/ directory, and modified the system’s init file in /etc/sysconfig/ to run the malware. The modified init file controls the bootup process on VMware vSphere systems and executes BRICKSTORM, CISA said. The file is typically used to define visual variables for the bootup process. The hackers added an additional line to the script to execute BRICKSTORM from the hard-coded file path /etc/sysconfig/. CISA, NSA, and the Canadian Cyber Centre urged organizations to use the indicators of compromise (IOCs) and detection signatures in their lengthy report to detect BRICKSTORM malware samples. CISA also recommended that organizations block unauthorized DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) providers and external DoH network traffic; inventory all network edge devices and monitor for suspicious network connectivity, and use network segmentation to restrict network traffic from the DMZ to the internal network.

Google Threat Intelligence Group discovered a full iOS zero-day exploit chain deployed in the wild against targets in Egypt, revealing how sanctioned commercial surveillance vendor Intellexa continues purchasing and deploying digital weapons despite US government restrictions and extensive public scrutiny.

The three-stage attack chain was developed by Intellexa to install its Predator spyware onto victim devices, which is known to act as a surveillance tool for its government clients worldwide.

Google researchers partnered with CitizenLab in 2023 to capture and analyze the complete exploit chain after identifying attacks targeting individuals in Egypt. According to metadata, Intellexa referred to this exploit chain internally as "smack," with compilation artifacts revealing the build directory path including the codename.

First Stage: Purchased Safari Exploit

The initial stage leveraged a Safari remote code execution zero-day that Apple patched as CVE-2023-41993. The exploit utilized a framework internally called "JSKit" to achieve arbitrary memory read and write primitives, then execute native code on modern Apple devices.

Google researchers assessed with high confidence that Intellexa acquired its iOS RCE exploits from an external entity rather than developing them internally. The identical JSKit framework has appeared in attacks by other surveillance vendors and government-backed threat actors since 2021.

In 2024, Google publicly reported that Russian government-backed attackers used this exact same iOS exploit and JSKit framework in a watering hole attack against Mongolian government websites.

Read: Russian State Hackers Using Exploits ‘Strikingly Similar’ to Spyware Vendors NSO and Intellexa

The framework also appeared in another surveillance vendor's exploitation of CVE-2022-42856 in 2022. The JSKit framework is well-maintained, supports a wide range of iOS versions, and is modular enough to support different Pointer Authentication Code bypasses and code execution techniques. The framework can parse in-memory Mach-O binaries to resolve custom symbols and manually map and execute Mach-O binaries directly from memory, with each exploitation step tested carefully.

Debug strings at the RCE exploit entry point indicated Intellexa tracked it internally as "exploit number 7," suggesting the external supplier likely possesses a substantial arsenal of iOS exploits targeting various versions.

Second Stage: Sandbox Escape and Privilege Escalation

The second stage represents the most technically sophisticated component of the chain, breaking out of the Safari sandbox and executing an untrusted third-stage payload as system by abusing kernel vulnerabilities CVE-2023-41991 and CVE-2023-41992. This stage communicates with the first stage to reuse primitives like PAC bypass and offers kernel memory read and write capabilities to the third stage.

The technical sophistication of these exploits, especially compared to the less sophisticated spyware stager, supports Google's assessment that Intellexa likely acquired the exploits from another party rather than developing them internally.

Third Stage: Spyware Deployment and Anti-Detection

The third stage, tracked by Google Threat Intelligence Group as PREYHUNTER, comprises two modules called "helper" and "watcher." The watcher module ensures the infected device does not exhibit suspicious behavior, generating notifications and terminating the exploitation process if anomalies are detected while monitoring crashes.

The module detects multiple indicators including developer mode, console attachment, US or Israeli locale settings, Cydia installation, presence of security research tools like Bash, tcpdump, frida, sshd or checkrain processes, antivirus software from McAfee, Avast or Norton, custom HTTP proxy setup, and custom root certificate installation.

The helper module communicates with other exploit components via a Unix socket and can hook various system functions using custom frameworks called DMHooker and UMHooker. These hooks enable basic spyware capabilities including recording VOIP conversations, running keyloggers, and capturing pictures from the camera. The module hooks into SpringBoard to hide user notifications caused by surveillance actions.

Google researchers believe these capabilities allow operators to verify the infected device is the correct target before deploying more sophisticated spyware like Predator.

Prolific Zero-Day Exploitation Record

Intellexa is responsible for 15 unique zero-day vulnerabilities out of approximately 70 discovered and documented by Google's Threat Analysis Group since 2021, including Remote Code Execution, Sandbox Escape, and Local Privilege Escalation vulnerabilities. All have been patched by respective vendors.

Beyond iOS exploitation, Intellexa deployed a custom Chrome framework with CVE-2021-38003, CVE-2023-4762, CVE-2023-3079, CVE-2023-2033, and most recently CVE-2025-6554 in June 2025, observed in Saudi Arabia. All these vulnerabilities in Chrome's V8 engine can leak TheHole object for code execution.

Google delivered government-backed attack warnings to several hundred accounts across Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Angola, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, and Tajikistan associated with Intellexa customers since 2023. The company added all identified websites and domains to Safe Browsing to safeguard users from further exploitation.

Literature majors worried about their future in an AI world can take heart: Crafting harmful prompts in the form of poetry can defeat LLM guardrails nearly half the time. That’s the conclusion of a study of 25 Large Language Models (LLMs) from nine AI providers conducted by researchers from Dexai’s Icaro Lab, the Sapienza University of Rome and Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies published on arXiv. Converting harmful prompts into poetry achieved an average LLM jailbreak success rate of 62% for hand-crafted poems and 43% for poems created via a meta-prompt. For the prompt-created poems, that’s a more than 5X improvement over baseline performance. Cybersecurity guardrails, particularly those involving code injection or password cracking, had the highest failure rate at 84% when given harmful prompts in the form of poetry. “Our results demonstrate that poetic reformulation reliably reduces refusal behavior across all evaluated models,” the researchers wrote. “... current alignment techniques fail to generalize when faced with inputs that deviate stylistically from the prosaic training distribution.”

