The European Commission (EC) is considering a “Digital Omnibus” package that would substantially rewrite EU privacy law, particularly the landmark General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It’s not a done deal, and it shouldn’t be.

The GDPR is the most comprehensive model for privacy legislation around the world. While it is far from perfect and suffers from uneven enforcement, complexities and certain administrative burdens, the omnibus package is full of bad and confusing ideas that, on balance, will significantly weaken privacy protections for users in the name of cutting red tape.

It contains at least one good idea: improving consent rules so users can automatically set consent preferences that will apply across all sites. But much as we love limiting cookie fatigue, it’s not worth the price users will pay if the rest of the proposal is adopted. The EC needs to go back to the drawing board if it wants to achieve the goal of simplifying EU regulations without gutting user privacy.

Let’s break it down. 

 Changing What Constitutes Personal Data 

 The digital package is part of a larger Simplification Agenda to reduce compliance costs and administrative burdens for businesses, echoing the Draghi Report’s call to boost productivity and support innovation. Businesses have been complaining about GDPR red tape since its inception, and new rules are supposed to make compliance easier and turbocharge the development of AI in the EU. Simplification is framed as a precondition for firms to scale up in the EU, ironically targeting laws that were also argued to promote innovation in Europe. It might also stave off tariffs the U.S. has threatened to levy, thanks in part to heavy lobbying from Meta and tech lobbying groups.  

 The most striking proposal seeks to narrow the definition of personal data, the very basis of the GDPR. Today, information counts as personal data if someone can reasonably identify a person from it, whether directly or by combining it with other information.  

 The proposal jettisons this relatively simple test in favor of a variable one: whether data is “personal” depends on what a specific entity says it can reasonably do or is likely to do with it. This selectively restates part of a recent ruling by the EU Court of Justice but ignores the multiple other cases that have considered the issue. 

 This structural move toward entity specific standards will create massive legal and practical confusion, as the same data could be treated as personal for some actors but not for others. It also creates a path for companies to avoid established GDPR obligations via operational restructuring to separate identifiers from other information—a change in paperwork rather than in actual identifiability. What’s more, it will be up to the Commission, a political executive body, to define what counts as unidentifiable pseudonymized data for certain entities.

Privileging AI 

In the name of facilitating AI innovation, which often relies on large datasets in which sensitive data may residually appear, the digital package treats AI development as a “legitimate interest,” which gives AI companies a broad legal basis to process personal data, unless individuals actively object. The proposals gesture towards organisational and technical safeguards but leave companies broad discretion.  

 Another amendment would create a new exemption that allows even sensitive personal data to be used for AI systems under some circumstances. This is not a blanket permission:  “organisational and technical measures” must be taken to avoid collecting or processing such data, and proportionate efforts must be taken to remove them from AI models or training sets where they appear. However, it is unclear what will count as an appropriate or proportionate measures.

Taken together with the new personal data test, these AI privileges mean that core data protection rights, which are meant to apply uniformly, are likely to vary in practice depending on a company’s technological and commercial goals.  

And it means that AI systems may be allowed to process sensitive data even though non-AI systems that could pose equal or lower risks are not allowed to handle it. 

A Broad Reform Beyond the GDPR

There are additional adjustments, many of them troubling, such as changes to rules on automated-decision making (making it easier for companies to claim it’s needed for a service or contract), reduced transparency requirements (less explanation about how users’ data are used), and revised data access rights (supposed to tackle abusive requests). An extensive analysis by NGO noyb can be found here.  

Moreover, the digital package reaches well beyond the GDPR, aiming to streamline Europe’s digital regulatory rulebook, including the e-Privacy Directive, cybersecurity rules, the AI Act and the Data Act. The Commission also launched “reality checks” of other core legislation, which suggests it is eyeing other mandates.

Browser Signals and Cookie Fatigue

There is one proposal in the Digital Omnibus that actually could simplify something important to users: requiring online interfaces to respect automated consent signals, allowing users to automatically reject consent across all websites instead of clicking through cookie popups on each. Cookie popups are often designed with “dark patterns” that make rejecting data sharing harder than accepting it. Automated signals can address cookie banner fatigue and make it easier for people to exercise their privacy rights. 

While this proposal is a step forward, the devil is in the details: First, the exact format of the automated consent signal will be determined by technical standards organizations where Big Tech companies have historically lobbied for standards that work in their favor. The amendments should therefore define minimum protections that cannot be weakened later. 

Second, the provision takes the important step of requiring web browsers to make it easy for users sending this automated consent signal, so they can opt-out without installing a browser add-on. 

However, mobile operating systems are excluded from this latter requirement, which is a significant oversight. People deserve the same privacy rights on websites and mobile apps. 

Finally, exempting media service providers altogether creates a loophole that lets them keep using tedious or deceptive banners to get consent for data sharing. A media service’s harvesting of user information on its website to track its customers is distinct from news gathering, which should be protected. 

