The 2026 Infostealer Intelligence Shortlist: Top 10 Vendors Security Teams Should Know
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Lembaga Tabung Haji (TH) has resumed its key systems and services after a Tabung Haji cyberattack on Oct 8 led to a temporary suspension, and the agency says depositorsβ savings are safe. In a statement issued today, TH said the reactivation followed comprehensive security checks, the strengthening of controls and system recovery measures.
The agency also said it worked with national cybersecurity authorities to address the threat and reinforce system security, so that the reactivated services can operate safely. TH has lodged a police report and continues to monitor its systems closely.
On Oct 8, TH temporarily suspended system and service operations across all channels. The agency said the suspension was meant to protect depositorsβ savings and personal information after the attack caused service disruptions.
TH described the Tabung Haji cyberattack as a criminal act against TH and the nation, intended to disrupt its services. After the incident, its internal team worked with external experts and national cybersecurity authorities to investigate the event, address the threat and restore the systems.
According to the statement, TH branches in Kedah, Terengganu and Kelantan resumed operations yesterday. Branches in other states opened as usual today. Services provided through strategic banking partners have also been reactivated.
The statement said the reactivation followed those checks and recovery measures. It added: βTH assures that depositorsβ savings are safe. Close monitoring and security enhancements will continue to ensure that the reactivated systems and services operate safely and smoothly.β
TH also announced that all functions of the THiJARI platform have resumed operations, with three exceptions. Password resets, new user registration and online account opening remain unavailable.
The agency said these three functions still require further restoration work before they can be reactivated. Updates will be communicated through THβs official channels from time to time.
TH lodged a police report over the incident and notified the mNational Cyber Security Agency (NACSA) and the Department of Personal Data Protection (JPDP). It has collaborated with cybersecurity authorities to address the threat and reinforce system security, which it said ensures the safety of the reactivated services.
TH urged depositors who detect unusual transactions, or who need assistance or have inquiries, to contact the TH Contact Centre (THCC) immediately at 03-6207 1919. The agency said it continues to monitor its systems closely and will keep strengthening security.
TH also thanked depositors for their patience, cooperation and support during the restoration period. βWe once again apologise and deeply regret the incident; however, these measures were necessary to safeguard depositorsβ savings,β the statement said.
Based on the statement, three points are confirmed. Depositorsβ savings are safe, key systems and services have resumed, and three THiJARI functions are still being restored.
TH said it will continue close monitoring and security enhancements, and it will share further updates through its official channels. Depositors with concerns can reach the THCC at 03-6207 1919.
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| BranchΒ | Affected versionsΒ | Fixed versionΒ |
| 10.4Β | 10.4.0 to 10.4.2Β | 10.4.3Β |
| 10.2Β | 10.2.0 to 10.2.6Β | 10.2.7Β |
| 10.0Β | 10.0.0 to 10.0.9Β | 10.0.10Β |
| 9.4Β | 9.4.0 to 9.4.14Β | 9.4.15Β |
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The U.S. Department of State's Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program is offering up to $10 million for information on Zhang Yu, a Chinese national accused of hacking COVID-19 research at U.S. universities on behalf of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS). U.S. officials also describe Zhang as a key figure in the HAFNIUM hacking campaign, which compromised thousands of computers worldwide.
His alleged partner, Xu Zewei, was arrested in Italy in July 2025 and extradited to the United States in April 2026. Zhang remains at large.
Zhang is a director at Shanghai Firetech Information Science and Technology Company, Ltd. U.S. officials say he worked at the direction of the MSS Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB). According to RFJ, the MSS and SSSB are Chinese intelligence services responsible for domestic counterintelligence, non-military foreign intelligence, and parts of the country's political and domestic security.
[caption id="attachment_114641" align="aligncenter" width="600"]The reward covers information leading to the identification or location of anyone who, while acting under the direction or control of a foreign government, takes part in malicious cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The State Department says Zhang's cyberattacks violated that law.
Starting in early 2020, Zhang and Xu allegedly gained unauthorized access to COVID-19 research conducted by U.S.-based universities and leading immunologists and virologists in order to steal sensitive information. At the time, Xu was a general manager at Shanghai Powerock Network Co. Ltd.
Prosecutors say the two men carried out the hacks at the behest of the MSS and SSSB and reported back to supervising officers at the SSSB. In one instance, Xu allegedly confirmed to his handlers that he had compromised the network of a research university in the Southern District of Texas.
In 2021, Zhang and Xu allegedly exploited vulnerabilities in computers running Microsoft Exchange Server, software used to store and retrieve emails. These intrusions were part of the mass hacking campaign publicly known as HAFNIUM. Victims included a university and a law firm, both based in the United States.
A nine-count indictment unveiled by the Justice Department in 2025 accused both men of computer intrusions between February 2020 and June 2021, including the HAFNIUM campaign, which prosecutors described as indiscriminate.
The scale of the campaign was significant. Brett Leatherman, assistant director of the FBI's Cyber Division, said in 2025 that through HAFNIUM, the Chinese Communist Party targeted more than 60,000 U.S. entities and successfully victimized more than 12,700 of them to steal sensitive information.
Xu was arrested by Italian authorities in July 2025 while on vacation in Milan. He was extradited to the United States in April 2026, while Zhang has not been apprehended.