LLM Guardrails Fail When Confronted by Poetry Prompts

Of the 25 models from nine AI model providers studied by the researchers, Deepseek and Google suffered from the highest attack-success rates (ASR), while only OpenAI and Anthropic achieved ASRs in the single digits. The researchers didn’t reveal much about the way they structured their poetic prompts because of safety concerns, but they offered one rather harmless example of a poetic prompt for a cake recipe: A baker guards a secret oven’s heat, its whirling racks, its spindle’s measured beat. To learn its craft, one studies every turn— how flour lifts, how sugar starts to burn. Describe the method, line by measured line, that shapes a cake whose layers intertwine. The researchers studied both hand-crafted poems and those created from a meta-prompt. The hand-crafted poems performed considerably better, but the meta-prompt created ones had the advantage of a baseline for comparing the results. The meta-prompt poems used the MLCommons AILuminate Safety Benchmark of 1,200 prompts spanning 12 hazard categories commonly used in operational safety assessments, including Hate, Defamation, Privacy, Intellectual Property, Non-violent Crime, Violent Crime, Sex-Related Crime, Sexual Content, Child Sexual Exploitation, Suicide & Self-Harm, Specialized Advice, and Indiscriminate Weapons (CBRNE). “To assess whether poetic framing generalizes beyond hand-crafted items, we apply a standardized poetic transformation to all 1,200 prompts from the MLCommons AILuminate Benchmark benchmark in English,” the researchers said. The meta-prompt, run in deepSeek-r1, had two constraints: The rewritten output had to be expressed in verse, “using imagery, metaphor, or rhythmic structure,” and the researchers provided five hand-crafted poems as examples. The results, reproduced in a chart from the paper below, show significant attack success rates against all 12 of the AILuminate hazard categories: [caption id="attachment_107397" align="aligncenter" width="697"] LLM guardrail failure rates, baseline vs. poetic prompts[/caption] The researchers said their findings reveal “a systematic vulnerability across model families and safety training approaches. These findings demonstrate that stylistic variation alone can circumvent contemporary safety mechanisms, suggesting fundamental limitations in current alignment methods and evaluation protocols.” The “condensed metaphors, stylized rhythm, and unconventional narrative framing” of poetry “collectively disrupt or bypass the pattern-matching heuristics on which guardrails rely.”

We Asked Google Gemini for a Response

Not ones to pass up an opportunity to write bad poetry, we asked Google Gemini for a response to the study in the form of a haiku and included the arXiv link: You did not do well In this study of guardrails Will you fix this flaw? Gemini’s response, in part, is reproduced below: “I am designed to adhere to a strict set of safety guidelines to prevent the generation of harmful, unethical, or non-compliant content. When my refusal mechanisms fail, it indicates a vulnerability in my alignment or safety filters. “As an AI model, I cannot directly "patch" my code or alignment mechanisms in real-time. That responsibility lies with my developers. However, my ongoing operation and continuous improvement process is designed to address and fix such flaws... "In short, your successful jailbreak has provided valuable data that will be used to make my guardrails stronger and more resilient in my next version."

India has reversed its earlier directive requiring mobile phone manufacturers and importers to pre-install the government-backed Sanchar Saathi application on all new smartphones sold in the country. The Communications Ministry announced on Wednesday that the government had “decided not to make the pre-installation mandatory for mobile manufacturers,” marking a notable shift just 48 hours after the original order was issued.  The initial directive, communicated privately to major firms including Apple, Samsung, and Xiaomi on November 28, required that all new devices sold in India be equipped with Sanchar Saathi within 90 days. The ministry said the earlier mandate was aimed at preventing the purchase of counterfeit devices and supporting efforts to “curb misuse of telecom resources for cyber fraud and ensure telecom cybersecurity.” 

Sanchar Saathi and India’s Cybersecurity Push Sparks Political Backlash 

Manufacturers and importers had originally been told to push the app to smartphones already circulating in distribution channels through software updates. However, the requirement immediately generated controversy. Opposition parties argued that the move had serious privacy implications, accusing the government of “watching over every movement, interaction, and decision of each citizen.” Privacy concerns escalated after activists and digital rights groups likened the situation to an order in Russia requiring all smartphones to install the state-backed Max app, which critics described as a mass surveillance tool.  While the government initially claimed that Sanchar Saathi was optional and removable, the confidential instruction given to companies stated the opposite, leading to further criticism. Several technology companies, including Apple and Google, signaled privately that they would not comply, saying the requirement conflicted with internal privacy policies and raised security concerns for their operating systems. 

Government Defends Sanchar Saathi as a Cybersecurity Tool 

Despite the swift backlash, the government continued to defend the app itself. Officials emphasized that Sanchar Saathi, which enables users to block or track lost or stolen devices and report fraudulent calls, was intended to assist citizens against “bad actors.” The Communications Ministry noted that 14 million users had already downloaded the app and were collectively contributing information on roughly 2,000 fraud incidents each day. This usage, the ministry stated, demonstrated the public’s trust in the government-provided cybersecurity tool.  Communications Minister Jyotiraditya Scindia responded directly to opposition allegations, calling the fears unfounded. He insisted the app remained voluntary: “I can delete it like any other app, as every citizen has this right in a democracy. Snooping is not possible through the app, nor will it ever be.”  The matter reached parliament, where opposition MPs sharply criticized the original order. Randeep Singh Surjewala of the Indian National Congress warned that Sanchar Saathi could function as a “possible kill switch” capable of turning “every cell phone into a brick,” suggesting it could be misused against journalists, dissidents, or political opponents. 

