Source: securityboulevard.com – Author: Richi Jennings Pictured: Several successful American IT professionals. The U.S. Justice Department says N. Korean hackers are getting remote IT jobs, posing as Americans. They’re funneling their pay into Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program and likely leaving behind remote-access Trojans. Two have been arrested so far, with more suspects sought. In today’s SB Blogwatch, […]
Source: securityaffairs.com – Author: Pierluigi Paganini Turla APT used two new backdoors to infiltrate a European ministry of foreign affairs Russia-linked Turla APT allegedly used two new backdoors, named Lunar malware and LunarMail, to target European government agencies. ESET researchers discovered two previously unknown backdoors named LunarWeb and LunarMail that were exploited to breach European […]
Source: securityaffairs.com – Author: Pierluigi Paganini City of Wichita disclosed a data breach after the recent ransomware attack The City of Wichita disclosed a data breach after the ransomware attack that hit the Kansas’s city earlier this month. On May 5th, 2024, the City of Wichita, Kansas, was the victim of a ransomware attack and […]
Source: www.bitdefender.com – Author: Graham Cluley Nissan North America has revealed that extortionists who demanded a ransom after breaking into its external VPN and disrupted systems last year also stole the social security numbers of over 53,000 staff. The security breach occurred on November 7, 2023. Upon initial investigation, Nissan and external experts brought in […]
Source: securityaffairs.com – Author: Pierluigi Paganini Electronic prescription provider MediSecure impacted by a ransomware attack Electronic prescription provider MediSecure in Australia suffered a ransomware attack likely originate from a third-party vendor. MediSecure is a company that provides digital health solutions, particularly focusing on secure electronic prescription delivery services in Australia. The company was forced to […]
Source: securityboulevard.com – Author: Jeffrey Burt The operators behind the Ebury server-side malware botnet have been doing business since at least 2009 and, according to the threat researchers who have been tracking it for the last decade, are stronger and more active than ever. The malware has compromised at least 400,000 Linux servers over the […]
The operators behind the Ebury server-side malware botnet have been doing business since at least 2009 and, according to the threat researchers who have been tracking it for the last decade, are stronger and more active than ever. The malware has compromised at least 400,000 Linux servers over the past 15 years, with about 100,000..
Microsoft patched a zero-day vulnerability exploited by attackers to distribute QakBot and other malware payloads on susceptible Windows systems.
Identified as CVE-2024-30051, this vulnerability is a privilege escalation flaw resulting from a heap-based buffer overflow in the Desktop Window Manager (DWM) core library. Successful exploitation grants attackers “SYSTEM privileges,” Microsoft said.
“These types of bugs are usually combined with a code execution bug to take over a target and are often used by ransomware (actors),”said Dustin Childs of the Zero Day Initiative.
Introduced in Windows Vista, the Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe) is a compositing window manager that renders all GUI effects in Windows like transparent windows, live taskbar thumbnails, Flip3D, and even high-resolution monitor support.
Applications do not draw directly on the screen. Instead, they write their window images to a specific spot in memory. Windows then combines and creates a “composite” of all these windows into one view before sending it to the monitor. This allows Windows to add effects like transparency and animations while displaying the windows.
Kaspersky researchers uncovered this vulnerability while investigating another Windows DWM Core Library privilege escalation bug tracked as CVE-2023-36033, also exploited as a zero-day in attacks.
While analyzing data related to recent exploits and associated attacks, Kaspersky researchers discovered an intriguing file uploaded to VirusTotal on April 1. The file's name hinted that it contained details on a Windows vulnerability.
The file had information regarding a Windows DWM vulnerability – written in broken English - that could be exploited to escalate privileges to SYSTEM level, with the exploitation process nearly mirroring the one used in CVE-2023-36033 attacks, “but the vulnerability was different,” researchers said.
Initially skeptical due to the document's quality and lack of crucial details on exploiting the vulnerability, further investigation confirmed the legitimacy of another zero-day vulnerability capable of privilege escalation. Kaspersky promptly reported it to Microsoft, leading to its designation as CVE-2024-30051 and subsequent patching in this month’s Patch Tuesday.
Zero-Day Exploited by QakBot
Following the reporting to Microsoft, Kaspersky continued monitoring for exploits and attacks leveraging this flaw.
“In mid-April we discovered an exploit for this zero-day vulnerability. We have seen it used together with QakBot and other malware and believe that multiple threat actors have access to it,” Kaspersky said.
Security researchers at Google Threat Analysis Group, DBAPPSecurity WeBin Lab, and Google-owned Mandiant also reported the zero-day to Microsoft, pointing to likely widespread exploitation in malware attacks, Childs said.
“Don’t wait to test and deploy this update as exploits are likely to increase now that a patch is available to reverse engineer,” said Childs.
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency also added CVE-2024-30051 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and directed all federal agencies to complete the patching process by June 4.
Kaspersky plans to disclose technical specifics of CVE-2024-30051 once users have had adequate time to update their Windows systems.
QakBot’s Journey from Banking Trojan to Initial Access Broker
QakBot, also known as Qbot, emerged as a banking trojan in 2008 and was used to steal credentials, website cookies, and credit cards to commit financial fraud. QakBot operators evolved over the years into initial access brokers, partnering with other threat groups to provide initial access to enterprise and home networks for ransomware attacks, espionage, and data theft.
QakBot’s infrastructure was taken down in August 2023 following a multinational law enforcement operation spearheaded by the FBI and known as “Operation Duck Hunt.” But Microsoft identified the resurgence of QakBot in phishing campaigns targeting the hospitality industry in December.
Law enforcement linked QakBot infections to 700,000 victim computers which included ransomware attacks targeting businesses, healthcare providers, and government agencies worldwide, which according to conservative estimates caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage.
Throughout the years, Qakbot served as an initial infection vector for various ransomware gangs and their affiliates, including Conti, ProLock, Egregor, REvil, RansomExx, MegaCortex, and most recently Black Basta.
Another Zero-Day Fix
Microsoft patched 59 CVEs in its May 2024 Patch Tuesday release, with one rated “critical,” 57 rated as “important” and one rated as “moderate.”
The patch also contains a fix for another zero-day flaw other that the one exploited by QakBot. The other bug, tracked as CVE-2024-30040, is rated "important" on the CVSS scale and is a Windows MSHTML platform security feature bypass vulnerability. MSHTML is a proprietary browser engine for the Microsoft Windows version of Internet Explorer.
“This vulnerability bypasses OLE mitigations in Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Office which protect users from vulnerable COM/OLE controls,” Microsoft said.
A hacker who socially-engineers a victim into opening a malicious document would be able to execute arbitrary code by passing OLE mitigations in the Microsoft suite of office applications.
Media Disclaimer: This report is based on internal and external research obtained through various means. The information provided is for reference purposes only, and users bear full responsibility for their reliance on it. The Cyber Express assumes no liability for the accuracy or consequences of using this information.
Source: www.exponential-e.com – Author: Graham Cluley Security agencies in the United States have issued a new warning about the Black Basta ransomware group, in the wake of a high-profile attack against the healthcare giant Ascension. The cyber attack last week forced the Ascension computer systems offline, and caused some hospital emergency departments to turn away […]
Source: securityaffairs.com – Author: Pierluigi Paganini Phorpiex botnet sent millions of phishing emails to deliver LockBit Black ransomware Experts reported that since April, the Phorpiex botnet sent millions of phishing emails to spread LockBit Black ransomware. New Jersey’s Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Cell (NJCCIC) reported that since April, threat actors used the the Phorpiex botnet to […]
Source: securityaffairs.com – Author: Pierluigi Paganini Australian Firstmac Limited disclosed a data breach after cyber attack Firstmac Limited disclosed a data breach after the new Embargo extortion group leaked over 500GB of data allegedly stolen from the company. Firstmac Limited, one of the largest non-bank lenders in Australia, disclosed a data breach. Firstmac Limited is an […]
Rapid7 has observed an ongoing campaign to distribute trojanized installers for WinSCP and PuTTY via malicious ads on commonly used search engines, where clicking on the ad leads to typo squatted domains. In at least one observed case, the infection has led to the attempted deployment of ransomware. The analysis conducted by Rapid7 features updates to past research, including a variety of new indicators of compromise, a YARA rule to help identify malicious DLLs, and some observed changes to the malware’s functionality. Rapid7 has observed the campaign disproportionately affects members of IT teams, who are most likely to download the trojanized files while looking for legitimate versions. Successful execution of the malware then provides the threat actor with an elevated foothold and impedes analysis by blurring the intentions of subsequent administrative actions.
Overview
Beginning in early March 2024, Rapid7 observed the distribution of trojanized installers for the open source utilities WinSCP and PuTTy. WinSCP is a file transfer client, PuTTY a secure shell (SSH) client. The infection chain typically begins after a user searches for a phrase such as download winscp or download putty, on a search engine like Microsoft's Bing. The search results include an ad for the software the user clicks on, which ultimately redirects them to either a clone of the legitimate website, in the case of WinSCP, or a simple download page in the case of PuTTY. In both cases, a link to download a zip archive containing the trojan from a secondary domain was embedded on the web page.
The infection begins after the user has downloaded and extracted the contents of the zip archive and executed setup.exe, which is a renamed copy of pythonw.exe, the legitimate Python hidden console window executable.
Upon execution, setup.exe loads the malicious DLL python311.dll. As seen in Figure 2, the copy of the legitimate python311 DLL which setup.exe is intended to load has actually been renamed to python311x.dll. This technique is known as DLL side-loading, where a malicious DLL can be loaded into a legitimate, signed, executable by mimicking partial functionality and the name of the original library. The process of side-loading the DLL is also facilitated by hijacking the DLL search order, where attempts are made to load DLLs contained within the same directory first, before checking other directories on the system where a legitimate copy might be present. Rapid7 has also observed the Python 3.11 library being targeted in prior malware campaigns, such as the novel IDAT loader, discovered by Rapid7 during August of 2023.
The primary payload contained within python311.dll is a compressed archive encrypted and included within the DLL's resource section. During execution, this archive is unpacked to execute two child processes.
First, the malware executes the unpacked copy of the legitimate WinSCP installer, seen in Figure 3 as WinSCP-6.1.1-Setup.exe. Then, the malicious Python script systemd.py is executed via pythonw.exe after being unpacked into the staging directory %LOCALAPPDATA%\Oracle\ along with numerous Python dependencies. Following the successful execution of both processes, setup.exe then terminates.
The script systemd.py, executed via pythonw.exe, decrypts and executes a second Python script then performs decryption and reflective DLL injection of a Sliver beacon. Reflective DLL injection is the process of loading a library into a process directly from memory instead of from disk. In several cases, Rapid7 observed the threat actor take quick action upon successful contact with the Sliver beacon, downloading additional payloads, including Cobalt Strike beacons. The access is then used to establish persistence via scheduled tasks and newly created services after pivoting via SMB. In a recent incident, Rapid7 observed the threat actor attempt to exfiltrate data using the backup utility Restic, and then deploy ransomware, an attempt which was ultimately blocked during execution.
To take a more in depth look at the malware delivery and functionality, we analyzed a malware sample recently observed being delivered to users looking for a PuTTY installer.
Initial Access
The source of the infection was a malicious ad served to the user after their search for download putty. When the user clicked on the ad, which are typically pushed to the top of the search results for visibility, they were redirected to a typo-squatted domain at the URL hxxps://puttty[.]org/osn.php. The landing page includes a download button for PuTTY, as well as two legitimate links to download a Bitvise SSH server/client. However, when the download link is clicked by the user it calls the embedded function loadlink(), which redirects the user to hxxps://puttty[.]org/dwnl.php, which then finally redirects the user to the most recent host of the malicious zip archive to serve the download. At the time of writing, puttty[.]org and the relevant URLs were still active, serving the zip archive putty-0.80-installer.zip from the likely compromised WordPress domain areauni[.]com.
Rapid7 observed the base domain, puttty[.]org was also serving a cloned version of a PuTTY help article available at BlueHost, where the download link provided is actually for the official distributor of the software. This relatively benign page is most likely conditionally served as a way to reduce suspicion as noted by Malwarebytes.
