AI Is Now Fighting on Both Sides of the Cyber War, Singapore Warns
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Lembaga Tabung Haji (TH) has resumed its key systems and services after a Tabung Haji cyberattack on Oct 8 led to a temporary suspension, and the agency says depositors’ savings are safe. In a statement issued today, TH said the reactivation followed comprehensive security checks, the strengthening of controls and system recovery measures.
The agency also said it worked with national cybersecurity authorities to address the threat and reinforce system security, so that the reactivated services can operate safely. TH has lodged a police report and continues to monitor its systems closely.
On Oct 8, TH temporarily suspended system and service operations across all channels. The agency said the suspension was meant to protect depositors’ savings and personal information after the attack caused service disruptions.
TH described the Tabung Haji cyberattack as a criminal act against TH and the nation, intended to disrupt its services. After the incident, its internal team worked with external experts and national cybersecurity authorities to investigate the event, address the threat and restore the systems.
According to the statement, TH branches in Kedah, Terengganu and Kelantan resumed operations yesterday. Branches in other states opened as usual today. Services provided through strategic banking partners have also been reactivated.
The statement said the reactivation followed those checks and recovery measures. It added: “TH assures that depositors’ savings are safe. Close monitoring and security enhancements will continue to ensure that the reactivated systems and services operate safely and smoothly.”
TH also announced that all functions of the THiJARI platform have resumed operations, with three exceptions. Password resets, new user registration and online account opening remain unavailable.
The agency said these three functions still require further restoration work before they can be reactivated. Updates will be communicated through TH’s official channels from time to time.
TH lodged a police report over the incident and notified the mNational Cyber Security Agency (NACSA) and the Department of Personal Data Protection (JPDP). It has collaborated with cybersecurity authorities to address the threat and reinforce system security, which it said ensures the safety of the reactivated services.
TH urged depositors who detect unusual transactions, or who need assistance or have inquiries, to contact the TH Contact Centre (THCC) immediately at 03-6207 1919. The agency said it continues to monitor its systems closely and will keep strengthening security.
TH also thanked depositors for their patience, cooperation and support during the restoration period. “We once again apologise and deeply regret the incident; however, these measures were necessary to safeguard depositors’ savings,” the statement said.
Based on the statement, three points are confirmed. Depositors’ savings are safe, key systems and services have resumed, and three THiJARI functions are still being restored.
TH said it will continue close monitoring and security enhancements, and it will share further updates through its official channels. Depositors with concerns can reach the THCC at 03-6207 1919.
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| Branch | Affected versions | Fixed version |
| 10.4 | 10.4.0 to 10.4.2 | 10.4.3 |
| 10.2 | 10.2.0 to 10.2.6 | 10.2.7 |
| 10.0 | 10.0.0 to 10.0.9 | 10.0.10 |
| 9.4 | 9.4.0 to 9.4.14 | 9.4.15 |
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The U.S. Department of State's Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program is offering up to $10 million for information on Zhang Yu, a Chinese national accused of hacking COVID-19 research at U.S. universities on behalf of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS). U.S. officials also describe Zhang as a key figure in the HAFNIUM hacking campaign, which compromised thousands of computers worldwide.
His alleged partner, Xu Zewei, was arrested in Italy in July 2025 and extradited to the United States in April 2026. Zhang remains at large.
Zhang is a director at Shanghai Firetech Information Science and Technology Company, Ltd. U.S. officials say he worked at the direction of the MSS Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB). According to RFJ, the MSS and SSSB are Chinese intelligence services responsible for domestic counterintelligence, non-military foreign intelligence, and parts of the country's political and domestic security.
[caption id="attachment_114641" align="aligncenter" width="600"]The reward covers information leading to the identification or location of anyone who, while acting under the direction or control of a foreign government, takes part in malicious cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The State Department says Zhang's cyberattacks violated that law.