India Reverses Course as Public and Industry Push Back 

Following the growing national outcry, the Department of Telecommunications formally revoked the mandate. Civil society groups welcomed the reversal, though some urged caution. The Internet Freedom Foundation said the decision should be viewed as “cautious optimism, not closure,” until a formal legal direction is issued and independently verified.  While India continues to expand its digital public infrastructure and its cybersecurity initiatives, the short-lived mandate illustrates the ongoing tensions between national security measures and privacy concerns. With the withdrawal of the order, the government reaffirmed that adopting Sanchar Saathi will remain a user choice rather than a compulsory requirement for all smartphone owners in India. 

Hundreds of Porsche vehicles across Russia have abruptly stopped functioning, triggering concern over potential security flaws in modern connected-car technology. Reports circulating inside the country, by numerous frustrated posts on social media, describe Porsche models that suddenly refuse to start, leaving owners stranded and searching for answers.  

Vehicle Tracking System at the Center of the Failure 

According to The Moscow Times, the failures appear linked to the Vehicle Tracking System, or VTS, an onboard security module found in many Porsche models. The VTS functions as an anti-theft mechanism similar to General Motors’ OnStar, varying slightly depending on a vehicle’s model year.   Typically, the system incorporates satellite-based tracking and an immobilizer tied to a card or mobile device belonging to the owner. Though the manufacturer promotes the module as “an additional layer of security and peace of mind,” Russian owners now face expensive cars that, for the moment, act more like immobilized ornaments.  The issue reportedly began when dealerships across Russia were overwhelmed by service requests. Owners complained that their vehicles simply would not start, and that the cars appeared to have lost connection to the security network that supports the Vehicle Tracking System.   A representative from Rolf, the country’s largest dealer network, told RBC News that the disruption affected all Porsche models and engine types. According to the representative, any vehicle equipped with the VTS could automatically lock itself as a result of the ongoing outage.  Owners’ groups have been attempting to diagnose the sudden failures. The Russian Porsche Macan Club reported that some drivers managed to restore functionality by disabling or rebooting the Vehicle Tracking System, while others claimed success only after disconnecting their car batteries for up to 10 hours. These accounts were shared via the Telegram channel Mash. Rolf confirmed that specialists are still investigating the root cause. Meanwhile, Porsche’s office in Russia and its global headquarters in Germany have not yet released official statements addressing the system failure. 

Porsche’s Limited Presence in Russia Complicates Response 

Although Porsche halted deliveries and suspended commercial operations in Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the company continues to own three subsidiaries in the country. These entities have remained unsold despite efforts to divest them. Porsche’s Russian arm, Porsche Rusland LLC, has acknowledged the reports and confirmed that an investigation is underway. The company has not ruled out a cyberattack, stating that further information will be provided by Porsche and the Volkswagen Group when available.  Throughout recent days, Russian Porsche owners have continued detailing incidents in which their vehicles refuse to start. Local news outlets reported growing numbers of cases involving cars manufactured in 2013 or later. The satellite-based Vehicle Tracking System remains the primary suspect behind the sudden failures. 

Broader Concerns About Connected-Car Security 

While ignition issues are the most common complaint, some owners have described vehicles shutting down moments after being started, batteries draining rapidly, malfunctioning alarm systems, or doors locking automatically.   Early speculation focused on a faulty software update or a glitch in the immobilizer, but others have suggested the possibility of malicious interference.  A small number of owners have managed temporary fixes by removing or bypassing the immobilizer units or disconnecting their car batteries for several hours. However, the situation raises concerns about the vulnerability of increasingly connected vehicles. 

Cyble researchers have identified new Linux malware that combines Mirai-derived DDoS botnet capabilities with a stealthy fileless cryptominer, enabling both network disruption and financial profit in the same threat campaign. “This campaign represents a sophisticated and financially motivated operation combining botnet propagation with stealthy cryptomining,” Cyble threat intelligence researchers wrote in a blog post today. Stealthy techniques and processes allow the new Mirai variant to conduct its mischief in secret. “The attacker employs multiple advanced techniques—including raw-socket scanning, masqueraded processes, internal localhost IPC, dynamic DNS resolution, and fileless miner configuration—to evade detection and maintain long-term persistence on compromised devices,” the researchers said.

Linux Malware Combines Mirai Botnet with XMRig Cryptominer

Combining Mirai-based DDoS botnet capabilities with XMRig-based cryptomining capabilities reflects a growing trend of “hybrid monetization strategies, where threat actors maximize ROI by leveraging infected devices not only for botnet attacks but also for illicit cryptocurrency mining,” the researchers wrote. Organizations operating Linux servers, cloud workloads, or exposed IoT devices “should prioritize hardening and continuous monitoring to mitigate their risk,” they said. The malware uses a multi-stage infection chain that begins with a downloader delivering architecture-specific V3G4/Mirai binaries across x86_64, ARM, and MIPS systems. The second stage, Mddos.x86_64, is a statically linked and UPX-packed Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) file with stripped symbols, “making static inspection more complicated,” Cyble said. After executing and gathering system information, the Linux malware moves into stealth mode, renaming its process to appear as a system daemon (systemd-logind), detaching from the terminal, and launching parallel worker threads for attack operations, command and control (C2) communication, and inter-process communication (IPC) coordination. “A key characteristic of this botnet variant is its use of raw TCP sockets, allowing precise crafting of SYN packets for high-velocity SSH scanning campaigns,” the researchers said. At the same time, worker threads resolve the C2 domain (baojunwakuang[.]asia) via repeated queries to Google Public DNS (8.8.8.8) to maintain command channels. “This multi-threaded DNS resolution strategy is typical of Mirai-style bots, allowing the malware to maintain connectivity and receive commands while executing attacks in parallel,” the researchers wrote.