In comparison, the typo-squatted WinSCP domains conditionally redirected visits to Rick Astley's Never Gonna Give You Up. Classic.
Execution
Upon extracting the zip archive putty-0.80-installer.zip, the user is once again presented with setup.exe, a renamed copy of pythonw.exe, to entice the user to initiate the infection by launching the executable.
Once executed, setup.exe will side-load the malicious DLL python311.dll. The DLL python311.dll then loads a renamed copy of the legitimate DLL, python3.dll, from the same directory after dynamically resolving the necessary functions from kernel32.dll by string match. Future requests for exported functions made by setup.exe can then be forwarded to python3.dll by python311.dll. This technique is commonly used when side-loading malware, so legitimate requests are proxied, which avoids unexpected behavior and improves stability of the payload delivery.
Following the successful sideloading procedure, the malware then performs pre-unpacking setup by dynamically resolving additional functions from ntdll.dll. The malware still uses functionality similar to the publicly available AntiHook and KrakenMask libraries to facilitate setup and execution, as previously noted by eSentire, which provides additional evasion capabilities. AntiHook contains functionality to enumerate the loaded modules of a process, searching each one for hooks, and remaps a clean, unhooked version of the module’s text section, if hooks are found. KrakenMask contains functionality to spoof the return address of function calls, to evade stack traces, and functionality to encrypt the processes virtual memory at rest to evade memory scanners.
The library ntdll.dll contains functions which make up the Windows Native API (NTAPI), which is generally the closest a process executed in user mode can get to utilizing functionality from the operating system’s kernel. By resolving NTAPI functions for use, malware can bypass detection applied to more commonly used user mode functions (WINAPI) and access lower level functionality that is otherwise unavailable. Several of the NTAPI function pointers resolved by the malware can be used for evasion techniques such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) tampering and bypass of the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) as has been observed in prior Nitrogen campaign samples. Some of the functions are dynamically resolved from ntdll.dll are found using concatenation of stack strings to form the full name of the target API just before resolution is attempted, likely to help evade detection.
Resolved ntdll.dll functions
EtwEventWrite
EtwEventWriteFull
EtwNotificationRegister
EtwEventRegister
Table 1. Functions the malware dynamically resolves from ntdll.dll.
Other observed function strings
WldpQueryDynamicCodeTrust (wldp.dll)
AmsiScanBuffer (amsi.dll)
Table 2. Other evasion related WINAPI function strings observed in the malware
With setup complete, an encrypted resource stored within the resource section of python311.dll is retrieved using common resource WINAPI calls, including FindResourceA, LoadResource, SizeOfResource, and FreeResource.
The resource is then decrypted in memory using an AES-256 hex key and initialization vector (IV) that are stored in the data section in plain text. The resulting file is a zip archive which contains three compressed files, including a legitimate MSI installation package for PuTTY and another compressed archive named installer_data.zip.
To execute the PuTTY installer, the malware first creates a copy of the MSI file in the hard-coded directory C:\Users\Public\Downloads\ via a call to fopen and then decompresses and writes the retrieved MSI package content with multiple successive calls to fwrite and other CRT library file io functions, followed by fclose. The full output path is assembled by concatenating the target directory with the desired file name, which is retrieved from original_installer.txt. The contents of original_installer.txt are identical to the name of the MSI package observed in the resource, for this sample: putty-64bit-0.78-installer.msi.
The MSI package is then executed by a call to CreateProcessW with the command line msiexec.exe ALLUSERS=1 /i C:\Users\Public\Downloads\putty-64bit-0.78-installer.msi. So, before the execution of the next malware payload the user is provided with the software they were originally looking for. This functionality is commonly seen with trojans to avoid suspicion by the end user, as the user only sees the legitimate installation window pop up after initial execution. However, the version numbers between the executed MSI package, putty-64bit-0.78-installer.msi, and the initially downloaded zip archive, putty-64bit-0.80-installer.zip, don't match — a potential indicator.
The same procedure is then repeated to copy the decompressed contents of the folder Oracle contained within the zip archive installer_data.zip to the staging directory created at %LOCALAPPDATA%\Oracle\. After the unpacking process is complete, another call by the malware to CreateProcessW executes the next payload with the command line %LOCALAPPDATA%\Oracle\pythonw.exe %LOCALAPPDATA%\Oracle\systemd.py. With its purpose completed, the loader then clears memory and passes back control to setup.exe, which promptly terminates, leaving the pythonw.exe process running in the background.
The Python script systemd.py contains multiple junk classes, which in turn contain numerous junk function definitions to pad out the core script. Ultimately, the script decrypts the file %LOCALAPPDATA%\Oracle\data.aes, which is a Sliver beacon DLL (original name: BALANCED_NAPKIN.dll), performs local injection of the Sliver DLL, and then calls the export StartW. The contents of main and other included functionality within the script appears to have been mostly copied from the publicly available Github repo for PythonMemoryModule.
Rapid7 recommends verifying the download source of freely available software. Check that the hash of the downloaded file(s) match those provided by the official distributor and that they contain a valid and relevant signature. The DLLs that are side-loaded by malware are often unsigned, and are often present in the same location as the legitimately signed and renamed original, to which requests are forwarded. Bookmark the official distribution domains for the download of future updates.
DNS requests for permutations of known domains can also be proactively blocked or the requests can be redirected to a DNS sinkhole. For example, by using the publicly available tool DNSTwist we can identify several additional suspicious domains that match the observed ASNs and country codes observed for many of the C2 IPv4 addresses observed to be contacted by the malware as well as known malware hosts/facilitators.
Domain
IPv4
ASN
wnscp[.]net
91.92.253[.]80
AS394711:LIMENET
puttyy[.]org
82.221.136[.]24
AS50613:Advania Island ehf
puutty[.]org
82.221.129[.]39
AS50613:Advania Island ehf
putyy[.]org
82.221.136[.]1
AS50613:Advania Island ehf
Table 3. More suspicious domains found via DNSTwist.
Rapid7 observed impacted users are disproportionately members of information technology (IT) teams who are more likely to download installers for utilities like PuTTY and WinSCP for updates or setup. When the account of an IT member is compromised, the threat actor gains a foothold with elevated privileges which impedes analysis by blending in their actions with that of the administrator(s), stressing the importance of verifying the source of files before download, and their contents before execution.
The user clicks on a malicious ad populated from a typical search engine query for a software utility and is ultimately redirected to a page hosting malware.
The user downloads and executes setup.exe (renamed pythonw.exe), which side-loads and executes the malicious DLL python311.dll.
Execution
T1059.006: Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
The malware executes a python script to load and execute a Sliver beacon.
Persistence
T1543.003: Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
The threat actor creates a service to execute a C2 beacon. The threat actor loads a vulnerable driver to facilitate disabling antivirus software and other defenses present.
The threat actor attempts the deployment of ransomware after exfiltrating data.
Rapid7 Detections
For Rapid7 MDR and InsightIDR customers, the following detection rules are currently deployed and alerting against malware campaigns like the one described in this blog:
Detections
Suspicious Process - Sliver C2 Interactive Shell Execution via PowerShell
Suspicious Process - Python Start Processes in Staging Directories
Attacker Technique - Renamed PythonW.exe Executed From Non-Standard Folder
Suspicious Service: Service Installed With Command Line using Python
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Google is encouraging the adoption of multi-factor authentication to protect against phishing and other cyberattacks. It hopes 2-Step Verification (2SV) can help.
Finland has warned of an ongoing Android malware campaign that targets banking details of its victims by enticing them to download a malicious counterfeit McAfee app.
Finland's Transport and Communications Agency – Traficom - issued a warning last week about an ongoing Android malware campaign that aims to withdraw money from the victim's online bank accounts.
Traficom said this campaign exclusively targets Android devices, with no separate infection chain identified for Apple iPhone users.
The agency has identified multiple cases of SMS messages written in Finnish language, instructing recipients to call a specified number. These messages often impersonate banks or payment service providers like MobilePay and utilize spoofing technology to appear as if they originate from domestic telecom operators or local networks.
[caption id="attachment_66875" align="aligncenter" width="1024"] Finnish language smishing message (Credit: Traficom)[/caption]
The scammers answering these calls direct victims to install a McAfee app under the guise of providing protection. However, the McAfee app being promoted is, in fact, malware designed to compromise victims' bank accounts.
According to reports received by the Cyber Security Center, targets are prompted to download a McAfee application via a link provided in the message. This link leads to the download of an .apk application hosted outside the app store for Android devices. Contrary to expectations, this is not antivirus software but malware intended for installation on the phone.
The OP Financial Group, a prominent financial service provider in Finland, also issued an alert on its website regarding these deceptive messages impersonating banks or national authorities.
The police have similarly emphasized the threat posed by this malware, warning that it enables operators to access victims' banking accounts and initiate unauthorized money transfers. In one reported case, a victim lost 95,000 euros (approximately $102,000) due to the scam.
Vultur Android Malware Campaign Trademarks
While Finnish authorities have not definitively identified the type of malware involved or shared specific hashes or IDs for the APK files, the attacks bear a striking resemblance to those reported by Fox-IT analysts in connection with a new version of the Vultur trojan.
[caption id="attachment_66873" align="alignnone" width="1024"] Vultur Trojan infection chain (Credit: Fox-IT)[/caption]
The new iteration of the Vultur trojan employs hybrid smishing and phone call attacks to persuade targets into downloading a fake McAfee Security app. This app introduces the final payload in three separate parts for evasion purposes. Notable features of this latest version include extensive file management operations, abuse of Accessibility Services, app blocking, disabling Keyguard, and serving custom notifications in the status bar.
Things to Do If You Suspect Being Victim
If you suspect that your device has been infected with the malware, it is advisable to contact your bank immediately to enable protection measures. Additionally, restoring "factory settings" on the infected Android device to wipe all data and apps is recommended.
OP Financial Group emphasizes that they do not request customers to share sensitive data over the phone or install any apps to receive or cancel payments.
“We will never send you messages with a link to the online bank login page. The bank also never asks you for your ID or card information via messages. Such messages are scams and you should not click on the links in them,” the OP Financial Group said.
“Even in order to receive or cancel a payment, you do not need to log in from a link, confirm with codes or provide your information. If you are asked to do this, contact the bank's customer service.”
Any similar requests should also be promptly reported to the police.
The news of the online banking fraud comes days after a multi-national police operation crack opened a massive fraudulent call center network run across Europe that targeted especially senior citizens with an intent to dupe them of thousands of dollars.
The crack down, dubbed Operation Pandora, was initiated when a vigilant bank teller in Freiburg, Germany, alerted law enforcement of a customer aged 76-years attempting to withdraw a large sum of money.
Scammers employed various tactics, posing as relatives, bank employees or police officers, to deceive victims into surrendering their savings. The operation revealed call centers operating in different countries, each specializing in different types of telephone fraud, from investment scams to debt collection demands.
Media Disclaimer: This report is based on internal and external research obtained through various means. The information provided is for reference purposes only, and users bear full responsibility for their reliance on it. The Cyber Express assumes no liability for the accuracy or consequences of using this information.
Cybercriminals and spies working for nation-states are surreptitiously coexisting inside compromised name-brand routers as they use the devices to disguise attacks motivated both by financial gain and strategic espionage, researchers said.
In some cases, the coexistence is peaceful, as financially motivated hackers provide spies with access to already compromised routers in exchange for a fee, researchers from security firm Trend Micro reported Wednesday. In other cases, hackers working in nation-state-backed advanced persistent threat groups take control of devices previously hacked by the cybercrime groups. Sometimes the devices are independently compromised multiple times by different groups. The result is a free-for-all inside routers and, to a lesser extent, VPN devices and virtual private servers provided by hosting companies.
“Cybercriminals and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors share a common interest in proxy anonymization layers and Virtual Private Network (VPN) nodes to hide traces of their presence and make detection of malicious activities more difficult,” Trend Micro researchers Feike Hacquebord and Fernando Merces wrote. “This shared interest results in malicious internet traffic blending financial and espionage motives.”
