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Survey Sees Little Post-Quantum Computing Encryption Progress

10 February 2026 at 17:15

A global survey of 4,149 IT and security practitioners finds that while three-quarters (75%) expect a quantum computer will be capable of breaking traditional public key encryption within five years, only 38% at this point in time are preparing to adopt post-quantum cryptography. Conducted by the Ponemon Institute on behalf of Entrust, a provider of..

The post Survey Sees Little Post-Quantum Computing Encryption Progress appeared first on Security Boulevard.

PQC-Hardened Model Context Protocol Transport Layers

Learn how to secure Model Context Protocol (MCP) transport layers using post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to defend against future quantum computing threats.

The post PQC-Hardened Model Context Protocol Transport Layers appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Microsoft Is Finally Killing RC4

22 December 2025 at 12:05

After twenty-six years, Microsoft is finally upgrading the last remaining instance of the encryption algorithm RC4 in Windows.

of the most visible holdouts in supporting RC4 has been Microsoft. Eventually, Microsoft upgraded Active Directory to support the much more secure AES encryption standard. But by default, Windows servers have continued to respond to RC4-based authentication requests and return an RC4-based response. The RC4 fallback has been a favorite weakness hackers have exploited to compromise enterprise networks. Use of RC4 played a key role in last year’s breach of health giant Ascension. The breach caused life-threatening disruptions at 140 hospitals and put the medical records of 5.6 million patients into the hands of the attackers. US Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) in September called on the Federal Trade Commission to investigate Microsoft for “gross cybersecurity negligence,” citing the continued default support for RC4.

Last week, Microsoft said it was finally deprecating RC4 and cited its susceptibility to Kerberoasting, the form of attack, known since 2014, that was the root cause of the initial intrusion into Ascension’s network.

Fun fact: RC4 was a trade secret until I published the algorithm in the second edition of Applied Cryptography in 1995.

Substitution Cipher Based on The Voynich Manuscript

8 December 2025 at 07:04

Here’s a fun paper: “The Naibbe cipher: a substitution cipher that encrypts Latin and Italian as Voynich Manuscript-like ciphertext“:

Abstract: In this article, I investigate the hypothesis that the Voynich Manuscript (MS 408, Yale University Beinecke Library) is compatible with being a ciphertext by attempting to develop a historically plausible cipher that can replicate the manuscript’s unusual properties. The resulting cipher­a verbose homophonic substitution cipher I call the Naibbe cipher­can be done entirely by hand with 15th-century materials, and when it encrypts a wide range of Latin and Italian plaintexts, the resulting ciphertexts remain fully decipherable and also reliably reproduce many key statistical properties of the Voynich Manuscript at once. My results suggest that the so-called “ciphertext hypothesis” for the Voynich Manuscript remains viable, while also placing constraints on plausible substitution cipher structures.

Book Review: The Business of Secrets

13 November 2025 at 07:09

The Business of Secrets: Adventures in Selling Encryption Around the World by Fred Kinch (May 24, 2024)

From the vantage point of today, it’s surreal reading about the commercial cryptography business in the 1970s. Nobody knew anything. The manufacturers didn’t know whether the cryptography they sold was any good. The customers didn’t know whether the crypto they bought was any good. Everyone pretended to know, thought they knew, or knew better than to even try to know.

The Business of Secrets is the self-published memoirs of Fred Kinch. He was founder and vice president of—mostly sales—at a US cryptographic hardware company called Datotek, from company’s founding in 1969 until 1982. It’s mostly a disjointed collection of stories about the difficulties of selling to governments worldwide, along with descriptions of the highs and (mostly) lows of foreign airlines, foreign hotels, and foreign travel in general. But it’s also about encryption.

Datotek sold cryptographic equipment in the era after rotor machines and before modern academic cryptography. The company initially marketed computer-file encryption, but pivoted to link encryption—low-speed data, voice, fax—because that’s what the market wanted.

These were the years where the NSA hired anyone promising in the field, and routinely classified—and thereby blocked—publication of academic mathematics papers of those they didn’t hire. They controlled the fielding of strong cryptography by aggressively using the International Traffic in Arms regulation. Kinch talks about the difficulties in getting an expert license for Datotek’s products; he didn’t know that the only reason he ever got that license was because the NSA was able to break his company’s stuff. He had no idea that his largest competitor, the Swiss company Crypto AG, was owned and controlled by the CIA and its West German equivalent. “Wouldn’t that have made our life easier if we had known that back in the 1970s?” Yes, it would. But no one knew.

Glimmers of the clandestine world peek out of the book. Countries like France ask detailed tech questions, borrow or buy a couple of units for “evaluation,” and then disappear again. Did they break the encryption? Did they just want to see what their adversaries were using? No one at Datotek knew.

Kinch “carried the key generator logic diagrams and schematics” with him—even today, it’s good practice not to rely on their secrecy for security—but the details seem laughably insecure: four linear shift registers of 29, 23, 13, and 7 bits, variable stepping, and a small nonlinear final transformation. The NSA probably used this as a challenge to its new hires. But Datotek didn’t know that, at the time.

Kinch writes: “The strength of the cryptography had to be accepted on trust and only on trust.” Yes, but it’s so, so weird to read about it in practice. Kinch demonstrated the security of his telephone encryptors by hooking a pair of them up and having people listen to the encrypted voice. It’s rather like demonstrating the safety of a food additive by showing that someone doesn’t immediately fall over dead after eating it. (In one absolutely bizarre anecdote, an Argentine sergeant with a “hearing defect” could understand the scrambled analog voice. Datotek fixed its security, but only offered the upgrade to the Argentines, because no one else complained. As I said, no one knew anything.)

In his postscript, he writes that even if the NSA could break Datotek’s products, they were “vastly superior to what [his customers] had used previously.” Given that the previous devices were electromechanical rotor machines, and that his primary competition was a CIA-run operation, he’s probably right. But even today, we know nothing about any other country’s cryptanalytic capabilities during those decades.

A lot of this book has a “you had to be there” vibe. And it’s mostly tone-deaf. There is no real acknowledgment of the human-rights-abusing countries on Datotek’s customer list, and how their products might have assisted those governments. But it’s a fascinating artifact of an era before commercial cryptography went mainstream, before academic cryptography became approved for US classified data, before those of us outside the triple fences of the NSA understood the mathematics of cryptography.

This book review originally appeared in AFIO.

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