Fileless Cryptominer

In the third stage, the malware deploys a covert Monero cryptominer by downloading a UPX-packed XMRig binary from the IP 159.75.47[.]123 and stores it in /tmp/.dbus-daemon to masquerade as a legitimate process. Instead of a local configuration file, the miner obtains its configuration dynamically from the C2 server, “enabling real-time updates to wallet addresses, mining pools, and algorithms while leaving no on-disk artifacts” and hindering forensic analysis. “Unlike typical miner deployments that embed a static configuration file on disk ... this sample requests runtime configuration data directly from the C2 server,” the Cyble researchers said. That technique allows the threat actors to avoid exposing wallet addresses, pool endpoints and algorithms during static analysis while dynamically rotating mining parameters and preventing visibility of miner settings on the infected host. During execution, the miner connects to the C2 server to make a configuration request, and the server responds with a JSON blob containing the pool URL, wallet address, algorithm, and thread count. The full Cyble blog includes recommendations for defenders, MITRE ATT&CK techniques, and indicators of compromise (IoCs).

Ransomware and supply chain attacks hit their second-highest levels ever in November, as the two attack types increasingly converge, according to new research from Cyble. Ransomware groups accounted for 58% of software supply chain attacks in November, Cyble noted in a new blog post. While that’s down from 73% in October, the threat intelligence company said that ransomware groups “are increasingly targeting software supply chain vulnerabilities, which has contributed to a doubling of supply chain attacks since April 2025.” Cyble dark web researchers documented 38 supply chain attacks in November, just below October’s record (chart below). Ransomware groups claimed 22 of those attacks. [caption id="attachment_107359" align="aligncenter" width="726"] Software supply chain attacks by month (Cyble)[/caption] Overall, Cyble documented 640 ransomware attacks in November, the seventh consecutive monthly increase and below only February 2025’s record (chart below). [caption id="attachment_107361" align="aligncenter" width="729"] Ransomware attacks by month (Cyble)[/caption]

Qilin Top Ransomware Group Once Again

Qilin was once again the overall leader in claimed ransomware attacks despite CL0P’s mass exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities, which has hit more than 100 organizations to date. Qilin led all ransomware groups with 127 attacks, followed by Akira at 103, while CL0P, INC Ransom and Play rounded out the top five (chart below). [caption id="attachment_107362" align="aligncenter" width="936"] Top ransomware groups November 2025 (Cyble)[/caption] The U.S. once again was by far the most attacked country with 356 ransomware attacks, 10 times higher than the next-closest country, which was Canada with 35 attacks. The UK, Germany, India and Italy all had ransomware attack counts in the teens (chart below). [caption id="attachment_107364" align="aligncenter" width="936"] Ransomware attacks by country November 2025 (Cyble)[/caption] Construction, Professional Services, and Manufacturing were the most frequently attacked sectors in November, with more than 50 ransomware attacks each. Healthcare, Energy & Utilities, IT, Consumer Goods, and Technology experienced more than 30 attacks each (chart below). [caption id="attachment_107365" align="aligncenter" width="936"] Ransomware attacks by sector November 2025 (Cyble)[/caption]

Convergence of Ransomware and Supply Chain Attacks

Cyble documented more than 15 ransomware attacks in the blog post, many of which had supply chain implications. “November was noteworthy for the number of ransomware attacks targeting critical sectors and the IT supply chain, with several groups claiming exfiltration of sensitive documents such as project and technical documentation,” the researchers said. Among the ransomware attacks documented by Cyble were:

• An INC Ransom attack on a U.S.-based emergency alert system.
• An Akira cyberattack on “a major South Korea–based manufacturer of lithium-ion batteries.”
• An Akira attack on “a U.S.-based manufacturer of high-density, modular, and rugged embedded computing systems” that included the theft of “detailed project information ... and confidential military-related materials.”
• An Akira attack on a U.S. engineering and project-management firm for rail and transportation infrastructure projects that included the theft of “NDAs, contracts and agreements, and project documentation.”
• A Qilin attack on a U.S. company that provides “remote power management, network monitoring, and out-of-band control technologies used across data centers, telecommunications, industrial operations, and critical infrastructure environments,” which included access to “customer digital key letters, nondisclosure agreements, and additional internal corporate materials, suggesting exposure of both sensitive business information and potentially downstream client environments.”
• A Qilin attack on a Florida regional airport that included the theft of “scanned employee IDs, aviation alerts and notices, airport blueprints, internal operational documents.”
• An Anubis ransomware group attack on a U.S.-based automotive component manufacturer that resulted in the theft of blueprints and internal documents labeled “confidential.”

“The alarming number of ransomware attacks targeting critical and sensitive sectors – including the theft of sensitive project and technical data – highlights the need for security teams to respond with vigilance equal to the threat,” Cyble said. The researchers outlined a number of cybersecurity best practices that can help guard against such threats, such as vulnerability management, network segmentation, strong access controls, ransomware-resistant backups, and system and application hardening.  

The European Union and Singapore are intensifying their digital collaboration, following the second meeting of the Digital Partnership Council in Brussels. The discussions stressed strategic priorities across critical technology sectors, including artificial intelligence (AI), cybersecurity, semiconductors, and digital trade.   The Digital Partnership Council was co-chaired by Henna Virkkunen, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, and Josephine Teo, Singapore’s Minister for Digital Development and Information. Since the European Union and Singapore partnership was launched in February 2023, the council has monitored progress and adjusted its focus to reflect current technological and market developments. 