The South Korean National Police Agency sounded an alarm Tuesday for a targeted campaign from the North Korean hacker groups aimed at stealing the country’s defense technology.
The announcement disclosed multiple successful breaches of hacking groups Lazarus, Andariel, and Kimsuky, which are all linked to Pyongyang’s stealthy hacking cartel. Exploiting vulnerabilities in both primary targets and their subcontractors, these groups planted malware capable of siphoning off valuable technological data.
North Korean hacker groups directly infiltrated defense industry companies, hacked their partners with relatively weak security, stole the company's server account information, and then infiltrated major servers with malware, the police announcement said.
The findings came from a joint operation by the National Police Agency and the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, which unearthed a series of compromises dating back to late 2022. Many affected companies were unaware of the breaches until authorities intervened.
North Korean hackers have a common goal of stealing defense technology and are conducting an all-out attack by deploying multiple hacking groups in this campaign, making their attack methods more elaborate and diverse, the police agency said.
North Korean Hacker Groups Use Diverse Tactics
The police report delineates three distinct cases, each illustrating the diverse tactics employed by the hacking groups to pilfer defense-related technology.
In one instance the Lazarus hackers breached a defense company's networks in November 2022 by exploiting loopholes in their network management. They targeted an external network server, infected it with malware, and leveraged an open port meant for testing to infiltrate the internal network. This allowed them access to sensitive data stored on employee computers, which they then exfiltrated to an overseas cloud server.
The breach affected six computers, and evidence of the data leak was identified through analysis of both the victim company's systems and the overseas servers.
[caption id="attachment_64775" align="aligncenter" width="895"] Lazarus hacker group’s attack chain. Credit: National Police Agency of South Korea[/caption]
In the second case the Andariel hacker group gained access to defense industry data by compromising an employee account, which maintained servers for a defense industry partner. By injecting malicious code into the partner's servers around October 2022, they were able to extract and leak stored defense technology data. This breach exploited a loophole in how employees used their personal and professional email accounts for official system access.
[caption id="attachment_64772" align="aligncenter" width="895"] Andariel hacker group attack chain. Credit: National Police Agency of South Korea[/caption]
Lastly, Kimsuky seized upon a vulnerability in a defense subcontractor's email server between April and July 2023. T Over several months, they stole technical data by exploiting a flaw that allowed the download of large files sent via email from external sources without requiring login credentials. This method bypassed security measures, enabling the hackers to access and extract sensitive information undetected.
[caption id="attachment_64773" align="alignnone" width="895"] Kimsuky hacker group’s attack chain. Credit: National Police Agency of South Korea[/caption]
The National Police Agency said, “It is expected that North Korea’s hacking attempts targeting defense technology will continue, so not only defense companies but also partner companies must separate internal and external networks, change email passwords periodically, and set up account authentication such as two-step authentication.”
Media Disclaimer: This report is based on internal and external research obtained through various means. The information provided is for reference purposes only, and users bear full responsibility for their reliance on it. The Cyber Express assumes no liability for the accuracy or consequences of using this information.
Microsoft researchers uncovered a new tool in the Russian state hackers’ arsenal that helped them gain elevated access, pilfer credentials and allowed lateral movement within compromised networks.Dubbed GooseEgg malware, this sophisticated tool exploits a vulnerability identified as CVE-2022-38028 in the Windows Print Spooler service, responsible for managing printing processes. Redmond fixed the vulnerability that gave attackers system privileges in its October 2022 Patch Tuesday stating the bug’s exploitation is “most likely.” It is yet to flag the flaw as actively exploited in its assessment.
Hackers Leverage the GooseEgg Malware to Exploit Windows Devices
GooseEgg malware is exclusively used by a group that the tech giant tracks as “Forest Blizzard,” which the United States and United Kingdom governments closely links to the Unit 26165 of Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU.Forest Blizzard, also known as Fancy Bear and APT28, has deployed GooseEgg since at least June 2020, targeting state, non-governmental, educational and transportation entities across Ukraine, Western Europe and North America, Microsoft said.“The use of GooseEgg in Forest Blizzard operations is a unique discovery that had not been previously reported by security providers,” Redmond said.Upon gaining access to a target device, Forest Blizzard used GooseEgg to escalate privileges within the network. Although GooseEgg itself functions as a basic launcher application, it enables attackers to execute remote code, implant backdoors and traverse compromised networks laterally.
The Rise of Forest Blizzard Hackers
Forest Blizzard additionally exploits other vulnerabilities including CVE-2023-23397, which impacts all versions of Microsoft Outlook software on Windows devices and is known to be exploited. This critically rated bug allows attackers to steal the Net-NTLM hash from the victims, enabling the attackers to assume a victim identity and to move deeper into the organization.In a December warning, Microsoft cautioned that Forest Blizzard was leveraging the Microsoft Outlook bug to illicitly access email accounts within Microsoft Exchange servers since April 2022. Forest Blizzard primarily targets government, energy, transportation and non-governmental organizations in the United States, Europe and the Middle East but Microsoft said it had observed the GRU hackers focus shift to media, information technology, sports organizations and educational institutions worldwide. “Forest Blizzard continually refines its footprint by employing new custom techniques and malware, suggesting that it is a well-resourced and well-trained group posing long-term challenges to attribution and tracking its activities,” Microsoft said. Media Disclaimer: This report is based on internal and external research obtained through various means. The information provided is for reference purposes only, and users bear full responsibility for their reliance on it. The Cyber Express assumes no liability for the accuracy or consequences of using this information.
McAfee released a report on a new LUA malware loader distributed through what appeared to be a legitimate Microsoft GitHub repository for the “C++ Library Manager for Windows, Linux, and MacOS,” known as vcpkg.
The attacker is exploiting a property of GitHub: comments to a particular repo can contain files, and those files will be associated with the project in the URL.
What this means is that someone can upload malware and “attach” it to a legitimate and trusted project.
As the file’s URL contains the name of the repository the comment was created in, and as almost every software company uses GitHub, this flaw can allow threat actors to develop extraordinarily crafty and trustworthy lures.
For example, a threat actor could upload a malware executable in NVIDIA’s driver installer repo that pretends to be a new driver fixing issues in a popular game. Or a threat actor could upload a file in a comment to the Google Chromium source code and pretend it’s a new test version of the web browser.
These URLs would also appear to belong to the company’s repositories, making them far more trustworthy.
Last week, the Internet dodged a major nation-state attack that would have had catastrophic cybersecurity repercussions worldwide. It’s a catastrophe that didn’t happen, so it won’t get much attention—but it should. There’s an important moral to the story of the attack and its discovery: The security of the global Internet depends on countless obscure pieces of software written and maintained by even more obscure unpaid, distractible, and sometimes vulnerable volunteers. It’s an untenable situation, and one that is being exploited by malicious actors. Yet precious little is being done to remedy it.
Programmers dislike doing extra work. If they can find already-written code that does what they want, they’re going to use it rather than recreate the functionality. These code repositories, called libraries, are hosted on sites like GitHub. There are libraries for everything: displaying objects in 3D, spell-checking, performing complex mathematics, managing an e-commerce shopping cart, moving files around the Internet—everything. Libraries are essential to modern programming; they’re the building blocks of complex software. The modularity they provide makes software projects tractable. Everything you use contains dozens of these libraries: some commercial, some open source and freely available. They are essential to the functionality of the finished software. And to its security.
You’ve likely never heard of an open-source library called XZ Utils, but it’s on hundreds of millions of computers. It’s probably on yours. It’s certainly in whatever corporate or organizational network you use. It’s a freely available library that does data compression. It’s important, in the same way that hundreds of other similar obscure libraries are important.
Many open-source libraries, like XZ Utils, are maintained by volunteers. In the case of XZ Utils, it’s one person, named Lasse Collin. He has been in charge of XZ Utils since he wrote it in 2009. And, at least in 2022, he’s had some “longterm mental health issues.” (To be clear, he is not to blame in this story. This is a systems problem.)
Beginning in at least 2021, Collin was personally targeted. We don’t know by whom, but we have account names: Jia Tan, Jigar Kumar, Dennis Ens. They’re not real names. They pressured Collin to transfer control over XZ Utils. In early 2023, they succeeded. Tan spent the year slowly incorporating a backdoor into XZ Utils: disabling systems that might discover his actions, laying the groundwork, and finally adding the complete backdoor earlier this year. On March 25, Hans Jansen—another fake name—tried to push the various Unix systems to upgrade to the new version of XZ Utils.
And everyone was poised to do so. It’s a routine update. In the span of a few weeks, it would have been part of both Debian and Red Hat Linux, which run on the vast majority of servers on the Internet. But on March 29, another unpaid volunteer, Andres Freund—a real person who works for Microsoft but who was doing this in his spare time—noticed something weird about how much processing the new version of XZ Utils was doing. It’s the sort of thing that could be easily overlooked, and even more easily ignored. But for whatever reason, Freund tracked down the weirdness and discovered the backdoor.
It’s a masterful piece of work. It affects the SSH remote login protocol, basically by adding a hidden piece of functionality that requires a specific key to enable. Someone with that key can use the backdoored SSH to upload and execute an arbitrary piece of code on the target machine. SSH runs as root, so that code could have done anything. Let your imagination run wild.
This isn’t something a hacker just whips up. This backdoor is the result of a years-long engineering effort. The ways the code evades detection in source form, how it lies dormant and undetectable until activated, and its immense power and flexibility give credence to the widely held assumption that a major nation-state is behind this.
If it hadn’t been discovered, it probably would have eventually ended up on every computer and server on the Internet. Though it’s unclear whether the backdoor would have affected Windows and macOS, it would have worked on Linux. Remember in 2020, when Russia planted a backdoor into SolarWinds that affected 14,000 networks? That seemed like a lot, but this would have been orders of magnitude more damaging. And again, the catastrophe was averted only because a volunteer stumbled on it. And it was possible in the first place only because the first unpaid volunteer, someone who turned out to be a national security single point of failure, was personally targeted and exploited by a foreign actor.
This is no way to run critical national infrastructure. And yet, here we are. This was an attack on our software supply chain. This attack subverted software dependencies. The SolarWinds attack targeted the update process. Other attacks target system design, development, and deployment. Such attacks are becoming increasingly common and effective, and also are increasingly the weapon of choice of nation-states.
It’s impossible to count how many of these single points of failure are in our computer systems. And there’s no way to know how many of the unpaid and unappreciated maintainers of critical software libraries are vulnerable to pressure. (Again, don’t blame them. Blame the industry that is happy to exploit their unpaid labor.) Or how many more have accidentally created exploitable vulnerabilities. How many other coercion attempts are ongoing? A dozen? A hundred? It seems impossible that the XZ Utils operation was a unique instance.
Solutions are hard. Banning open source won’t work; it’s precisely because XZ Utils is open source that an engineer discovered the problem in time. Banning software libraries won’t work, either; modern software can’t function without them. For years, security engineers have been pushing something called a “software bill of materials”: an ingredients list of sorts so that when one of these packages is compromised, network owners at least know if they’re vulnerable. The industry hates this idea and has been fighting it for years, but perhaps the tide is turning.
The fundamental problem is that tech companies dislike spending extra money even more than programmers dislike doing extra work. If there’s free software out there, they are going to use it—and they’re not going to do much in-house security testing. Easier software development equals lower costs equals more profits. The market economy rewards this sort of insecurity.
We need some sustainable ways to fund open-source projects that become de facto critical infrastructure. Public shaming can help here. The Open Source Security Foundation (OSSF), founded in 2022 after another critical vulnerability in an open-source library—Log4j—was discovered, addresses this problem. The big tech companies pledged $30 million in funding after the critical Log4j supply chain vulnerability, but they never delivered. And they are still happy to make use of all this free labor and free resources, as a recent Microsoft anecdote indicates. The companies benefiting from these freely available libraries need to actually step up, and the government can force them to.
There’s a lot of tech that could be applied to this problem, if corporations were willing to spend the money. Liabilities will help. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA’s) “secure by design” initiative will help, and CISA is finally partnering with OSSF on this problem. Certainly the security of these libraries needs to be part of any broad government cybersecurity initiative.