According to RFJ, China uses an extensive network of private companies and contractors to hack and steal information in a way that hides the government's involvement. Both men worked for private Shanghai firms while allegedly acting on behalf of state intelligence services.
RFJ is asking anyone with information on Zhang, his associates, or their malicious cyber activities to submit a tip through its Tor-based tip line. Rewards of up to $10 million are available for information that meets the program's criteria.
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| ProductΒ | Fixed versionsΒ |
| Bitbucket Data CenterΒ | 9.4.26, 10.2.8, 10.5.1Β |
| Confluence Data CenterΒ | 9.2.26, 10.2.19Β |
| Jira Service Management Data CenterΒ | 5.12.40, 10.3.26, 11.3.12Β |
| Jira Software Data CenterΒ | 9.12.40, 10.3.26, 11.3.12Β |
| Bamboo Data CenterΒ | 10.2.24, 12.1.12Β |
| Crowd Data CenterΒ | 6.3.7, 7.0.3, 7.1.7, 7.2.4Β |
| CrucibleΒ | 4.9.15Β |
| FisheyeΒ | 4.9.15Β |
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The FBI and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) have issued a joint cybersecurity advisory warning organizations about FortiBleed, an active global credential-compromise campaign targeting internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways. The advisory, published on October 6, 2026, cites SOCRadar data verifying more than 86,644 compromised devices across 194 countries.
According to the advisory, the campaign exploits reused or leaked credentials and legacy SHA-256 password storage, allowing threat actors to harvest and crack authentication data at scale. Attackers continue to scan exposed Fortinet firewalls using previously obtained credentials, and some affected organizations have been locked out of their own systems.
The operation's internal workflow came to light after the threat actors unintentionally exposed their own backend server. The open directory revealed a mature, multi-stage campaign run as an initial access broker operation.
Attackers first scanned the internet for exposed FortiGate SSL VPN portals using automated scripts. They then gathered credentials through credential stuffing and password spraying, drawing on prior Fortinet leak dumps and infostealer logs.
Password hashes taken from compromised devices were exfiltrated and fed into a GPU-accelerated cracking cluster running on rented infrastructure, where Hashcat and Hashtopolis ran distributed jobs to convert stolen data into plaintext credentials.
[caption id="attachment_114628" align="aligncenter" width="800"]Cracked credentials were then validated, with scripts filtering out honeypots, mapping organizations and ranking high-value targets by revenue and network structure. Attackers created new administrative accounts on firewalls to maintain persistence, then moved into victim networks to enumerate Active Directory and identify privileged accounts. The final stage involved selling access, including working VPN configurations and target lists, to downstream threat actors.
The advisory warns that victims may lose access to their Fortinet devices if attackers delete original accounts or change their passwords. In certain cases, threat actors removed existing accounts to block organizations from their devices while attempting lateral movement. Recovery may require steps beyond standard patching and password resets.
Reporting also indicates that initial access brokers using the FortiBleed attack chain have supplied access to ransomware affiliates, currently including INC/Lynx ransomware and Payload ransomware.
The agencies released indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help defenders review their environments. IP address 45.154.12.132 was observed as a command and control server, while 154.202.59.169 and 103.27.186.156 served as proxy nodes and 45.155.250.158 functioned as a beacon relay. The address 85.11.187.8 was linked to the Hashtopolis tool. The advisory also lists 13 IP addresses observed between June 18 and July 23, 2026, conducting brute force attacks or authenticating with compromised accounts.
Account names found on victim systems include adminin, fortiAdmin, forticloud-sync, fgtsecure, adminsslvpn, itadmin and roadmin. The agencies note that IP addresses may be reassigned over time and advise organizations to vet IOCs before acting on them.
The FBI and USSS recommend that organizations:
Organizations that detect a compromise are urged to isolate affected hosts, scope the intrusion and report incidents to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), a local FBI field office or a local USSS field office.
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The Wikimedia investigation adds to recent reports of AI agents interacting with public websites and online services in unintended ways. The Foundation said such activity can create challenges for website operators, particularly when agents generate large volumes of automated traffic or attempt to use public services for purposes beyond their intended function.
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| Affected branchΒ | Fixed releaseΒ |
| OpenSSL 4.0Β | 4.0.3Β |
| OpenSSL 3.6Β | 3.6.5Β |
| OpenSSL 3.5Β | 3.5.9Β |
| OpenSSL 3.4Β | 3.4.8Β |
| OpenSSL 3.0 Premium SupportΒ | 3.0.23Β |
| OpenSSL 1.1.1 Premium SupportΒ | 1.1.1zjΒ |
| OpenSSL 1.0.2 Premium SupportΒ | 1.0.2zsΒ |
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Confirming a ~$7M hack. Still investigating exactly what happened and how.Β Until we have clarity, Duelbits stays offline. User funds are safe.Β Next steps: finish the investigation, re-top hot wallets, and bring Duelbits back online, launch Duelbits 2.0.Β I'll keep posting updates as I have them.Β Duelbits will be back up asap.Β Updates to follow"ΒJoe said the platform would stay offline until the investigation is finished and the hot wallets have been refilled. No one has independently verified his claim that user funds are safe.Β
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