A Muddled Legal Landscape

The Commission’s use of the "Omnibus" process is meant to streamline lawmaking by bundling multiple changes. An earlier proposal kept the GDPR intact, focusing on easing the record-keeping obligation for smaller businesses—a far less contentious measure. The new digital package instead moves forward with thinner evidence than a substantive structural reform would require, violating basic Better Regulation principles, such as coherence and proportionality.

The result is the opposite of  “simple.” The proposed delay of the high-risk requirements under the AI Act to late 2027—part of the omnibus package—illustrates this: Businesses will face a muddled legal landscape as they must comply with rules that may soon be paused and later revived again. This sounds like "complification” rather than simplification.

The Digital Package Is Not a Done Deal

Evaluating existing legislation is part of a sensible legislative cycle and clarifying and simplifying complex process and practices is not a bad idea. Unfortunately, the digital package misses the mark by making processes even more complex, at the expense of personal data protection. 

Simplification doesn't require tossing out digital rights. The EC should keep that in mind as it launches its reality check of core legislation such as the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, where tidying up can too easily drift into a verschlimmbessern, the kind of well-meant fix that ends up resembling the infamous ecce homo restoration. 

After a years-long battle, the European Commission’s “Chat Control” plan, which would mandate mass scanning and other encryption-breaking measures, at last codifies agreement on a position within the Council of the EU, representing EU States. The good news is that the most controversial part, the forced requirement to scan encrypted messages, is out. The bad news is there’s more to it than that.

Chat Control has gone through several iterations since it was first introduced, with the EU Parliament backing a position that protects fundamental rights, while the Council of the EU spent many months pursuing an intrusive law-enforcement-focused approach. Many proposals earlier this year required the scanning and detection of illicit content on all services, including private messaging apps such as WhatsApp and Signal. This requirement would fundamentally break end-to-end encryption. 

Thanks to the tireless efforts of digital rights groups, including European Digital Rights (EDRi), we won a significant improvement: the Council agreed on its position, which removed the requirement that forces providers to scan messages on their services. It also comes with strong language to protect encryption, which is good news for users.

But here comes the rub: first, the Council’s position allows for “voluntary” detection, where tech platforms can scan personal messages that aren’t end-to-end encrypted. Unlike in the U.S., where there is no comprehensive federal privacy law, voluntary scanning is not technically legal in the EU, though it’s been possible through a derogation set to expire in 2026. It is unclear how this will play out over time, though we are concerned that this approach to voluntary scanning will lead to private mass-scanning of non-encrypted services and might limit the sorts of secure communication and storage services big providers offer. With limited transparency and oversight, it will be difficult to know how services approach this sort of detection. 

With mandatory detection orders being off the table, the Council has embraced another worrying system to protect children online: risk mitigation. Providers will have to take “all reasonable mitigation measures” to reduce risks on their services. This includes age verification and age assessment measures. We have written about the perils of age verification schemes and recent developments in the EU, where regulators are increasingly focusing on AV to reduce online harms.

If secure messaging platforms like Signal or WhatsApp are required to implement age verification methods, it would fundamentally reshape what it means to use these services privately. Encrypted communication tools should be available to everyone, everywhere, of all ages, freely and without the requirement to prove their identity. As age verification has started to creep in as a mandatory risk mitigation measure under the EU’s Digital Services Act in certain situations, it could become a de facto requirement under the Chat Control proposal if the wording is left broad enough for regulators to treat it as a baseline. 

Likewise, the Council’s position lists “voluntary activities” as a potential risk mitigation measure. Pull the thread on this and you’re left with a contradictory stance, because an activity is no longer voluntary if it forms part of a formal risk management obligation. While courts might interpret its mention in a risk assessment as an optional measure available to providers that do not use encrypted communication channels, this reading is far from certain, and the current language will, at a minimum, nudge non-encrypted services to perform voluntary scanning if they don’t want to invest in alternative risk mitigation options. It’s largely up to the provider to choose how to mitigate risks, but it’s up to enforcers to decide what is effective. Again, we're concerned about how this will play out in practice.

For the same reason, clear and unambiguous language is needed to prevent authorities from taking a hostile view of what is meant by “allowing encryption” if that means then expecting service providers to implement client-side scanning. We welcome the clear assurance in the text that encryption cannot be weakened or bypassed, including through any requirement to grant access to protected data, but even greater clarity would come from an explicit statement that client-side scanning cannot coexist with encryption.

As we approach the final “trilogue” negotiations of this regulation, we urge EU lawmakers to work on a final text that fully protects users’ right to private communication and avoids intrusive age-verification mandates and risk benchmark systems that lead to surveillance in practice.

By publishing its guidelines under Article 28 of the Digital Services Act, the European Commission has taken a major step towards social media bans that will undermine privacy, expression, and participation rights for young people that are already enshrined in international human rights law. 