We got extraordinarily lucky this time, but maybe we can learn from the catastrophe that didn’t happen. Like the power grid, communications network, and transportation systems, the software supply chain is critical infrastructure, part of national security, and vulnerable to foreign attack. The US government needs to recognize this as a national security problem and start treating it as such.
Rapid7’s Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team continuously monitors our customers' environments, identifying emerging threats and developing new detections.
In August 2023, Rapid7 identified a new malware loader named the IDAT Loader. Malware loaders are a type of malicious software designed to deliver and execute additional malware onto a victim's system. What made the IDAT Loader unique was the way in which it retrieved data from PNG files, searching for offsets beginning with 49 44 41 54 (IDAT).
In part one of our blog series, we discussed how a Rust based application was used to download and execute the IDAT Loader. In part two of this series, we will be providing analysis of how an MSIX installer led to the download and execution of the IDAT Loader.
While utilization of MSIX packages by threat actors to distribute malicious code is not new, what distinguished this incident was the attack flow of the compromise. Based on the recent tactics, techniques and procedures observed (TTPs), we believe the activity is associated with financially motivated threat groups.
MSIX Installers
In January of 2024, Red Canary released an article attributing different threat actors to various deployments of malicious MSIX installers. The MSIX installers employed a variety of techniques to deliver initial payloads onto compromised systems.
All the infections began with users navigating to typo squatted URLs after using search engines to find specific software package downloads. Typo squatting aka URL hijacking is a specific technique in which threat actors register domain names that closely resemble legitimate domain names in order to deceive users. Threat actors mimic the layout of the legitimate websites in order to lure the users into downloading their initial payloads.
Additionally, threat actors utilize a technique known as SEO poisoning, enabling the threat actors to ensure their malicious sites appear near the top of search results for users.
Technical Analysis
Typo Squatted Malvertising
In our most recent incident involving the IDAT Loader, Rapid7 observed a user downloading an installer for an application named ‘Room Planner’ from a website posing as the legitimate site. The user was searching Google for the application ‘Room Planner’ and clicked on the URL hxxps://roomplannerapp.cn[.]com. Upon user interaction, the users browser was directed to download an MSIX package, Room_Planner-x86.msix(SHA256: 6f350e64d4efbe8e2953b39bfee1040c8b041f6f212e794214e1836561a30c23).
PowerShell Scripts
During execution of the MSIX file, a PowerShell script, 1.ps1 , was dropped into the folder path C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\RoomPlanner.RoomPlanner_7.2.0.0_x86__s3garmmmnyfa0\and executed. Rapid7 determined that it does the following:
Obtain the IP address of the compromised asset
Send the IP address of the compromised asset to a Telegram bot
Retrieve an additional PowerShell script that is hosted on the Telegram bot
Delete the message containing the IP address of the compromised asset
Invoke the PowerShell script retrieved from the Telegram bot
In a controlled environment, Rapid7 visited the Telegram bot hosting the next stage PowerShell script and determined that it did the following:
Retrieve the IP address of the compromised asset by using Invoke-RestMethod which retrieved data from the domain icanhazip[.]com
Enumerate the compromised assets Operating System, domain and AV products
Send the information to the Telegram bot
Create a randomly generated 8 character name, assigning it to the variable $JAM
Download a gpg file from URL hxxps://read-holy-quran[.]group/ld/cr.tar.gpg, saving the file to %APPDATA% saving it as the name assigned to the $JAM variable
Decrypt the contents of the gpg file using the passphrase ‘riudswrk’, saving them into a newly created folder named after the $JAM variable within C:\ProgramData\$JAM\cr\ as a .RAR archive file
Utilize tar to unarchive the RAR file
Start an executable named run.exe from within the newly created folder
Create a link (.lnk) file within the Startup folder, named after the randomly generated name stored in variable $JAM, pointing towards run.exe stored in file path C:\ProgramData\$JAM\cr\ in order to create persistence
Read in another PowerShell script hosted on a Pastebin site, hxxps://pastebin.pl/view/raw/a137d133 using downloadstring and execute its contents (the PowerShell script is a tool used to bypass AMSI) with IEX (Invoke-Expression)
Download data from URL hxxps://kalpanastickerbindi[.]com/1.jpg and reflectively load the contents and execute the program starting at function EntryPoint (indicating the downloaded data is a .NET Assembly binary)
After analysis of the AMSI (Anti Malware Scan Interface) bypass tool, we observed that it was a custom tool giving credit to a website, hxxps://rastamosue[.]memory-patching-amsi-bypass, which discusses how to create a program that can bypass AMSI scanning.
AMSI is a scanning tool that is designed to scan scripts for potentially malicious code after a scripting engine attempts to run the script. If the content is deemed malicious, AMSI will tell the scripting engine (in this case PowerShell) to not run the code.
RAR Contents
Contained within the RAR file were the following files:
Files
Description
Dharna.7z
File contains the encrypted IDAT Loader config
Guar.xslx
File contains random bytes, not used during infection
Run.exe
Renamed WebEx executable file, used to sideload DLL WbxTrace.dll
Msvcp140.dll
Benign DLL read by Run.exe
PtMgr.dll
Benign DLL read by Run.exe
Ptusredt.dll
Benign DLL read by Run.exe
Vcruntime140.dll
Benign DLL read by Run.exe
Wbxtrace.dll
Corrupted WebEx DLL containing IDAT Loader
WCLDll.dll
Benign WebEx DLL read by Run.exe
After analysis of the folder contents, Rapid7 determined that one of the DLLs, wbxtrace.dll, had a corrupted signature, indicating that its original code was tampered with. After analyzing the modified WebEx DLL, wbxtrace.dll, Rapid7 determined the DLL contained suspicious functions similar to the IDAT Loader.
Upon extracting the contents of the RAR file to the directory path C:\ProgramData\cr, the PowerShell script executes the run.exe executable.
The IDAT Loader
During execution ofrun.exe(a legitimate renamed WebEx executable), the executable sideloads the tampered WebEx DLL, wbxtrace.dll. Once the DLL wbxtrace.dll is loaded,the DLL executes a section of new code containing the IDAT Loader, which proceeds to read in contents from within dharna.7z.
After reading in the contents fromdharna.7z, the IDAT Loader searches for the offset 49 44 41 54 (IDAT) followed byC6 A5 79 EA. After locating this offset, the loader reads in the following 4 bytes,E1 4E 91 99, which are used as the decryption key for decrypting the rest of the contents. Contained within the decrypted contents are additional code, specific DLL and Executable file paths as well as the final encrypted payload that is decrypted with a 200 byte XOR key.
The IDAT loader employs advanced techniques such as Process Doppelgänging and the Heaven’s Gate technique in order to initiate new processes and inject additional code. This strategy enables the loader to evade antivirus detections and successfully load the final stage, SecTop RATinto the newly created process, msbuild.exe.
We recently developed a configuration extractor capable of decrypting the final payload concealed within the encrypted files containing the IDAT (49 44 41 54) sections. The configuration extractor can be found on our Rapid7 Labs github page.
After using the configuration extractor, we analyzed the SecTop RAT and determined that it communicates with the IP address 91.215.85[.]66.
Rapid7 Customers
InsightIDR and Managed Detection and Response customers have existing detection coverage through Rapid7's expansive library of detection rules. Rapid7 recommends installing the Insight Agent on all applicable hosts to ensure visibility into suspicious processes and proper detection coverage. Below is a non-exhaustive list of detections deployed and alerting on activity described:
According to a recent poll by the US Chamber of Commerce, 60% of small businesses are concerned about cybersecurity threats, and 58% are concerned about a supply chain breakdown.
Not surprisingly, small businesses in the professional services sector feel significantly more concerned about cybersecurity threats than those in manufacturing or services, but the poll explains that they also feel more prepared to handle them.
“The small businesses most concerned about cybersecurity threats include businesses with 20-500 employees (74%) and businesses in the professional services industry (71%). On the other hand, small businesses that are least likely to say they are prepared for cyber threats include businesses in the manufacturing sector (61%), female-owned businesses (68%), and businesses in average health (64%).”
Services businesses are right to be concerned. The most serious cyberthreat faced by organizations is ransomware, and on any given month, in almost any country, the services sector is the one hardest hit by ransomware.
However, while the services sector suffers more attacks than manufacturing, the difference has been steadily narrowing, so that it is almost insignificant
Small businesses are not sitting on their hands though. 49% say they have trained staff on cybersecurity measures in the past year, 23% think they are “very prepared” to handle cyberthreats, and 50% feel “somewhat prepared.”
It’s no surprise that small businesses are concerned—they have limited resources, and yet they need to be ready to fight off the same sophisticated criminal gangs as the biggest enterprises.
And, as you can read in our 2024 State of Malware report, cybercriminals continue to evolve their tactics. They like to use social engineering, and vulnerabilities in internet-connected devices and services, rather than old-fashioned malware to infiltrate systems and networks. And once they’ve broken in to a company network, they are increasingly turning to legitimate tools instead of malware to carry out their attacks, a tactic known as living-off-the-land (LOTL)
This requires a different approach and security solutions capable of dealing with these threats.
We don’t just report on threats—we block and remove them.
ThreatDown can help small business to be secure. Choose the ThreatDown bundle that’s right for your organization.
The cybersecurity world got really lucky last week. An intentionally placed backdoor in XZ Utils, an open-source compression utility, was pretty much accidentally discovered by a Microsoft engineer—weeks before it would have been incorporated into both Debian and Red Hat Linux. From ArsTehnica:
Malicious code added to XZ Utils versions 5.6.0 and 5.6.1 modified the way the software functions. The backdoor manipulated sshd, the executable file used to make remote SSH connections. Anyone in possession of a predetermined encryption key could stash any code of their choice in an SSH login certificate, upload it, and execute it on the backdoored device. No one has actually seen code uploaded, so it’s not known what code the attacker planned to run. In theory, the code could allow for just about anything, including stealing encryption keys or installing malware.
It was an incredibly complex backdoor. Installing it was a multi-year process that seems to have involved socialengineering the lone unpaid engineer in charge of the utility. More from ArsTechnica:
In 2021, someone with the username JiaT75 made their first known commit to an open source project. In retrospect, the change to the libarchive project is suspicious, because it replaced the safe_fprint function with a variant that has long been recognized as less secure. No one noticed at the time.
The following year, JiaT75 submitted a patch over the XZ Utils mailing list, and, almost immediately, a never-before-seen participant named Jigar Kumar joined the discussion and argued that Lasse Collin, the longtime maintainer of XZ Utils, hadn’t been updating the software often or fast enough. Kumar, with the support of Dennis Ens and several other people who had never had a presence on the list, pressured Collin to bring on an additional developer to maintain the project.
There’s a lot more. The sophistication of both the exploit and the process to get it into the software project scream nation-state operation. It’s reminiscent of Solar Winds, although (1) it would have been much, much worse, and (2) we got really, really lucky.
I simply don’t believe this was the only attempt to slip a backdoor into a critical piece of Internet software, either closed source or open source. Given how lucky we were to detect this one, I believe this kind of operation has been successful in the past. We simply have to stop building our critical national infrastructure on top of random software libraries managed by lone unpaid distracted—or worse—individuals.
Rapid7’s Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team continuously monitors our customers' environments, identifying emerging threats and developing new detections.
In August 2023, Rapid7 identified a new malware loader named the IDAT Loader. Malware loaders are a type of malicious software designed to deliver and execute additional malware onto a victim's system. What made the IDAT Loader unique was the way in which it retrieved data from PNG files, searching for offsets beginning with 49 44 41 54 (IDAT).
At the time, the loader was seen being distributed via a FakeUpdates campaign. In two recent investigations, Rapid7’s Managed Detection & Response (MDR) observed the loader being used again. Based on the recent tactics, techniques and procedures observed (TTPs), we believe the activity is associated with financially motivated threat groups.