Starting in early 2020, Zhang and Xu allegedly gained unauthorized access to COVID-19 research conducted by U.S.-based universities and leading immunologists and virologists in order to steal sensitive information. At the time, Xu was a general manager at Shanghai Powerock Network Co. Ltd.
Prosecutors say the two men carried out the hacks at the behest of the MSS and SSSB and reported back to supervising officers at the SSSB. In one instance, Xu allegedly confirmed to his handlers that he had compromised the network of a research university in the Southern District of Texas.
In 2021, Zhang and Xu allegedly exploited vulnerabilities in computers running Microsoft Exchange Server, software used to store and retrieve emails. These intrusions were part of the mass hacking campaign publicly known as HAFNIUM. Victims included a university and a law firm, both based in the United States.
A nine-count indictment unveiled by the Justice Department in 2025 accused both men of computer intrusions between February 2020 and June 2021, including the HAFNIUM campaign, which prosecutors described as indiscriminate.
The scale of the campaign was significant. Brett Leatherman, assistant director of the FBI's Cyber Division, said in 2025 that through HAFNIUM, the Chinese Communist Party targeted more than 60,000 U.S. entities and successfully victimized more than 12,700 of them to steal sensitive information.
Xu was arrested by Italian authorities in July 2025 while on vacation in Milan. He was extradited to the United States in April 2026, while Zhang has not been apprehended.
According to RFJ, China uses an extensive network of private companies and contractors to hack and steal information in a way that hides the government's involvement. Both men worked for private Shanghai firms while allegedly acting on behalf of state intelligence services.
RFJ is asking anyone with information on Zhang, his associates, or their malicious cyber activities to submit a tip through its Tor-based tip line. Rewards of up to $10 million are available for information that meets the program's criteria.
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| Product | Fixed versions |
| Bitbucket Data Center | 9.4.26, 10.2.8, 10.5.1 |
| Confluence Data Center | 9.2.26, 10.2.19 |
| Jira Service Management Data Center | 5.12.40, 10.3.26, 11.3.12 |
| Jira Software Data Center | 9.12.40, 10.3.26, 11.3.12 |
| Bamboo Data Center | 10.2.24, 12.1.12 |
| Crowd Data Center | 6.3.7, 7.0.3, 7.1.7, 7.2.4 |
| Crucible | 4.9.15 |
| Fisheye | 4.9.15 |
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The FBI and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) have issued a joint cybersecurity advisory warning organizations about FortiBleed, an active global credential-compromise campaign targeting internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways. The advisory, published on October 6, 2026, cites SOCRadar data verifying more than 86,644 compromised devices across 194 countries.
According to the advisory, the campaign exploits reused or leaked credentials and legacy SHA-256 password storage, allowing threat actors to harvest and crack authentication data at scale. Attackers continue to scan exposed Fortinet firewalls using previously obtained credentials, and some affected organizations have been locked out of their own systems.
The operation's internal workflow came to light after the threat actors unintentionally exposed their own backend server. The open directory revealed a mature, multi-stage campaign run as an initial access broker operation.
Attackers first scanned the internet for exposed FortiGate SSL VPN portals using automated scripts. They then gathered credentials through credential stuffing and password spraying, drawing on prior Fortinet leak dumps and infostealer logs.
Password hashes taken from compromised devices were exfiltrated and fed into a GPU-accelerated cracking cluster running on rented infrastructure, where Hashcat and Hashtopolis ran distributed jobs to convert stolen data into plaintext credentials.
[caption id="attachment_114628" align="aligncenter" width="800"]Cracked credentials were then validated, with scripts filtering out honeypots, mapping organizations and ranking high-value targets by revenue and network structure. Attackers created new administrative accounts on firewalls to maintain persistence, then moved into victim networks to enumerate Active Directory and identify privileged accounts. The final stage involved selling access, including working VPN configurations and target lists, to downstream threat actors.