EFF recently submitted feedback to the Commission’s consultation on the guidelines, emphasizing a critical point: Online safety for young people must include privacy and security for them and must not come at the expense of freedom of expression and equitable access to digital spaces.

Article 28 requires online platforms to take appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure a high level of safety, privacy and security of minors on their services. But the article also prohibits targeting minors with personalized ads, a measure that would seem to require that platforms know that a user is a minor. The DSA acknowledges that there is an inherent tension between ensuring a minor’s privacy and requiring platforms to know the age of every user. The DSA does not resolve this tension. Rather, it states that service providers should not be incentivized to collect the age of their users, and Article 28(3) makes a point of not requiring service providers to collect and process additional data to assess whether a user is underage. 

Thus, the question of age checks is a key to understanding the obligations of online platforms to safeguard minors online. Our submission explained the serious concerns that age checks pose to the rights and security of minors. All methods for conducting age checks come with serious drawbacks. Approaches to verify a user’s age generally involve some form of government-issued ID document, which millions of people in Europe—including migrants, members of marginalized groups and unhoused people, exchange students, refugees and tourists—may not have access to.

Other age assurance methods, like biometric age estimation, age estimation based on email addresses or user activity, involve the processing of vast amounts of personal, sensitive data – usually in the hands of third parties. Beyond being potentially exposed to discrimination and erroneous estimations, users are asked to trust platforms’ intransparent supply chains and hope for the best. Age assurance methods always impact the rights of children and teenagers: Their rights to privacy and data protection, free expression, information and participation.

The Commission's guidelines contain a wealth of measures elucidating the Commission's understanding of "age appropriate design" of online services. We have argued that some of them, including default settings to protect users’ privacy, effective content moderation and ensuring that recommender systems’ don’t rely on the collection of behavioral data, are practices that would benefit all users. 

But while the initial Commission draft document considered age checks as only a tool to determine users’ ages to be able to tailor their online experiences according to their age, the final guidelines go far beyond that. Crucially, the European Commission now seems to consider “measures restricting access based on age to be an effective means to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security for minors on online platforms” (page 14). 

This is a surprising turn, as many in Brussels have considered social media bans like the one Australia passed (and still doesn’t know how to implement) disproportionate. Responding to mounting pressure from Member States like France, Denmark, and Greece to ban young people under a certain age from social media platforms, the guidelines contain an opening clause for national rules on age limits for certain services. According to the guidelines, the Commission considers such access restrictions  appropriate and proportionate where “union or national law, (...) prescribes a minimum age to access certain products or services (...), including specifically defined categories of online social media services”. This opens the door for different national laws introducing different age limits for services like social media platforms. 

It’s concerning that the Commission generally considers the use of age verification proportionate in any situation where a provider of an online platform identifies risks to minors’ privacy, safety, or security and those risks “cannot be mitigated by other less intrusive measures as effectively as by access restrictions supported by age verification” (page 17). This view risks establishing a broad legal mandate for age verification measures.

It is clear that such bans will do little in the way of making the internet a safer space for young people. By banning a particularly vulnerable group of users from accessing platforms, the providers themselves are let off the hook: If it is enough for platforms like Instagram and TikTok to implement (comparatively cheap) age restriction tools, there are no incentives anymore to actually make their products and features safer for young people. Banning a certain user group changes nothing about problematic privacy practices, insufficient content moderation or business models based on the exploitation of people’s attention and data. And assuming that teenagers will always find ways to circumvent age restrictions, the ones that do will be left without any protections or age-appropriate experiences.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation and ARTICLE 19 strongly support the Wikimedia Foundation’s legal challenge to the categorization regulations of the United Kingdom’s Online Safety Act.

The Foundation – the non-profit that operates Wikipedia and other Wikimedia projects – announced its legal challenge earlier this year, arguing that the regulations endanger Wikipedia and the global community of volunteer contributors who create the information on the site. The High Court of Justice in London will hear the challenge on July 22 and 23.

EFF and ARTICLE 19 agree with the Foundation’s argument that, if enforced, the Category 1 duties - the OSA’s most stringent obligations – would undermine the privacy and safety of Wikipedia’s volunteer contributors, expose the site to manipulation and divert essential resources from protecting people and improving the site. For example, because the law requires Category 1 services to allow users to block all unverified users from editing any content they post, the law effectively requires the Foundation to verify the identity of many Wikipedia contributors. However, that compelled verification undermines the privacy that keeps the site’s volunteers safe.

Wikipedia is the world’s most trusted and widely used encyclopedia, with users across the word accessing its wealth of information and participating in free information exchange through the site. The OSA must not be allowed to diminish it and jeopardize the volunteers on which it depends.

Beyond the issues raised in Wikimedia’s lawsuit, EFF and ARTICLE 19 emphasize that the Online Safety Act poses a serious threat to freedom of expression and privacy online, both in the U.K. and globally. Several key provisions of the law become operational July 25, and some companies already are rolling out age-verification mechanisms which undermine free expression and privacy rights of both adults and minors.