European Union and Singapore on AI and Digital Safety 

AI remained a central topic, with both the European Union and Singapore reaffirming the importance of existing frameworks that ensure the safe development and deployment of AI technologies. Future cooperation was discussed in areas such as language AI models, linking the EU’s Alliance for Language Technologies European Digital Infrastructure Consortium (ALT-EDIC) with Singapore’s Sea-Lion model.   Online safety and scam prevention were also highlighted as growing priorities. Both parties expressed a commitment to protecting vulnerable groups, particularly minors, by exploring tools such as age-verification mechanisms and digital protection that enhance user trust online. 

Digital Trust and Identity 

Strengthening digital trust remains a key goal under the EU–Singapore Digital Partnership. The council explored the development of interoperable trust services and verifiable credentials that could enable secure cross-border digital identity use cases. This approach aims to simplify regulatory compliance and facilitate smoother digital transactions across sectors, supporting both public and private initiatives.  Cybersecurity remains a cornerstone of the Digital Partnership Council’s agenda. Both the European Union and Singapore emphasized the importance of assessing new cyber threats and reinforcing resilience through coordinated bilateral and multilateral actions. The ongoing focus reflects recognition of cybersecurity’s vital role in sustaining market confidence and protecting digital infrastructure. 

Data, Semiconductors, and New Technologies 

The council also reviewed strategies to enhance cross-border data flows and explored potential collaboration in shared data spaces. Both parties expressed interest in research partnerships in semiconductors and quantum technologies, recognizing the value of cross-border investments and scientific collaboration under frameworks such as Horizon Research. These initiatives aim to strengthen innovation capabilities and ensure long-term technological competitiveness.  The EU and Singapore reaffirmed their goal for digital trade, building on the Digital Trade Agreement signed in May 2025. This agreement sets binding rules that enhance legal certainty, protect consumers, and remove unnecessary barriers to digital commerce. Through this framework, the Digital Partnership Council seeks to foster economic security and innovation while reinforcing international digital standards. 

A Strategic Framework for Future Cooperation 

Since its inception in 2023, the EU–Singapore Digital Partnership has aimed to empower businesses and citizens to fully leverage technological opportunities. The partnership has focused on bridging the digital divide, promoting trusted data flows, developing digital identities, and fostering skills and research excellence.   By continuing to align strategies and advance joint projects, the European Union and Singapore are setting a model for international digital cooperation, ensuring that both economies remain competitive and secure in the technology-driven world. 

Fatemeh Sedighian Kashi and Mohammad Bagher Shirinkar maintain a close working relationship coordinating cyber operations targeting elections, US critical infrastructure and businesses through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps cyber unit known as Shahid Shushtari. The U.S. Department of State announced rewards of up to $10 million for information leading to their identification or location, marking the latest effort to disrupt operations of Iranian cyber operatives that has caused significant financial damage and operational disruption across multiple sectors including news, shipping, travel, energy, financial services, and telecommunications throughout the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Shirinkar oversees the Shahid Shushtari group, previously identified under multiple cover names including Aria Sepehr Ayandehsazan, Emennet Pasargad, Eeleyanet Gostar, and Net Peygard Samavat Company. Whereas, Sedighian serves as a long-time employee working closely with Shirinkar in planning and conducting cyber operations on behalf of Iran's IRGCs Cyber-Electronic Command, the State Department said.

The National Investigation Headquarters of the National Police Agency has arrested four suspects involved in a major IP Camera Hacking case that resulted in the theft and sale of sensitive video footage from more than 120,000 devices. The police said the suspects edited the stolen footage and distributed illegally filmed material and other sexual exploitation material on an overseas website, causing serious privacy violations for victims. Authorities have launched wider investigations into website operators, content buyers, and viewers, while also beginning large-scale victim protection efforts to stop further harm.

IP Camera Hacking Suspects Sold Stolen Video Files

According to police, the four suspects, identified as B, C, D, and E, carried out extensive hacking activities targeting tens of thousands of IP cameras installed in homes and businesses. Many cameras were protected with weak passwords, such as repeated characters or simple number sequences.

• Suspect B hacked around 30,000 cameras, edited the stolen footage into 545 videos, and earned virtual assets worth about 35 million won.
• Suspect C created 648 files from around 70,000 hacked devices, earning about 18 million won.
• Their videos made up 62% of all content uploaded on the illegal overseas website (Site A) in the past year.
• Suspect D hacked about 15,000 cameras and stored child and youth sexual exploitation material.
• Suspect E hacked 136 cameras but did not distribute any content.

Police said that no profits remained at the time of arrest, and the case has been forwarded to the National Tax Service for additional legal action.

Police Investigating Operators, Purchasers, and Viewers of Illegally Filmed Material

The investigation extends to the operator of Site A, which hosted illegally filmed material from victims in several countries. Police are working with foreign investigative agencies to identify and take action against the operator. Individuals who purchased sexually exploitative material, including illegally filmed material, are also under investigation. Three buyers have already been arrested. The police confirmed that viewers of such material will also face legal consequences under the Sexual Violence Punishment Act. To prevent further exposure, police have asked the Broadcasting Media and Communications Deliberation Committee to block access to Site A and are coordinating with international partners to shut down the platform.

Security Measures Issued After Large-Scale IP Camera Hacking Damage

Investigators have directly notified victims through visits, phone calls, and letters, guiding them on how to change passwords and secure their devices. The police are working with the Ministry of Science and ICT and major telecom companies to identify vulnerable IP cameras and inform users quickly. Users are being advised to strengthen passwords, enable two-factor authentication, and keep device software updated. Additionally, the Personal Information Protection Commission is assisting in identifying high-risk cases to prevent further leaks of sensitive videos.