The advisory warns that victims may lose access to their Fortinet devices if attackers delete original accounts or change their passwords. In certain cases, threat actors removed existing accounts to block organizations from their devices while attempting lateral movement. Recovery may require steps beyond standard patching and password resets.
Reporting also indicates that initial access brokers using the FortiBleed attack chain have supplied access to ransomware affiliates, currently including INC/Lynx ransomware and Payload ransomware.
The agencies released indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help defenders review their environments. IP address 45.154.12.132 was observed as a command and control server, while 154.202.59.169 and 103.27.186.156 served as proxy nodes and 45.155.250.158 functioned as a beacon relay. The address 85.11.187.8 was linked to the Hashtopolis tool. The advisory also lists 13 IP addresses observed between June 18 and July 23, 2026, conducting brute force attacks or authenticating with compromised accounts.
Account names found on victim systems include adminin, fortiAdmin, forticloud-sync, fgtsecure, adminsslvpn, itadmin and roadmin. The agencies note that IP addresses may be reassigned over time and advise organizations to vet IOCs before acting on them.
The FBI and USSS recommend that organizations:
Organizations that detect a compromise are urged to isolate affected hosts, scope the intrusion and report incidents to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), a local FBI field office or a local USSS field office.
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The Wikimedia investigation adds to recent reports of AI agents interacting with public websites and online services in unintended ways. The Foundation said such activity can create challenges for website operators, particularly when agents generate large volumes of automated traffic or attempt to use public services for purposes beyond their intended function.
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| Affected branch | Fixed release |
| OpenSSL 4.0 | 4.0.3 |
| OpenSSL 3.6 | 3.6.5 |
| OpenSSL 3.5 | 3.5.9 |
| OpenSSL 3.4 | 3.4.8 |
| OpenSSL 3.0 Premium Support | 3.0.23 |
| OpenSSL 1.1.1 Premium Support | 1.1.1zj |
| OpenSSL 1.0.2 Premium Support | 1.0.2zs |
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Confirming a ~$7M hack. Still investigating exactly what happened and how. Until we have clarity, Duelbits stays offline. User funds are safe. Next steps: finish the investigation, re-top hot wallets, and bring Duelbits back online, launch Duelbits 2.0. I'll keep posting updates as I have them. Duelbits will be back up asap. Updates to follow"Joe said the platform would stay offline until the investigation is finished and the hot wallets have been refilled. No one has independently verified his claim that user funds are safe.
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Ofcom has opened an investigation into Aylo, the service provider of Pornhub, over its Pornhub age checks, examining whether the platform has met its legal obligations to prevent children from accessing pornographic content under the UK Online Safety Act.
The investigation focuses on a new age assurance process introduced by Pornhub in May 2026 for some users. The process relies on signals from Apple indicating that UK users attempting to access Pornhub may have completed Apple’s own age checks.
Under the Online Safety Act, responsibility for ensuring that age assurance is highly effective rests with the service provider, regardless of where in the process an age check takes place.
Ofcom said it is concerned that Aylo may not have carried out sufficient due diligence and testing before introducing the new process. The regulator is examining whether the system is sufficiently effective in preventing children from encountering pornography.
The investigation will assess whether Aylo complied with two key requirements under the Online Safety Act: using highly effective age assurance to prevent children from seeing pornography and completing a suitable and sufficient assessment of children’s access to the service.
Ofcom will also examine how Aylo implemented the process and whether the necessary due diligence was completed before deployment. The investigation will not determine how Apple operates its own age checks.
George Lusty, Ofcom’s Director of Enforcement, said online age checks are an important protection against children encountering inappropriate or harmful material and that technology companies are expected to ensure such systems are highly effective before deployment.
Ofcom said its investigation will begin with gathering and analysing evidence to determine whether a breach has occurred. If the regulator finds evidence of a compliance failure, it can issue a provisional decision to the company.