In this two-part blog series, we will examine the attack chain observed in two separate incidents, offering in-depth analysis of the malicious behavior detected. The incidents discussed in the series stem from opportunistic infections, wherein threat groups utilize malvertising and drive-by downloads in order to have their initial malicious payloads executed by users.
This first installment focuses on an incident triggered by a user downloading an application, which subsequently triggered the execution of the IDAT Loader and the BruteRatel C4 (BRC4) framework following initial access to a compromised asset.
Technical Analysis
Stage 1: The drive by
In a recent incident, we observed a user navigate to a website that hosted popular Korean shows. Upon attempting to watch the video, the website redirected the user's browser through multiple websites, eventually leading to the download of an application named AppFile_v1.1.exe. Threat actors utilize website redirection in order to make it difficult for network technologies to scan links for malicious content.
Binary Analysis: Shaking off the Rust
After initial analysis of the binary AppFile_v1.1.exe, we determined the program was written in Rust.
During execution, the program will query the name of the executable. If the executable’s name matches AppFile_v1.1.exe, the program will continue. Most sandboxes will rename the files (sometimes based on the hash) of submitted programs. This technique helps to evade sandboxes, ensuring the malicious functions are not run. If the program name does not match its original intended name, the program will quit and display an error message, showing an image that a web page could not be loaded.
Next, the program will check to see if it resides within a debugger by querying the function IsDebuggerPresent. If the check passes, it will decrypt a hard-coded string that resolves to “Normal”. If not, the program will decrypt another hard-coded string that resolves to “Debugger” and then exit.
Once the anti-debug check passes, the program retrieves an encrypted string and XOR decrypts it, revealing the URL hxxps://cdn-network-services-001[.]com/update/minor/1/release.json.
The program will then perform anti-analysis techniques, specifically querying for the username and open process and comparing them to a list of known sandbox usernames and tools. The list of usernames and processes are also XOR-encrypted and are decrypted at runtime. Based on Open Source Intelligence, we determined that another malware known as Serpent Stealer contained a similar table of user names. See Appendix A below for the complete list.
Usernames
Known Sandbox Tools/Processes
hbyldjtckyn1
httpdebuggerui.exe
lubi53an14cu
immunitydebugger.exe
rgzcbuyrznreg
ksdumperclient.exe
8lnfaai9qdjr
httpanalyzerstdv7.exe
j6sha37ka
ida64.exe
If any of the checks fail, the program will exit and display the message box. If the checks pass, the program will then utilize Rust library tokio-1.32.0/src/net/tcp/stream.rs in order to read in data from the decrypted URL and store the contents in memory.
Upon initial analysis, the downloaded data appeared to be encoded. Subsequently, the data is passed into a function tasked with decoding it. The decoding process involves reading each byte and subtracting the hexadecimal value 32.
After the downloaded data is decoded, the program XOR decrypts another string, revealing a path to the executable C:\Windows\system32\werfault.exe. Using syscalls, the program then does the following:
Windows API Function
Syscall ID
Description
NtOpenProcess
0x0026
Used to start the process werfault.exe
NtCreateUserProcess
0x00c8
Used for spoofing Parent Process ID (PPID)
NtAllocateVirtualMemory
0x0018
Allocate new space within memory, storing the new executable
NtGetContextThread
0x00F2
Used to retrieve the context of a thread within the target process (werfault.exe).
The thread in this case is a pointer to the entry point of the new executable
NtSetContextThread
0x0018B
Used to point to the thread from NtGetContextThread
NtResumeThread
0x0052
Starts the thread set by NtSetContextThread
After analysis of the decoded binary, we determined that it was another executable written in Rust. The program's executable contains a zip archive within the .rdata section. During execution, the program generates a folder with a randomly generated name in the %TEMP% directory and extracts the contents of the archive into this newly created folder.
The archive contained a DLL, msidcrl40.dll, an executable namedlive.exe and an encrypted file, dynatron.mdb. Initial analysis of the DLL msidcrl40.dll showed that the DLL’s signature was corrupted, indicating the DLL was tampered with. Further analysis showed that the DLL contained code related to the IDAT Loader.
IDAT Loader
After the rust program drops the contents of the zip archive, it then proceeds to execute the binary live.exe, which sideloads the DLL, msidcrl40.dll, containing the IDAT Loader code.
After the binarylive.exeloads the DLL msidcrl40.dll, the DLL executes the function containing the IDAT Loader. The loader then reads in encrypted contents contained within the file dynatron.mdb, searching for the offset 49 44 41 54 (IDAT) followed by C6 A5 79 EA. After decrypting the contents, the loader will then decompress the contents using RtlDecompressBuffer and execute additional code into a newly created process, cmd.exe.
The code contained withincmd.exe is responsible for decrypting the final payload and injecting it into a newly created process, msbuild.exe.
Using our IDAT Loader config extractor, we were able to extract the final payload and determined that it was SecTop RAT. During execution of the SecTop RAT, we observed that it communicated with the IP address 152.89.217[.]215.
Post-Exploitation: BRC4 Deployment
After the SecTop RATwas executed successfully, Rapid7 observed follow-on activity in which the threat actor executed another version of the IDAT loader from within the folder path C:\ProgramData\. We observed the following related files were dropped by the threat actor into C:\ProgramData:
Files
Description
glib-2.0.dll
Benign executable loaded by rvm.exe
iconv.dll
Benign executable loaded by rvm.exe
intl.dll
Benign executable loaded by rvm.exe
rvm.exe
Legitimate executable that loads vmtools.dll during execution
spank.mpg
Encrypted file containing IDAT sections, read in by vmtools.dll
vmtools.dll
Tampered DLL containing IDAT Loader, loaded by rvm.exe
After analysis of the files, we determined that rvm.exe was a renamed executable rvmsetup.exe, a legitimate tool that is a part of the VMWare Tools toolset. The binary is used to join a VMWare source virtual machine to an active directory domain. We also observed that the binaryvmtools.dllhad a corrupted signature, indicating the binary’s code was tampered with. We observed that the DLL vmtools.dllcontained code related to the IDAT Loader.
During execution of the executable, rvm.exe, the program loads vmtools.dll. After vmtools.dllis loaded, the DLL is directed to execute a function that contains the IDAT Loader. The IDAT Loader proceeds to read in contents from within spank.mpg, searching for the same offset, 49 44 41 54 (IDAT) followed by C6 A5 79 EA. After decrypting the contents within spank.mpg, the IDAT Loader spawns a new process, cmd.exe, injecting additional code that is responsible for decrypting the final payload and injecting it into a newly created process, explorer.exe.
Using our static config extractor, we extracted the final payload, a 64-bit executable. During initial analysis of the final payload, we observed that the program utilized the API functions VirtualAlloc and VirtualProtect. During execution of the program, it utilizedVirtualAlloc to read in and store additional code, including encrypted data, into a new region of memory. The program then called upon the function VirtualProtect, changing the newly allocated region of memory (containing the new code) to be executable. We also observed the 64 bit executable (obtained from the IDAT Loader python script) had the capability to perform process hollowing by starting a new process, notepad.exe, and injecting the code into the newly created process.
The newly allocated code was responsible for decrypting the encrypted data using RC4, copying the decrypted code into an allocated memory buffer via VirtualAlloc, and setting the memory buffer to have executable permission using VirtualProtect. Rapid7 determined the decrypted code was a Brute Ratel C4 (BRC4) “badger”.
Brute Ratel originated as a post-exploitation tool intended for penetration testers, designed to mimic adversary tactics as of December 2020. Its development aimed to replicate the functionality of established Command and Control (C2) software like Cobalt Strike, Mythic and Sliver. Following a successful compromise of a target, the attacker deploys the Brute Ratel "badger," tasked with establishing communication with the attacker's Command and Control domain.
During execution of the BRC4 program, we observed that it reached out to the domain updatenazure[.]com.
After the BRC4 program was executed, we observed the threat actor attempting to enumerate the domain controller by using the command nltest /dclist.
Rapid7 Customers
InsightIDR and Managed Detection and Response customers have existing detection coverage through Rapid7's expansive library of detection rules. Rapid7 recommends installing the Insight Agent on all applicable hosts to ensure visibility into suspicious processes and proper detection coverage. Below is a non-exhaustive list of detections deployed and alerting on activity described:
We’re going to let you in on a little cybersecurity secret… There’s malware on Mac computers. There pretty much always has been.
As revealed in our 2024 ThreatDown State of Malware report, a full 11% of all detections recorded by Malwarebytes on Mac computers in 2023 were for different variants of malware—the catch-all term that cybersecurity researchers use to refer to ransomware, trojans, info stealers, worms, viruses, and more.
That 11% figure may not sound imposing but remember that many people today still believe that Apple devices, including Mac computers, are invulnerable to cyberinfections because of some sort of vague “Apple magic.”
In reality, “Apple magic” is more a byproduct of old advertising (this 2006 commercial from the “I’m a Mac, and I’m a PC” series did irreparable harm) and faulty conclusions concerning cybersecurity’s biggest breaches and attacks: People mistakenly believe that because most attacks target Windows computers and servers, no attacks target Macs.
The truth is far more nuanced, as the visible, overwhelming focus of cyberattacks on Windows machines is a consequence of Microsoft’s long-standing success in business computing.
For decades, every multinational corporation, every local travel agency, every dentist, every hospital, every school, government, and city hall practically ran on Windows. This mass adoption was good for Microsoft and its revenue, but it also drew and maintained the interests of cybercriminals, who would develop malware that could impact the highest number of victims. This is why the biggest attacks, even today, predominantly target Windows-based malware and the sometimes-unpatched vulnerabilities found in Windows software and applications.
Essentially, as Windows is the biggest target, cybercriminals zero in their efforts respectively.
But new information last year revealed that could all be changing.
Mac malware tactics shifted in 2023
Apple’s desktop and laptop operating system, macOS, represents a 31% share of US desktop operating systems, and roughly 25% of all businesses reportedly utilize Mac devices somewhere in their networks.
While the LockBit variant for Mac was not operational upon discovery, the LockBit ransomware gang said at the time that it was “actively being developed.” Fortunately, LockBit suffered enormous blows this year, and the ransomware gang is probably less concerned with Mac malware development and more concerned with “avoiding prison.”
Separately, in September 2023, Malwarebytes discovered a cybercriminal campaign that tricked Mac users into accidentally installing a type of malware that can steal passwords, browser data, cookies, files, and cryptocurrency. The malware, called Atomic Stealer (or AMOS for short) was delivered through “malvertising,” a malware delivery tactic that abuses Google ads to send everyday users to malicious websites that—though they may appear legitimate—fool people into downloading malware.
In this campaign, when users searched on Google for the financial marketing trading app “TradingView,” they were sometimes shown a malicious search result that appeared entirely authentic: a website with TradingView branding was visible, and download buttons for Windows, Mac, and Linux were clearly listed.
But users who clicked the Mac download button instead received AMOS.
Just months later, AMOS again wriggled its way onto Mac computers, this time through a new delivery chain that has more typically targeted Windows users.
In November, Malwarebytes found AMOS being distributed through a malware delivery chain known as “ClearFake.” The ClearFake campaign tricks users into believing they’re downloading an approved web browser update. That has frequently meant a lot of malicious prompts mimicking Google Chrome’s branding and update language, but the more recent campaign imitated the default browser on Mac devices—Safari.
“This may very well be the first time we see one of the main social engineering campaigns, previously reserved for Windows, branch out not only in terms of geolocation but also operating system.”
Replace “magic” with Malwarebytes
Cyberthreats on Mac aren’t non-existent, they’re just different. But different threats still need effective protection, which is where Malwarebytes Premium can help.
Malwarebytes Premium detects and blocks the most common infostealers that target Macs—including AMOS—along with annoying browser hijackers and adware threats such as Genieo, Vsearch, Crossrider, and more. Stay protected, proactively, with Malwarebytes Premium for Mac.