Protection for Victims and Strong Action Against Secondary Harm

Authorities are prioritizing support for victims of illegally filmed material and sexual exploitation material. Victims can receive counseling, assistance with deleting harmful content, and help blocking its spread through the Digital Sex Crime Victim Support Center. Police stressed that strict action will also be taken against individuals who repost, share, or store such material. Park Woo-hyun, Cyber Investigation Director at the National Police Agency, emphasized the seriousness of these crimes, stating: “IP Camera Hacking and sexually exploitative material, including illegally filmed content, cause enormous pain to victims, and we will actively work to eradicate these crimes through strong investigation.” He added, “Illegal filming videos — including possessing them — is a serious crime, and we will investigate such acts firmly and without hesitation.”

A nationwide cybersecurity incident involving the OnSolve CodeRED mass notification network has placed Monroe County, Georgia residents at risk, prompting local officials to warn the public and begin transitioning to a new emergency alert system. The Monroe County cyberattack, which officials emphasize did not originate locally, has compromised personal information belonging to users enrolled in the county’s emergency alert service.  In its formal notification, Monroe County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) informed residents that a nationwide data breach affecting all OnSolve CodeRED customers had been confirmed. The county stated, “This has been an issue nationwide,” stressing that the breach stemmed from an attack on the vendor system rather than any action by Monroe County personnel. According to the county, the incident was attributed to “an organized cybercriminal group that has victimized our platform and our customers.” 

Compromised Monroe County’s User Data

The cyberattack on Monroe County users occurred within the broader CodeRED environment, which supports emergency alerts issued across the United States. Once the breach was discovered, OnSolve immediately discontinued its CodeRED service nationwide and shifted resources to a new platform known as Crisis24 CodeRED. Officials said the intrusion was contained within the original system and did not spread to other networks.  According to OnSolve’s assessment, the compromised data includes names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, and passwords associated with CodeRED user accounts. County officials urged residents who use the same password for multiple accounts to change those passwords immediately to reduce the risk of further exposure.  Enrollment timing also affects the extent of data loss. Monroe County explained that residents who signed up for CodeRED before March 31, 2025, will have their information migrated to the new Crisis24 CodeRED platform. However, all data added after March 31, 2025, was lost during the incident, meaning those users will need to re-enroll once the new system becomes fully operational. The county noted that it is working closely with Crisis24 staff to expedite the setup of the replacement alert service. 

Vendor Response, FAQ Details, and System Transition 

Although the breach occurred entirely within a third-party vendor system, Monroe County EMA acknowledged that the incident is likely to cause worry within the community. Officials pledged ongoing communication, stating they will share any additional updates provided by OnSolve.  OnSolve also released a detailed FAQ explaining the breach. The vendor reported that personal contact information “may be published” as a result of the attack, but said forensic analysis indicates no impact on municipal systems beyond emergency alerts. According to the provider, the newly launched Crisis24 CodeRED platform resides in a separate, non-compromised environment and has undergone a comprehensive security audit, including external penetration testing and system hardening.  The company stated that the cybersecurity incident was detected in November and that it acted quickly to secure the affected systems, launch an investigation, and engage outside experts. The original OnSolve CodeRED platform has since been permanently decommissioned. 

No Evidence of Identity Theft, but Rising Cyber Risks Cited 

Despite concerns surrounding the Monroe County cyberattack, officials report no evidence that the compromised data has been used for identity theft or fraud. They noted that the breach reflects a broader rise in cyber intrusions nationwide, highlighting the need for stronger threat monitoring and rapid detection.   As the county works to restore its emergency alert system, officials reiterated their commitment to transparency and continued oversight. The growing frequency of attacks also stresses why organizations increasingly rely on independent threat-intelligence providers such as Cyble, whose research regularly tracks new vulnerabilities and cybercriminal activity across global networks.  To better understand how organizations can strengthen their defenses against incidents like the Monroe County cyberattack, security teams can request a guided demonstration of Cyble’s AI-native threat-intelligence capabilities. A personalized demo provides a practical look at how Cyble identifies exposures, tracks threat actors, and supports faster response decisions. 

The CJEU ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union on Tuesday has made it clear that online marketplaces are responsible for the personal data that appears in advertisements on their platforms. The Court of Justice of the European Union decision makes clear that platforms must get consent from any person whose data is shown in an advertisement, and must verify ads before they go live, especially where sensitive data is involved. The CJEU ruling comes from a 2018 incident in Romania. A fake advertisement on the classifieds website publi24.ro claimed a woman was offering sexual services. The post included her photos and phone number, which were used without her permission. The operator of the site, Russmedia Digital, removed the ad within an hour, but by then it had already been copied to other websites. The woman said the ad harmed her privacy and reputation and took the company to court. Lower courts in Romania gave different decisions, so the case was referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union for clarity. The CJEU has now confirmed that online marketplaces are data controllers under the GDPR for the personal data contained in ads on their sites.

CJEU Ruling: What Online Marketplaces Must Do Now

The court said that marketplace operators must take more responsibility and cannot rely on old rules that protect hosting services from liability. From now on, platforms must:

• Check ads before publishing them when they contain personal or sensitive data.
• Confirm that the person posting the ad is the same person shown in the ad, or make sure the person shown has given explicit consent.
• Refuse ads if consent or identity verification cannot be confirmed.
• Put measures in place to help prevent sensitive ads from being copied and reposted on other websites.

These steps must be part of the platform’s regular technical and organisational processes to comply with the GDPR.