[caption id="attachment_114372" align="aligncenter" width="600"]Aylo would then have an opportunity to respond to Ofcom’s findings before a final decision is made.
If Ofcom determines that a company has broken the law, it can require the platform to take specific steps to comply with its obligations or address harm caused by the breach. The regulator can also impose fines of up to £18 million or 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.
The investigation comes alongside a separate Ofcom enforcement programme targeting the spread of illegal intimate images, including explicit AI-generated deepfakes.
Ofcom has said platforms should have automated hash matching technology in place by September 30 to detect and prevent the sharing of illegal intimate images. Platforms without hash matching must demonstrate that other systems and processes are equally effective at curbing the spread of non-consensual intimate images, or NCII.
Companies that fail to meet their legal duties could face fines of up to 10% of their global annual revenue.
Ofcom has partnered with SWGfL, which operates the StopNCII.org database and Revenge Porn Helpline, to share information and expertise on tackling intimate image abuse online.
The regulator is also seeking evidence from academics, survivor and victim support groups, and other stakeholders about how women’s and girls’ experiences online have changed.
Ofcom said the evidence will contribute to a report on industry progress in reducing online harms to women and girls. The regulator will also consider whether formal recommendations to the UK government are needed if industry action falls short.
The two enforcement efforts highlight Ofcom’s broader focus on requiring online services to put effective safeguards in place before harmful content or access risks materialise.
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Are you a cybersecurity professional, researcher, CISO or industry expert with insights to share? The Cyber Express is always looking to bring new voices and perspectives to the cybersecurity community.
If you would like to be featured on Security Pill or discuss a potential podcast collaboration, reach out to us at [samiksha.jain@thecyberexpress.com].
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Cyber attackers are gaining an advantage from artificial intelligence that defenders cannot yet match, according to a senior official at the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). Dave Chismon, the NCSC’s chief technology officer for architecture, warned that AI-enabled cyber attacks could grow as organisations struggle to use automated systems for defensive actions without putting their own operations at risk.
The problem is not simply whether AI can perform a cybersecurity task. For defenders, an automated action can affect live systems, business operations and critical services. That means security teams have to consider what could go wrong before allowing AI to act on its own.
Chismon draws a clear distinction between offensive and defensive cybersecurity.
For attackers, many of the problems are technical. They may need to find an exploit or work out how to avoid detection. The objective is often clear: compromise a system, make malware communicate with its controller or steal information.
Defenders face a different set of obstacles. Getting an outdated system replaced may require budget approval. Applying a patch could affect another service. A firewall change may need to go through a formal approval process.
As Chismon explains, defenders are often restricted by organisational policies, while attackers are more likely to be restricted by technical problems. Cybersecurity is also a cost for most organisations rather than their primary business function, making security decisions subject to competing priorities.
That difference matters for agentic cyber defence. AI systems can work well when they are given a technical problem and a measurable result. Defensive actions are harder because there may not be a single clear success state, and someone still has to take responsibility for what the system does.
The NCSC is not arguing that defenders should avoid AI. Instead, Chismon says organisations need to account for the constraints around defensive actions.
Some security tasks are already suitable for greater automation. Penetration testing, vulnerability research and vulnerability discovery can be carried out in controlled environments, with findings passed to development teams for remediation. Vulnerability scanning can also become a routine process once an organisation is satisfied that the activity will not disrupt its systems.
Security operations centres offer another example. Establishing a SOC involves policies, legal considerations and moving data from live systems into platforms where suspicious activity can be detected and investigated. The resulting alerts can then be handed to human teams for action.
Chismon identifies three principles for this model: technology handles detection while humans take action, detection must not damage the organisation, and automated responses should remain tightly controlled and limited in scope.
The NCSC framework looks at five areas when assessing whether a defensive action is suitable for automation: potency, scope, criticality, rollout confidence and recoverability.