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Researchers have demonstrated a worm that spreads through prompt injection. Details:
In one instance, the researchers, acting as attackers, wrote an email including the adversarial text prompt, which “poisons” the database of an email assistant using retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), a way for LLMs to pull in extra data from outside its system. When the email is retrieved by the RAG, in response to a user query, and is sent to GPT-4 or Gemini Pro to create an answer, it “jailbreaks the GenAI service” and ultimately steals data from the emails, Nassi says. “The generated response containing the sensitive user data later infects new hosts when it is used to reply to an email sent to a new client and then stored in the database of the new client,” Nassi says.
In the second method, the researchers say, an image with a malicious prompt embedded makes the email assistant forward the message on to others. “By encoding the self-replicating prompt into the image, any kind of image containing spam, abuse material, or even propaganda can be forwarded further to new clients after the initial email has been sent,” Nassi says.
It’s a natural extension of prompt injection. But it’s still neat to see it actually working.
Abstract: In the past year, numerous companies have incorporated Generative AI (GenAI) capabilities into new and existing applications, forming interconnected Generative AI (GenAI) ecosystems consisting of semi/fully autonomous agents powered by GenAI services. While ongoing research highlighted risks associated with the GenAI layer of agents (e.g., dialog poisoning, membership inference, prompt leaking, jailbreaking), a critical question emerges: Can attackers develop malware to exploit the GenAI component of an agent and launch cyber-attacks on the entire GenAI ecosystem?
This paper introduces Morris II, the first worm designed to target GenAI ecosystems through the use of adversarial self-replicating prompts. The study demonstrates that attackers can insert such prompts into inputs that, when processed by GenAI models, prompt the model to replicate the input as output (replication), engaging in malicious activities (payload). Additionally, these inputs compel the agent to deliver them (propagate) to new agents by exploiting the connectivity within the GenAI ecosystem. We demonstrate the application of Morris II against GenAI-powered email assistants in two use cases (spamming and exfiltrating personal data), under two settings (black-box and white-box accesses), using two types of input data (text and images). The worm is tested against three different GenAI models (Gemini Pro, ChatGPT 4.0, and LLaVA), and various factors (e.g., propagation rate, replication, malicious activity) influencing the performance of the worm are evaluated.
Cybercriminals are targeting Mac users interested in cryptocurrency opportunities with fake calendar invites. During the attacks the criminals will send a link supposedly to add a meeting to the target’s calendar. In reality the link runs a script to install Mac malware on the target’s machine.
Cybersecurity expert Brian Krebs investigated and flagged the issue.
Scammers, impersonating cryptocurrency investors, are active on Telegram channels to get interested people to attend a meeting about a future partnership.
One of those investors called Signum Capital tweeted a warning on X in January that one of their team members was being impersonated on Telegram and sending out invites by direct message (DM).
The criminals reach out to targets by DM on Telegram and ask if they have an interest in hearing more about the opportunity in a call or meeting. If they show interest they will be sent a fabricated invitation for a meeting. When the times comes to join the meeting the invitation link doesn’t work. The scammers tell the victim it’s a known issue, caused by a regional access restriction, which can be solved by running a script.
We asked Malwarebytes Director of Core Technology and resident Apple expert Thomas Reed to look at this method. This isn’t the first time criminals have used scripts to compromise users, he told us.
“AppleScript has been used against Mac users with moderate frequency by malware creators over the years. It has the advantage of being very easy to write, and if compiled, is also extremely difficult to reverse engineer.”
According to Reed, AppleScripts can be provided in a few different forms. One is a simple .scpt file that opens in Apple’s Script Editor app. This has a few drawbacks for criminals: A victim would need to click something within Script Editor to run the script, and they would able to see the code, which might be a problem because AppleScript tends to be more human readable than most other scripts. However, there are ways to obfuscate what the code is doing, and many users won’t bother to read it anyway.
Another option is an AppleScript applet. This is something that acts like a normal Mac app. It contains a basic AppleScript executable and the script to be run. In this form, the script can be code signed, notarized, given an icon, and otherwise made to appear more trustworthy. The code could be pretty bland, and unlikely to trigger any kind of detection from Apple’s notarization process, but could download and execute something less trustworthy.
Scripts have another advantage for criminals, Reed warned.
“AppleScripts also have the advantage of being able to very easily get administrator permissions.”
A script that attempts to run a command with administrator privileges will ask users to authenticate, triggering a password dialog.
If the user enters their password, the script doesn’t actually get to see it, but everything else the script attempts to do “with administrator privileges” will successfully run as root without further authentication. This makes it very easy for the script to show a standard authentication request dialog and trick the user into giving root permissions.
“So, in summary, AppleScript can be quite effective for writing malware. In fact, some malware has been written exclusively – or almost exclusively – in AppleScript, such as OSX.DubRobber or OSX.OSAMiner.”
In this case, the script was a simple Apple Script that downloaded and executed a macOS-oriented Trojan. The nature of the Trojan is unknown, but it certainly won’t surprise anyone if it turns out it was a banking Trojan that specializes in stealing cryptocurrencies.
Recognizing the scam
To avoid falling victim to these scammers, it’s good to know a few of their tactics.
Targets are approached by DM on Telegram.
Topics are cryptocurrency investment opportunities.
The scammers have a preference for the Calendly scheduling platform.
A fake “regional access restriction” creates a sense of last minute urgency.
The script had the .scpt (Apple script) extension.
The script was hosted on a domain that pretended to be a meeting support site.
The presence of Mac malware is unfortunately still underestimated, but you can find protection by Malwarebytes for Mac and protect Mac endpoints in your environment by ThreatDown solutions.
We don’t just report on threats—we remove them
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.
UEFI threats have historically been limited in number and mostly implemented by nation state actors as stealthy persistence. However, the recent proliferation of Black Lotus on the dark web, Trickbot enumeration module (late 2022), and Glupteba (November 2023) indicates that this historical trend may be changing.
With this context, it is becoming important for security practitioners to understand visibility and collection capabilities for UEFI threats. This post covers some of these areas and presents several recent Velociraptor artifacts that can be used in the field. Rapid7 has also released a white paper providing detailed information about how UEFI malware works and some of the most common types.
Background
Unified Extensible Firmware Interface, or UEFI, is the interface between a system’s hardware and its operating system (OS). The technology can be viewed as an updated BIOS capability to improve and add security to the boot process.
The two main types of UEFI persistence are:
Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) based
Firmware payload implant that is resilient to even a hard disk format.
Difficult to implement — there are risks associated with implementing and potentially bricking a machine if there are mistakes with the firmware.
Difficult to detect at scale — defenders need to extract firmware which typically requires a signed driver, then running tools for analysis.
Typically an analyst would dump firmware, then extract variables and other interesting files like PEs for deep dive analysis.
2. EFI System Partition (ESP) based
A special FAT partition that stores bootloaders and sits late in the EFI boot process.
Much easier to implement, only requiring root privileges and to bypass Secure Boot.
Does not survive a machine format.
EFI Secure Variables API visibility
EFI Secure Variables (or otherwise known as NVRAM) is how the system distributes components from the firmware during boot. From an analysis point of view, whilst dumping the firmware is difficult needing manual workflow, all operating systems provide some visibility from user space. This blog will discuss the Windows API; however, for reference Linux and macOS provides similar data.
GetFirmwareEnvironmentVariable (Windows) can collect the name, namespace guid and value of EFI secure variables. This collection can be used to check current state including key/signature database and revocation.
Some of the data points it enables extracting are:
Platform Key (PK) — top level key.
Key Exchange Key (KEK) — used to sign Signatures Database and Forbidden Signatures Database updates.
It's worth noting that this technique is relying on the Windows API and could be subverted with capable malware, but the visibility can provide leads for an analyst around boot configuration or signatures. There are also “boot only” NVRAM variables that can not be accessed outside boot, so a manual chip dump would need to be collected.
Velociraptor has a community contributed capability: Generic.System.EfiSignatures. This artifact collects EFI Signature information from the client to check for unknown certificates and revoked hashes. This is a great artifact for data stacking across machines and is built by parsing data values from the efivariables() plugin.
EFI System Partition (ESP) visibility
The ESP is a FAT partitioned file system that contains boot loaders and other critical files used during the boot process which do not change regularly. As such, it can be a relatively simple task to find abnormalities using forensics.
For example, parsing the File Allocation Table we can review metadata around path, timestamps, and deleted status that may provide leads for analysis.
In the screenshot above we observe several EFI bootloader files with timestamps out of alignment. We would typically expect these files to have the same timestamps around operating system install. We can also observe deleted files and the existence of a System32 folder in the temporal range of these entries.
The EFI/ folder should be the only folder in the ESP root so querying for any paths that do not begin with EFI/ is a great hunt that detects our lead above. You can see in my screenshot below, the BlackLotus staging being bubbled to the top adding filtering for this use case.
Interestingly, BlackLotus was known to use the Baton Drop exploit so we can compare to the publicly available Baton Drop and observe similarities to deleted files on the ESP.
The final component of ESP-based visibility is checking the bytes of file contents. We can run YARA to look for known malware traits, or obtain additional file type metadata that can provide leads for analysis. The screenshot below highlights the well known Black Lotus certificate information and PE header timestamp.
Available Velociraptor artifacts for this visibility of the ESP are:
Windows.Forensics.UEFI — This artifact enables disk analysis over an EFI System Partition (ESP). The artifact queries the specified physical disk, parses the partition table to target the ESP File Allocation Table (FAT). The artifact returns file information, and PE enrichment as typical EFI files are in the PE format.
Windows.Detection.Yara.UEFI—This artifact expands on basic enumeration of the ESP and enables running yara over the EFI system partition.
Measured Boot log visibility
Bootkit security has always been a “race to the bottom.” If the malware could load prior to security tools, a defender would need to assume they may be defeated. Since Windows 8, Measured Boot is a feature implemented to help protect machines from early boot malware. Measured Boot checks each startup component — from firmware to boot drivers — and stores this information in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). A binary log is then made available to verify the boot state of the machine.The default Measured Boot log location is C:\Windows\Logs\MeasuredBoot\*.log and a new file is recorded for each boot.
Windows.Forensics.UEFI.BootApplication parses Windows MeasuredBoot TCGLogs to extract PathName of events, which can assist detection of potential ESP based persistence (EV_EFI_Boot_Services_Application). The artifact leverages Velociraptor tools to deploy and execute Matt Graeber’s excellent powershell module TCGLogTools to parse TCGLogs on disk and memory.
We can see when running on an infected machine that the BOOT application path has clearly changed from the default: \EFI\Microsoft\Boot\bootmgfw.efi. Therefore, Boot Application is a field that is stackable across the network.
We can also output extended values, including digest hashes for verification.
Other forensic artifacts
There are many other generic forensic artifacts analysts could focus on for assisting detection of a UEFI threat. From malware network activity to unexpected errors in the event log associated with Antivirus/Security tools on the machine.
For example: BlackLotus made an effort to evade detection by changing Windows Defender access tokens to SE_PRIVILEGE_REMOVED. This technique keeps the Defender service running but effectively disables it. While Velociraptor may not have protected process privileges to check tokens directly, we can check for other indicators such as errors associated with use.
Similarly, Memory integrity (HVCI) is a feature of virtualization-based security (VBS) in Windows. It provides a stronger virtualization environment via isolation and kernel memory allocations.The feature is related to Secure Boot and can be disabled for malware that needs a lower integrity environment to run. It requires setting the configuration registry key value to 0.
1 - enabled Windows.Registry.HVCI available on the artifact exchange can be used to query for this key value.
Conclusion
Despite UEFI threats possessing intimidating capabilities, security practitioners can deploy some visibility with current tools for remote investigation. Forensically parsing disk and not relying on the Windows API, or reviewing other systemic indicators that may signal compromise, is a practical way to detect components of these threats. Knowing collection capabilities, the gaps, and how to mitigate these is just as important as knowing the threat.
In this post we have covered some of Velociraptor’s visibility for UEFI threats and we have only scratched the surface for those who know their environment and can query it effectively. Rapid7 supports Velociraptor open source, providing the community with Velociraptor and open source features unavailable even in some paid tools.
It was just a little over a year ago that the Rhadamanthys stealer was first publicly seen distributed via malicious ads. Throughout 2023, we observed a continuation in malvertising chains related to software downloads.