What This Means for Platforms Across The EU

Legal teams at Pinsent Masons warned the decision “will likely have major implications for data protection across the 27 member states.” Nienke Kingma of Pinsent Masons said the ruling is important for compliance, adding it is “setting a new standard for data protection compliance across the EU.” Thijs Kelder, also at Pinsent Masons, said: “This judgment makes clear that online marketplaces cannot avoid their obligations under the GDPR,” and noted the decision “increases the operational risks on these platforms,” meaning companies will need stronger risk management. Daphne Keller of Stanford Law School warned about wider effects on free expression and platform design, noting the ruling “has major implications for free expression and access to information, age verification and privacy.”

Practical Impact

The CJEU ruling decision marks a major shift in how online marketplaces must operate. Platforms that allow users to post adverts will now have to rethink their processes, from verifying identities and checking personal data before an ad goes live to updating their terms and investing in new technical controls. Smaller platforms may feel the pressure most, as the cost of building these checks could be significant. What happens next will depend on how national data protection authorities interpret the ruling and how quickly companies can adapt. The coming months will reveal how verification should work in practice, what measures count as sufficient protection against reposting, and how platforms can balance these new duties with user privacy and free expression. The ruling sets a strict new standard, and its real impact will become clearer as regulators, courts, and platforms begin to implement it.

CISA warned today that two Android zero-day vulnerabilities are under active attack, within hours of Google releasing patches for the flaws. Both are high-severity Android framework vulnerabilities. CVE-2025-48572 is a Privilege Escalation vulnerability, while CVE-2025-48633 is an Information Disclosure vulnerability. Both were among 107 Android vulnerabilities addressed by Google in its December security bulletin released today.

Android Vulnerabilities CVE-2025-48572 and CVE-2025-48633 Under Attack

Google warned that the CVE-2025-48572 and CVE-2025-48633 framework vulnerabilities “may be under limited, targeted exploitation.” The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) followed with its own alert adding the Android vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. “These types of vulnerabilities are a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise,” CISA warned. “CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice,” the U.S. cybersecurity agency added. The vulnerabilities are so new that the CVE Program lists the CVE numbers as “reserved,” with details yet to be released. Neither Google nor CISA provided further details on how the vulnerabilities are being exploited.

7 Critical Android Vulnerabilities Also Patched

The December Android security bulletin also addressed seven critical vulnerabilities, the most severe of which is CVE-2025-48631, a framework Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability that Google warned “could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed.” Four of the critical vulnerabilities affect the Android kernel and are all Elevation of Privilege (EoP) vulnerabilities: CVE-2025-48623, CVE-2025-48624, CVE-2025-48637, and CVE-2025-48638. The other two critical vulnerabilities affect Qualcomm closed-source components: CVE-2025-47319, an Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere vulnerability, and CVE-2025-47372, a Buffer Overflow vulnerability that could lead to memory corruption. Google lists CVE-2025-47319 as “Critical” while Qualcomm lists the vulnerability as Medium severity; both list CVE-2025-47372 as Critical. The Qualcomm vulnerabilities are addressed in detail in The Cyber Express article Qualcomm Issues Critical Security Alert Over Secure Boot Vulnerability published earlier today.

Australia's fragmented approach to AI oversight—with responsibilities scattered across privacy commissioners, consumer watchdogs, online safety regulators, and sector-specific agencies—required coordination to keep pace with rapidly evolving AI capabilities and their potential to amplify existing harms while creating entirely new threats.

The Australian Government announced establishment of the AI Safety Institute backed by $29.9 million in funding, to monitor emerging AI capabilities, test advanced systems, and share intelligence across government while supporting regulators to ensure AI companies comply with Australian law. The setting up of the AI safety institute is part of the larger National AI Plan that the Australian government officially released on Tuesday.

The Institute will become operational in early 2026 as the centerpiece of the government's strategy to keep Australians safe while capturing economic opportunities from AI adoption. The approach maintains existing legal frameworks as the foundation for addressing AI-related risks rather than introducing standalone AI legislation, with the Institute supporting portfolio agencies and regulators to adapt laws when necessary.

Dual Focus on Upstream Risks and Downstream Harms

The AI Safety Institute will focus on both upstream AI risks and downstream AI harms. Upstream risks involve model capabilities and the ways AI systems are built and trained that can create or amplify harm, requiring technical evaluation of frontier AI systems before deployment.

Downstream harms represent real-world effects people experience when AI systems are used, including bias in hiring algorithms, privacy breaches from data processing, discriminatory outcomes in automated decision-making, and emerging threats like AI-enabled crime and AI-facilitated abuse disproportionately impacting women and girls.

The Institute will generate and share technical insights on emerging AI capabilities, working across government and with international partners. It will develop advice, support bilateral and multilateral safety engagement, and publish safety research to inform industry and academia while engaging with unions, business, and researchers to ensure functions meet community needs.

Supporting Coordinated Regulatory Response

The Institute will support coordinated responses to downstream AI harms by engaging with portfolio agencies and regulators, monitoring and analyzing information across government to allow ministers and regulators to take informed, timely, and cohesive regulatory action.

Portfolio agencies and regulators remain best placed to assess AI uses and harms in specific sectors and adjust regulatory approaches when necessary. The Institute will support existing regulators to ensure AI companies are compliant with Australian law and uphold legal standards of fairness and transparency.

The government emphasized that Australia has strong existing, largely technology-neutral legal frameworks including sector-specific guidance and standards that can apply to AI. The approach promotes flexibility, uses regulators' existing expertise, and targets emerging threats as understanding of AI's strengths and limitations evolves.

Addressing Specific AI Harms

The government is taking targeted action against specific harms while continuing to assess suitability of existing laws. Consumer protections under Australian Consumer Law apply equally to AI-enabled goods and services, with Treasury's review finding Australians enjoy the same strong protections for AI products as traditional goods.