Potency considers what an AI system is actually allowed to do. At the lowest level, it may only provide information and advice to a human. At higher levels, it could collect information autonomously, change system data or configuration, or execute code.
Scope considers how many systems could be affected, while criticality looks at whether those systems support important business or mission functions. Rollout confidence examines how well the action can be tested before deployment. Recoverability considers how easily an incorrect action can be reversed.
For now, Chismon suggests starting with lower-risk actions. AI can already help defenders process large amounts of security information, summarise reports and threat intelligence, and help teams prioritise what requires attention.
The NCSC and the UK Department for Culture, Media and Sport are working on Cyber Shield, described as a national-scale agentic cyber defence ecosystem. The NCSC also plans to publish an “AI for Cyber Defence” problem book covering areas where further research is required.
One key question is whether organisations can prove that an automated defensive action is genuinely low risk. Chismon points to areas such as analysing traffic logs and understanding the network connections or processes a system may require.
That evidence could eventually allow organisations to automate more defensive actions, harden systems and reduce their attack surfaces. But Chismon cautions that this will require further research and that organisations should continue strengthening their security through conventional measures while autonomous cyber defence develops.![]()
The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) Madhya Pradesh, India LSA has cautioned citizens against fraudulent SIM cards, misuse of telecom identifiers and tampering with IMEI numbers, warning that such violations can carry serious legal consequences under India’s Telecommunications Act, 2023.
The advisory follows recent cybercrime investigations that uncovered instances of unauthorized SIM activation. In one case, a Point of Sale (PoS) agent in Chhattisgarh was found to have illegally activated 25 mobile connections using citizens’ identification documents without their knowledge or consent.
Following the discovery, the DoT and telecom service providers blacklisted the concerned PoS agent, preventing it from issuing mobile connections in the future.
The 25 mobile connections linked to the case were examined through the Digital Intelligence Platform, or DIP, operated by the DoT. Connections identified as suspicious were subjected to re-verification.
Numbers that failed the re-verification process were subsequently deactivated.
The action highlights concerns around SIM card fraud, particularly where mobile connections are obtained or activated using another person’s identity documents. The DoT has also cautioned citizens against transferring SIM cards registered in their names, as legal liability may extend to the original subscriber if the connection is later misused.
The DoT said fraudulent issuance of SIM cards, misuse of telecom identifiers and tampering with IMEI numbers are punishable offences under the Telecommunications Act 2023.
Such violations may attract imprisonment of up to three years and fines of up to ₹50 lakh.
The department has urged citizens to avoid obtaining SIM cards through fake documents, fraud, cheating or impersonation. It has also warned against procuring SIM cards in their own names and subsequently transferring, renting, loaning or otherwise providing them to others for misuse in cyber fraud or other unlawful activities.
Citizens have also been advised not to use devices such as modems, modules or SIM Boxes with configurable or tampered IMEI numbers.
The DoT has highlighted the misuse of telecommunications identifiers, including the International Mobile Equipment Identity, or IMEI numbers, as a security concern.
Citizens have been cautioned against using mobile applications, websites or other methods to modify Calling Line Identity (CLI) or other telecommunications identifiers. The department has also warned against using devices with tampered IMEI numbers.
According to the advisory, misuse of SIMs and telecom identifiers can affect citizen safety and pose risks to the security and integrity of telecommunications networks.
The DoT has advised citizens to regularly use Sanchar Saathi to verify mobile connections issued in their names and block numbers that are unnecessary or not genuinely theirs.
The Sanchar Saathi platform also provides a facility called “Check Genuineness of Your Mobile handset,” which allows users to verify IMEI numbers and associated device information. The service can provide details including the handset’s brand name, model name and manufacturer information.
Citizens can access the Sanchar Saathi services through its portal or mobile application to check and secure their mobile connections and devices.
The DoT has urged citizens to remain vigilant and avoid sharing SIM cards registered in their names, particularly where the connection could later be used for cyber fraud or other unlawful activities.
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