Fast forward to 2024 and the same malvertising campaigns are still going on. After a lull last summer, we noticed an increase since the fall which so far has been sustained. The most recent targeted searches are for Parsec and FreeCad, followed by WinSCP, Advanced IP Scanner, Slack and Notion.
Threat actors are targeting business users with payloads such as FakeBat, Nitrogen or Hijackloader. One other malware family we have seen here and there is Rhadamanthys. In this blog post, we detail the latest distribution chain related to this malware.
Key points
Rhadamanthys is an infostealer distributed via malspam and malvertising.
Google searches for popular software such as Notion return malicious ads.
Threat actors are using decoy websites to trick users into downloading malware.
The initial payload is a dropper that retrieves Rhadamanthys via a URL pasted online.
The TexBin paste site shows the URL was seen/accessed 8.5K times.
Malicious ad
Threat actors continue to impersonate well-known brands via sponsored search results. As can be seen below in a search for Notion (productivity software), an extremely deceiving ad is shown. Because it includes the official logo and website for Notion, most users will not think twice and click on the link.
While the ad looks real on the surface, the Google Ads Transparency Center page (which can be accessed by clicking on the menu right next to the ad’s URL) shows this ad was created by a certain ‘BUDNIK PAWEŁ’ from Poland. According to the same report, the first ad first appeared on January 23, 2024.
As a matter of fact, we have been tracking this fraudulent advertiser for a few weeks and had reported it to Google in early February, when we first ran into it. At the time, victims who clicked the ad and visited the site were tricked with a download for NetSupport RAT.
In this more recent campaign, the threat actor is pushing Rhadamanthys as the final payload, after an initial dropper. In the web traffic seen below, we can see that the threat actor uses a number of redirects to evade detection. URL shorteners and redirectors are quite common for the initial ad click, often followed by an attacker-controlled domain responsible for cloaking traffic.
There is one more check within the browser via JavaScript to detect virtual machines before the actual landing page is displayed to the victim.
Landing page and payload
The landing page is the decoy site that victims will see after they click on the ad. Apart from the URL in the address bar, it looks very similar to the official web site for Notion, although somewhat simplified. There are two download buttons, one for Mac and the other for Windows.
The Mac payload (Notion.dmg) is a new variant of Atomic Stealer. Thanks to Luis Castellanos from Block for sharing a sample with us.
The Windows binary is a signed file but its digital signature is not valid. The name of the signer that shows here is from the inventor of PuTTY, a popular admin tool. This digital certificate is likely fake or was revoked, but it may evade detection in some cases.
This dropper contacts the paste site TextBin where it retrieves a URL for the followup payload, Rhadamanthys. If the numbers are correct this unlisted paste was viewed 8.5k times already.
Rhadamanthys attempts to steal credentials stored in applications such as PuTTY, WinSCP and mail programs (screenshot from Joe Sandbox):
Upon execution, Rhadamanthys reports to its command and control server, sends and receives data.
Conclusion
Not a lot has changed with malvertising campaigns focused on software downloads as we enter the second year of actively tracking them. Sponsored search results continue to be highly misleading due to the fact that any verified individual is able to impersonate popular brands by using their logo and official site within the ad itself.
We are aware of reports shared within private circles, that businesses were compromised after an employee clicked on a malicious ad. Follow-up activities post infection include the usual ‘pentesting tools’ that precede a company-wide breach or ransomware deployment.
The infrastructure used in this particular attack was reported to the relevant parties. Malwarebytes and ThreatDown customers are protected against the payloads and distribution sites.
Additionally, EDR customers who have DNS Filtering can proactively block online ads by enabling the rule for advertisements. This is a simple, and yet powerful way to prevent malvertising across an entire organization or in specific areas.
Endpoint users will see a customizable message when they click on an ad such as those that appear on a search engine results page:
Malicious hackers are targeting people in the cryptocurrency space in attacks that start with a link added to the target’s calendar at Calendly, a popular application for scheduling appointments and meetings. The attackers impersonate established cryptocurrency investors and ask to schedule a video conference call. But clicking the meeting link provided by the scammers prompts the user to run a script that quietly installs malware on macOS systems.
KrebsOnSecurity recently heard from a reader who works at a startup that is seeking investment for building a new blockchain platform for the Web. The reader spoke on condition that their name not be used in this story, so for the sake of simplicity we’ll call him Doug.
Being in the cryptocurrency scene, Doug is also active on the instant messenger platform Telegram. Earlier this month, Doug was approached by someone on Telegram whose profile name, image and description said they were Ian Lee, from Signum Capital, a well-established investment firm based in Singapore. The profile also linked to Mr. Lee’s Twitter/X account, which features the same profile image.
The investor expressed interest in financially supporting Doug’s startup, and asked if Doug could find time for a video call to discuss investment prospects. Sure, Doug said, here’s my Calendly profile, book a time and we’ll do it then.
When the day and time of the scheduled meeting with Mr. Lee arrived, Doug clicked the meeting link in his calendar but nothing happened. Doug then messaged the Mr. Lee account on Telegram, who said there was some kind of technology issue with the video platform, and that their IT people suggested using a different meeting link.
Doug clicked the new link, but instead of opening up a videoconference app, a message appeared on his Mac saying the video service was experiencing technical difficulties.
“Some of our users are facing issues with our service,” the message read. “We are actively working on fixing these problems. Please refer to this script as a temporary solution.”
Doug said he ran the script, but nothing appeared to happen after that, and the videoconference application still wouldn’t start. Mr. Lee apologized for the inconvenience and said they would have to reschedule their meeting, but he never responded to any of Doug’s follow-up messages.
It didn’t dawn on Doug until days later that the missed meeting with Mr. Lee might have been a malware attack. Going back to his Telegram client to revisit the conversation, Doug discovered his potential investor had deleted the meeting link and other bits of conversation from their shared chat history.
In a post to its Twitter/X account last month, Signum Capital warned that a fake profile pretending to be their employee Mr. Lee was trying to scam people on Telegram.
The file that Doug ran is a simple Apple Script (file extension “.scpt”) that downloads and executes a malicious trojan made to run on macOS systems. Unfortunately for us, Doug freaked out after deciding he’d been tricked — backing up his important documents, changing his passwords, and then reinstalling macOS on his computer. While this a perfectly sane response, it means we don’t have the actual malware that was pushed to his Mac by the script.
But Doug does still have a copy of the malicious script that was downloaded from clicking the meeting link (the online host serving that link is now offline). A search in Google for a string of text from that script turns up a December 2023 blog post from cryptocurrency security firm SlowMist about phishing attacks on Telegram from North Korean state-sponsored hackers.
“When the project team clicks the link, they encounter a region access restriction,” SlowMist wrote. “At this point, the North Korean hackers coax the team into downloading and running a ‘location-modifying’ malicious script. Once the project team complies, their computer comes under the control of the hackers, leading to the theft of funds.”
Image: SlowMist.
SlowMist says the North Korean phishing scams used the “Add Custom Link” feature of the Calendly meeting scheduling system on event pages to insert malicious links and initiate phishing attacks.
“Since Calendly integrates well with the daily work routines of most project teams, these malicious links do not easily raise suspicion,” the blog post explains. “Consequently, the project teams may inadvertently click on these malicious links, download, and execute malicious code.”
SlowMist said the malware downloaded by the malicious link in their case comes from a North Korean hacking group dubbed “BlueNoroff, which Kaspersky Labs says is a subgroup of the Lazarus hacking group.
“A financially motivated threat actor closely connected with Lazarus that targets banks, casinos, fin-tech companies, POST software and cryptocurrency businesses, and ATMs,” Kaspersky wrote of BlueNoroff in Dec. 2023.
The North Korean regime is known to use stolen cryptocurrencies to fund its military and other state projects. A recent report from Recorded Future finds the Lazarus Group has stolen approximately $3 billion in cryptocurrency over the past six years.
While there is still far more malware out there today targeting Microsoft Windows PCs, the prevalence of information-stealing trojans aimed at macOS users is growing at a steady clip. MacOS computers include X-Protect, Apple’s built-in antivirus technology. But experts say attackers are constantly changing the appearance and behavior of their malware to evade X-Protect.
“Recent updates to macOS’s XProtect signature database indicate that Apple are aware of the problem, but early 2024 has already seen a number of stealer families evade known signatures,” security firm SentinelOne wrote in January.
According to Chris Ueland from the threat hunting platform Hunt.io, the Internet address of the fake meeting website Doug was tricked into visiting (104.168.163,149) hosts or very recently hosted about 75 different domain names, many of which invoke words associated with videoconferencing or cryptocurrency. Those domains indicate this North Korean hacking group is hiding behind a number of phony crypto firms, like the six-month-old website for Cryptowave Capital (cryptowave[.]capital).
In a statement shared with KrebsOnSecurity, Calendly said it was aware of these types of social engineering attacks by cryptocurrency hackers.
“To help prevent these kinds of attacks, our security team and partners have implemented a service to automatically detect fraud and impersonations that could lead to social engineering,” the company said. “We are also actively scanning content for all our customers to catch these types of malicious links and to prevent hackers earlier on. Additionally, we intend to add an interstitial page warning users before they’re redirected away from Calendly to other websites. Along with the steps we’ve taken, we recommend users stay vigilant by keeping their software secure with running the latest updates and verifying suspicious links through tools like VirusTotal to alert them of possible malware. We are continuously strengthening the cybersecurity of our platform to protect our customers.”
The increasing frequency of new Mac malware is a good reminder that Mac users should not depend on security software and tools to flag malicious files, which are frequently bundled with or disguised as legitimate software.
As KrebsOnSecurity has advised Windows users for years, a good rule of safety to live by is this: If you didn’t go looking for it, don’t install it. Following this mantra heads off a great deal of malware attacks, regardless of the platform used. When you do decide to install a piece of software, make sure you are downloading it from the original source, and then keep it updated with any new security fixes.
On that last front, I’ve found it’s a good idea not to wait until the last minute to configure my system before joining a scheduled videoconference call. Even if the call uses software that is already on my computer, it is often the case that software updates are required before the program can be used, and I’m one of those weird people who likes to review any changes to the software maker’s privacy policies or user agreements before choosing to install updates.
Most of all, verify new contacts from strangers before accepting anything from them. In this case, had Doug simply messaged Mr. Lee’s real account on Twitter/X or contacted Signum Capital directly, he would discovered that the real Mr. Lee never asked for a meeting.
If you’re approached in a similar scheme, the response from the would-be victim documented in the SlowMist blog post is probably the best.
On the internet, people need to worry about more than just opening suspicious email attachments or entering their sensitive information into harmful websites—they also need to worry about their Google searches.
That’s because last year, as revealed in our 2024 ThreatDown State of Malware report, cybercriminals flocked to a malware delivery method that doesn’t require they know a victim’s email address, login credentials, personal information, or, anything, really.
Instead, cybercriminals just need to fool someone into clicking on a search result that looks remarkably legitimate.
This is the work of “malicious advertising,” or “malvertising,” for short. Malvertising is not malware itself. Instead, it’s a sneaky process of placing malware, viruses, or other cyber infections on a person’s computer, tablet, or smart phone. The malware that eventually slips onto a person’s device comes in many varieties, but cybercriminals tend to favor malware that can steal a person’s login credentials and information. With this newly stolen information, cybercriminals can then pry into sensitive online accounts that belong to the victim.
But before any of that digital theft can occur, cybercriminals must first ensnare a victim, and they do this by abusing the digital ad infrastructure underpinning Google search results.
Think about searching on Google for “running shoes”—you’ll likely see ads for Nike and Adidas. A Google search for “best carry-on luggage” will invariably produce ads for the consumer brands Monos and Away. And a Google search for a brand like Amazon will show, as expected, ads for Amazon.
But cybercriminals know this, and in response, they’ve created ads that look legitimate, but instead direct victims to malicious websites that carry malware. The websites themselves, too, bear a striking resemblance to whatever product or brand they’re imitating, so as to maintain a charade of legitimacy. From these websites, users download what they think is a valid piece of software, instead downloading malware that leaves them open to further attacks.