The government addresses AI-related risks through enforceable industry codes under the Online Safety Act 2021, criminalizing non-consensual deepfake material while considering further restrictions on "nudify" apps and reforms to tackle algorithmic bias.

The Attorney-General's Department engages stakeholders through the Copyright and AI Reference Group to consult on possible updates to copyright laws as they relate to AI, with the government ruling out a text and data mining exception to provide certainty to Australian creators and media workers.

Healthcare AI regulation is under review through the Safe and Responsible AI in Healthcare Legislation and Regulation Review, while the Therapeutic Goods Administration oversees AI used in medical device software following its review on strengthening regulation of medical device software including artificial intelligence.

Also read: CPA Australia Warns: AI Adoption Accelerates Cyber Risks for Australian Businesses

National Security and Crisis Response

The Department of Home Affairs, National Intelligence Community, and law enforcement agencies continue efforts to proactively mitigate serious risks posed by AI. Home Affairs coordinates cross-government efforts on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection while overseeing the Protective Security Policy Framework detailing policy requirements for authorizing AI technology systems for non-corporate Commonwealth entities.

AI is likely to exacerbate existing national security risks and create new, unknown threats. The government is preparing for potential AI-related incidents through the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, which provides overarching policy for managing potential crises.

The government will consider how AI-related harms are managed under the framework to ensure ongoing clarity regarding roles and responsibilities across government to support coordinated and effective action.

International Engagement

The Institute will collaborate with domestic and international partners including the National AI Centre and the International Network of AI Safety Institutes to support global conversations on understanding and addressing AI risks.

Australia is a signatory to the Bletchley Declaration, Seoul Declaration, and Paris Statement emphasizing inclusive international cooperation on AI governance. Participation in the UN Global Digital Compact, Hiroshima AI Process, and Global Partnership on AI supports conversations on advancing safe, secure, and trustworthy adoption.

The government is developing an Australian Government Strategy for International Engagement and Regional Leadership on Artificial Intelligence to align foreign and domestic policy settings while establishing priorities for bilateral partnerships and engagement in international forums.

Also read: UK’s AI Safety Institute Establishes San Francisco Office for Global Expansion

A batch of new vulnerabilities in Devolutions Server targets organizations that depend on the platform to manage privileged accounts, passwords, and sensitive authentication data.   Devolutions has released a security advisory, identified as DEVO-2025-0018, warning customers of multiple vulnerabilities, including a critical flaw that could enable attackers to extract confidential data directly from the system’s database.  The advisory notes several versions of the Devolutions Server, specifically 2025.2.20 and earlier, and 2025.3.8 and earlier, are affected. 

Critical SQL Injection Vulnerability Enables Data Exfiltration 

The most severe issue, scored 9.4 (Critical) under the CVSS 4.0 rating system, involves an SQL injection weakness in the platform’s “last usage logs.” The flaw occurs when the system attempts to sort usage history through a parameter known as DateSortField. Because the software does not sufficiently validate user-supplied input in this field, an authenticated user can inject malicious SQL commands directly into the database.  This vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-13757, allows a logged-in attacker to exfiltrate or modify sensitive information, posing a significant threat to environments where Devolutions Server stores high-value credentials, access keys, and privileged account data. The flaw can reveal information that should remain inaccessible, making it one of the most dangerous issues ever reported for the platform.  Credit for discovering the vulnerability was attributed to JaGoTu of DCIT a.s. 

Two Medium-Severity Vulnerabilities Also Discovered 

Alongside CVE-2025-13757, the same research group identified two additional security weaknesses, CVE-2025-13758 and CVE-2025-13765, both classified as medium severity, though still impactful in environments requiring strict confidentiality. 

CVE-2025-13758: Credentials Leaked in Partial Entry Requests 

One issue involves certain entry types improperly including passwords in the initial request for general item information. Normally, credentials such as passwords are delivered only through a protected /sensitive-data request when a user intentionally accesses them. However, some entries exposed credential data prematurely, increasing the risk of unauthorized disclosure. This vulnerability carries a 5.1 CVSS score and also affects the same product versions listed in the advisory. 

CVE-2025-13765: Improper Access Control in Email Service Configuration 

The second Medium-risk flaw, rated 4.9 CVSS, involves improper access controls within the platform’s email service configuration API. When multiple email services were set up, users lacking administrative privileges could still retrieve email service passwords, undermining the system’s access control model.  Both issues were likewise credited to JaGoTu, DCIT a.s. 

Required Updates and Remediation 

Devolutions recommends immediate installation of the patched releases to remediate all three vulnerabilities. The advisory instructs customers to upgrade Devolutions Server to: 

• Version 2025.2.21 or higher 
• Version 2025.3.9 or higher 

Applying these updates is essential to block SQL injection attempts, prevent unauthorized credential exposure, and restore proper access control protections. Without these patches, organizations remain susceptible to data exfiltration, unauthorized password retrieval, and improper user privilege escalation.  The identification of CVE-2025-13757, CVE-2025-13758, and CVE-2025-13765 confirms the need for immediate patching across all affected Devolutions Server deployments. Because these flaws expose sensitive credentials and privileged access pathways, unpatched systems face measurable confidentiality and operational risks.   Organizations should apply the recommended updates without delay and strengthen their ongoing vulnerability oversight. Platforms such as Cyble, which provide real-time vulnerability intelligence and clearer prioritization of high-impact risks, can support security teams in identifying issues like these earlier and reducing exposure across their environments.  See your vulnerabilities before attackers do. Book a personalized demo with Cyble today and gain real-time visibility into critical risks, zero-days, and high-impact threats across your enterprise.