It’s true that malvertising is often understood as a risk to businesses, but the copycat websites that are created by cybercriminals can and often do impersonate popular brands for everyday users, too.
As revealed in our 2024 ThreatDown State of Malware report, the five most impersonated brands for malvertising last year included:
Amazon
Rufus
Weebly
NotePad++
TradingView
These five brands may not all carry the same familiarity, but their products and services capture a broad swath of user interest, from Weebly’s website creation products, to TradingView’s investment trading platform, to Rufus’s niche-but-useful portable OS booting tool.
Why the increase in malvertising last year?
If Google ads have been around for more than a decade, why are they only being abused by cybercriminals now? The truth is, malvertising has been around for years, but a particular resurgence was recorded more recently.
In 2022, cybercriminals lost access to one of their favorite methods of delivering malware.
That summer, Microsoft announced that it would finally block “macros” that were embedded into files that were downloaded from the internet. Macros are essentially instructions that users can program so that multiple tasks can be bundled together. The danger, though, is that cybercriminals would pre-program macros within certain files for Microsoft Word, Excel, or PowerPoint, and then send those files as malicious email attachments. Once those attachments were downloaded and opened by users, the embedded macros would trigger a set of instructions directing a person’s computer to install malware from a dangerous website online.
Macros were a scourge for cybersecurity for years, as they were effective and easy to deliver.
But when Microsoft restricted macro capabilities in 2022, cybercriminals needed to find another malware delivery channel. They focused on malvertising.
Today’s malvertising is increasingly sophisticated, as cybercriminals can create and purchase online ads that target specific types of users based on location and demographics. Concerningly, modern malvertising can even avoid basic fraud detection as cybercriminals can create websites that determine whether a user is a real person or simply a bot that is trawling the web to find and flag malicious activity.
How to protect against malvertising
The threat of malvertising is multi-layered: There are the fraudulent ads that cybercriminals place on Google search results, the malicious websites that imitate legitimate brands and companies to convince users to download malware, and the malware infection itself.
As such, any successful defense strategy must be multi-layered.
For safe browsing, people can rely on Malwarebytes Browser Guard, a browser extension that blocks third-party tracking and flags malicious websites known to be in the control of cybercriminals. As we wrote before:
“Malwarebytes Browser Guard provides additional protection to standard ad-blocking features by covering a larger area of the attack chain all the way to domains controlled by attackers. Thanks to its built-in heuristic engine it can also proactively block never-before-seen malicious websites.”
The problem with malvertising, though, is that new malicious websites are created every single day. Cybersecurity defenders, then, are often caught in a game of catch-up.
Here, users can find safety from Malwarebytes Premium, which provides real-time protection to detect and stop any cyberthreats that get installed onto a device, even if those threats are masquerading as legitimate apps or software.
We don’t just report on threats—we remove them
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.
If your IT and security teams think malware is bad, wait until they learn about everything else.
In 2024, the modern cyberattack is a segmented, prolonged, and professional effort, in which specialists create strictly financial alliances to plant malware on unsuspecting employees, steal corporate credentials, slip into business networks, and, for a period of days if not weeks, simply sit and watch and test and prod, escalating their privileges while refraining from installing any noisy hacking tools that could be flagged by detection-based antivirus scans.
In fact, some attacks have gone so “quiet” that they involve no malware at all. Last year, some ransomware gangs refrained from deploying ransomware in their own attacks, opting to steal sensitive data and then threaten to publish it online if their victims refused to pay up—a method of extracting a ransom that is entirely without ransomware.
Understandably, security teams are outflanked. Defending against sophisticated, multifaceted attacks takes resources, technologies, and human expertise. But not every organization has that at hand.
What, then, are IT-constrained businesses to do?
Today, on the Lock and Code podcast with host David Ruiz, we speak with Jason Haddix, the former Chief Information Security Officer at the videogame developer Ubisoft, about how he and his colleagues from other companies faced off against modern adversaries who, during a prolonged crime spree, plundered employee credentials from the dark web, subverted corporate 2FA protections, and leaned heavily on internal web access to steal sensitive documentation.
Haddix, who launched his own cybersecurity training and consulting firm Arcanum Information Security this year, said he learned so much during his time at Ubisoft that he and his peers in the industry coined a new, humorous term for attacks that abuse internet-connected platforms: “A browser and a dream.”
“When you first hear that, you’re like, ‘Okay, what could a browser give you inside of an organization?'”
But Haddix made it clear:
“On the internal LAN, you have knowledge bases like SharePoint, Confluence, MediaWiki. You have dev and project management sites like Trello, local Jira, local Redmine. You have source code managers, which are managed via websites—Git, GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Subversion. You have repo management, build servers, dev platforms, configuration, management platforms, operations, front ends. These are all websites.”
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Cyber mercenaries present a grave threat to human rights and freedom of expression. They have been implicated in surveillance, torture, and even murder of human rights defenders, political candidates, and journalists. One of the most effective ways that the human rights community pushes back against the threat of targeted surveillance and cyber mercenaries is to investigate and expose these companies and their owners and customers.
But for the last several months, there has emerged a campaign of bullying and censorship seeking to wipe out stories about the mercenary hacking campaigns of a less well-known company, Appin Technology, in general, and the company’s cofounder, Rajat Khare, in particular. These efforts follow a familiar pattern: obtain a court order in a friendly international jurisdiction and then misrepresent the force and substance of that order to bully publishers around the world to remove their stories.
We are helping to push back on that effort, which seeks to transform a very limited and preliminary Indian court ruling into a global takedown order. We are representing Techdirt and MuckRock Foundation, two of the news entities asked to remove Appin-related content from their sites. On their behalf, we challenged the assertions that the Indian court either found the Reuters reporting to be inaccurate or that the order requires any entities other than Reuters and Google to do anything. We requested a response – so far, we have received nothing.
Background
If you worked in cybersecurity in the early 2010’s, chances are that you remember Appin Technology, an Indian company offering information security education and training with a sideline in (at least according to manytechnicalreports) hacking-for-hire.
On November 16th, 2023, Reuters published an extensively-researched story titled “How an Indian Startup Hacked the World” about Appin Technology and its cofounder Rajat Khare. The story detailed hacking operations carried out by Appin against private and government targets all over the world while Khare was still involved with the company. The story was well-sourced, based on over 70 original documents and interviews with primary sources from inside Appin. But within just days of publication, the story—and many others covering the issue—disappeared from most of the web.
On December 4th, an Indian court preliminarily ordered Reuters to take down their story about Appin Technology and Khare while a case filed against them remains pending in the court. Reuters subsequently complied with the order and took the story offline. Since then dozens of other journalists have written about the original story and about the takedown that followed.
At the time of this writing, more than 20 of those stories have been taken down by their respective publications, many at the request of an entity called “Association of Appin Training Centers (AOATC).” Khare’s lawyers have also sent letters to news sites in multiple countries demanding they remove his name from investigative reports. Khare’s lawyers also succeeded in getting Swiss courts to issue an injunction against reporting from Swiss public television, forcing them to remove his name from a story about Qatar hiring hackers to spy on FIFA officials in preparation for the World Cup. Original stories, cybersecurity reports naming Appin, stories about the Reuters story, and even stories about the takedown have all been taken down. Even the archived version of the Reuters story was taken down from archive.org in response to letters sent by the Association of Appin Training Centers.
One of the letters sent by AOATC to Ron Deibert, the founder and director of Citizen Lab, reads:
Ron Deibert had the following response:
Not everyone has been as confident as Ron Deibert. Some of the stories that were taken down have been replaced with a note explaining the takedown, while others were redacted into illegibility, such as the story from Lawfare:
It is not clear who is behind The Association of Appin Training Centers, but according to documents surfaced by Reuters, the organization didn’t exist until after the lawsuit was filed against Reuters in Indian court. Khare’s lawyers have denied any connection between Khare and the training center organization. Even if this is true, it is clear that the goals of both parties are fundamentally aligned in silencing any negative press covering Appin or Rajat Khare.
Regardless of who is behind the Association of Appin Training Centers, the links between Khare and Appin Technology are extensive and clear. Khare continues to claim that he left Appin in 2013, before any hacking-for-hire took place. However, Indian corporate records demonstrate that he stayed involved with Appin long after that time.
EFF is helping two news organizations stand up to the Association of Appin Training Centers’ bullying—Techdirt and Muckrock Foundation.
Techdirt received a similar request to the one Ron Diebert received, after it published an article about the Reuters takedown, but then also received the following emails:
Dear Sir/Madam,
I am writing to you on behalf of Association of Appin Training Centers in regards to the removal of a defamatory article running on https://www.techdirt.com/ that refers to Reuters story, titled: “How An Indian Startup Hacked The World” published on 16th November 2023.
As you must be aware, Reuters has withdrawn the story, respecting the order of a Delhi court. The article made allegations without providing substantive evidence and was based solely on interviews conducted with several people.
In light of the same, we request you to kindly remove the story as it is damaging to us.
As you have stated in your article, the Reuters story was declared defamatory by the Indian Court which was subsequently removed from their website.
However, It is pertinent to mention here that you extracted a portion of your article from the same defamatory article which itself is a violation of an Indian Court Order, thereby making you also liable under Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
You are advised to remove this article from your website with immediate effect.
Thanks & Regards
Association of Appin Training Centers
We responded to AOATC on behalf of Techdirt and MuckRock Foundation to the “requests for assistance” which were sent to them, challenging AOATC’s assertions about the substance and effect of the Indian court interim order. We pointed out that the Indian court order is only interim and not a final judgment that Reuters’ reporting was false, and that it only requires Reuters and Google to do anything. Furthermore, we explained that even if the court order applied to MuckRock and Techdirt, the order is inconsistent with the First Amendment and would be unenforceable in US courts pursuant to the SPEECH Act:
To the Association of Appin Training Centers:
We represent and write on behalf of Techdirt and MuckRock Foundation (which runs the DocumentCloud hosting services), each of which received correspondence from you making certain assertions about the legal significance of an interim court order in the matter of Vinay Pandey v. Raphael Satter & Ors. Please direct any future correspondence about this matter to me.
We are concerned with two issues you raise in your correspondence.
First, you refer to the Reuters article as containing defamatory materials as determined by the court. However, the court’s order by its very terms is an interim order, that indicates that the defendants’ evidence has not yet been considered, and that a final determination of the defamatory character of the article has not been made. The order itself states “this is only a prima-facie opinion and the defendants shall have sufficient opportunity to express their views through reply, contest in the main suit etc. and the final decision shall be taken subsequently.”
Second, you assert that reporting by others of the disputed statements made in the Reuters article “itself is a violation of an Indian Court Order, thereby making you also liable under Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.” But, again by its plain terms, the court’s interim order applies only to Reuters and to Google. The order does not require any other person or entity to depublish their articles or other pertinent materials. And the order does not address its effect on those outside the jurisdiction of Indian courts. The order is in no way the global takedown order your correspondence represents it to be. Moreover, both Techdirt and MuckRock Foundation are U.S. entities. Thus, even if the court’s order could apply beyond the parties named within it, it will be unenforceable in U.S. courts to the extent it and Indian defamation law is inconsistent with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 47 U.S.C. § 230, pursuant to the SPEECH Act, 28 U.S.C. § 4102. Since the First Amendment would not permit an interim depublication order in a defamation case, the Pandey order is unenforceable.
If you disagree, please provide us with legal authority so we can assess those arguments. Unless we hear from you otherwise, we will assume that you concede that the order binds only Reuters and Google and that you will cease asserting otherwise to our clients or to anyone else.
We have not yet received any response from AOATC. We hope that others who have received takedown requests and demands from AOATC will examine their assertions with a critical eye.
If a relatively obscure company like AOATC or an oligarch like Rajat Khare can succeed in keeping their name out of the public discourse with strategic lawsuits, it sets a dangerous precedent for other larger, better-resourced, and more well-known companies such as Dark Matter or NSO Group to do the same. This would be a disaster for civil society, a disaster for security research, and a disaster for freedom of expression.